VOLUME III No. 1 MARCH 1963

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

A Quarterly of the Institute of East-European Studies

at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY / DORDRECHT-HOLLAND

This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sat, 10 Sep 2016 04:35:19 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT

A QUARTERLY OF THE INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG / SWITZERLAND

Editor: Joseph M. Bocheński / *Managing Editor:* Thomas J. Blakeley

Editorial Board: David D. Comey, Helmut Fleischer, Siegfried Müller-Markus

Consulting Editors: Arnold Buchholz (Stuttgart), Helmut Dahm (Bonn), Zbigniew Jordan (London), George L. Kline (Bryn Mawr), Nicolas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame), Gustav A. Wetter (Rome), Karl A. Wittfogel (New York)

STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT intends to serve as an international medium for the publication – in English, German and French – of research papers, short notes, critical reviews and other writings about contemporary Soviet philosophy.

Communications to the editors and manuscripts should be addressed to *The Editor, Institute of East-European Studies, Rue de l'Hôpital, Fribourg, Switzerland.*

All manuscripts should be typewritten with large margin and double spacing. Authors will receive 25 reprints free of charge; additional copies may be ordered at cost price.

The editor invites submission of original technical papers in the field of Soviet philosophy and of philosophy of other Communist countries.

Authors and publishers are invited to send books and reprints of articles, which are technical and belong strictly to the field of the 'Studies', for review.

Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to *D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland.* Annual subscription price (4 issues) *f* 40.—. Single copy rate *f* 12.50.

Copyright D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sat, 10 Sep 2016 04:35:19 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CONTENTS

J. M. Bocheński / Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy?

N. Lobkowicz / Philosophy in Czechoslovakia Since 1960

S. Müller-Markus / Zur sowjetischen Philosophie der Physik im Jahre 1962

Notes and Comments

Ideology, Power-Politics and Dialectics – Criticism of Sartre – New Books – A Bibliography of Hungarian Philosophy – Varia

Reviews

Gustav A. Wetter: Sowjetideologie heute (J. M. Bocheński)
A. S. Bogomolov: Ideja razvitija v buržuaznoj filosofii XIX i XX vekov (H. Fleischer)
Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma (H. Fleischer)
P. V. Kopnin: Dialektika kak logika (T. J. Blakeley)
V. I. Čerkesov: Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznan ija (T. J. Blakeley)
M. N. Alekseev: Dialektičeskaja logika (T. J. Blakeley)
M. N. Rutkevič: Praktika – osnova poznanija i kriterij istiny, and *A. N. Iliadi:* Praktičeskaja priroda čelovečeskogo poznanija (T. J. Blakeley)
Eugene Kamenka: The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (R. T. De George)

Bibliography

Bibliography of Soviet Ethics (R. T. De George)

Chronology

1961
1962

Report from the Institute

The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or members of the Institute

Printed in The Netherlands by D. Reidel, Dordrecht

This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sat, 10 Sep 2016 04:35:19 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

J. M. BOCHEŃSKI

WHY STUDIES IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY?

While other departments of Sovietology – above all Historiography, but also Law, Political Economy, Political Science and Sociology – are constantly developing, little attention is being paid in the non-Communist world to the study of Soviet Philosophy. There must be at present something like 12,000 teaching philosophers outside the Soviet Bloc, and probably more: but there are certainly no more than a few dozen among them who manifest any degree of academic knowledge of Soviet thought. At the Universities we do not know of a single regular chair entirely dedicated to the study of Soviet philosophy. In the great American and European centers of Soviet Studies there are only very few competent philosopher-sovietologists. Some centers have, it is true, a Marxologist: but Marxology is not the same as Sovietology. When we read American or European philosophical magazines, we find only exceptionally a paper or a review concerning Soviet doctrines. At the philosophical congresses, if no philosophers from Communist countries are present, nobody even cares to mention the subject.

The result is that while Soviet philosophers are ever better informed about the philosophy abroad, the great majority of non-Communist philosophers do not have even the slightest notion about the work of their Soviet colleagues. Few of them, indeed, even care to read a synthetic presentation of the subject, such as offered in the books of Acton, Wetter or of the undersigned.

When this fact is brought to the attention of non-Communist philosophers, they usually state that there are two reasons for not studying Soviet philosophy: first, they say that it is sheer nonsense; second, that it is irrelevant for any purpose. The study of nonsensical texts which do not have even a practical relevance, is obviously useless. And this is why, it is often concluded, Soviet philosophy need not be studied by non-Communists.

We disagree with this conclusion. We believe that the study of Soviet Philosophy is useful and even necessary, for both theoretical and practical

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

purposes. And we do so because of two premisses which are contradictorily opposed to the premisses assumed by the philosophers quoted above. Namely, we think that:

(i) not all Soviet philosophy is nonsense; on the contrary, much of it is philosophically interesting;

(ii) Soviet philosophy is not irrelevant; it is an important factor in the phenomenon of Communism, which, as everybody will agree, is important, both theoretically and practically.

I

Much in Soviet philosophy is not lacking in interest for the philosopher. There was a time when the contrary could be rightly asserted; namely the time between the anti-Deborin decree of 1931[1] and the speech of Ždanov of 1947. During that time, especially after 1938 (when the *Short Course of the History of CPSU (b)* with the chapter by Stalin was published), what Soviet philosophers produced looked far more like quotatology (to quote professor Baskin, a Soviet philosopher himself) than philosophy.[2] But, since 1947 and especially since 1950 (Stalin's pronouncements on language) the situation has at least partly changed.[3] There is now in the Soviet Union a steadily growing body of respectable thought. There are lively discussions between Soviet philosophers; problems are being worked out which are not only their own esoteric problems, but are common to all philosophers. A number of Soviet philosophers have shown a degree of mental independence and of courage worthy of thinkers and the number of their publications which are relevant to philosophers in general is increasing.

Of course, "the smoke of the cult of personality" of which a Bulgarian philosopher was writing recently [4] is still present and, perhaps the *majority* of Soviet philosophers could not be called 'philosophers' in any acceptable meaning of the word, at least as used in the non-Communist world. But Soviet writers on philosophy certainly number more than 2000; and in that great mass there is a minority – estimated at more than one hundred – who "wish to use reason", to quote Whitehead. Moreover, many among them are teaching in the great centers of Moscow, Leningrad and Tiflis.

To this one may object that even those relatively few are dogmatically bound by their Communist faith. But this should not be considered as a

serious objection. Nobody maintains that, e.g., Hindu thought is worthless, in spite of the fact that in the great majority of cases it is linked with a religious faith.[5] Secondly, Communist faith is often formulated in terms so vague[6] that as long as one is not bound to keep to the quotations but is allowed to interpret, a very broad spectrum of possibilities is offered to the thinker.

Here is a sketchy picture of what has been already achieved in Soviet philosophy:

Logic: a growing recognition of mathematical logic as *the* formal logic of our times[7] (in that respect the Soviet Union is ahead of Western Europe); much good work in strictly formal logic[8], some valuable studies on particular problems of philosophy of logic – like that of contradictions[9], of multi-valued logic and others.[10]

Ontology: a strenuous effort has been made in order to make some order in the classification of the categories[11] and similar topics[12] (in that respect the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States).

Philosophy of Science: the Soviet Union is one of the few countries where the collaboration between physicists and philosophers is really flourishing and where intense discussions are being held on the basic problems on the border between philosophy and physics.[13] Moreover, it is, as far as known, the only country in the world where (a) the State itself organizes and promotes the collaboration between physicists and philosophers and (b) all students of philosophy have to have three semesters of natural sciences. One great discussion took place around the theory of relativity[14]; another on realism in microphysics[15]; we may also mention those on quantum mechanics, cybernetics and cosmogony.

Cosmology: in this dogmatically bound field, there is at least one interesting doctrine to be mentioned: namely the appearance in Soviet philosophy of a theory of emergence, which is not always linked with naive optimistic evolutionism.[16]

Psychology: here, since 1950[17] the situation seems less favorable – from the philosophical point of view – than it was before. Still, there is a number of studies on the psycho-physical problem which are worth reading by anybody interested in the subject.[18]

Social philosophy: little progress up to now; and yet, at least the problem of the relation of philosophy to sociology has been stated and one may expect some developments.[19]

Axiology: the field has been recently discovered[20] and everything indicates that it will be cultivated.[21]

History of Philosophy: the general level of the Soviet writings was not brilliant up to now.[22] However, there are some scientific books on single authors (Aristotle[23], Kant[24], Hegel[25], and others[26]), which seem to be growing in number. Moreover even the rather unfortunate and large *History of Philosophy*[27] presents at least one interesting feature: it offers a panorama of history not centered upon Europe.

It is true that nothing transcendental has been achieved; even in the fields where Soviet Philosophy is most developed – like in logic – we do not find epoch-making ideas. But in several fields – above all perhaps in philosophy of physics – good work is sometimes being done. In any case, some problems which are also problems for other philosophers are discussed. Moreover, if we are not very much mistaken, there is every chance that Soviet philosophy will rapidly improve. The number of younger workers and their ardor is such that only a major catastrophe could stop this progress.

That is why we say that Soviet philosophy is relevant to philosophy *tout court*. Whoever is interested in philosophical problems has an interest in what is being done on such problems in the Soviet Union. Often, it is true, he may be disappointed; but often again he might find in the thoughts of his Soviet colleagues things useful for his own work.

II

Soviet philosophy is an important factor in Communism. In the non-Communist countries there is a wide-spread theory that ideology has lost its influence on the practice of Communism, especially in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is sometimes claimed that academic philosophy is distinct from ideology so that even if the latter had any real importance, it would not follow that philosophy does.

But both contentions are unwarranted. As to the first, specialists are talking today not of de-ideologization, but of a re-ideologization in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. There has seldom been so much stress laid on ideology, both in the official declarations of the parties and their leaders, and in the practice of supporting the study of Marxism-Leninism. What is often said about power-policy of the Soviet leaders, does not

contradict this fact: for power-politics is prescribed by ideology itself. Nor do phenomena of *embourgeoisement* noticed here and there in the Soviet Union contradict the thesis. It may be that they reflect a certain trend in the Soviet population; but the question is not what the populations wish: we are concerned with the will of the Party leaders. Also, if we consider phenomena which are most akin to Communism – namely the great religions – we see, that such *embourgeoisement* did not prevent, e.g., Buddhism or Christianity from remaining great powers during thousands of years. What right has one in face of such facts to proclaim that Communism lost its ideological basis in less than fifty years?

Moreover, the above-mentioned theory is mostly motivated by a sort of extrapolation of the writers' own scepticism about doctrines, and especially about ideologies – which, of course, is not legitimate. It must be remembered that the Russians have always been far more addicted to generalizations and dogmatic formulas than Westerners – and that this attitude found a counterpart in the Marxian doctrines. There is no justification at all for the contention that all that has been radically changed in a few years. And if it has not, then ideology remains an important factor in Soviet, and consequently, in Communist reality.

As to the distinction between ideology and philosophy there is perhaps some justification for it. There certainly are in the Soviet Union some philosophers, who work in fields rather remote from ideology. There may be even some – certainly very few – who have liberated themselves from the dogma and are working without taking into consideration any ideological assumption. Also, a distinction between academic writings and those textbooks like *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma,* which are destined for the masses of students, must be drawn. There certainly is a difference of level between them.

But still, philosophy is, on the whole, far more strictly linked with ideology in the Soviet Union than in any non-Communist country. On one side, the prevailing majority of Soviet philosophers assume the basic doctrines of Diamat and of Histomat, i.e. ideological premisses. On the other side, even the popular products, such as the said *Osnovy,* are written by men who work in the same institutions as the more academic workers and do not escape their influence. In spite of the disastrous level of, say, the *Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii,* it is easy to show how purely academic discussion influenced its content. But these *Osnovy* have been distributed

in more than one million copies. Every university student, every technician, every future manager and politician has to learn out of them. Through them academic philosophy has a real influence on the masses.

We do not wish to exaggerate. We do not claim that philosophers are ruling the Soviet Union. Certainly politicians, or even great physicists and top managers are more influential than even the leading philosophers. Nevertheless, philosophy is in the Soviet Union, a more important factor than philosophy is in any non-Communist country. And that is why Soviet philosophy is relevant, quite apart from its interest for philosophers, both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, because its study shows what trends exist in the intellectually leading circles of that empire, and so do help understanding the Soviet phenomenon in its totality. Practically, because that understanding has today a paramount importance for the survival of the free countries.

III

The attitude of non-Communist philosophers towards Soviet philosophy. We may ask ourselves, why does the majority of non-Communist philosophers preserve the above-mentioned attitude of indifference toward the Soviet efforts? Why are there so few serious studies in Soviet philosophy in Europe and in the United States?

There seem to be several reasons for it. The first and certainly most important one is simply the lack of knowledge. This is not entirely the fault of the non-Communist philosophers: what they have as sources of information are either publications by Western Communists or systematic works produced by one or another among the Sovietologist-philosophers. Now the first kind of writings is usually presented in a way apt to discourage any philosopher who happens to read them. For one thing they rarely offer the best of the Soviet production; usually it is rather the worst of it. Then, even if some good piece of work is translated, it is presented in a context which appears to the philosophical reader to be intolerably political and dogmatic. As to the systematic works, by the very fact that they are systematic they are late; moreover, they mostly concentrate on the essentials, which are dogmatic; they seldom give information about the work on special problems, i.e. that which is of greatest interest in Soviet thought. So the great majority of Western philosophers is either

uninformed at all, or, what is worse, misinformed about Soviet philosophy. They mostly take it to be just another form of political propaganda without any interest for them.

But there seem to be also other reasons for such indifference. There are a number of philosophers – unfortunately, as it seems, equally large on both sides of the Iron Curtain – who are, so to say, completely cloistered in their own views. Whatever does not completely fit into their own conceptual scheme, they evaluate as worthless. To quote two outstanding other instances of this attitude, whatever is done by phenomenologists is said to be sheer nonsense by some members of the analytical school; and, conversely, whatever is produced by the latter is declared to be irrelevant and pre-philosophical by some of the former. Now Soviet philosophy moves, as a whole, inside a very different frame of reference and supposes quite different basic assumptions than most schools flourishing now in the non-Communist world. E.g. practically all Soviet philosophers are frankly metaphysicians (in the non-Soviet meaning of the word); they are also thorough-going epistemological realists. Once this is observed by some philosophers, they declare, of course, they are not interested, exactly as they would do with other schools in the West.

However, one may disagree with that sort of sectarianism. Humanity has now, *grosso modo,* three major types of philosophy; the phenomenological, the analytic and the Soviet. Contemporary philosophy is not only what pleases *Herr Professor* in a given university, but all these together, right or wrong. Moreover, in all three camps there are thinking men who work, perhaps with other methods, perhaps with unequal success, but still do work toward the solution of identical or similar problems; what has been said above about philosophy of logic sufficiently shows this, we believe. Therefore, it does not seem either prudent or reasonable to close ones eyes to what is going on beyond the walls of one's own group. And once this is admitted, the study of Soviet philosophy appears to be very useful indeed.

Finally, there is perhaps still a third reason. Soviet Philosophers usually accuse the bulk of non-Communist thinkers of being party-philosophers, indeed, lackeys and defenders of the bourgeoisie. This is, certainly as far as the enormous majority of philosophers is concerned, not only untrue, but even ludicrously untrue. Yet, something of what the Soviet writers say may be true, in as far as the attitude toward our subject is concerned.

One sometimes has the feeling that many among our philosophers are more or less consciously persuaded that Soviet philosophy, being Communist, cannot be an interesting philosophy. In other terms, they *are,* in one sense, party-men: they do not consider Soviet philosophy for its own value, but decide *a priori,* that being the philosophy of a party alien to their own, it must be wrong. In that respect, at least, they seem to have taken over something of the worst they found in their Soviet colleagues.

But this is certainly not the right attitude for a philosopher. If there is anything on which all free thinkers agree, it is certainly that they should make every effort to look at things as they are, not as it is useful to any party or human group. That is why such a prejudice, which seems to be present in many cases, must be said to be regrettable and one hopes that it shall be overcome.

REFERENCES

1. On the period before 1931 (concerning logic) cf. V. I. Čerkesov: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (The Materialist Dialectic as Logic and Epistemology). Moskva, Izd. MGU, 1962. p. 12 f. (cf. *SST* 2 (1962) 321 f. and 3 (1963) 74; D. Joravsky: *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science (*1917–1932*)*. London. 1961. (cf. *SST* 2 (1962) 142–148).
2. It seems that at the beginning there was some philosophical life, especially in philosophy of physics and in history of philosophy; later on the situation became far worse, culminating in the 'quotatology' here referred to.
3. For a description of the 1947 to 1958 development cf. J. M. Bocheński: *Einführung in die sowjetische Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Philosophy). (*Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 45/59. Bonn. 1959; reprinted in part in *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism)). 3. Aufl. Bern-München. 1960. (A bibliography on this period is being published by the Fribourg Institute: *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* (Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy). (Sovietica). Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, I and II, 1959; III, 1962; IV, 1963; cf. T. J. Blakeley: 'A Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 12–15.
4. D. Spasov, in *Ruch Filozoficzny* 21, 1962, 2, 136; cf. *SST* 2 (1962) 327.
5. Similarity between religions and Communism should not be overstressed. The basic difference is that while adherents of the great religions openly admit that their doctrine is not science but faith, Communists proclaim that their ideology is 'scientific'. This is why the logical situation of a Communist is by far worse than that of a believer of a great religion. However, the sociological implications are to a large extent similar and the argument remains valid in spite of these basic differences.
6. Cf. D. D. Comey: 'Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Soviet Policy'. In *SST* 2 (1962) 301–320.
7. On mathematical logic in the Soviet Union, cf. S. A. Janovskaja: 'Matematičeskaja

logika i osnovnaja matematika' (Mathematical Logic and Basic Mathematics). In: *Matematika v SSSR za sorok let* (Mathematics in the USSR in 40 Years). I. Moskva. 1959. pp. 13–120; G. Küng: 'Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union (1917–1947 and 1947–1957)'. *SST* 1 (1961) pp. 39–43. On the general situation in logic: H. Dahm: 'Renaissance der formalen Logik' (The Renaissance of Formal Logic), *Ost-Probleme* 8 (1957), 254–267; J. M. Bocheński,: 'Soviet Logic', *SST* 1 (1961) 29–38; D. D. Comey,: 'Two Recent Soviet Conferences on Logic', *SST* 2 (1962) 21–36.

8. Cf. A. A. Zinov'ev: 'O rabote seminara po logike v Institute Filosofii' (On the work of the Logic Seminar of the IF). In *VF* 1958, 12, 167–172, reviewed by D. D. Comey and G. L. Kline in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 24 (1959) 232–233. See also the bibliography cited in note 5 (Janovskaja, Küng) and, among the more recent works published by the *Philosophical* Institute: *Logičeskie issledovanija* (Logical Investigations). Moskva, Izd. AN, 1959; and *Primenenie logiki v nauke i texnike* (The Application of Logic in Science and Technology). Moskva, Izd. AN, 1960.
9. G. A. Volkov: 'Konferencija po voprosam protivorečij' (Conference on Contradiction). *VF* 1958, 12, 163–173; and, above all, N. Lobkowicz,: *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie* (The Principle of Contradiction in Contemporary Soviet Philosophy). (Sovietica) Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1959, which contains a German translation of some otherwise not available relevant texts and a general introduction into the field.
10. Zinov'ev, A. A.: *Filosofskie problemy mnogoznačnoj logiki* (Philosophic Problems of Many-Valued Logic). Moskva, Izd. AN, 1960; and the review by L. H. Hackstaff and J. M. Bocheński in *SST* 2 (1962) 37–48.
11. M. M. Rozental', G. M. Štraks: *Kategorii materialističeskoj dialektiki* (The Categories of the Materialist Dialectic). Moskva, 1956; V. P. Tugarinov: *Sootnošenie kategorij dialektičeskogo materializma* (The Interrelation of the Categories of Dialectical Materialism). Leningrad, 1956. For bibliography and a general report of the discussions, see H. Fleischer: 'On Categories in Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* 1 (1961) 65–77.
12. Cf. H. Dahm: 'Soviet Philosophy's Conception of "Basic Laws", "Order" and "Principles"'. *SST* 1 (1961) 52–63; H. Fleischer: 'The Materiality of Matter'. *SST* 2 (1962) 12–20.
13. S. Müller-Markus: 'Bibliography of Philosophical Articles in *Uspexi fizičeskix nauk*'. *SST* 2 (1962) 255–260, and 'Die Organisation der sowjetischen Philosophie der Physik seit Dezember 1960' (The Organisation of Soviet Philosophy of Physics Since December 1960). *SST* 2 (1962) 49–63.
14. S. Müller-Markus: *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie I.* (Sovietica) Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1960. Cf. 'Einstein and Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* 1 (1961) 78–87.
15. A first discussion on the subject was started by the important articles of M. A. Markov: 'O prirode fizičeskogo znanija' (On the Nature of Physical Knowledge), *VF* 1947, 2, 140–176 (s. the index of *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie I* under 'Markov, M. A.' p. 68b). Other discussions are continuing now. S. Müller-Markus is preparing an ample report on them. See also his article in this issue of the *SST.* and C. Olgin: 'Science and Philosophy in the USSR'. *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of USSR*, 1960, 12, 5–19.
16. S. T. Meljuxin: *O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj prirody* (On the Dialectic of

the Development of Anorganic Nature). Moskva. 1960. Cf. V. V. Kazjutinskij: 'O napravlenii razvitija kosmičeskix ob"ektov'. *FN* 1961, 4, 87–94 (German translation: *Ost-Probleme* 14, 1962, 2–8).

17. *Naučnaja sessija, posvjasčennaja problemam fiziologičeskogo učenija akademika I. P. Pavlova* (Session on Problems of I. P. Pavlov's Physiology). Moskva. 1950.
18. Bauer, R. A.: *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, Cambridge, 1952; review by D. D. Comey of *Recent Soviet Psychology* (ed. by Neil O'Connor) in *SST* 2 (1962) 251–253.
19. Cf. V. P. Rožin: *Vvedenie v marksistskuju sociologiju* (Introduction to Marxist Sociology). Leningrad, Izd. LGU, 1962.
20. Cf. V. P. Tugarinov: *O cennostjax žizni i kul'tury* (On the Values of Life and Culture). Leningrad, Izd. LGU, 1960.
21. As far as ethics are concerned, see the introduction to R. T. De George: 'A Bibliography of Soviet Ethics' in this issue of *SST* 83.
22. The subject is studied – for the first time as it seems – by K. G. Ballestrem in an article forthcoming in the *SST* 3, 1963 (2).
23. Axmanov, A. S.: *Logičeskoe učenie Aristotelja* (The Logical Doctrine of Aristotle). Moskva. 1954. Two other books appeared before 1947. The *Bibliographie* also lists seven articles for 1947–1958.
24. Not less than six books on Kant are known to have been published since 1937. Bibliography in Ballestrem (note 22).
25. Since 1956 six books were published on Hegel. Eleven articles on Hegel were published in the *VF* 1947–1958 (cf. *Bibliographie I*, p. 93a).
26. Cf. G. L. Kline: *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*. New York–London. 1952.
27. *Istorija filosofii*. Moskva. Izd. AN. I and II, 1957; III and IV, 1959; V, 1960.

N. LOBKOWICZ

PHILOSOPHY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SINCE 1960

The present paper is an account of major 'philosophical events' in Czechoslovakia since 1960.

However, as none of the numerous political and literary periodicals which I used to rummage through while composing my *Marxismus-Leninismus in der ČSR*[1] were at my disposal for the last two years, all information contained in this report is drawn from the two philosophical reviews published by the Czechoslovak and the Slovak Academies of Sciences respectively. Obviously, therefore, this account cannot pretend even to the sort of quasi-completeness which I aspired to in my book.

As regards the latter, a short remark may be in place. Though the manuscript was ready for the press in the summer of 1960, the book did not come out until early in 1962. Consequently, while reading the proofs, I tried to incorporate as much additional information as possible. As a result, the book, in a few cases, contains quite detailed information about events of 1961, whereas in most instances, it is incomplete as regards the years 1959 and 1960; this latter circumstance is due to the long delay in publishing, which is characteristic of some Communist reports on congresses, meetings, new publications, and the like. This may explain why, in the present paper, some passages cover events as early as 1959, whereas in other passages I shall restrict myself to giving an account of the years 1961 and 1962.

I

The reader will remember that I divided the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Czechoslovakia into three main periods: first, the period from the formation of the Communist Parties, in 1921, to the end of World War II; second, the period from 1945 to the formation both of the Czechoslovak and the Slovak Academies of Sciences in 1953; third, the period following 1953 which still seemed to last when I wrote the last pages of my book.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

Meanwhile, this third period may be said to have come to a close. For, at least to my mind, the third period was marked by a quite impressive progress both as to the quantity and as to the quality of publications and, in general, of the 'philosophic output'. In the years 1956–1958 particularly, the number of books and articles concerned with the history of philosophy, with logic and with esthetics, had reached a *niveau* which was remarkable in comparison both to all previous ones and to the 'philosophic output' of most other Communist countries, the Soviet Union included. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that, during these few years, Czechoslovak philosophers produced more relatively objective and scientifically acceptable studies than any other Communist philosophers since the end of World War II (with the notable exception of the Poles, of course).

This, at least according to Western standards, quite gratifying development abruptly came to a close when, on March 24th, 1959, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a resolution entitled 'Report on the Present Situation of Philosophy'. This document which, as it was not published until late in 1960[2] was unknown to me while I wrote my book, is remarkable in several respects. First, at least to my knowledge, it is the first formal decree of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia concerning philosophy proper. Secondly, curiously enough, this document seems to have been prompted precisely by the progress just mentioned. Its main aim, it seems, was to counteract the tendency of a number of Czechoslovak philosophers to break away from any kind of a politically engaged philosophizing and to withdraw into highly specialized fields of study; as opposed to this, the resolution emphasizes that Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the instrument of the revolutionary workers' movement and of the Communist parties for the transformation of nature, society and thought rather than a private affair of "closed scholars separated from life". Finally, the document contains a rather interesting analysis of the specifically Czechoslovak expressions of revisionism. According to this analysis revisionism in Czechoslovakia originates mainly from three sources: first, from the overestimation of the influence of Hegelian philosophy on Marxism-Leninism which is said to lead to an artificial separation of the 'young' Marx from the 'old' one; secondly, from a "cult of isolated facts compiled at haphazard" which is said to lead to a positivist revision of Marxism; finally, from the tendency to dissociate science and ideology as well as philosophy and politics, on

the pretext that such a dissociation would increase the *naučnost'* both of science and of philosophy.

Of these three features, only the first and the third would seem to be properly revisionist, whereas the second feature is related to 'eclecticism' rather than to revisionism; indeed, even the third feature would be generally considered revisionist only if it is explicitly spelled out, not if it expresses itself as a mere tendency. Accordingly, I should like to revise slightly my interpretation of the anti-revisionist campaign of 1959 which I have described at some length in my book.[3] At that time, I was led to believe that the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia actually had reason to worry about truly revisionist trends among Czechoslovak philosophers. Consequently, I was somewhat puzzled when I discovered that authors such as I. Sviták and K. Kosík who participated in the discussion on philosophy and ideology in the *Literární Noviny* (1956/1957) and who really had displayed quite revisionist views, during the ideological battle immediately following the resolution of the Central Committee, were treated with some indulgence, whereas L. Tondl who was mainly interested in philosophy of science was almost torn to pieces. This puzzle became a real enigma when, hardly a year later, Tondl was permitted to publish a lengthy review (which seemed to indicate that the 'positivist' revisionism he had been accused of was not too serious an offence after all). Since the publication of the resolution in question, it has become relatively easy to decipher the situation. Apparently, the decree never was intended to be a truly anti-revisionist manifesto to begin with, since genuinely revisionist trends had never existed in Czechoslovakia. Rather, on the pretext of counteracting revisionism which, since the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, was to be considered the 'chief danger', the document in question aimed at throttling the tendency of many Czechoslovak philosophers to escape from political activism by retreating into ideologically neutral and thus ideologically irrelevant fields of study.

This interpretation would seem to be corroborated by the changes in the editorial staff of the philosophical reviews. Thus, for example, in 1959, only three co-editors (among them L. Tondl) of the *Filosofický Časopis* (published by the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) were dismissed, and no fewer than eight new collaborators were added. Of the latter, two were old members of the Party (L. Svoboda

and G. Riedel), both of whom had played quite an important role during the first years after the war but who later were completely outstripped by men, younger both in age and in party membership, and far more philosophically-minded; four others were philosophical newcomers who were presumably delegated by the ideological 'brain' of the CP of Czechoslovakia, the Institute for Social Sciences of the Central Committee. A detail otherwise hardly relevant may indicate how important (and powerful) these four must have been: until their appearance, the list of collaborators indicated the academic degree of each of the co-editors, carefully distinguishing between a simple 'dr.', a 'doc. dr.' and 'prof. dr.'; with the first issue quoting the new co-editors, such ceremonies disappeared and even A. Kolman, director of the Philosophical Institute since the beginning of 1960, was not permitted to bear his honorary degree when, on April 15th, 1960, he was nominated full member of the Academy of Sciences. Apparently, the newly appointed 'apparatchiks' had nothing to show in this respect and did not want to be considered inferior to their colleagues.

The corresponding change in the editorial staff of the *Slovenský Filozofický Časopis* as usual took somewhat longer to come about; actually, it did not occur until the beginning of 1961 and then it was connected with a radical change of the whole status of the Slovak philosophic review. I have been unable to discover the causes of this delay. As far as I can see, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia was paralleled by an analogous resolution of the CP of Slovakia; however, as the latter document, at least to my knowledge, never was published, I have no clues for deciding whether it differed from its Czechoslovak model in any significant respect.

In any case, the eventual transformation of the Slovak review would seem to corroborate my claim that in Czechoslovakia the CP's were worried about a growing scientism and objectivism rather than about revisionism. To begin with, the review got a new name, the fifth since 1946, incidentally. Beginning with the first issue of 1961, the periodical of the Philosophical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences has been called *Otázky Marxistickej Filozofie (Questions of Marxist Philosophy)* instead of *Slovenský Filozofický Časopis (Slovak Philosophical Review)*. This change of title seems to indicate, first, that the Slovak philosophers had to comply with the old demand of Czech philosophers that the

Filosofický Časopis, published in Prague, should represent the whole of Czechoslovakia instead of only Bohemia.[4] Secondly, however, it indicates that the Slovak philosophical review is expected to focus its attention hence forward on questions related to the 'needs of practice'. This point is suggested even by the make-up of the title-page: The original quiet violet has been superseded by a flaming red alternating with yellow, carrying huge black letters. It is clearly spelled out in an introductory article by one of the senior members of the CP of Slovakia, L. Szántó. According to Szántó, the new title is intended to emphasize that the review "aims at the development of the philosophy of the working class which builds up Communist society, of a philosophy which aims to change and not only to interpret the world"[5]; hitherto, the review was far too abstractly theoretical, far too specialized and secluded from the real world, to fulfill this task. Of course, Szántó admits, the contributions will not have to cease being theoretical; but they will have to be connected with the needs of practice "more closely, more immediately, more organically", be it the practice of economic building-up, of political leadership, of scientific research or "simply the practice of education in the widest sense of the term". As the most important tasks of the new review Szánto singled out a closer collaboration of philosophy with specialized sciences and combat against "the ideologies of nationalism and of religious obscurantism which, in the past, we have neglected to a considerable degree".[6]

Compared to this thorough shift in the basic aims of the review, the changes in the editorial staff would seem to be a minor matter. Still, it is worth noticing that five of the fourteen co-editors were dismissed and twenty new collaborators were added. Among the latter we find the same kind of personalities as those mentioned above; on the one hand, old party members (for example, L. Szántó and M. Topol'ský), and, on the other hand, personalities who had never so much as been mentioned among philosophers. Incidentally, the crafty practice of concealing all academic degrees was followed in this case as well; however, unlike A. Kolman in the *Filosofický Časopis,* the two Slovak members of the Academy of Sciences, I. Hrušovský and L. Szántó, were permitted to cite their honorary titles.

On May 3rd, 1961, at a meeting of the editorial staff of both philosophical reviews held in Bratislava, the CP's demands were drummed into the editors' heads once more. Only one paper was read and that, char-

acteristically, by the leading collaborator of the Institute for Social Sciences of the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia and chief editor of the *Filosofický Časopis* since 1955, Vl. Ruml. In the first section of this paper, Ruml emphasized that the resolution of the Central Committee has to become the guide for all activities of the Czechoslovak philosophical reviews. In this context, Ruml brought up the issue of freedom of scientific discussions; the passage is significant enough to be quoted in full:

"It is evident that the law of correlation between absolute and relative truth at a definite stage of human knowledge is applicable to Marxism too. Within Marxism, there inevitably is a struggle between a Marxist knowledge which is relatively settled and another one which still is incomplete. The clash between these contraries is an intrinsic motive force within Marxist philosophy. Without an exchange of ideas and without some freedom of discussion there can be no development of Marxist theory, in our case of Marxist philosophy. However, the freedom of scientific discussion must respect the boundaries between science and unscientific opinions. This requirement does not limit the evolution of science. Take as an example contemporary physics: different interpretations of the theory of relativity represent a scientific discussion within the framework of science; yet to try to deny the truth-character of the concepts and of the laws of the theory of relativity amounts to stepping outside of science. Similarly, in social theory and Marxist philosophy, there exists a definite level which has to be acknowledged in the study of objects. Accordingly, we favour a scientific discussion within the framework of Marxism, as long as it is based upon the unity of the party. A discussion complying with these requirements will further the development both of Marxist theory and of the life of the party."[7]

In the second section of his paper, Ruml pointed out a number of subjects which, from now on, require a particularly careful treatment: "The formation of a material-technical basis, the role of technology, the tasks of the individual, the all-round development of the human personality in socialist society, the development of our peoples' democracy, the development of the class-structure of our society, the importance of socialist workers' brigades for the development of society, the problem of the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in its study of society, a scientific and atheist criticism of neo-Thomist ideology, the relation

between philosophy and natural science, methodological problems of specialized sciences, the unity of dialectical and historical materialism, the critical analysis of the methodology of contemporary revisionism, etc." [8] Finally, Ruml made a number of recommendations regarding questions of organization; thus, the two reviews should coordinate their 'thematic plans', i.e., their programs for the respective year, they should organize joint discussions and jointly write book reviews, etc. The ensuing discussion reminds one of the enthusiastic unanimity which was characteristic of the Stalinist period: though everybody had something to say, nobody voiced anything like criticism; since the report about the meeting explicitly states that the unanimity originated from an active participation rather than from a passive agreement, the monolithic character of the meeting must have been quite conspicuous.

However, this new orientation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in Czechoslovakia has been, as usual, slow in materializing. In March, 1962, an editorial entitled 'Towards a Creative Up-Swing of Philosophical Activity – Towards a Further Development of the *Filosofický Časopis*' still complains that no serious steps have been undertaken to make of the technical journal a telling aid for "teachers and propagandists of philosophy". Apparently, there is a tendency to look for more readers as well as to increase the number of collaborators still further. This would seem to indicate that the philosophical reviews are expected to become instruments of ideological propaganda rather than to remain the relatively specialized periodicals which they originally were. As the editorial just mentioned points out, the *Filosofický Časopis* (which will soon be ten years old) suffered for a long time from a "unilaterally historizing tendency"; only in very recent months did it succeed in focusing its attention on "theoretical problems of the present time".[9]

All this, of course, is not simply a return to the sad practice of the Stalinist period. Actually, such a return would hardly seem possible today. During the years following Stalin's death, too many Czechoslovak philosophers became interested in true scientific research; any attempt to make of them mere propagandists would not be likely to succeed. However, the development just described clearly indicates that the CP-s are not willing to allow the Czechoslovak philosophers to become scholars detached from the world, that is to say, uninterested in the political, social and economic designs of the CP-s.

II

Before we pass on to publications, let us quickly review the congresses and meetings held in Czechoslovakia since 1960.

Though the last congress which I covered in my book took place in June, 1959, the first which I can mention here was not held until October, 1960. The idea that for more than a year there should have been no philosophical congress or meeting is, I must admit, somewhat puzzling; I can only state that none is mentioned in either philosophical review. Perhaps the resolution of the Central Committee as well as the ensuing 'anti-revisionist' rush made this a bad time for organizing meetings; this is only conjecture. In any case, the yearly report of the Philosophical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences explicitly states that, in Slovakia, there were no philosophical conferences in 1959[10]; for the year 1960, I found no report at all, since the Slovak Philosophical Institute seems to have decided to discontinue its praiseworthy practice of publishing a yearly report of its activities. The Philosophical Institute in Prague had, for several years before this, published no such reports anyway.

Be that as it may, on October 7th, 1960, the department for basic Marxism-Leninism at the university in Bratislava organized a conference on 'Questions of the Development of Socialist Democracy'; most of the contributors were members of the Faculty of Law of the Charles University in Prague.[11] Four other meetings were organized by, or in collaboration with, the Philosophical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in the course of the winter 1960–61: on November 18th, there was a meeting on science and ideology[12]; on November 30th, 1960, a smaller group discussed a book *On Laws in Philosophy and Biology* by a certain Miss J. Machovcová[13]; on February 2nd, 1961, there was a 'scientific conference for students' at which a number of apparently quite interesting papers were read. One, for example, concerned 'The Ways of Expressing the Functor of Possibility in Trivalent Logic' by a second-term student; it was highly rated by Czechoslovakia's most productive logician, V. Filkorn.[14] Finally, also in February, there was a conference on contradictions in thought, at which V. Černík tried to show that the dialectical law of contradiction is compatible with the logical law of non-contradiction.[15]

Far more important was a conference organized by the Philosophical

Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the CP of Czechoslovakia which was held in Liblice from April 26th to April 29th, 1961, and which concerned itself with the 'theoretical question of the building-up of socialism and Communism in the light of the results of social sciences'.[16] The conference which was attended by nearly 150 philosophers, among which there were some from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany, began with a paper read by one of Czechoslovakia's most outstanding specialists in questions of revolution, J. Houška. Another long paper entitled 'The Changes of the Social Class-Structure During the Period of Transition and the Development of new Social Relations Among People' was read by the specialist in socialist ethics, Dr. Slejška. As the director of the Philosophical Institute, A. Kolman, pointed out in his concluding remarks, the conference had a 'great scientific and political significance', since it showed that highly complex research in the field of social sciences can be achieved only by scholars working in teams (an example of such team-work was a lengthy paper 'On Problems of the Building-up of Socialism and Communism' which was composed by five authors from different departments).

On December 14th and 15th, 1961, the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the CP of Czechoslovakia held a joint meeting on problems of causality in contemporary physics and biology; once again a number of guests from abroad were present, for example, R. Havemann, J. Segal, R. Rochhausen and R. Löther from Eastern Germany, A. Polikarov from Bulgaria, as well as the well-known Polish philosopher, H. Eilstein. Two Soviet philosophers, B. M. Kedrov and I. T. Frolov, sent in written communications. The first paper, entitled 'Causality and the Principle of Variations in Physics' was read by A. Kolman. According to Kolman, a causal connection has to be described as follows:

Between the two physical processes $O_i^c(t_1, t_2)$ and $O_k^c(t_3, t_4)$ there exists a causal connection $O_i^c \rightarrow O_k^c$ if and only if the two necessary conditions: $t_1 < t_3$ and $t_2 < t_4$, as well as the sufficient condition: from O_i^c a definite quantum of energy ΔE is transferred to O_k^c, are satisfied.

Accordingly, the law of causality has to be formulated thus: for each physical process O_i^c there exists one and only one physical process O_k^c as

well as one and only one physical process O_h^c of such a kind that $O_h^c \rightarrow O_j^c \rightarrow O_k^c$ holds. This law of causality is a postulate the validity of which is verified by the constantly increasing number of data; Kolman explicitly rejects H. Margenau's claim that there is no acceptable formulation of the law of causality as well as the idea that the law of causality has to be introduced into a definite deductive system as an underivable axiom. (As a reviewer later pointed out, it is somewhat difficult to see the difference between the latter idea and Kolman's own claim that the law of causality is a postulate). As to the principles of variations, according to Kolman, they are the most general expression of the law of causality in physics.

A number of shorter papers followed: the German professor of physical chemistry, R. Havemann, spoke about causality and human freedom (the latter has to be described in terms of a contingency of physical events); A. Polikarov introduced a distinction between a radical and a moderate indeterminism, the latter of which would seem to be compatible with Marxist materialism; V. Ruml commented upon the neopositivist 'subjectivization' of causality, etc. The papers of the second day were mainly concerned with mechanist, vitalist and holist interpretations of causality and determinism as well as with the general underestimation of causality in contemporary biology.[17]

Also in December, 1961, the first congress of Czechoslovak psychologists took place. The chief paper was read by Vl. Tardy who is a former pupil of the famous Czechoslovak economist and philosopher K. Engliš; there followed no less than 33 short papers, several of which were concerned with the relation of psychology to philosophy (A. Kolman, J. Cvekl, J. Zeman, J. Janoušek).[18]

On January 18th and 19th, 1962, the department for scientific atheism of the Philosophical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences organized a meeting on methods in atheist education.[19] The last meeting I know of centered around a discussion on how to study the ideas of the Middle Ages, which was organized by the editorial staff of the *Filosofický Časopis,* on February 1st, 1962. Besides commenting upon a recent book on Husite ideology by the medievalist R. Kalivoda, the participants listened to a paper 'On the Struggle for a more Ambitious Approach to Medieval Thought' by M. Machovec, which was published several months ago.[20]

We may conclude this section by mentioning meetings abroad which were attended by Czechoslovak philosophers. From October 8th to 11th, 1959, five Czechoslovak Marxist-Leninists attended the symposium on questions of philosophy of science held at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig on the occasion of its 550th anniversary.[21] On November 19th and 20th 1960, the three specialists on idealist philosophy, I. Dubský, M. Sobotka and J. Zelený, attended the third congress of the *Hegelgesellschaft* in Vienna; I. Dubský read a short paper on Hegel's and Heidegger's notion of time.[22] Incidentally, some months later, J. Zelený who, in 1958, had written a book on historical materialism and who was always considered as a mere partyman was invited by the *Kolleggemeinschaft Wien (Philosophisches Institut)* to lecture on 'Reason and Understanding in Hegel and Marx'; judging by his own report, the ensuing discussion chiefly carried on by Professor E. Heintele must have been quite lively.[23] On September 11th to 16th, 1961, two experts attended the third congress of the *Association Internationale de Cybernétique* in Namur (Belgium).[24] Also in September, 1961, the medievalist R. Kalivoda attended the second International Congress on Medieval Philosophy held at the *Thomas-Institut* in Cologne.[25] Finally, on February 12th to 15th, 1962, Vl. Ruml, M. Kaláb, V. Filkorn and J. Strinka attended the first conference of editors of philosophical periodicals from countries of the socialist camp held at the Museum of J. Dimitrov in Leipzig; Vl. Ruml commented upon the paper of the head of the Soviet delegation and the chief editor of the *Voprosy Filosofii,* M. B. Mitin; M. Kaláb read the introductory paper of the second day, on 'Philosophical Problems of Socialist and Communist Construction'; V. Filkorn commented upon a paper concerned with the fight against bourgeois ideologies which was presented by the chief editor of the East German *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,* W. Eichhorn; as to J. Strinka, his function seems to have been confined to writing the report after the delegation came home.[26]

III

Surveying the numerous articles published in both Czechoslovak philosophical reviews since the end of 1959 and comparing them, for example, to the issues of 1958, one notices several differences. First, the number of lead-articles (which are usually signed by 'the editors' or else by some

politically prominent personality and which, accordingly, advance the Party's 'motto of the day') has increased considerably. Thus, for example, in 1958 the *Filosofický Časopis* contained only one editorial; in 1959, there were three of them, all of which were published after the resolution of the Party was made public; in 1960, four printed in italics, a device that had not hitherto been used, and one in ordinary print (which was apparently meant as a lead-article); in 1961, three in italics and one in ordinary print. Similarly, in the Slovak review, in 1958, two editorials; in 1959, two; in 1960, four; in 1961, four.[27]

Secondly, there are far more articles concerned with questions of 'scientific Communism', i.e., with an ideological rationalization of political events and designs. Thus, for example, in 1961, the *Filosofický Časopis* contained twelve such articles[28] as opposed to only four in 1958. Moreover, one once again finds headings such as 'Some Questions about the Essential Difference between Physical and Spiritual Labor and the Program of the CPSU' or even 'The Foundations of Socialism in Cuba', titles of a kind that had vanished after 1956. Thirdly, there are thus relatively few articles concerned with philosophy proper; in 1961 the *Filosofický Časopis* published only six articles concerned with history as opposed to ten articles in 1958; similarly, the Slovak review which, in 1958 had devoted 81 of its 420 pages to logic, cybernetics and semantics, in 1961, in spite of the fact that it had at its disposal 50 pages more, published only 22 pages on these subjects.

IV

Still, there is a number of articles worth mentioning. I shall group them according to the various subjects and, in each case, I shall include the relevant books. Incidentally, as the writing of books takes years, not months, publications in book-form seem to have been affected by the new 'route order' far less, as yet, than their companions in misfortune, the articles.

Dialectical Materialism: There is only one work in book-form which I found mentioned, namely, *The Concept of Matter in Dialectical Materialism* by M. Král; judging by other publications of the same author who, in 1958, published a short yet brilliant article on sense and verification, this book may be worth reading.[29] Incidentally, in 1961, Král published

another book on *Modern Physics and Philosophy* which, however, is intended for laymen rather than for scholars.[30]

Two articles are concerned with motion. The first, by B. Fajkus who, in 1961, published a book on *The Material Unity of the World* (mentioned in my book), discusses the classification of forms of motion.[31] According to Fajkus, two criteria of classification have to be used: on the one hand, the criterion 'more or less abstract', on the other hand, the criterion of evolution. Thus, for example, physical motion is more abstract than chemical or biological motion, whereas biological motion is more complex, rather than more abstract, than chemical motion. As a result, Fajkus offers the following schema:



The second article, by J. Coufal, once more discusses the problem as to whether motion is contradictory.[32] Though this paper is not simply a continuation of the discussion which, in 1957, was started by the controversial article of the young J. Bartoš, the issue has remained the same. Coufal belongs to the primitives: according to him the statement that a moving body is and is not at one and the same place is correct. He goes as far as to say that "elementary logic can neither discover nor disprove that 'A and non-A in the very same respect' (sometimes) holds". Here, one only can repeat what Bartoš said about M. N. Alekseev: *difficile satiram non scribere.*[33]

The famous 'dialectical law of contradiction' is the subject of another article, by J. Klofáč and V. Tlustý; the two authors seem to be working on a book concerned with contradictions. According to them, 'extensionalist' logic is unable to reflect the complex phenomenon of real-contradictions. "Yet, though logic does not speak of contradictions, other sciences do. Therefore, logic can be applied to real processes only in connection with the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction is an indispensable rule of scientific thought . . . In this sense, the laws of dialectics complete and correct logical principles and are principles of correct and true thinking."[34]

Somewhat more gratifying is an article on the 'law of negation of nega-

tion' by M. Suchý. This law, to Suchý, can express only certain sides of an evolutionary process (which Suchý does not specify); however, most of the functions usually ascribed to this law can be reduced to the law of transition from quantity to quality provided that the latter is understood in all its dimensions.[35]

Philosophy of Science: Since 1960, the number of contributions to this interesting subject has considerably increased; one of the reasons for this development may be the presence of A. Kolman who is quite a competent worker in history of science and in cybernetics; the reader will remember that in the beginning of 1960 Kolman was called back from the Soviet Union where he had lived since the 'twenties (except for a short period after the World War II) and appointed director of the Philosophical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In 1960, his book on *Lenin and Contemporary Physics* was translated both into Czech and into Slovak.[36] Also in 1960, in a lengthy article, he defended the value of cybernetics against an attack by the President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, T. Pavlov[37]; it seems that Kolman is determined not to tolerate any incompetent criticism of cybernetics. It is worth noting that an article criticizing G. Klaus and thus, I believe, by implication, Kolman, had to be published in the Slovak review, though the author was of Czech origin.[38] In 1961, Kolman published an article on 'Space, Time, Matter and Motion in Cosmology' in which he emphasizes that cosmology is a border-line case of a science the results of which still are very incomplete; incidentally, he again voices his old complaint that, on the one hand, scientists usually know little about Marxism-Leninism, and, on the other hand, many Marxist philosophers know virtually nothing about modern science.[39] Finally, Kolman wrote a preface, also in 1961, for a short article on 'The Principle of Causality and the Second Law of Thermodynamics' by the Soviet physicist Ja. P. Terleckij which originally had appeared in the *Doklady AN SSSR.*[40]

An interesting article 'On Questions as to the Finiteness and Infinity of the Universe' was contributed by two collaborators of the Astronomical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, M. Kopecký and J. Rajchl.[41] According to this paper, "the problem of the duration of the universe as a whole ... on philosophical grounds has been decided in favour of an infinite duration, i.e., of the eternity of the universe"; the problem as to the spatial finiteness or infinity of the universe, however, is

far more complex and has to be considered as still unsolved. On the one hand, it is conceivable that an infinite space does not comprise the whole universe; it can be a part of a finite space in relation to which it is itself finite. On the other hand, it is impossible to transfer properties of the universe discovered by means of finite models to the universe as a whole, since they might apply only to the world represented by these models. Of course, most non-physicists speaking of an 'infinity of the universe' simply mean 'that there is matter everywhere'; and this is perfectly correct, since expressions such as 'where', 'somewhere', and 'everywhere' are meaningful only where matter exists. Yet this would seem to be a question of semantics; from the point of view of physics, the question as to the finiteness or infinity of the universe is still unanswerable. Incidentally, it is worth noticing that this article is said to have been provoked by a discussion initiated by A. Kolman.

Several articles are concerned with cybernetics. I shall mention only two of them. 'Remarks on the Theory of Finite Automata' by M. Mleziva, and 'On the Subject of Cybernetics' by J. Bober.[42]

Logic: Here, I should like to begin by mentioning two works which, though they were published in 1959, are not quoted in my book; both are in German and both seem to be highly competent. The first, *The Indirect Axiomatization of Systems of the Bivalent Calculus of Propositions Containing Implication,* by M. Mleziva, is based upon studies of J. Łukasiewicz and A. Tarski of 1930, and of B. Sobocinski of 1935. The second, *On some Questions of the Modern Theory of Definition,* by P. Materna, is a thesis submitted to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of a Candidate of philosophical sciences in 1956.[43]

Also in 1959 O. Weinberger, who previously had published an excellent work on imperative propositions, produced a *Logic* intended for lawyers.[44] In 1961, three logicians published a very severe review of Weinberger's textbook; indeed they criticized his pedagogical approach so violently as to finally qualify the whole book as a 'failure'.[45] Some months later, Weinberger replied, accusing the reviewers of 'intolerance' and trying to justify his procedure.[46] This skirmishing is somewhat reminiscent of the scathing review of A. I. Popov's *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* which, at the end of 1960, was published by the *Voprosy Filosofii*[47]; however, I have good reason to believe that Weinberger's book was incompa-

rably better than that of Popov, which makes the whole skirmish even more puzzling. It is interesting to note that the only officially approved textbook on modern logic for universities is, in fact, that of Weinberger, despite the criticism made of it.

The only article concerned with the history of logic discusses Kant's ideas on the evolution and history of logic. According to the author of this extremely well-documented paper, L. Menzel, the first modern logician contemptuously to quote Kant's claim that since Aristotle "logic has not been able to advance a single step" was Couturat. In more recent times, this reference to Kant was introduced by H. Scholz and then repeated by Hilbert-Ackermann, Bocheński, Dürr as well as by most Marxist logicians. By way of qualification, Menzel points to some little-known passages in which Kant makes observations on post-Aristotelean logic. Thus, for example, in his lecture on logic, Kant refers to Leibniz and Wolff as to two philosophers who have set logic going *(in Gang gebracht)*, and shows an awareness of the difference between Wolffian and Aristotelean logic. Moreover, in several letters dating from 1783 to 1791, Kant speaks with great admiration of Leibniz' *ars characteristica universalis,* so that Scholz may be said to err when he describes Kant as a man totally opposed to mathematized metaphysics as conceived by Leibniz.[48]

Historical Materialism: Owing to the recent developments, nearly two-thirds of all articles are concerned with historical materialism or with connected questions. However, as none of them seem philosophically relevant enough to be mentioned here, I shal restrict myself to books. In 1961, a work on *The Subject and the Method of Historical Materialism* by L. Hrzal and K. Mácha concluded a discussion which had dragged out since 1955; among other things, it contains a discussion of sociology. The latter is said to be inevitably unscientific as soon as it becomes impartial, i.e., when it steps outside the realm of Marxist class-consciousness and partisanship.[49] Somewhat similar is a study *On Social Being and Social Consciousness* by J. Karásek; in a recent review, the author was criticized for maintaining that national character is not class-conditioned.[50]

Somewhat more interesting is a work concerned with an important question of Marxist ethics, namely, with the meaning of human life; the author, J. Kánský, who also recently published a short article on the criterion of morality[51], maintains "that the only truly meaningful life is one the basic intention of which is the struggle for progress. At present,

this amounts to saying: the struggle for the formation of Communist society". The book also contains a long section on happiness; as a matter of fact, Kánský is the first Czechoslovak Marxist to have written on this subject. However, his definition of happiness is as strange as is his explanation of the meaning of life: happiness is "the realization of the full development of all essential forces of man in his struggle for the formation of Communist society."[52]

Two other works are concerned more with what in the West one would call philosophy of law: *Remarks on the Theory of Socialist Democracy,* by Z. Mlynář, and *Some Questions Concerning the Basis and Superstructure in Czechoslovakia,* by Fr. Vartík.[53]

History of Philosophy. In 1961, the Communist world felt the urge to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of Heraclitus' birth; besides a speech of the day by L. Svoboda, two short articles by D. Machovec and J. Špaňár, both of whom are competent scholars, were published. Also in 1961, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences published commentary translations of Plato's *Laws* and of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics.* A. Zempliner wrote an interesting article on Leibniz' knowledge of, and relation to, Chinese philosophy[54]; and I. Dubský published a book in German on *Hegel's Notion of Labor and the Idealist Dialectics* in which he tries to show that Marx's concept of labour is the completion of Hegelian dialectics.[55]

As regards the history of Czech and Slovak philosophy, the medievalist R. Kalivoda published a book of more than 550 pages on *The Husite Ideology*[56]; M. Machovec wrote a booklet on the Czech physiologist Fr. Palacký and his relation to philosophy[57]; and V. Pekárek briefly discussed the first Czech translation of Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* which was published by a small Communist publishing-house in Kladno, in 1933.[58]

V

I should like to conclude this account of recent Czechoslovak publications by referring to the 'perspective plans concerning philosophical literature in the years 1961–1965' published by both the Czech and the Slovak counterpart of the *Gospolitizdat (Státní nakladatelství politické literatury; Slovenské vijdavat'elstvo politickej literatúry)* in 1960. Both programs indicate that, from now on, the two publishing-houses intend to increase as much as possible the number of 'original works'; up to now, they had

mainly published translations from the Russian. Moreover, both publishing-houses emphasize that they will accept only works of 'maximal sociopolitical significance' and that they will try to concentrate on books concerned with 'actual problems, i.e., especially with the development of the prerequisites of Communism in our countries'.

The program of the Czech publishing-house distinguishes between three basic categories of books: publications for scholars, i.e., specialized monographs; publications for propagandists; and popular literature intended for all readers interested in philosophy. Among the questions to be treated by scientific monographs, the plan mentions problems such as the relation between the universal, the particular and the singular in the social process, the structure of natural and social processes, philosophical aspects of cybernetics, party-mindedness and science, the motive forces of socialism, technology and modern society. The list of projected publications for propagandists includes works on the categories of dialectical materialism, on the theory of contradictions, on the dialectics of end and means, on Marxist theory of knowledge, on basic questions of Marxist esthetics, on modern theology and idealism, on modern science and religion, etc. Finally, the list of popular literature includes headings such as 'What is Truth?', 'What is Justice?', 'Labour as Need and Want', 'Can Religion be Progressive?', 'How Science Overcomes Superstition', etc. An additional list of projected publications on the history of philosophy mentions as topics German classical philosophy, Hegel, disputes on the young Marx, as well as the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the First International.

The program of the Slovak publishing-house, on the contrary, follows the traditional division. From the province of dialectical materialism, the program mentions topics such as categories, the laws of dialectics and cybernetics; historical materialism is represented by projected books on questions as to the relation between base and superstructure in the period between socialism and Communism, on the prediction of social evolution, on theory and practice; the section on 'scientific Communism' mentions topics such as the change of human interrelations and the national question in Czechoslovakia; finally, the publishing-house plans to publish works of, and books on, representatives of the French enlightenment, the Russian revolutionary democrats and some German 'pre-Marxists'.[59]

VI

Let me conclude with a few biographical remarks. Since 1960, three world-renowned Czechoslovak authors have passed away. On August 30th, 1960, at the age of 72 years, the classical philologist and expert in esthetics, Karel Svoboda, died. To the Western world he is probably best known for his works on the esthetics of Aristotle (1927) and of St. Augustine (1933), both published in French. After World War II, he published an interesting book on Bolzano's esthetics as well as two translations of fragments of the Presocratics. Though he never became a Communist, he was able to retain his chair of classical philology at the University of Prague until 1958. On June 13th, 1961, forgotten both by the Communist and by the Western world, the economist, philosopher and former governor of the Czechoslovak National Bank, Karel Engliš, passed away. Born in 1880, he was appointed professor in Brno in 1910; in the fall of 1947, on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the University of Prague, he was elected rector of the Charles' University. A few days afterwards the Communists took over, and on February 27th, 1948, he had to leave the university and never again appeared in public. Incidentally, translations of two of his books concerning logic[60] came out in Austria recently.

The third deceased is of a very different stamp. On March 9th, 1962, at the age of 84 years, the President of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Zdeněk Nejedlý, died. Those among Western readers who are not acquainted with Czechoslovak history may wonder why I refer to this man as "world-renowned". However, strange as it may sound, of the three deceased authors mentioned here, Nejedlý was probably the best known. At the turn of the century, he was already a corresponding member of the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences; his numerous books on the Husite movement, on B. Smetana and other composers, were known all over the world; there can hardly be any doubt that Nejedlý was the most learned of all the leading Communist functionaries since 1918. That he became a Communist, and one of the highest Czechoslovak Communist functionaries at that, is probably due to his outrageous pan-Slavism; one may doubt whether Nejedlý would have died a Communist if the Great Revolution had taken place in England or France instead of in Russia. This pan-Slavism was the basic theme of a lecture held in Prague on January 29th, 1946, in which Nejedlý asked for a complete reorientation

of Czechoslovak philosophy; I have described the ensuing development in my book.[61]

Far less famous was Radim Neumann Foustka who died on October 20th, 1960. Originally an admirer and follower of Beneš, after 1945 he became a Communist and was appointed head of the department of theory of state and law at the Charles' University in 1954. Foustka was one of Czechoslovakia's best experts in the theory of revolutions in people's democracies, a subject to which he devoted a number of articles and eventually a whole book entitled *The State, its Origin, Essence and Evolution.*

Completed on November 25th, 1962.

REFERENCES

1. Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1961. 267 pp. (abbreviated MLČ).
2. 'Zpráva o současné situaci ve filosofii', *Usnesení a dokumenty ÚV KSČ od XI. sjezdu do celostátní konference* 1960 (Resolutions and Documents of the CC of the KP of Czechoslovakia from the Eleventh Congress to the Nationwide Conference in 1960). SNPL, Praha. 1960. pp. 305–319.
3. MLČ p. 69 ff.
4. Cf. MLČ p. 65 f.
5. L. Szántó: 'Za filozofiu spätu so životom' (For a Philosophy Connected with Life). *Otázky Marxistickej Filozofie* (Questions of Marxist Philosophy), (abbreviated: *OMF*), 1961, 1, 3–10 (here 4).
6. *Ibid.* 9.
7. *Filosofický Časopis* (Philosophical Review), (abbreviated: *FC*), 1961, 5, 821–824 (here 822).
8. *Ibid.* 822 f.
9. 'Za tvůrčí rozmach filosofické aktivity, za další rozvoj Filosofického Časopisu ČSAV' (For a Creative Development, for a Further Development of the Philosophical Review of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences). *FC* 1962, 2, 165–169.
10. *Slovenský Filozofický Časopis* (Slovak Philosophical Review), (abbreviated: *SFČ*), 1960, 2, 222 ff.
11. *OMF* 1961, 1, 76 f.
12. *OMF* 1961, 1, 78 f.
13. *OMF* 1961, 1, 80.
14. *OMF* 1961, 3, 240 f.
15. *OMF* 1961, 3, 239 f.
16. *FC* 1961, 5, 814–820.
17. *FC* 1962, 3, 472–486.
18. *FC* 1962, 3, 469–472. Cf. *Československá Psychologie* (Czechoslovak Psychology), 1962, 2.
19. *OMF* 1962, 2, 175.

20. *FC* 1962, 5, 790 ff. Cf. M. Machovec: 'K zápasu o náročnejší metodologický přístup k středověké myšlenkové látce' (On the Struggle for a more Ambitious Methodological Approach to Medieval Thought), *FC* 1962, 3, 398–419.
21. *FC* 1960, 3, 447–453.
22. *FC* 1961, 4, 657 ff.
23. *FC* 1961, 6, 938 ff.
24. *FC* 1962, 1, 155 ff.
25. *FC* 1962, 3, 486 ff.
26. *FC* 1962, 5, 770 ff.
27. Notice, however that *OMF* appears six times a year since 1961.
28. This is an approximate number, since it is sometimes difficult to decide whether an article is concerned with 'scientific Communism' or with genuine historical materialism.
29. M. Král: *Pojem hmoty v dialektickém materialismu* (The Concept of Matter in Dialectical Materialism). NČSAV, Praha. 1960. 88 pp.
30. *Moderní fyzika a filosofie* (Modern Physics and Philosophy). SNPL, Praha. 158 pp.
31. B. Fajkus: 'Některé otázky klasifikace forem pohybu hmoty' (On some Questions Concerning the Classification of the Forms of Motion of Matter). *FC* 1962, 1, 79–87.
32. J. Coufal: 'K otázke protirečivosti pohybu' (On the Question as to the Contradictoriness of Motion). OMF 1961, 2, 97–106.
33. Cf. MLČ p. 128.
34. J. Clofáč, V. Tlustý: 'Dialektický zákon rozporu' (The Dialectical Law of Contradiction). FC 1960, 5, 731–740.
35. M. Suchij: 'Vyjadřuje tendenciu vývoja iba zákon negácie negácie?' (Does the Law of the Negation of Negation Express the Tendency of Development?). *SFČ* 1960, 3, 285–289.
36. A. Kolman: *Lenin a současná fyzika* (Lenin and Contemporary Physics). SNPL, Praha. 1960; *Lenin a súčasná Fyzika* (Lenin and Contemporary Physics). Osveta, Bratislava. 1960. 177 pp.; Russian original: *Lenin i novejšaja fizika* (Lenin and Contemporary Physics). Moskva. 1959. 153 pp.
37. A. Kolman: 'Na obranu kybernetiky' (In Defence of Cybernetics). *FC* 1960, 4, 515–529.
38. J. Kamarýt: 'Ke kritice kybernetického mechanismu, positivismu a fideismu' (Remarks to the Critique of Cybernetic Mechanism, Positivism and Fideism). *OMF* 1962, 2, 97–110.
39. A. Kolman: 'Prostor, čas, materie a pohyb v kosmologii' (Space, Time, Matter and Motion in Cosmology). *OMF* 1961, 5, 331–343.
40. J. P. Těrleckij: 'Princip kausality a druhý zákon termodynamický' (The Principle of Causality and the Second Law of Thermodynamics). *FC* 1961, 2, 239–243.
41. N. Kopecký, J. Rajchl: 'K otázkám konečnosti a nekonečnosti Vesmíru' (On Questions Concerning the Finiteness and Infinity of the Universe). *FC* 1962, 1, 68–78.
42. M. Mleziva: 'K teorii konečných automatů' (On the Theory of Finite Automata). *FC* 1960, 3, 342–367. J. Bober: 'O predmete kybernetiky '(On the Subject of Cybernetics). *OMF* 1961, 6, 416–425.
43. M. Mleziva: *Die Mittelbare Axiomatisierung der die Implikation enthaltenden Systeme des zweiwertigen Aussagenkalküls.* (The Indirect Axiomatization of a Two-Valued Propositional Calculus Containing Implication). Rozpravy ČSAV, 1959, 12, 67 pp.

P. Materna: *Zu einigen Fragen der modernen Definitionslehre* (On Some Questions of Modern Theory of Definition). Rozpravy ČSAV, 1959, 3, 72 pp.
44. O. Weinberger: *Logika* (Logic). SPN, Praha. 1959.
45. K. Berka, M. Jauris, M. Mleziva: 'Kritické poznámky k učebnici logiky pro právníky' (Critical Remarks on a Textbook of Logic for Lawyers). *FČ* 1961, 2, 269–281.
46. *FC* 1961, 5, 801–813.
47. *VF* 1960, 12, 159–162.
48. L. Menzel: 'O Kantově názoru na vývoj a dějiny formální logiky' (On Kant's Opinion Concerning the Development and History of Formal Logic). *FC* 1962, 1, 114–125.
49. L. Hrzal, K. Mácha; *Předmět i metoda historického materialismu* (Subject and Method of Historical Materialism). SNPL, Praha. 1961. 156 pp.
50. J. Karásek: *O společenskom bytí a společenskom vedomí* (On Social Being and Social Consciousness). Osveta, Bratislava. 1961. 202 pp.
51. J. Kánsky: 'O kritériu morálnosti' (On the Criterion of Morality). *OMF* 1961, 3, 230–232.
52. J. Kánsky: *Co je zmyslom našho života* (What is the Sense of Our Life). Osveta, Bratislava. 1961. 96 pp.
53. Z. Mlynář: *K teorii socialistické demokracie* (Remarks on the Theory of Socialist Democracy). SNPL, Praha. 1961. 206 pp.
54. A. Zempliner: 'Čínská filosofie a Leibniz' (Chinese Philosophy and Leibniz). *FČ* 1960, 4, 610–646.
55. I. Dubský: *Hegels Arbeitsbegriff und die Idealistische Dialektik* (Hegel's Concept of Labor and the Idealist Dialectic). Rospravy ČSAV, spol. vědy. 1961, 14, 48 pp.
56. R. Kalivoda: *Husitská ideologie* (Hussite Ideology). NČSAV, Praha. 1961. 564 pp.
57. M. Machovec: *Fr. Palacký a česká filosofie* (Fr. Palacký and Czech Philosophy). Rozpravy ČSAV, spol. vědy, 1961, 2, 126 pp.
58. *FC* 1961, 6, 893–900.
59. *FC* 1960, 6, 971–974; *OMF* 1961, 3, 249 ff.
60. K. Engliš: *Das Problem der Logik* (The Problem of Logic). Wien, Rohrer. 1962. 67 pp.; *Die Lehre von der Denkordnung* (The Doctrine of Ordering Thought). Wien, Rohrer. 1962. 279 pp.
61. MLČ p. 208 ff.

S. MÜLLER-MARKUS

ZUR SOWJETISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE DER PHYSIK IM JAHRE 1962

I. ALLGEMEINE ENTWICKLUNGSZÜGE

Das Jahr 1962 brachte eine weitere Intensifierung der sowjetischen Bemühungen, die moderne Physik im Sinne des Diamat zu bewältigen. Offenkundig ist dabei vor allem der Trend, sich von schablonenhaften Generalisierungen im Stile des früheren Philosophierens zu befreien und zu den aktuellen Einzelproblemen vorzustoßen. Die Aktivität verlagert sich dabei immer mehr von der Ebene der Philosophen auf die der Physiker, wobei eine Reihe von neuen Namen auftritt. Der Appell zur philosophischen Durchdenkung des heutigen Wissens hat die Naturwissenschaftler erfaßt.

Ein weiteres Kennzeichen der gegenwärtigen Situation ist die immer wieder eingestandene Rückzugsbewegung der doktrinären Parteiphilosophen vor der heutigen Physik. Das Trauma des Prozesses gegen Einstein, den die Philosophen unter so dramatischen Umständen verloren, ist noch nicht überwunden. Daß ein Physiker wie Kapica in drastischer Weise die Philosophen noch 1962 daran erinnerte*, ist nur aus dem tiefen Groll zu verstehen, den die Physiker heute noch zum mindesten gegen den doktrinären Philosophenflügel hegen, einem Groll, der sich bei zahlreichen Gelegenheiten Luft macht. Die alte Philosophengarde wie Mitin, I. V. Kuznecov, Omel'janovskij, welche den Sturz Maksimovs und den Bruch 1955 überlebte, reagiert auf diese Situation mit ständigen Beteuerungen ihres guten Willens, die neuen Einsichten anzuerkennen, und zieht sich nach Möglichkeit auf Positionen zurück, die so genereller Natur sind, daß sie einer direkten Konfrontierung mit der Physik ausweichen. So heißt es in einem offiziösen (weil anonymen) Aufsatz der *VF* 1962, 8: "In letzter Zeit ... wird auf wissenschaftlichen Konferenzen und Versammlungen, in unserer Presse, bei zahlreichen Unterhaltungen zwischen Wissenschaftlern immer wieder die Frage nach dem militanten Bündnis zwischen Naturwissenschaftlern und Philosophen aufgeworfen. Selbst-

* See D. D. Comey in *SST* 2 (1962) 226–228.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

verständlich setzt dieses Bündnis keinen einseitigen Kontakt voraus, wo die eine Seite gegenüber der anderen aktiv hervortritt und die andere nur passiv rezipiert, was von der ersten ausgeht. Man soll sich dieses Bündnis nicht so vorstellen, als müsse die Philosophie Aufgabe und Bedingungen der modernen Naturwissenschaft diktieren und Schiedsrichter bei der Lösung konkreter Probleme der Wissenschaft sein. Man darf sich die Sache nicht so vorstellen: Die Einzel-(Natur-)Wissenschaften sollen der Philosophie das konkrete Material zur Verfügung stellen und sich dabei unabhängig von ihr entwickeln, während die Philosophie nur dieses Material in verallgemeinerter Form in sich einsaugt und immer hinter der Entwicklung der Naturwissenschaft zurückbleibt".[1] Die deklarativen Hinweise auf die völlige Harmonie zwischen Physik und Diamat wirken demgegenüber eher wie Überkompensationen von Minderwertigkeitskomplexen.

Andererseits buchen die Philosophen zu Recht als Erfolg die Tatsache, daß eine wirkliche Philosophie der Physik im Aufbrechen ist. Dies zeigt sich an der zunehmenden Zahl von Konferenzen und Diskussionen, aber auch an der Vertiefung der Probleme. Wenn sich auch die derzeitige sowjetische Wissenschaftsphilosophie noch nicht mit der angelsächsischen, besonders englischen, *Philosophy of Science* messen kann, so hat sie ihr doch die bewußte Zuwendung zu den eigentlich metaphysischen Anliegen voraus. Das Fanal gaben ja seinerzeit Fok und A. D. Aleksandrov auf der Allunionskonferenz 1958 und man sieht, daß ihr Neubeginn nicht im luftleeren Raum hängen blieb.

So schreibt Okulov 1962: "Man kann ohne Übertreibung sagen, daß die letzten Jahre für die sowjetische Philosophie auch in dieser Richtung (gemeint ist die Naturphilosophie – der Verfasser) fruchtbar gewesen sind . . . Die Publikationen über philosophische Fragen der Naturwissenschaft zeigen, daß unsere Gelehrten heute, ausgehend von den Grundprinzipien des dialektischen Materialismus, ihre originellen Deutungen für eine Reihe von philosophischen Problemen anbieten, insbesondere der Quantenmechanik und Relativitätstheorie".[2]

Gerade unter diesem Gesichtspunkt halten die Philosophen nicht mit ihrer Kritik an den derzeitigen Mängeln zurück. Okulov gibt zu, daß angesichts des wachsenden Interesses für marxistische naturphilosophische Forschungen im In- und Ausland die Arbeit der methodologischen Seminare und des Wissenschaftlichen Rats für philosophische Fragen der

Naturwissenschaft beim Präsidium der AN nicht restlos befriedigt. Hauptmangel sei die ungenügend tiefe Analyse der eigentlich philosophischen Anliegen, viele Arbeiten litten an einem Empirismus; die eigentlichen Thesen des Diamat würden nur schwach beleuchtet und man stelle nur selten neue philosophische Probleme. Ferner würden vornehmlich weit zurückliegende Theorien behandelt. Als Hauptaufgaben nennt Okulov: Philosophische (gemeint sind wohl ontologische), erkenntnistheoretische und logische Probleme der Naturwissenschaft, allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Entwicklung und der logischen Struktur der Naturerkenntnis, Analyse ihrer allgemein theoretischen Fragen.[3] Okulov verlangt ein umfassendes Werk, in dem das moderne Weltbild vom Standpunkt des Diamat dargestellt wird, wie es die Wissenschaft schon lange erwarte. "Dieses Werk sei von ungeheurer philosophischer Bedeutung, es solle eine Dialektik der Natur auf der Höhe des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts schaffen. Mit der Vorstellung, als sei die Dialektik eine Summe von Beispielen mit rein beschreibendem, kommentierendem Charakter der Darlegung der Grundgesetze und Kategorien der Dialektik, ist ein Ende zu machen".[4]

Auch der o.g. Anonymus in *VF* 1962, 8 verlangt enzyklopädische Werke über die philosophische Analyse der ganzen modernen Naturwissenschaft; z.Zt. beginne man mit einer mehrbändigen Ausgabe "Der dialektische Materialismus und die moderne Naturwissenschaft" unter Teilnahme von Philosophen und vielen hervorragenden Naturwissenschaftlern; der erste Band "Gegenstand und Zusammenhang der Naturwissenschaften" befinde sich bereits im Druck.[5]

Ganz offenkundig ist die Ausweitung des freien Spielraums für Diskussionen, z.B. auf der Konferenz über philosophische Probleme der Elementarteilchen. Von einer Restalinisierung ist auf diesem Sektor der Sowjetphilosophie eigentlich nichts zu bemerken. Im Gegenteil, die alten Freund-Feind Stellungen ('hie Diamat, dort Idealismus') mit ihrem polemisierenden statt argumentierenden Stil werden bewußt selbst von den Philosophen abgebaut. Das heißt nicht, daß die alte Mentalität nicht immer wieder sich durchdrängt, aber sie ist durch die Einbußen an Selbstvertrauen erheblich geschwächt. In diesem Sinn kann man von einer Tendenz zu einer Art aufgeklärten Diamat bei der Mehrheit der Diskussionspartner sprechen. Ob sie anhält, ob sie den steigenden Vertrauensschwund in den Diamat auffängt oder ob bei ihrem Versagen die Partei-

führung wieder zu den alten, bereits gescheiterten Methoden zurückgreift, kann freilich nicht vorausgesagt werden. Die folgende Darstellung greift nur besonders symptomatische Ereignisse heraus.

II. ORGANISATORISCHES UND NEUE PUBLIKATIONEN

A. Das Jahr 1962 erlebte 4 große naturphilosophische Konferenzen und zwar über die philosophischen Probleme der Physik der Elementarteilchen[6], über Psychologie und Physiologie des höheren Nervensystems,[7] über Kybernetik[8] (alle drei in Moskau) und über Methodologie und Logik der wissenschaftlichen Forschung in Kiev.[9] Über die Elementarteilchen-Konferenz wird weiter unten berichtet. Die Konferenzen faßten im wesentlichen die Arbeiten der methodologischen Seminare zusammen; ihnen gingen lange Vorbereitungsarbeiten voraus, wo Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftler über den jeweiligen Fragenkreis sich um gemeinsame Standpunkte bemühten.[10]

B. In einem Bericht von M. F. Vedenov in *VF* 1962, 10, 148–149 wird, soweit ersichtlich, erstmalig das "Büro des Wissenschaftlichen Rats für das komplexe Problem 'Philosophische Fragen der modernen Naturwissenschaft' " erwähnt. Es handelt sich vermutlich um den 1959 gegründeten Wissenschaftlichen Rat für philosophische Fragen der modernen Naturwissenschaft bei der AN SSSR. Das Büro beriet am 31.5.1962 über (1) Zustand und wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse der Forschung in philosophischen Fragen der Naturwissenschaft an den Hochschulen. (2) Ergebnisse der theoretischen Konferenz über philosophische Fragen der Elementarteilchen-Physik. (3) Ergebnisse der theoretischen Konferenz über die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften von der Erde und der Umformungsweg der Natur. Zu (1) sprach S. T. Kaltachčan, Vertreter des Amtchefs für Unterricht in Gesellschafts-Wissenschaften am Ministerium für Höhere und Mittlere Spezialausbildung der UdSSR, und N. V. Pilipenko, Vertreter des Amtchefs des Ministeriums für Höhere und Mittlere Spezialausbildung der RSFSR. Sie brachten Material über das Anwachsen der Forschung zu philosophischen Fragen der Naturwissenschaft an den Universitäten und die weitere Stärkung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern. Danach steige mit jedem Jahr die Zahl der entsprechenden Veröffentlichungen. Mit naturphilosophischen Fragen beschäftigten sich die Universitäten Mos-

kau, Leningrad, Kiev, Sverdlovsk und kleinerer Städte, z.B. in der Republik Kazachstan sieben philosophische Lehrstühle und sechs in Georgien. Die Perspektivpläne zeugten von der Vielfalt der Forschungen und dem Wachstum der Zahl der Philosophen und Naturforscher, die sich mit der entsprechenden Problematik auseinandersetzen. Zur Erforschung zentraler philosophischer Probleme würden große Teams ("Kollektive") aus verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Institutionen geschaffen. An der Monographie "Naturwissenschaft und Aufbau des Kommunismus" arbeiteten Vertreter des Lehrstuhls für dialektischen und historischen Materialismus der naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultäten der MGU, der Lehrstühle für Philosophie am Medizinischen Institut in Kemerovo und am Ersten Medizinischen Institut in Moskau, der Lehrstühle für Marxismus-Leninismus der Medizinischen Institute Jaroslavl und Kujbyšev sowie Vertreter der naturwissenschaftlichen Lehrstühle der MGU. An einer Monographie über "Philosophische Probleme der modernen Lehre von der Bewegung der Materie" arbeiteten philosophische Lehrstühle der Leningrader Universität, des Medizinischen Instituts in Irkutsk, der Ural-Universität, des Elektrotechnischen Instituts in Leningrad. Teams der philosophischen Lehrstühle des Pädagogischen Instituts in Rostov, der Baškirischen Universität und des Medizinischen Instituts in Kazan arbeiteten an einer Monographie über "Die Spezifik des Lebens und die Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Entwicklung der lebendigen Körper".

In der Diskussion wies G. A. Svečnikov, Älterer wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter des Sektors für philosophische Fragen der Naturwissenschaft am IF, auf die Notwendigkeit eines besseren Kontakts der Wissenschaftlich-Technischen Räte der Unions- und Republikanischen Ministerien für Hochschul- und mittlere Spezialbildung mit dem Wissenschaftlichen Rat für das komplexe Problem "Philosophische Fragen der modernen Naturwissenschaft" hin.

I. V. Kuznecov verlangte einen engeren Kontakt der Institute der AN mit den Universitäten, sowie die Heranziehung von wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeitern des IF für Vorlesungen über philosophische Probleme der Naturwissenschaft an den Hochschulen.

V. N. Stoletov, Minister für Höhere und Mittlere Spezialausbildung der RSFSR, verlangte die Heranziehung vorhandener und die Vorbereitung neuer Kader für die naturphilosophische Forschung. Philosophische Fragen der Naturwissenschaft müßten von den Philosophen und nicht den

Naturwissenschaftlern bearbeitet werden. Š. G. Adeišvili (Universität Tiflis) schlug vor, zur Beschleunigung der Ausbildung von naturphilosophischen Kadern Bewerber in die Aspirantur ohne vorherige Tätigkeit in einem Industrie-Betrieb heranzuziehen.

An der Diskussion nahmen ebenfalls B. F. Semkov (Referent der Wissenschaftlich-Organisatorischen Abteilung des Präsidiums der AN), V. M. Kaganov (IF), I. B. Novik (IF), A. I. Kompaneec (IF), V. V. Filimonov (Pädagogisches Institut in Syktykvar), Omel'janovskij und Prof. G. F. Chil'mi teil.

C. In den Filosofskie Nauki 1962, 6 wird die Existenz einer besonderen "Kommission für philosophische Fragen der Naturwissenschaft des Wissenschaftlich-Technischen Rats am Ministerium für Höhere und Mittlere Spezialausbildung der UdSSR" erwähnt.[11]

III. PHILOSOPHIE DER PHYSIK AN DER MGU

Kennzeichnend für die Intensität der naturphilosophischen Arbeit ist ein Bericht über das methodologische Seminar an der Physikalischen Fakultät der MGU.[12] Das Seminar existiert seit über 10 Jahren. Mitarbeiter sind die Dozenten der Physikalischen Fakultät und die Dozenten für Philosophie an den naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultäten der MGU. An den Sitzungen nimmt stets eine große Zahl von Studenten teil. Vier Sitzungen behandelten 1961 die Kausalität in der klassischen und Quantenphysik mit Referaten von Akademiemitglied N. N. Bogoljubov (einem der bedeutendsten mathematischen Physiker der UdSSR) und Ja. P. Terleckij. Ferner sprachen u.a. Prof. F. A. Korolëv über "Diskretheit und Kontinuität im Lichte der Elementarteilchen-Physik", Prof. B. V. Kukarkin über "methodologische Probleme der modernen Kosmogonie"[13], Prof. V. K. Semenčenko und V. A. Zamkov über Heisenbergs "Physik und Philosophie".* Der Bericht spricht ferner von dem weiten Widerhall der Forschungen N. A. Kozyrevs (Leningrad) über die experimentellen Möglichkeiten der Bestimmung der Eigenschaften der Zeit, worüber Kozyrev auch am Seminar referierte.

Bemerkenswert ist das Bemühen, auch in den rein physikalischen Vorlesungen philosophische Probleme zu erörtern; dazu referierten u.a. Akademiemitglied I. K. Kikoin ("Methodologische Probleme der Mechanik

* Ullstein, Berlin. 1959.

im Lehrgang der allgemeinen Physik") sowie Prof. A. A. Sokolov[14] und Prof. A. S. Davydov[15] ("Methodologische Probleme der Quantenmechanik"). Der Berichterstatter spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer Verbesserung der geistigen Zielrichtung ("idejnaja napravlennost'") der physikalischen Lehrgänge und der Erarbeitung der dialektisch-materialistischen Weltanschauung bei den Studenten; mehr als früher würden heute methodologische Fragen bei den Vorlesungen berührt. Blochincev (*Osnovy kvantovoj mechaniki,* 1961), Bazarov (der Berichterstatter selbst, *Termodinamika,* 1961), A. A. Sokolov, I. M. Loskutov und I. M. Ternov (*Kvantovaja mechanika,* 1962), alles Mitarbeiter des Seminars, hätten ihre Arbeiten auf Grund entsprechender Diskussionen verfaßt. Die Partei begnügt sich jedoch offenbar nicht mit Wissenschafts-internen Forschungen; sie wünscht eine Popularisierung, um die breiten Schichten von der Harmonie zwischen Diamat und Physik zu überzeugen. Bazarov erwähnt einen gemeinsamen Brief des Physikalischen Dekanats und des Parteibüros 1962 an die Lehrstühle der Fakultät, worin auf die Bedeutung der ideologischen Erziehung der Werktätigen im Lichte des neuen Parteiprogramms hingewiesen wurde. Praktische Schritte wurden bisher nicht bekannt.

IV. LINUS PAULING AM IF

Die VF 1962, 2 berichten über ein Gespräch zwischen dem amerikanischen Nobelpreisträger Linus Pauling und Vertretern des IF am 30. November 1961. Pauling wurde 1949–1951 wegen seiner Resonanztheorie von den Philosophen aufs heftigste angegriffen und seine Theorie offiziell 1951 verurteilt.[16] Paulings Auftreten am IF in Gegenwart der führenden Köpfe des reaktionären Philosophenflügels Mitin und I. V. Kuznecov zeigte die ganze Unsicherheit dieser Philosophengruppe, zugleich aber auch den Abgrund zwischen der extrem positivistischen, ja philosophiefremden Haltung Paulings und der Pseudometaphysik der Sowjetphilosophen. Diese Situation wird durch die folgenden (gekürzten) Ausschnitte aus dem Gespräch in geradezu klassischer Weise gekennzeichnet[17]:

Pauling: 1947 schrieb Haldane, meine Resonanztheorie sei das beste Beispiel des Diamat. 1949 schrieben die *VF,* diese Theorie sei mit dem Diamat nicht zu vereinen. Ich finde es sehr schwer, die philosophischen Arbeiten der Philosophen der alten Generation zu verstehen. Ich habe eine sehr einfache Haltung gegenüber der Welt als ganzer, darunter auch

der Philosophie. "Nach meiner Meinung bestand der größere Teil der Werke der Philosophen der alten Generation im Grunde eher aus Worten als aus Sinn." Das Prinzip meines Freundes Bridgman war, von nichts zu sprechen, was nicht bewiesen oder verifiziert oder falsifiziert ist durch das praktische Experiment. Dies ist eine zu extreme Haltung, da sie uns hindert, über sehr viele interessante Dinge zu sprechen. Aber darin ist dennoch ein Körnchen Wahrheit.

Mitin: Früher haben unsere Philosophen, welche den rationalen Kern einer neuen Theorie nicht von ihren idealistischen Begleiterscheinungen unterscheiden konnten, diese Theorien angegriffen. Aber heute (ich denke, daß ich dies sagen kann und die hier anwesenden Genossen werden es bestätigen) haben wir uns von solchen Extremen befreit oder befreien wir uns. "Im Gegenteil, wir gelangen zum Schluß und beweisen es nach Maß unserer Möglichkeiten, daß die neuen, wirklich wissenschaftlichen Richtungen und Entdeckungen nicht nur völlig in den Rahmen unseres philosophischen Systems passen, sondern auch die Grundprinzipien des Diamat bestätigen."

Pauling: Die philosophischen Schulen in Amerika spielen keine Rolle gegenüber der Wissenschaft, dies bezieht sich auf die Philosophie als Ganzes. Die amerikanischen Gelehrten verhalten sich ebenso wie ich gegenüber der Wissenschaft pragmatisch, wenn auch nicht im philosophischen Sinne. Seit meiner vierzigjährigen Tätigkeit finde ich keinen Fall, wo die Arbeit eines Gelehrten in Amerika oder England irgendwie von der Philosophie beeinflußt wäre. Ich bin gegen die göttliche Offenbarung und göttliche Wahrheiten, weil dieses Moment den Gelehrten einengt und ihn zwingt, in einer bestimmten Richtung zu arbeiten. Von meinem Standpunkt aus ist der Diamat gerade eine solche dogmatische Theorie, welche dem Menschen bestimmte Rahmen auferlegt. Insbesondere gilt dies gegenüber der Resonanztheorie. Ausserdem ist er bei allem Dogmatismus eine sehr unklare Philosophie.

I. V. Kuznecov: Jede wissenschaftliche These legt Einschränkungen auf, das ist unvermeidlich. Auch der Verzicht auf den Glauben an die göttliche Offenbarung ist eine Einschränkung. Das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der Energie bedeutet eine Einschränkung, indem es die Unmöglichkeit eines perpetuum mobile dartut. Darin ist jedoch nichts Dogmatisches.

Pauling: In meiner Leugnung der göttlichen Offenbarung bin ich keineswegs absolut, ich sehe zu, ob man nicht irgendwelche Beweise dafür finden könne, und wenn man sie findet, so nehme ich sie an. Dasselbe kann ich

über meine Beziehung zu dem übersinnlichen Wissen, zur Telepathie sagen. Solange es keine Beweise gibt, ist die Frage offen. Ich untersuchte jene Argumente, welche gewöhnlich die Verteidiger der göttlichen Offenbarung bringen, fand aber nichts, was mich als Gelehrten befriedigte. Dasselbe gilt auch für den Diamat. Dennoch glaube ich nicht, daß diese Meinung absolut ist, ich bin geöffnet für weitere Beweise, ich habe nur die empirische Erfahrung zur Verfügung. Als ich vorige Woche in Leningrad war, bemerkte ich, daß in den fünfziger Jahren die sowjetische Chemie zurückblieb, weil die Philosophen die Resonanztheorie unterdrückten. Dies ist ein Beispiel, wo die Philosophie, vielleicht ein falscher Teil dieser Philosophie, sich schädlich auf die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft auswirkte. Insbesondere zeigt sich dies an der nicht ganz exakten und glatten Darstellung der Resonanztheorie in den Lehrbüchern für Chemie, was sich wieder auf die Affassungen der Studenten auswirkt.

I. V. Kuznecov: Die sowjetischen Philosophen waren gegenüber der Resonanztheorie vorsichtig, weil sich darin die Grundthese befand, daß der reale Zustand eines Moleküls die Summe von vorgestellten Teilzuständen sei. Das reale, materielle Objekt bestand somit gewissermaßen aus logischen Abstraktionen und nicht aus realen, materiellen Teilchen. Der Hauptpunkt des Zweifels war, daß das reale Objekt aus gedanklichen logischen Konstruktionen aufgebaut wurde. Butlerov hat offenbar seinerseits die Struktur des Moleküls als eine reale, in der Wirklichkeit vorkommende Struktur angesehen.

Pauling: Das Protein-Molekül besitzt eine Struktur, die Chemie versteht sie jedoch als 2-valentige Verbindung Kohlenstoff-Kohlenstoff, 1-valentige Verbindung Kohlenstoff-Kohlenstoff, und Kohlenstoff-Wasserstoff. Diese Verbindungen existieren nicht real, sondern nur im Kopf des Gelehrten.

I. V. Kuznecov: Aber etwas Reales spiegeln diese Abstraktionen doch wieder?

Pauling: Als reales Experiment. Die Kritiker haben die Theorie von Butlerov nicht kritisiert, obwohl sie auch darauf gepaßt hätte.

I. V. Kuznecov: Nach meiner Auffassung ist die Anwendung der Quantenmechanik und der quantitativen Methoden auf die Chemie sehr fortschrittlich und erfolgreich. Die Resonanztheorie versuchte erstmalig die theoretische Chemie mit der Quantenmechanik zu vereinen und spielte zweifellos eine große Rolle. Auf diesem Weg gibt es die weitesten Ab-

straktionen. Vielleicht unterstreicht keine andere Wissenschaft so wie der Diamat den gewaltigen Wert der Methode des abstrakten Denkens und er gibt auf diesem Weg für den Gelehrten keinerlei Hindernisse. Er unterstreicht nur, daß letztlich hinter jeder wissenschaftlichen Abstraktion sich eine objektive Realität verbergen muß, welche verifiziert, daß es sich nicht um eine Phantasie handelt. Das ist die Hauptforderung, niemals des Gefühl der Realität zu verlieren. So finden wir nichts Schlechtes daran, daß durch die Fourier-Zerlegung die in Raum und Zeit begrenzten realen Funktionen, etwa die Schwingungen einer Saite endlicher Länge, in vorgestellte Komponenten zerlegt werden, d.h. in unendliche Sinus-Kurven in Raum und Zeit. Wir finden, daß diese Methode außergewöhnlich fruchtbar ist. Es scheint mir, daß die Resonanztheorie der Fourier-Zerlegung ähnelt und wir begrüßen deshalb alle Erfolge bei der Entwicklung dieser Theorie.

Pauling: Diese Haltung unterscheidet sich stark von der früheren. Meiner Auffassung nach war das Hauptübel, daß die Kritiker der Resonanztheorie nicht die Quantenmechanik kannten.

Mitin: Wir bemühen uns, all das Wertvollste philosophisch zu durchdenken, was in der Wissenschaft vorkommt, und es mit unserer Weltanschauung zu verknüpfen. Dabei gibt es Schwierigkeiten, einige Extreme oder Irrtümer sind völlig natürlich und erklärbar. "Je weiter wir aber vorwärtsgehen, desto höher erheben wir uns in dem Verständnis unserer Weltanschauung und in der Entwicklung der Wissenschaft, desto mehr liquidieren wir diese Extreme und Irrtümer und finden einen immer rationaleren Sinn in allen wissenschaftlichen Errungenschaften; wir sehen, wie sie die Grundprinzipien des Diamat bestätigen. Auch das, was Prof. Kuznecov über die Rolle der Abstraktion in der Entwicklung der Wissenschaft sagte, über den grenzenlosen Horizont für den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt und gleichzeitig von der realen Grundlage für die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft, das ist das Wichtigste, was unsere Prinzipien in dieser Frage kennzeichnet."

Pauling: Ich habe eine offene Vernunft gegenüber dem Diamat, aber ich bin ein tief praktischer Mensch und mich interessieren vorläufig mehr die unmittelbare Anwendung als schwierige philosophische Probleme. Ich bedaure sehr, daß meine erste, nein meine zweite Begegnung mit dem Diamat eine ganze Reihe von schwierigen Momenten zutage treten ließ.

V. DIE KONFERENZ ÜBER PHILOSOPHISCHE PROBLEME DER TEILCHENPHYSIK

Im April 1962 fand am Lebedev-Institut für Physik in Moskau die Theoretische Konferenz über philosophische Probleme der Elementarteilchen-Physik statt, einberufen vom Wissenschaftlichen Rat für das komplexe Problem "philosophische Probleme der modernen Naturwissenschaft" und der Abteilung für physikalisch-mathematische Wissenschaften der AN SSSR. Es nahmen über 250 Physiker und Philosophen mit 11 Referaten teil.[18] Gegenstand war diesmal ein 'Frontproblem' der Physik, statt wie früher wiederholt bemängelt, ein Etappenproblem. Es wurde praktisch ideologiefrei über philosophisches Neuland diskutiert. Grundthesen des Diamat wie "der Zufall ist eine Form der Notwendigkeit", die restlose Erkennbarkeit der Welt oder die Unendlichkeit des Alls, gerieten ins Wanken. Die Physiker wagten kühne Hypothesen, während sich die Philosophen im wesentlichen auf Gemeinplätze beschränkten. Diskutiert wurde vornehmlich die Struktur der Teilchen. Zum Grundsätzlichen meinte Blochincev: Die Teilchenprobleme lassen sich nur durch ein enges schöpferisches Zusammenwirken von philosophischem und physikalisch-mathematischem Denken bewältigen. Für einen materialistischen Physiker muß es tiefe innere Ursachen, nämlich eine innere Struktur für die Existenz und die Eigenschaften der Teilchen geben. Diese Struktur wurde durch Hofstadter und die Versuche mit π-Mesonenstreuung in Dubna nachgewiesen. Zur Zeit sind uns nur die äußerlichsten Regionen der Teilchenstruktur zugänglich, die heutige Quantenfeldtheorie vermag nicht die Vielfalt und die Eigenschaften der Teilchen zu erklären. Die Schwierigkeit besteht darin, daß der heutige Physiker nur die Teilchensprache kennt; diese eignet sich jedoch schlecht zur Beschreibung von Vorgängen in den Tiefen des Teilchens. Verzichtet man jedoch auf den Teilchenbegriff, so verletzt man den mathematischen Apparat der Theorie. Möglicherweise fehlen nur zwei bis drei Begriffe für eine physikalische Idee zum vollen Verständnis der Mikrowelt; sie dürfen nicht weniger revolutionär sein als die Ausgangsbegriffe der Relativitäts- und Quantentheorie.

Nach I. V. Kuznecov blieb die gegenwärtige Theorie weit hinter dem Experiment zurück; daher ist es heuristisch bedeutsam, den Begriffsapparat von Theorien bei ihrem Übergang in eine neue Theorie zu analysieren. Dabei stellt sich heraus: (1) Einander ablösende Theorien ent-

halten stets wesenhaft allgemeine Elemente, identische Begriffe, welche die Existenz ähnlicher Eigenschaften der materiellen Objekte wiedergeben. (2) Sie enthalten die gleichen Erhaltungs- und Bewegungsgesetze. (3) Das Invarianzpostulat gilt sowohl in einer für die jeweilige Theorie spezifischen als auch in einer für die alte und neue Theorie gemeinsamen Form. (4) Die allen Theorien zu eigenen Grundgesetze können aus dem Variationsprinzip abgeleitet werden, was die Einheit des Allgemeinen und Besonderen widerspiegelt. (5) Die neue Theorie enthält die Gesetze der vorhergehenden als Grenzfall (Korrespondenzprinzip), sofern ein charakteristischer Parameter der neuen Theorie einen bestimmten Wert annimmt.[19]

Nach Terleckij dienen die Hofstadterschen Versuche als glänzende Bestätigung der Leninschen These von der Unerschöpflichkeit des Elektrons.[20] Für räumliche Gebiete innerhalb der Teilchen und evtl. in deren unmittelbarer Umgebung liegen Abweichungen von der Quantenmechanik und Relativitätstheorie vor, wir gelangen dabei zur Existenz von starren Teilchen und einer Elementarlänge, zu verborgenen Parametern, zu einem imaginären Thermostaten von Überlicht-Teilchen usw. In kleinen Abständen wird dabei gemäß der Negation der Negation wieder eine quasi-klassische Auffassung ohne Unschärfebeziehung eingeführt. Nach Tjapkin (Vereinigtes Kernforschungsinstitut Dubna) und Fajnberg (Physik. Institut der AN) hat hingegen das Experiment keine starre räumliche Ausdehnung (starre Formfaktoren) der Teilchen bewiesen. Auch für den Leningrader Philosophen Meljuchin gibt es ein subelementares Materieniveau, dessen Erkenntnis die ungewöhnlichsten physikalischen Ideen erfordert; dennoch darf eine neue Theorie weder das Kausalitätsprinzip noch die Materieerhaltung verletzen.[21] Pachomov (Bijsk) wies auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Wechselwirkungstyp und Teilchenstruktur hin, es gibt folglich Teilchen mit verschiedenen Strukturen, die total verschiedenen Gesetzen unterliegen; die Komplexheit der Struktur nimmt mit der Stärke des Wechselwirkungstyps zu.

I. S. Alekseev (MGU) gab eine interessante Hypothese zum Problem der Relation von Ganzem, Teil und Struktur in der Mikrowelt: Durch die wechselseitige Umwandelbarkeit der Teilchen und ihre gegenseitige Zuordnung im ganzen Spektrum der bekannten Energien wird nicht nur die Existenz der Urmaterie nahegelegt, deren Anregungszustände die Teilchen sind, sondern auch ein eigenartiger Zusammenhang des Teilchens mit dem

Weltall: Beim Zusammenstoß eines Teilchens von nahezu Lichtgeschwindigkeit mit einem anderen Teilchen wird die Wechselwirkungsenergie so groß, daß Galaxien und Supergalaxien entstehen können (Blochincev), so daß das Teilchen gewissermaßen das ganze All hinter sich nachzieht. Die heutigen physikalischen Mittel, d.h. die Teilchen selbst, gestatten also offenbar nicht, in das subelementare Niveau einzudringen. Hier tritt eine eigenartige Erkenntnisgrenze auf, die mit unserer Situation als Makrowesen zusammenhängt. Vorläufig finden wir in der Wissenschaft keinen Anhalt für die Überschreitung dieser Grenze.

V. I. Skurlatov (Physik. Institut der AN) erinnerte in diesem Zusammenhang daran, daß Demokrit das Unendlichkeitsproblem durch die Annahme eines untrennbaren momentanen Zusammenhangs jedes Atoms mit dem Universum lösen wollte. Diese Annahme stehe mit der ganzheitlichen quantenmechanischen Beschreibung des Kosmos im Einklang, mit dem Gedanken von kraftlosen Wechselwirkungen; dieser finde möglicherweise in einer neuen Theorie des inneren Isotopenraums der Teilchen eine anschauliche Erklärung. Arbeiten, die einen inneren Raum annehmen, führen ja zum Teilchenspektrum. Es besteht eine tiefe Analogie zwischen den Modellen eines Innenraums der Teilchen und den relativistischen geschlossenen Weltmodellen.

Auch S. F. Šušurin (MGU) begründete vom logischen Standpunkt aus die Existenz eines subelementaren Materie-Niveaus. Überaus kennzeichnend ist sein Hinweis auf die operationelle Natur der physikalischen Begriffe – was der bisherigen antipositivistischen Haltung der Sowjetphilosophie widerspricht – und seine Forderung, die philosophischen Probleme der Teilchenphysik müßten zur Grundlage einer Ontologie des Diamat werden.

Omel'janovskij untersuchte eingehend das Problem der Elementarität[22]: Häufig hört man, unähnlich den chemischen Elementen gebe es heute kein Kriterium für die Elementarität der Teilchen; diese These ist zu vorsichtig, denn wir stehen vor einer völlig neuen Situation. Das Neutron zerfällt spontan in ein Elektron, Proton und Neutrino, obwohl es nicht aus ihnen besteht. Ein Teilchen, das ein anderes absorbiert oder erzeugt, ist nicht zusammengesetzt, denn bei der Beschleunigung von Elektronen oder Protonen werden Photonen emittiert oder absorbiert, obwohl diese nicht in den Ausgangsteilchen enthalten sind. Folglich lassen sich auch stabile Teilchen nicht nur deshalb als wahrhaft elementar ansehen, weil sie nicht spontan zerfallen.

Die Definition des Elementarteilchens als ein aus keinen anderen Teilchen bestehendes Objekt ist tautologisch. Offenbar besteht eine Hierarchie von Elementaritäten, wobei jedes Niveau (Teilungsstufe) eine elementare Stufe für die folgende Teilung und eine zusammengesetzte für die vorhergehende darstellt. Diese relative Elementarität gestattet zwei Varianten: (1) Es gibt wirklich elementare Grundelemente, dann ist der Begriff des verschiedenen Elementaritätsgrades falsch, da er aus einer Verdoppelung der termini rührt und nicht dem Wesen der Dinge entspricht. (2) Die Teilungsreihe ist nach beiden Seiten unendlich. Dies entspricht der These des Diamat von der Unendlichkeit der Materie und steht nicht im Gegensatz zur Naturwissenschaft.[23]

Variante (2) zerfällt wieder in zwei Untervarianten: (2a) besagt, daß im Sinne der Hegelschen schlechten Unendlichkeit ein immer wiederholter Übergang vom Elementaren zum Zusammengesetzten und umgekehrt vorliegt, m.a.W. es besteht überhaupt kein Objekt aus wirklich elementaren Teilen. (2b) nimmt mit Engels in der unendlichen Teilungsreihe Knotenpunkte an, die verschiedene qualitative Daseinsformen der Universal-Materie bedingen.

Hier besteht die Materie weder aus elementaren Teilchen noch ihrer Kombination, noch ist sie eine Substanz, die nicht aus Elementarteilchen bestünde, sie weist vielmehr als Ganzes sowohl die Eigenschaften des Elementaren und Zusammengesetzten auf. Darin ist der Weg zur Lösung des Elementaritätsproblems der Teilchenphysik vorgezeichnet.[24]

Omel'janovskij bietet folgende Lösung an: In der Mikrophysik werden die Begriffe des Elementaren und Zusammengesezten fließend. Unterhalb der Schwelle von 100 MeV verhält sich etwa das Proton wie ein Elementarteilchen, darüber zerfällt es bei Stößen in Hyperonen und K-Mesonen, verhält sich also wie ein komplexes Teilchen. Elementarität und Komplexheit kommen also dem Proton nur unter den Bedingungen zu, wie sie vom Gerät fixiert werden. Beide Begriffe sind also relativ; "relativ" jedoch nicht im obigen Sinn des Atomaren gegenüber chemischen Umwandlungen und der Teilbarkeit in Kern und Elektronenschale, sondern relativ in dem Sinn, daß das Proton für sich[25] weder elementar noch komplex ist, sondern nur in den Grenzfällen sich als elementar *oder* komplex im organischen Zusammenhang mit seinen Umwandlungsbedingungen erweist. Die "Elementarität" des Protons ist also nicht die "Elementarität" von Kern, Atom usw. Die hier ausgesprochene Relativi-

tät ist Ausdruck der zweieinigen Natur von Elementarität und Komplexheit der Teilchen. Sie ähnelt der Relativität von zeitlichem und räumlichem Intervall, die Ausdruck der inneren Einheit von Raum und Zeit ist.[26]

Deshalb verliert auch nach Omel'janovskij für die Mikrophysik der Ausdruck "besteht aus" seinen Sinn. Schon das H-Atom besteht nicht im selben Sinn aus einem Proton und einem Elektron wie der Sand aus Körnchen, da ein Massendefekt vorliegt. Ebenso ist das freie Neutron instabil, das im Kern gebundene stabil, der Kern ist also nicht aus Neutronen und Protonen "zusammengesetzt". Auch die Hypothese, das Mesonenfeld werde aus dem elementareren Nukleonenfeld gebildet oder die Bosonen seien komplexe Bildungen aus Fermionen, führt nicht zum Begriff "besteht aus", da es sich nicht um Vereinigungen von mehreren Teilchen zu einem, sondern um Transformationen handelt: Fermionen wandeln sich in Bosonen um, nicht hingegen bestehen Bosonen aus Fermionen. Dies ist ein gigantischer Schritt zur Einheit der Materie; die Teilchenphysik vereint hier das Entwicklungs- mit dem Einheitsprinzip. Die philosophische Bedeutung dieser Erkenntnis ist kaum zu überschätzen und muß besonders untersucht werden.[27] Damit gewinnt nach Omel'janovskij auch der Strukturbegriff einen neuen Sinn. Die Tatsache, daß ein Proton von virtuellen Nukleonen und Antinukleonen, π- und K-Mesonen und Hyperonen umgeben ist, nimmt hier dem Strukturbegriff des "besteht aus" seinen klassischen Sinn.

Im weiteren wurden auf der Konferenz typische Probleme der Quantenmechanik erörtert, so vor allem der Wellen-Teilchen-Dualismus und die Wahrscheinlichkeit. Dabei kam es zu mehreren Häresien gegen die früheren Thesen der Philosophen. Fajnberg unterstrich die Bedeutung des früher gerade von Omel'janovskij attackierten Komplementaritätsprinzips für Philosophie, Mathematik und Biologie. Die Quantenfeldtheorie stellt nach Fajnberg gegenüber der nicht-relativistischen Quantenmechanik keine besonders neuen philosophischen Probleme, da sie keine neue Konstante enthält. Die wachsende Rolle statistischer Gesetze macht die Notwendigkeit zur Erscheinungsform der Zufälligkeit.

Dem widersprach G. B. Ždanov (Physik. Institut der AN) mit dem Argument, die Mittelung der Zufälligkeiten erziele auf dem Niveau der Makrowelt eine eindeutige Notwendigkeit, dies zeige, daß die auf tieferen Niveaus auftretende Zufälligkeit eine bestimmte Form der Notwendigkeit

sei, freilich eine von der dynamischen Notwendigkeit verschiedene.[28]

Auch Fajnbergs Verteidigung des Komplementaritätsprinzips stieß auf energischen Widerspruch vonseiten des Philosophen Kompaneec (IF), der den progressiven Charakter der Bohrschen Philosophie bezweifelte. Daraufhin unternahm der Philosoph Novik (IF) eine der bemerkenswertesten Versuche der Konferenz, den Anschluß an das neue physikalische Denken zu gewinnen: Die heutige Physik beruht auf einer noch fundamentaleren Revolution als vor fünfzig Jahre die Entdeckung des Wirkungsquants; im Gegensatz zu jener stehen wir heute nicht vor einer Revolutionierung des Weltbilds, sondern der Erkenntnis, nicht vor einer Mathematisierung, sondern Kybernetisierung der Physik. So ist die Heisenbergsche S-Matrix vom Typus der Kybernetik mit input, output und schwarzem Kasten. Terleckij hat die Tendenz, den bekannten Gesetzen der Dialektik eine diktatorische Rolle in der Physik zuzuschreiben, indem philosophische Sätze dogmatisiert werden. In Wirklichkeit ist die Erkenntnis unitär, d.h. die Wahrheit wird auf verschiedenen Richtungen und im Umgreifen aller Möglichkeiten erlangt. Nicht die Natur ist unser Schuldner, was die neuen Vorstellungen der physikalischen Realität und der physikalischen Erkenntnis anlangt, sondern wir sind ihr verpflichtet, sie zu durchdenken, dazu bedarf es einer neuen, nicht-Newtonschen Sprache und einer positiven, undogmatischen philosophischen Arbeit.

Auch Pozner (MGU) vertrat eine fortschrittliche Richtung: Einige Diskussionsbeiträge über das Komplementaritätsprinzip, den Wellen-Teilchen-Dualismus und die Unschärfebeziehung stellten ein kybernetisches Schema mit denselben Ideen beim input, einem schwarzen Kasten in der Mitte und verschiedenen Wertungen am output dar. Man müsse noch weiter die Idee der Komplementarität erweitern und noch weiter auf die klassischen Vorstellungen verzichten.

Interessant war auch die Diskussion über den Wellen-Teilchen-Dualismus. Nach Sokolov ist dies ein Zentralproblem auch der Teilchenphysik. Die Ursache für das statistische Verhalten liegt in der Struktur des Vakuums: Das Teilchen ist eine Korpuskel, deren Koordinaten und Impuls durch das Vakuum verschmiert werden, was sich als Welleneigenschaft kundtut. Sokolov gab zu, daß diese Deutung jedoch sehr vorläufig sei. Nach Serdjukov kann der Dualismus nicht als dialektische Synthese gedeutet werden; die "Welle" ist nur eine Form für den Inhalt "Teilchen".

I. V. Kuznecov nannte die Auffassung Serdjukovs "physikalisches

Analphabetentum". Nach Glebov verhält sich dasselbe Objekt je nach den verschiedenen Umständen als Welle oder Teilchen, während es weder das eine noch andere im klassischen Sinn ist. Nach Bazarov ist das klassische Bild einer Teilchenbahn weder logisch (Aporien Zenons) noch naturwissenschaftlich zu halten; es wird deshalb in der Quantemechanik durch das dialektische, bahnfreie Bild der Bewegung eines Einzelteilchens ersetzt, wie es bereits von Hegel und Engels vorbereitet wurde. Dieses Bild verlangt den Einfluß der Zukunft auf die Vergangenheit, d.h. kraftfreie Wechselwirkungen; daraus erklärt sich auch der Wellen-Teilchen-Dualismus.

Nach Tjapkin (Vereinigtes Kernforschungsinstitut) muß man von der direkten Aufgabe – statistische Voraussetzung der Meßergebnisse – zur umgekehrten Aufgabe übergehen, nämlich aus den Ergebnissen des Makroversuchs eindeutige Informationen über die unmittelbar nicht beobachtbaren Details der Bewegung des Objekts vor der Wechselwirkung mit dem Gerät zu erzielen. Die Idee, das Objekt habe in jedem Raumpunkt einen bestimmten Impuls, stehe nicht im Widerspruch zu den Tatsachen.[29] Nach Širokov lassen sich alle Schwierigkeiten der heutigen Physik durch eine Synthese zwischen allgemeiner Relativitätstheorie und Quanten-mechanik beheben. Die Quanten-Statistik bezieht sich nicht auf Gesamtheiten, sondern auf das einzelne, freilich nicht isolierte, Teilchen.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. *VF* 1962, 8; 89. S. auch ebenda 90–91, wo in einem offiziösen Grundsatzartikel über das Bündnis von Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern offen zugegeben wird, daß dieses Bündnis jede Art "Herumkommandierens, administrativen Eingreifens, Verfügens und Befehlens" ausschließe, wie sie der Stalinsche Persönlichkeitskult hervorbrachte. Dort sei die Wahrheitssuche durch die Dogmatisierung von häufig ungenauen, ja falschen Formulierung Stalins ersetzt worden. – Es scheint, daß diese Attacke gegen den Stalinismus ein Ventil für den angestauten Groll der Naturwissenschaftler gegen den Diamat schlechthin darstellt, denn die vom o.g. Anonymus erwähnte Leugnung der Relativitätstheorie gründete sich keineswegs auf Stalinsche Thesen, sondern auf Engels und Lenin.
2. *VF* 1962, 1, 32.
3. An dieser Themenzusammenstellung sieht man freilich, wie verschwommen die Philosophen die eigentlich philosophischen Probleme der Naturwissenschaft formulieren.
4. *VF* 1962, 1, 33.
5. *VF* 1962, 8, 93.
6. *VF* 1962, 10, 143–148.

7. *VF* 1962, 7, 68–124.
8. *VF* 1962, 11, 146–154.
9. *VF* 1962, 10, 133–141.
10. So jedenfalls *VF* 1962, 8, 92.
11. I. P. Bazarov in *FN* 1962, 6, 121–122.
12. *ibid.*
13. Siehe *VF* 1962, 2, 37–45; Angaben über das Datum der hier zitierten Referate fehlen.
14. Einer der führenden sowjetischen Theoretiker zur Quantenfeldtheorie, S. A. A. Sokolov: *Vvedenie v kvantovuju elektrodinamiku* (Einführung in die Quantenelektrodynamik). Moskva. 1958. 534 str.
15. Einer der führenden sowjetischen Kernphysiker; S. A. S. Davydov: *Teorija atomnogo jadra* (Die Theorie des Atomkerns). Moskva. 1958. 611 str. – Daß Physiker wie die genannten bewußt philosophische Fragen in ihre Lehrbücher einbauen wollen, ist sicher mehr als ein Tribut an die Ideologie, sondern berührt echte Anliegen der modernen Physik, wie sie auch im Westen von führenden theoretischen Physikern empfunden werden.
16. S. A. Buchholz: *Ideologie und Forschung in der sowjetischen Naturwissenschaft,* Stuttgart, 1953. S. 38–43. G. Wetter: *Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion,* Hamburg. 1958. S. 56–59.
17. *VF* 1962, 2, 145–150.
18. S. *VF* 1962, 10, 143–148. An vollständigen Texten wurden bisher veröffentlicht: M. E. Omel'janovskij: 'Kvantovaja fizika i problema elementarnosti častic' (Die Quantenphysik und das Problem der Elementarität der Teilchen). *VF* 1962, 9; I. S. Šapiro: 'O kvantovanii prostranstva i vremeni v teorii "elementarnyx častic" ' (Über die Quantelung von Raum und Zeit in der "Elementar"-Teilchen-Theorie), *VF* 1962, 5; und N. F. Ovčinnikov: 'O klassifikacii principov soxranenja (Über die Klassifizierung der Erhaltungsprinzipien). dito.
19. Diese an sich richtigen, aber für das gestellte Problem trivialen Thesen Kuznecovs beleuchten die theoretische Sterilität des doktrinären Philosophenflügels: Aus ihnen läßt sich nicht die Spur eines revolutionären Gedankens gewinnen, wie ihn Bloxincev fordert.
20. Es scheint fraglich, ob Lenin wirklich die innere räumliche Struktur des Elektrons gemeint hat. Aus dem Kontext (MEK, Ausg. 1950, str. 250) geht nur hervor, daß Lenin gegen die "unveränderliche Wesenheit der Dinge" bei Bogdanov und die "Substanz" bei Valentinov und Juškevič polemisierte: Unveränderlich sei für Engels nur die Widerspiegelung der bewußtseinsunabhängigen Außenwelt durch das Bewußtsein, eine andere absolute Substanz, wie sie die müßige Professorenphilosophie sich ausmalte, gebe es für Marx und Engels nicht. Wesen und Substanz seien ebenfalls relativ und drückten nur die Vertiefung der Erkenntnis des Objektes aus; sei diese Vertiefung gestern nicht über das Atom, heute nicht über den Aether und das Elektron hinausgelangt, so sehe der Diamat darin nur Meilensteine der fortschreitenden Erkenntnis. "Das Elektron ist ebenso unerschöpflich wie das Atom, die Natur ist unendlich, aber sie existiert unendlich . . .". – Nun ist das Atom zunächst räumlich keineswegs unerschöpflich, sondern läßt sich erschöpfend aus seinen Bestandteilen darstellen, sofern man nur das Verhältnis des Ganzen zu seinen Teilen untersucht. Nimmt man jedoch von vornherein eine unendliche Teilbarkeit auch der Bestandteile des Atoms an, dann bricht die Analogie zusammen: Die Unerschöpflichkeit des Atoms ist dann eine Folge der Unerschöpflichkeit u.a.

des Elektrons. Versteht man jedoch unter 'Unerschöpflichkeit" "unerschöpflich in Bezug auf die Variable X", so braucht unter X nicht notwendig eine Unterteilung nach räumlichen Zellen oder (möglicherweise unräumlichen) Bestandteilen des Ganzen verstanden zu werden, sondern z.B. "menschliche Erkenntnis". Dann kämen dem Elektron eine unendliche Menge von Bestimmungen zu, die sich dem Erkennen in einem zeitlich unendlich fortlaufenden Prozeß entfalten müßten: m.a.W. das So-Sein des Elektrons wäre nur durch eine unendliche Reihe von Bestimmungsstücken darstellbar. Dies könnte z.B. der Fall sein, wenn das Weltganze aus einer unendlichen Menge von Faktoren bestünde, die das So-Sein des Elektrons konstituierten. Aber dann wäre das Elektron unabhängig von einer inneren räumlichen Struktur bereits unerschöpflich. Es ist gerade die Verschwommenheit der Leninschen Formulierung, die Terleckij den Nachweis der Bestätigung durch die moderne Physik erlaubt: Das Vieldeutige, ja im Grenzfall das Nichtssagende findet sich immer bestätigt.

21. Ein klassisches Beispiel für den dogmatischen Charakter dieser Art des Philosophierens. Von einer Materieerhaltung weiß nicht einmal die Makrophysik etwas, sofern man unter "Materie" den Stoff, die Masse oder das Feld versteht. Nur das Ganze aus Masse und Energie bleibt erhalten; im Diamat wird aber entschieden bestritten, daß die Energie Materie sei. Bezeichnenderweise wies gerade Terleckij seinerzeit darauf hin, daß die relativistischen Erhaltungssätze (Divergenzfreiheit des Energie-Impulstensors) zunächst keine Materieerhaltung implizieren (s. Müller-Markus: *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie.* Dordrecht, 1960, S. 395, 396). Versteht man aber mit Lenin unter Materie die Wirklichkeit schlechthin, so wird die Erhaltung der Materie physikalisch undiskutierbar.
22. *VF* 1962, 9, 121–131.
23. Hier wird also explizit auch die "Unendlichkeit nach unten" ausgesprochen. Was die Unendlichkeit nach oben anlangt, so widerspricht sie den geschlossenen Weltmodellen; Omel'janovskijs Behauptung ist dahin einzuschränken.
24. Omel'janovskij verharrt leider bei solchen verbalen Deklarationen, ohne ihnen eine physikalische Deutung zu geben. Im Verhältnis des Atoms zu seinen Bestandteilen Kern und Elektronen hat der Ausdruck "Knotenpunkt" kaum einen Sinn. Aber man muß noch weiter gehen: Die Frage nach der Elementarität in der physikalischen Natur setzt eine Klärung des Ausdrucks "Besteht aus . . ." voraus. Dieser Ausdruck impliziert die Annahme, daß diejenigen Seienden, aus denen ein anderes Seiendes besteht, auch ohne dieses ihre Identität bewahrten. Anderenfalls hat der Ausdruck "Besteht aus" nur einen eingeschränkten Sinn, indem die Fortdauer der Elemente eines Ganzen beim Verlassen des Ganzen nicht impliziert wird. Dann aber ist die Konstanz der Namensgebung für die Elemente auch nach Verlassen des Ganzen irreführend. So ist etwa fraglich, ob ein Atom wirklich aus Nukleonen und Elektronen besteht, nachdem diese bei Zerstörung des Atoms andere Eigenschaften annehmen, z.B. keine gequantelten Energieniveaus mehr aufweisen. Exakter ist dann die Ausdrucksweise: Das Ganze, das wir "Atom" nennen, enthält eine innere Differenzierung, deren Ereignisreihen mit verschiedenen, aber zeitlich konstanten termini zu bezeichnen sind wie "Elektron", "Kern"; diese haben aber nur einen Sinn, solange sie auf das Ganze bezogen werden. Geht dieses unter, so werden andere Ereignisreihen erzeugt, die untereinander einen anderen Zusammenhang aufweisen als während der Existenz des Atoms. Die Elementarität hängt also eng mit dem Begriff der zeitlichen Identität von Seienden beim Untergang von Ganzheiten zusammen; muß man diese aus triftigen physikalischen Gründen

leugnen, so bleibt nur noch eine Elementarität im Sinnen einer strukturellen inneren Differenzierung von Ganzheiten. Das von Omel'janovskij gestellte Problem der unendlichen Teilungsreihe wird dann sinnlos. Diese Einsicht klingt in den folgenden Überlegungen Omel'janovskijs an, wird aber von ihm nicht der Hierarchiehypothese gegenübergestellt.

25. Die Berechtigung dieses Ausdrucks ist gerade fraglich ("proton sam po sebe"), da wir außerhalb der experimentellen Bedingungen, die ja für das So-Sein des Protons konstitutiv sind, überhaupt nicht von einem "Proton an sich" sprechen können. Dies gilt bereits für einen Makrokörper, der außerhalb seiner im Prinzip unendlichen Menge von Zuordnungen zu Inertialsystemen mit Ausnahme seiner invarianten Kennzeichnungen überhaupt kein So-Sein besäße, also z.B. raum- und zeitlos wäre, was aber von keinem physisch Existenten ausgesagt werden kann. Hier wäre eine "dialektische" Ontologie anzusetzen, dialektisch im Sinne von "nicht eigenseiend, sondern durch die Kommunikation mit anderen (im Grenzfall allen) ebenfalls nicht-Eigenseienden mitkonstituiert". Davon fehlt aber bei Omel'janovskij jede Spur.
26. Diese Analogie ist nur dann durchzuführen, wenn Komplexheit und Elementarität als Folge von Ordnungsschematismen mit isomorpher Abbildbarkeit auf die Raumzeit gezeigt werden.
27. Diese beliebte These ist mit Vorsicht aufzunehmen: Die "Einheit der materiellen Welt" im Diamat ist eine substanzielle (*ein* Stoff) und dynamische zugleich (*eine* durchgängige Bewegung und Entfaltung). Die Teilchenphysik kennt zunächst nur die letztere. Selbst wenn man ein einheitliches Weltgrundfeld annimmt, so wäre noch nachzuweisen, daß dies ein substanzielles, also eigenseiendes, energetisches Etwas darstellt und nicht nur ein gedankliches Modell zur Beschreibung von pluralen physischen Wesenheiten. Wie immer, die Pluralität der Teilchen gleicher Verhaltensklassen (gleichen Namens) und der Teilchen verschiedener Verhaltensklassen (verschiedener Namen) muß aus einem dem Grundfeld eingeprägten formalen Seienden erklärt werden, z.B. aus den Eigenlösungen einer Wellengleichung. Dieses formale Seiende gehört aber einer anderen Seinsklasse (Seinsreich) an als das energetisch Seiende. Die phänomenale Pluralität der Teilchen kann also nicht auf eine numenale Einheit der Substanz zurückgeführt werden, ohne eine Pluralität der Seinsreiche anzunehmen. Hier scheint dem Verfasser eine Wachstumsspitze der Sowjetphilosophie in Richtung auf einen ontologischen Pluralismus zu liegen.
28. Der Einwand widerlegt Fajnbergs These nicht, sondern unterstreicht sie: Wenn Verhaltensweisen sich auf dem je tieferen Niveau als nur statistisch beschreiben lassen, auf dem je höheren Niveau aber auch als determiniert, so bedeutet "Erscheinungsform der Zufälligkeit" so lange "statistische Gesetze sind das mathematische Fundament deterministischer", als sich die letzteren genetisch aus den ersteren gewinnen lassen, nicht aber umgekehrt. Tatsächlich können wir aus dem determinierten Verhalten von Makrokörpern nicht auf das indeterminierte von Quanten-Objekten schließen, wohl aber nach den Ehrenfestschen Stätzen umgekehrt.
29. Sie steht aber im Widerspruch zum Apparat der Quantenmechanik; stimmt sie, so ist dieser nicht zur Beschreibung der Tatsachen geeignet. Tjapkin beruft sich auf die dem Verfasser unbekannte Arbeiten R. Fejnmans 1948 und Rjazanovs 1958.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

IDEOLOGY, POWER-POLITICS AND DIALECTICS

It has been often said that power-politics is incompatible with allegiance to an ideology. The scope of the present note is to show that, as concerns Soviet ideology, this is not the case under certain circumstances.

Let '$\varphi(a, t)$' stand for 'a is the fact at the time t'. Then the fact that an ideology k prescribes both m_1 and m_2 as means toward the final goal g may be best expressed by saying that both $\varphi(m_1, t)$ and $\varphi(m_2, t)$ are, for some t, necessary conditions of $\varphi(g, t)$ (where the last t does not need to be identical with the former). This has been often interpreted in a way substantially equivalent to the following formula (in which α is the class of time-moments preceding the achievement of full Communism).

$$(1) \qquad k \supset :\cdot (\exists t)\, \varphi(g, t) \supset :(t) : t \varepsilon \alpha \cdot \supset \cdot \varphi(m_1, t) \cdot \varphi(m_2, t)$$

Then, if it happens that

$$(2) \qquad (\exists t) \cdot t \varepsilon \alpha \cdot \varphi(m_1, t) \supset \sim \varphi(m_2, t)\,,$$

we shall have $\sim k$, provided that $(\exists t)\, \varphi(g, t)$.

The relevant substitutions of our formulae are 'safety and power of the Soviet state' for 'm_1' and the name of any important means to achieve the Communist goals (according to k) for 'm_2' – e.g. 'collectivisation of the peasants' or 'waging war on the imperialists'.

The result is that if there is an incompatibility as in (2) ideology (k) has to be sacrificed to the power of the Soviet state.

But, this is by no means the only possible analysis of the situation. Instead of (1) we may have as well

$$(1') \quad k \supset :\cdot (\exists t)\, \varphi(g, t) \supset :(\exists t) \cdot t \varepsilon \alpha \cdot \varphi(m_1, t) :(\exists t) \cdot t \varepsilon \alpha \cdot \varphi(m_2, t)$$

or even

$$(1'') \quad k \supset :\cdot (\exists t)\, \varphi(g, t) \supset :(t) \cdot t \varepsilon \alpha \supset \varphi(m_1, t) :(\exists t) \cdot t \varepsilon \alpha \cdot \varphi(m_2, t)\,.$$

But, from (1') or (1'') with (2) and $(\exists t)\, \varphi(g, t)$ the conclusion that $\sim k$ does *not* follow. It is even intuitively clear that the incompatibility stated

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

in (2) may be present for, say t_n, but not for another t, e.g. for t_{n+1}.

Now (1″) is what Communists in general and Soviet Communists in particular seem to assume (with the above substitutions). While power must *always* be cared for, it is not necessary for them to apply at every moment any other precept of their ideology. They all must be applied at *some* time – but circumstances may oblige them to postpone that application, without Communists being logically obliged to reject their ideology by this mere fact.

If this analysis is correct, then we have here a rather curious interpretation of what Soviet writers sometimes mean by 'dialectics': in its present use it appears to mean nothing more than a judicious distribution of quantifiers. Dialectic is then a single application of the lower calculus of predicates.

This conclusion, however, is incidental. The relevant ones are the following:

1. There is no logical incompatibility between the following of power-politics and the following of Communist ideology.

2. The fact that Communists indulge in making compromises in politics is not a sufficient reason to doubt their ideological sincerity.

3. The fact that opposite policies may be justified by the same ideology is not a sufficient reason to believe that this ideology is too vague to be of assistance in the choice of means.

The last conclusion needs some comments. Ideology would have to be termed vague and irrelevant if the choice of practical means would depend *solely* on circumstances. This, however, is not the case with Communist ideology. It states, namely, that *if* the circumstances permit, such or such means have to be used. The situation is here not dissimilar to that met in morals. There also, the fact that I do not feel obliged to save a drowning man depends on circumstances; I may have, e.g., to help, at the same moment, my wife and be unable to help both her and this man. But this does not mean that the moral rules which I acknowledge are irrelevant to my decision. Moreover, it is in the name of *the same* rules that I may feel compelled in one case to help the drowning man and in another not to help him. For such a rule is not based upon a substitution of

(3) $$p \supset q$$

but, rather of

$$(4) \qquad p \supset \cdot r \supset q \cdot s \supset \sim q \qquad (r \neq s)$$

where 'p' is to be substituted by the statement of the goal, 'q' by that of a means, and 'r' and 's' by those of two different empirical circumstances.

And there is no reason why (4) should be regarded as more vague than (3); it is not more vague, but only more complex. This is the point which the partisans of the theory discussed here do not seem to have noticed.

A final remark: if what has been said here is true, the so-called ideological differences supposedly existing between the Soviet and Chinese leaders are not ideological at all. They are quarrels about some empirical statements, not about doctrine. *J. B.*

A REPLY TO SARTRE'S CRITIQUE OF THE MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON

In the latest issue of *Valóság* (Reality) the official journal for social sciences of the TIT (Society for Scientific Information, Budapest) T. Huszár, known for his previous articles in Hungarian journals on questions of ethics and education, refutes Sartre's criticism of the Marxist philosophy of the person (expounded in the latter's *Critique de la Raison Dialectique,* Paris, 1960). In a detailed discussion of some key propositions in Sartre's work, Huszár contends that Sartre grasps only one side of Marx's conception of the person, the aspect namely, according to which the person is determined by anterior circumstances, reducible to economic processes in a given society. Sartre accuses Marxism of conceiving of the person as 'the passive product of conditioned reflexes' an existant 'determined in its entirety by prior conditions'. While accepting Marxian dialectics, Sartre wishes to evolve a philosophy of the person through its method, using existentialist concepts and points of view. Huszár points to the incompatibility of Marxism and existentialism in this, as in all respects, and says: "the person is a very complex phenomenon: has several bearings, aspects; may be characterized sociologically, juridically, ethically, psychologically. The decisive momentum for the determination of the profile of the person is the sociological momentum." Yet Marx regarded the person as "the individual being of social relations. Marx spoke of the essence of man as the totality of social relations; this is how the striking thought is to be understood that the essence of the person is 'not his beard, his blood,

his abstracted physical nature, but his social quality' . . . Every man is an amalgamation of certain social qualities and of socially determined personal peculiarities." While admitting that there is much yet to be done in working out a Marxist theory of the person. Huszár believes that the victory of Marxist theory will be brought about by the extension of Communist society, permitting man to find himself through the harmonious development of the manifold traits of his personality.

The problem raised by Sartre – the lack of sufficiently developed concepts to account for the person in Marxist philosophy – received due attention in Huszár's treatment. The controversy is a valid and an important one, and deserves further study. The exponents of the above discussion adopt a standpoint which, despite points of agreement, offers little hope of final agreement. Sartre tends to underrate the ontological individualism (in the sense of the concreteness of the particular) of Marxism and the string of argument that may be produced from its premiss; Huszár attempts to mitigate the sociological collectivity of the Marxist doctrine, but does not readily find concepts in the original texts to substantiate his argument. The possible point of final agreement could be the conception of society as a unity of self-creative individuals, simultaneously determining themselves individually and collectively. However, hopes of seeing the Marxist and existentialist philosophy of the person coincide in a basic context are dim as long as (in Huszár's words) existentialism considers society as merely concealing the real essence of man, and as long as Marxism holds that man is a social entity, whose personality is fundamentally the subjective appearance of objective social processes. *E. L.*

NEW BOOKS

Among the publications announced by the Moscow University Press, the following are of philosophic interest:

Estestvoznanie i stroitel'stvo kommunizma (Natural Science and the Building of Communism), a collective work.

Račkov, P.: *Nauka i obščestvennyj progress* (Science and Social Progress).

Filosofija marksizma i neopozitivizm (The Philosophy of Marxism and Neo-Positivism), a collective work.

Dialektičeskij materializm i sovremennoe estestvoznanie (Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Natural Science), a collective work.

Vzaimodejstvie form obščestvennogo soznanija (The Interaction of the Forms of Social Consciousness), a collective work under the editorship of A. Čugaev.

Protiv imperialističeskoj ideologii antikommunizma (Against the Imperialistic Ideology of Anti-Communism), a collective work.

Kosičev, A. D.: *Razvitie marksistskoj filosofii v bor'be s ideologiej anarxizma i sovremennost'* (The Development of Marxist Philosophy in Conflict with the Ideology of Anarchism and the Present).

Kommunizm i religija (Communism and Religion), a collective work under the editorship of I. D. Pancxava.

Tarakanov, N.: *Fal'sifikacija peredovyx tradicij russkogo naroda – odna iz form ideologii antikommunizma* (Falsification of the Progressive Traditions of the Russian People as one of the Forms of the Ideology of Anti-Communism).

Mal'cev, V.: *Kritičeskij očerk po dialektičeskoj logike* (Critical Essay on Dialectical Logic).

Titarenko, A.: *Pragmatistskij ložemarksizm – filosofija antikommunizma* (Pragmatist Pseudo-Marxism as the Philosophy of Anti-Communism).

Sokolov, V.: *Filosofija Spinozy i sovremennost'* (The Philosophy of Spinoza and the Present).

Larmin, O.: *Xudožestvennyj metod i stil'* (Artistic method and Style).

T. B.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HUNGARIAN PHILOSOPHY

The *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle* (Hungarian Review of Philosophy) 1962, 2 gives a bibliography of philosophical literature published in Hungary in 1961. The listing of the journal is as remarkable for the titles it includes, as for those it omits. Below we give the more important of the works listed, followed by the major titles published in Hungary during the year 1961, but omitted from the above journal's bibliography.*

Ákos, K.: *A megismerés* (Cognition). 234 pp.

Almási, M.: *A modern dráma útjai* (The Paths of Modern Drama). 275 pp.

Aristotelesz (Aristotle): *Organon,* vol. I.

Brecht, B.: *A szinházról* (Of Theatre). Selections. 109 pp.

* Parenthesized number following page numbers refers to listing of work in *Bibliographie der Sowjetischen Philosophie,* Dordrecht.

Burrows, M.: *A holttengeri tekercsek* (The Scrolls from the Dead Sea). 395 pp.

Clausewitz, C. v.: *A háborúról* (Of War), vol. I. 348 pp.

Comenius, J. A.: *A világ útvesztöje* (The World's Labyrinth). 189 pp.

Descartes, R.: *Selected Works.* 382 pp.

Eszmék és esztétikák (Ideas and Aestheticians). Selections from the Soviet literature. 261 pp.

Gedö, A.: *A modern revizionizmus filozofiai birálatához* (The philosophical Evaluation of Modern Revisionism). 369 pp.

Geymonat, L.: *Galileo Galilei.* 278 pp.

Hegedüs, A.: *A modern polgári szociologia és a társadalmi valóság* (Modern Bourgeois Sociology and Social Reality). 257 pp.

Hegel, G. F. W.: *A szellem fenomenologiája* (Phenomenology of the Spirit). 554 pp.

Ibn Tufajl Abu Bekr: *A természetes ember* (The Natural Man). 149 pp.

Jegorov (Egorov), A. G.: *Müvészet és társadalmi élet* (Iskusstvo i obščestvennaja žizn = Art and Social Life). 448 pp. (3220)

Lenin, V. I.: *Materializmus és empiriokriticizmus* (Materialism and Empiriocriticism). 469 pp.

Marx, K.: *A töke* (Capital), vol I book 1, and vol II book 3. 500 and 914 pp.

Marx, Gy.: *Túl az atomfizikán* (Past Atomic Physics). 277 pp.

A marxista filozofia alapjai (Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii = Foundations of Marxist Philosophy). 855 pp.

Mátrai, L.: *Gondolat és Szabadság* (Thought and Freedom). 342 pp.

Plechanov, G. V.: *A vallásról* (On Religion). 423 pp.

Plutarkhosz (Plutarch of Chaeronea): *Négy görög életrajz* (Four Greek Biographies). 183 pp.

Régi Magyar filozofusok (Ancient Hungarian Philosophers. XV – XVIII Centuries). 239 pp.

A Szovjetunio Kommunista Pártjának programja. Tervezet (The Program of the C.P.S.U., Plan). 120 pp.

Tamás, Gy.: *Tudományos meghatározás* (Scientific Definition). 181 pp.

Zoltai, D.: *Világnézeti nevelés és vallásos világnézet* (Education on Weltanschauung and Religious Weltanschauung). 131 pp.

We have omitted from the above listing works which are either: irrelevant

to philosophy (e.g. belles-lettres, history of literature, monographs of purely scientific interest) primarily polemical (political or religious), textbooks intended for an institution, new volumes of standard series (e.g. the collected works of the classics), or reprints of earlier publications.

The following list includes those works which do not come into any of these categories, but which the editors have excluded from the bibliography of the *Hungarian Review of Philosophy*.

Boeck, H.: *Marxista etika és szocialista erkölcs* (Zur marxistischen Ethik und socialistischen Moral = Marxist Ethics and Socialist Morals). 250 pp.

Dezséry, L.: *A cinizmusról* (On Cynicism) 208 pp.

Elek, T.: *Albert Einstein ismeretelméleti koncepciójáról és a relativitáselmélet filozofiai tartalmáról* (On Albert Einstein's Epistemological Conception and the Philosophic Content of Relativity Theory). 140 pp.

Feuerbach, L. A.: *A kereszténység lényege* (Das Wesen des Christentums = The Essence of Christianity). 518 pp.

Kovalev, S. I. (ed.): *Kézikönyv a vallásról* (Sputnik ateista = The Atheist's Companion). 499 pp. (3937).

Krüvelev (Kryvelev), I. A.: *Könyv a bibliáról* (Kniga o Biblii = Book on the Bible). 388 pp. (3495).

Szacskov (Sačkov), I. V.: *A kvantummechanika materialista értelmezéséről* (O materialičeskom istolkovanii kvantovoj mexaniki = On the Materialist Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics). 197 pp. (3878).

Sándor, P.: *O logike Aristotelja* (On Aristotelian Logic) (Budapest) 182 pp.

E. L.

VARIA

The Slovak Institute in Rome has published the second volume of its series, *Slovak Studies*. This volume contains a series of articles, dedicated to Nikolaj O. Losskij, under the general title, *Philosophica I.* The opening article, 'Physics and Metaphysics', is by N. Losskij himself and the others are: 'Nikolaj O. Losskij and his Philosophy' by J. Dieška; 'Die russisch-sowjetische Psychologie' by V. Šatura (a review by E. Laszlo is forthcoming in SST); 'Réalisme Chrétien et Matérialisme Dialectique' by E. Náhalka; 'Perspectives Personnalistes en Education Moderne' by

P. E. Grieger; 'Inquiry into the Nature of Moral Being in the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas' by Ch. Murin; and 'Displaced or Conforms' by L. Gleiman. *T. B.*

In 1961/62 there were forty-two philosophic (methodological) seminars functioning under the auspices of the Siberian Division of the AN SSSR, with 1300 participants. (s. *VF* 1962, 12, 153–155). *T. B.*

The discussion on contradictions (cf. N. Lobkowicz: *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie.* Dordrecht. 1959) seems to be still underway. In *FN* 1962, 5, 83–89 V. I. Sviderskij makes a contribution thereto under the title, 'The Contradictory Character of Mechanical Motion'. He takes the position of A. Kolman and tries to interpret the dialectical contradictions of mechanical movement in such a way that they do not transgress the laws of formal logic. Although the posing of the problem is clear, the 'solution' remains obscure in this article.

Wolfhart Boeselager

In reviewing A. F. Šiškin's book *Osnovy marksistskoj etiki* (*FN*, 1962, 6) F. B. Sadykov criticizes the Ministry of Higher and Middle Education of the USSR for recommending the book as a university text. Their choice he says takes into account neither the real potentialities nor the spiritual interests of students. Among his complaints: the book is too long (528 pages) and verbose; Šiškin merely states certain problems without leading the reader to perceive them; Šiškin often gets so involved in detail that his main point is lost; Šiškin does not treat some moral problems most disturbing to youth. Unfortunately Sadykov does not elaborate on what these latter problems are. *R. D. G.*

REVIEWS

Gustav A. Wetter: *Sowjetideologie heute. I. Dialektischer und historischer Materialismus.* Fischer Bücherei, Frankfurt a/M. und Hamburg. 1962. 333 S.

Professor Wetter published earlier a presentation of dialectical materialism in Italian (*Il materialismo dialettico sovietico.* Roma 1948), then a German re-elaboration of the same (*Der dialektische Materialismus. Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion.* Wien. 1951. 5.A.1960. English: London. 1958. French: Paris. 1962) as well as a number of more monographic writings on Soviet philosophy (*Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion.* Hamburg. 1958. – *Der dialektische Materialismus und das Problem der Entstehung des Lebens. Zur Theorie vom Z. I. Oparin.* München. 1958. – *Die sowjetische Konzeption der Koexistenz.* Bonn. 1959, of which the English version appeared in *Soviet Survey* 1959, Oct.–Dec., pp. 19–34).

He offers us now a new, synthetic book covering not only dialectical but also historical materialism and even the critique of capitalist economy in Soviet Marxism-Leninism. The scope of the book is, consequently, broader than that of any previous publications by the scholar from Rome. At the same time, it is somewhat narrower in that the author – contrarily to what he did in his book on Diamat – is exclusively concerned here with official or semi-official sources and disregards the properly philosophical literature. His main sources are, in fact, in addition to such texts of Marx, Engels and Lenin as are used in Soviet textbooks, the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Principles of Marxist Philosophy – *OMF*) and (to a lesser extent) the *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* (Principles of Marxism-Leninism – *OML*). To state this is not to formulate a criticism, for Prof. Wetter was aiming, obviously, at a short presentation of the essentials of Soviet ideology and not at a description of the philosophical speculation around it; and there can be no doubt that such a book was very much needed, even in German where we have a number of similar writings (see the *Bibliography* by K. G. Ballestrem in *SST* II (1962) pp. 168–173; however, the authors of most of these books are not using original sources but other Western publications).

The book is divided into three parts, in which dialectical materialism (pp. 13–149), historical materialism (pp. 150–273) and the criticism of capitalism (pp. 274–331) are discussed. This means that the stress is put on diamat. It may be remembered that in the *OMF* historical materialism occupies more space than does Diamat, while in the *OML* the whole philosophy, as compared with other parts of Marxism-Leninism, occupies a relatively small chapter. However, the author justifies the relative shortness of the chapter on economy and the present volume is followed by another devoted to the political doctrine.

The speculative character of the work appears not only in the added stress put on the more general, i.e. more philosophical, parts of Marxism-Leninism, but also in the fact that Wetter devotes nearly one third of his book (about 110 pages) to the criticism of the doctrines. In other words, this is a book mostly

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

about the most speculative aspects of Marxism-Leninism, written by a philosopher who writes not as a historian but as a systematic thinker. One may perhaps regret the nearly complete absence of historical introductions to the doctrines. This goes so far that in the paragraphs devoted to the class-character of ideology (p. 241 f.) and to science as a superstructure (p. 254 f.) Stalin's intervention of 1950 is not even mentioned – a rather curious aspect of a book written by one who has shown himself a master in the history of Soviet philosophy.

There are, consequently, two self-imposed limitations in the work: to the *basic* elements of ideology and to its *present* state. Within these limits, the book is an outstanding achievement. The presentation of the doctrine is, in general, a masterpiece of reporting on philosophical texts. The present reviewer knows of very few writings from which a non-specialist could learn so much about contemporary Soviet ideology and on which he could rely, on the whole, with so much security. Prof. Wetter has been often accused by the Soviet *aparatčiki* of falsifying Marxism-Leninism. There can be no better refutation of that extravagant claim than a book like this. For, not even the Soviet philosophers have ever offered any comparable short presentation of their own doctrines. Of course, they have a number of voluminous books on the subject, running into a thousand or more pages of the Western size, but nothing in a short form which would be as complete, precise, objective and clear as this book.

It also offers a criticism of the Soviet doctrines. This goes beyond what the author has previously written; most of his criticisms are re-stated and developed; some new ones are added. This criticism is usually separated from the report. It is internal and external at the same time. Contrary to what we meet in most cases in Soviet philosophy and in many of its critics, it is a scientific criticism, completely free from emotional factors and presented in a fine, scholarly style.

The present reviewer has only a few remarks about the interpretation of the texts; none of them concerns basic issues.

The book raises, however, some problems of method, which could be of central importance in the field. The first and, perhaps, the most important is this: is it legitimate and even possible to operate a complete abstraction from Soviet philosophical literature and to present dialectical and historical materialism as described in the *Osnovy* alone? That these textbooks, printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, contain mostly a rather superficial, not to say vulgar, interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, far below the level of some more academic works, is certain. And yet, the author does not mention the academic elaborations of the doctrines. To quote just two instances, we do not find anything concerning the more recent interpretations of evolution in nature – a doctrine which rejects a *general* trend toward ever better stages. This is well known to every specialist and even to every reader of *Ost-Probleme*. Yet, what we get from Prof. Wetter here is just the statement of the so-called law of negation of negation (p. 112ff) which gives the impression that Soviet ideology still holds to the unqualified optimistic evolutionism of the *Aufklärung*. Another point is the treatment of the problem of formal logic and dialectics (pp. 131–134). Here

again, one who would know only Wetter's text would get a rather limited idea of what is going on in Soviet thought.

Of course, Prof. Wetter would probably reply that he is not interested here in the more refined speculations of Soviet philosophers but in what the average Soviet citizen gets as official doctrine. For, he may say, only that official doctrine and not the theories developed by some professors are culturally and politically relevant. But, this does not solve the practical problem at hand. The present reviewer tried to show that we must distinguish in Soviet ideology, in its present state, at least three different sets of doctrines, which he called 'basic faith', 'speculative superstructure' and 'declassified doctrines'. Whatever position one takes as to this hypothesis, the problem at least is there and some solution of it is basic for any study of contemporary Soviet thought. One aspect of this problem is, in how far the 'liberalization' now nearly complete in the realm of the declassified doctrines passes, through a sort of osmosis, to the speculative superstructure and, from there, to the basic faith – namely to that which Prof. Wetter presents and criticizes here. *Is* there any such influence at all? And, if so, in what does it consist? One may take the position that no such osmosis is present – but in that case, this position needs to be stated and argued, for there are far too many reasons for disbelieving it.

And then, granted that there is some such influence of speculative thought on the basic dogmas, the question of different interpretations of that dogma may arise. Is it really possible to consider *all* Soviet theories as having now only *one* philosophical meaning? To quote just one instance, the doctrine of universal connection may obtain a more Hegelian and a more Aristotelian interpretation. The latter has been powerfully voiced of late by such thinkers as Tugarinov, Blauberg and others – but the former is also present. Would, then, it not be necessary in a book which, after all, is speculative to mention at least those divergent interpretations existing in the Soviet Union?

Such are the questions which occur while reading Wetter's book. This reviewer is, however, less than anybody qualified to make out of them an objection against the method chosen by the author because he himself published, a few years ago, a book in which he attempted to state the essentials of the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* without any historical or hermeneutic developments. And, as a matter of fact, it seems that, if the questions are serious enough to be considered, one should not fall into the opposite view, according to which there would be no such thing as the dogmatic assumptions of Soviet philosophy – a view which appears to be rather wide-spread among less informed writers. It is probably not an unhappy event that a scholar of the competence of Prof. Wetter did state – by the very fact of chosing this method – that there *is* such a thing and presented it ably to the general reader.

Another, quite different, problem of method is concerned with criticism of Soviet doctrines. Such criticism must be conducted from a philosophical point of view and that is what Wetter does here. This is, of course, quite legitimate and even necessary. But, if the standpoint chosen is too narrow – I mean the standpoint

of a quite determined philosophical system – it may happen that the criticism made operates not only against the Soviet ideology but also against many non-Communist philosophical views. We shall exemplify this in one instance.

Prof. Wetter criticises the Soviet doctrine of self-movement, etc. from the point of view that the principle of causality applies everywhere, i.e. also to the primitive matter as such. From this point of view, of course, the doctrine could not be consistent. But Soviet ideology holds that there *are* limitations to the principle of causality. It, namely, does not apply to the fundamental emergence. This – the passage from virtuality to actual being of the different 'forms of movement' (like life) – is not ruled by the principle of causality. The present reviewer is quite in agreement with Prof. Wetter that this is an irrational assumption – he simply does not see how one can hold it and, at the same time, proclaim a complete devotion to the principle of rationality. But, there are many philosophers outside the Soviet Bloc who hold exactly the same doctrine. It is, basically, the theory of emergent evolution of Lloyd Morgan, also held by many vitalists.

This is not a criticism of what the author does, but only the statement of a problem we have to deal with. It may be stated in the following terms. Philosophers feel that there is something peculiarly shocking in Soviet ideology; something which all non-Communist thinkers – may their name be Ayer, Jaspers, Russell or Wetter – *do* reject. Now, the differences of views among them are great, indeed. Why, then, do they agree in rejecting Soviet ideology? What are the major points which appear as unacceptable in it as well to a positivist, to a vitalist and to a metaphysician? Should these doctrines not be first of all found and then should not the criticism be concentrated on them?

It is not implied that a philosopher has no right to discuss Soviet ideology as he discusses, say, logical positivism or existentialism, namely from his own particular point of view. However, it seems desirable that a philosopher concentrate on such problems as are most vital for the society he lives in. And, in our case, these central vices of Marxism-Leninism, equally rejected by all free men, are surely the most important ones.

It seems that most vices of this sort are, in Marxism-Leninism, of a methodological nature. Philosophers, who are not Communists, were mostly shocked by two things in Soviet philosophical literature. One is primitivism; the other is *partijnost'* (party-mindedness). Now, astonishingly enough, very little attention is paid by Prof. Wetter to these two sensitive points. We find, it is true, an excellently put argument against the objectivity of party-mindedness in proletarian philosophy. But other, very serious, objections against the method used by Soviet ideologists and even by the majority of Soviet philosophers – such as described, e.g., by T. J. Blakeley (whose book, *Soviet Scholasticism*, is not mentioned), are disregarded. Also, as far as primitivism is concerned, one may rightly say that Soviet philosophy is on the way toward overcoming that childish disease of Bolshevism; one may quote a long series of more recent academic Soviet works which are no longer primitive in their style and in the

underlying *forma mentis*. But the *Osnovy*, mainly used by the author, still contain an incredible amount of such primitivism. To mention just one instance, how could one call otherwise the text concerning contradictions (*OMF* 1960, p. 245f.)? Well, what happened seems to be this: Prof. Wetter, as every serious historian of philosophy and, moreover, as a man who approaches his subject with a truly great amount of charity, did his best to disregard the weaknesses in the doctrines he studies and to present them in the best light possible. This, it may be thought, is regrettable from one point of view. However, it is, at the same time, a most positive and encouraging contribution to our discussions. Here is a philosopher who shows by his very attitude toward his adversaries what philosophy really should be.

And one may also add the following remark: after all, a philosophical discussion with an adversary like Marxism-Leninism must be a confrontation of *material* points of view, i.e. not only of those concerning method. Now, Wetter supplies in this work a re-statement of a view which is not only methodologically different from that of the Soviet writers, but opposes to them a coherent, well thought-out system. From the point of view of the general reader, of one who is less interested in things which seem to be decisive to a philosopher (especially to a modern, analytical philosopher), but wants a material criticism of the principles – it is a most desirable thing. And, therefore, while regretting that little attention was paid to the above-mentioned methodological problems, one must, once again, admit that for such a book this was, perhaps, the right method to be used.

After what has been said about the particular points of view, it would hardly be legitimate to oppose to the author's position a different one. Yet, perhaps the mention of one detail might be not entirely devoid of interest for the readers. While criticizing the Engels'ian dichotomy, materialism-idealism, Wetter objects that it contains two confusions: (1) between thought and spirit: spiritual activity is not the same, he says rightly, as mere thought – acts of will are, e.g., spiritual, but not activities of thought; (2) between an object, independent of knowledge, and matter. The first criticism will probably not be retained by many non-Communist philosophers, while the second has been recognized by Soviet philosophers as valid (in the formulation offered by the undersigned; this is, by the way, a classical example of the difference between academic philosophy and vulgar ideology in the Soviet Union: cf. L. Denisova: 'Bytie' (Being). In *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Philosophical Encyclopedia) I, 1959, col. 242). But this is not the major point. There is at least one other major confusion in Engels, namely between the mental and the ideal. From the point of view of the present reviewer, the scholastic distinction between *esse subjectivum* (a real spiritual process) and *esse objectivum* (ideal being) is one which, *pace* Descartes and his followers, cannot be disregarded after Frege, Husserl, Moore, and others. One who is not able to see the distinction between them and who still thinks as the old Berkeley did commits a very heavy blunder indeed.

The reader will be aware that most of the above remarks express more

thoughts provoked by Prof. Wetter's book than criticisms of it. This was meant – it must be repeated – to supply the average, non-philosophical, reader with a clear and correct presentation of the basic Marxist-Leninist doctrines, with an essential criticism of these doctrines from Wetter's philosophical point of view. As such, it is undoubtedly a success. There is no book better suited for the beginner, more reliable and better written than this one. Moreover, if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union does not decide to make important changes in its ideology – and, up to now, it has never done so – this book will probably remain for a long time a standard work on the subject to be warmly recommended to everybody who wishes to know what Soviet ideology is.

J. M. Bocheński

A. S. Bogomolov: *Ideja razvitija v buržuaznoj filosofii XIX i XX vekov* (The Idea of Evolution in Bourgeois Philosophy of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries). Moskva, Izd. MGU, 1962. 379 str.

The universal application of the 'Principle of Evolution' is one of the most outstanding characteristics that determine the 'dialectical' nature of Marxist materialism. All the more astonishing is the fact that the systematicians of Diamat have not yet produced a monographical elaboration of their general view on evolution. To say that the whole dialectic is exactly a general morphology of evolution is of no use, as long as there is not even clarity concerning the basic question which type of movement and change is to be titled by the name 'evolution' (or 'development' – *razvitie*). That there is such a lack of clarity in Soviet philosophical literature was confirmed by such competent people as the editors of the journal *Filosofskie nauki* (1961, 2, 123). In fact, by the one word *'razvitie'* Soviet philosophers used to designate rather heterogeneous processes: matter as a whole develops itself by producing living and thinking beings; there are also evolutions in the framework of inorganic matter where out of diffuse masses of particles a hierarchy of systems emerges; each of the bodies belonging to such systems experiences an evolution of its own; in some of them (very few only) the evolution of physical matter towards life takes place, as well as the differentiation of the world of organisms which is an evolution as well; each organism has its evolution towards a final form, and the directed alteration of the latter may be part of the evolution of the species; finally, human society is the subject of an evolution which leads from one formation to the other. All this has been repeated in Marxist-Leninist literature so often that it has become commonplace, but it seems to me that once more the 'well-known' is far from being really understood. Neither does the law of the 'unity and the struggle of the opposites' explain why there is an evolution of matter, nor does the law of the 'transition of quantitative to qualitative changes' offer an acceptable explanation of the strange phenomenon that matter in general and inorganic matter in particular has some 'tendency' to manifest itself not only in elementary particles, atoms, molecules, stars, planets and galaxies, but also in mayflowers, frogs, elephants, soldiers, engineers, priests and poets. I think that the Diamat philosophers will have to find some completely new starting points for their attempt to explain why and how originate such processes that lead to the formation of 'higher' structural types of matter. One may hope that Soviet philosophers will proceed to a systematic investigation of the peculiar forms and the general features of the processes of evolution. A start has already been made – I wish to mention the interesting collection of articles published in 1958 under the title *Problemy razvitija v prirode i obščestve* (Problems of Evolution in Nature and in Society), the book of S. T. Meljuxin on the dialectic of evolution in inorganic nature (reviewed in *SST* 1962, 157–163) and B. M. Kedrov's booklet *O povtorjaemosti v processe razvitija* (On Repetitivity in the Process of Evolution), published in 1961.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

In the light of this situation, it seems best for Soviet philosophers first to examine the already existing, more or less elaborated, conceptions of evolutionistic ontology. This is the line along which proceeds A. S. Bogomolov in this book in which he critically examines the conceptions of evolution (or development) in the writings of Hegel, Spencer, Bergson, S. Alexander, K. L. Morgan, Whitehead, J. C. Smuts, R. W. Sellars and others. His own, dialectico-materialistic, view on evolution is presupposed as being known to the reader and only briefly touched here and there and in the concluding remarks.

The first chapter (pp. 10–79) sketches Hegel's view on development which, though development is here considered not as a process in time, nevertheless contains many single elements which are also valid as a characterization of real evolution. The second chapter (pp. 80–128) is dedicated to the 'bourgeois evolutionism' of Spencer whose reduction of every change to regroupment of homogeneous particles under the mechanical laws of attraction and repulsion provokes the criticism of Diamat. In the third chapter (pp. 129–174) Bogomolov shows how the progress of physics and biology as well as the social changes connected with the transition of capitalism to its imperialist stage undermined the position of that basically conservative, simplist, gradualist and optimistic doctrine, as the counterpart of which the theories of 'creative evolution' arose.

The analysis of these theories begins with the fourth chapter (pp. 175–226) dedicated to Bergson whose images, analogies and poetical metaphors Bogomolov finds impressive but not convincing – all the less because they suggest a spiritualistic conception of the world process. At a spiritualistic cosmology finally arrive also the theories of 'emergent evolution' elaborated by Alexander and Morgan which Bogomolov discusses in chapter five (pp. 227–271). Since the non-speculative parts of these doctrines are better comparable with the conception of Diamat, their discussion is quite instructive. The main problems here are: the possibility of foreseeing the new qualities produced by the process of evolution; the characterization of the qualitative differences; the overall picture of the world process; the moving force of evolution.

The most complete theory of 'creative evolution' Bogomolov sees in Whitehead's speculative cosmology, the positions of which he examines in the sixth chapter (pp. 272–319). He wants to show how Whitehead's attempt to unite into one conception the dialectically opposed moments of change and constancy (represented by his categories 'actual entity' and 'eternal object') failed and forced him to seek asylum in the concept of God. Bogomolov concludes his discussion of the 'idealistic' versions of 'creative evolution' with the shorter chapter seven (pp. 320–335) on the theory of evolution contained in the 'Holism' of Smuts.

In chapter eight, the last of the book (pp. 336–362), the author presents the materialistic interpretation of emergent evolution given by R. W. Sellars. Its discussion has a peculiar note because of the circumstance that Sellars – as opposed to Bergson, Whitehead, Alexander, Morgan and Smuts – knows and takes into consideration the formulae of the Diamat solution of the problem; he

criticizes them for their Hegelian logicism and proposes to replace them by categories of the real dynamic while Bogomolov defends them as being 'more concrete' than those proposed by Sellars. There follow some concluding remarks on dialectic and metaphysics in the theory of evolution (pp. 363–374). Bogomolov points out, among other things, that it is necessary not to confine oneself to Lenin's characterization of the contrarity of the dialectical and the metaphysical view on evolution (so that, as e.g. in *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*, the 'metaphysical' view is represented by such obsolete or even forgotten theories as those of Robinet and Spencer), but rather to recognize that after Lenin new theories of evolution (equally metaphysical, but in a different way) have become dominant in bourgeois philosophy, namely, the theories of 'creative evolution'.

I indicated above that the Diamat theory of evolution lacks not only monographical elaboration but also clarity of construction. It seems to me, therefore, highly problematic when Bogomolov considers the existing elements of Diamat evolutionism as a universally elaborated and well-defined, sufficient and valid theory, from the superior position of which a final judgement about the other interpretations of evolution would be possible. Thereby the author presupposes decidedly too much. I do not contest that it is possible to perceive and to reveal from the point of view of Diamat (even if its theory lacks completeness and precision) some deficiencies of the competing theories. The contemporary Diamat philosopher should, however, be modest enough to confess that he, too, (notwithstanding Lenin's ironical remark about the 'seekers' in philosophy) has not yet found the final solution of the enigma. It seems not to be in accordance with the weight of the problems involved when Bogomolov presents – in opposition to Spencer who reduces every qualitative difference to a quantitative one, and to the theories of emergent evolution who 'absolutize' the qualitative differences – the dialectico-materialistic thesis concerning the transition of quantitative into qualitative changes as the saving discovery which answers all the questions raised by the phenomenon of qualitatively different kinds of beings. Can this much-quoted formula be seriously considered as a rational explanation of why and how life emerged out of the inorganic 'forms of movement of matter'? I think that those philosophers are better advised who leave the phenomenon unexplained and the problem open instead of producing, by purely verbal manipulations, the semblance of a solution. The author should also be aware of the fact that even some of his Diamat colleagues hold the category 'qualitative definiteness' to be insufficiently well defined. In fact, what a variety of differences between phenomena can be designed as 'qualitative': the difference between atom and molecule, between ice, water and steam, between meteorite and animal, between horse and ass, between capitalism and socialism, capitalism and imperialism, socialism and Communism, etc. Whoever is sitting in such a glass-house shouldn't throw stones at the theoreticians of emergent evolution who have their difficulties in defining the 'emergents' and the nature of the differences between 'levels of existence'.

Despite these critical remarks which are directed not so much against the author personally as against the common opinion of the contemporary Diamat school, I wish to evaluate and to recommend Bogomolov's book as a valuable contribution to its theme. Experts in the theories criticized by him will find, to be sure, a number of points where he has misunderstood their meaning (as is quite unavoidable in every dispute between theories foreign to each other). But it should not be denied that Bogomolov did his best in presenting the views of his opponents in a decent and sufficiently detailed way and not exclusively in an unfavorable light. It is remarkable the extent to which he offers verbal quotation from the texts. (By the way, Diamat itself is treated by many of its critics not better, but worse.)

Of course, Bogomolov also attempts to reveal the social roots and motives of those theories which he is going to criticize. It seems to me that he did not proceed as pedantically as one might expect after his critical remarks against K. S. Bakradze.* In some cases it is quite credible that general ontological reflections at least had been stimulated by social experiences and aims – so in the case of Smuts whose 'holistic' cosmology developed itself parallel to the author's endeavors at first for the unity of South Africa, then of the Commonwealth and finally of the whole world. But in other cases the coordination between social motives and philosophical positions seems to be questionable or even a forced construction. Is it, for example, evident that Whitehead's pessimism (which finds its expression in his notion of the destructivity of the world process) reflects exactly the state of mind of the *bourgeois* in the age of capitalist decay? (p. 314). And what should one say about the *cliché* that the recognition of laws of development is forbidden to the bourgeois thinker because it implies the recognition that capitalism is doomed to its downfall and that the victory of socialism is inevitable? (p. 271). (Some Soviet authors even go so far as to maintain that the mere recognition of causality has the same implications!). Nevertheless it must be said that Bogomolov is not proceeding as schematically as other authors. He says that the rise of the theories of 'creative evolution' is the result of a complex interlacing of scientific, philosophical and social motives in which, as he points out in reference to Whitehead, it is not always the latter that are dominant. (p. 280)

Whether or not somebody finds a philosophical study interesting or tiresome

* In his review of Bakradze's *Očerki po istorii novejšej i sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (Studies in the History of Modern and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy), published in *VF* 1962, 6, A.S. Bogomolov criticized the author's restriction to the cognitive problematic and declared: "In our opinion, Marxist historical-philosophical investigation must, besides the most careful critical analysis of a philosophical doctrine, also answer these questions: what traits of the social process are *reflected* in this philosophical doctrine; the *Weltanschauung* and the interests of which class or layer of the society are *expressed* in it; to what layers of the society is it *addressed* and, finally, the interests of what class does it *serve*? All of this determines the objective role played by a philosophical theory." (p. 180).

is, of course, much a matter of taste and of personal access to the problems discussed. Consequently, I am uttering perhaps only a subjective judgement when I say that I have not found Bogomolov's book boring. It may serve as the point of departure for a fruitful discussion between the Diamat and the Western evolutionist ontologies (among which, in addition to those discussed by Bogomolov, that of P. Teilhard de Chardin has recently won some prominence).

H. Fleischer

Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma (Some Questions of Dialectical Materialism). Red. V. P. Tugarinov. Leningrad, Izd. LGU, 1962. 195 str.

"To-day nobody still believes that the task of developing Marxist-Leninist philosophy is fulfilled only by the Leaders while for rank-and-file philosophers nothing remains but the propaganda of ready-made results", wrote Professor Tugarinov in the foreword of a recent collection of articles, written by the philosophers of the University of Leningrad. It contains twelve studies, grouped into three sections: I. Laws – II. Categories – III. Theory of Knowledge.

M. F. Vorob'ev and V. P. Rožin deal with various questions connected with the presentation of the main laws of the dialectic. The reviewer cannot say anything good about the predominantly exegetic treatment of the dialectical laws in the first two chapters – Vorob'ev: 'Questions of the Contemporary Presentation of the Principal Laws of Materialistic Dialectic'; Rožin: 'On the Inner Connection of the Laws of the Materialistic Dialectic' –, since he holds (as he indicated in his article published in *SST* 2, 1962, 4) a more 'revisionist' inquiry into the legitimacy of these laws to be imperative. – Of particular interest is Rožin's chapter 'On the Character of the Action of the Fundamental Law of the Materialistic Dialectic Under the Conditions of Socialism'. It is the refutation of polemic attacks directed against the author's and Tugarinov's common article 'On Contradictions and Moving Forces', published in *VF* 1957, 3. By this short article Rožin and Tugarinov had started a lively discussion which, however, has not led to any clear results – because of the *VF* editors' laxness, as L. Il'ičev stated in *Kommunist* (1962, 16, 27).

Noteworthy is V. P. Tugarinov's chapter 'Discussion-Questions of the Concept of Matter' which is also a reply to violent criticism to which the author's views (see *SST* 2, 1962, 14–16) had been subjected. Tugarinov again points out that 'matter' is also an ontological category and that it is legitimate to consider matter as the 'substance' of the world.

The following studies are devoted to some categories which up to now have found little elaboration in Soviet philosophical literature: A. A. Satybalov wrote on 'Realism, Naive Realism and Materialism', M.V. Émdin on 'Osnova i obosnovannoe' (The Base and the Based), and S. G. Šljaxtenko on 'Essences of Different Orders'. As the reviewer sees it, these three articles (especially the first two) have the common shortcoming that the categorial

instruments which the authors apply are not quite or even far from being adequate. It might be, e.g., a very important thing to clarify what it means to say (and what determinative correlations it implies) that *A* functions as the '*fundamentum*' of *B*. But as it seems to the reviewer, Émdin's statements remain far behind the problem.

Two chapters by T. A. Kazakevič and M. G. Makarov are dedicated to problems of finality, the first to the phenomenon of organic *celesoobraznost'* (purposeful construction of organisms), the second to the role of conscious purpose-setting in the field of human activity. While the first seems not to present anything new as compared with the superior study of I. T. Frolov *, the latter is very interesting.

In the epistemological section we find reflections by N. V. Rybakova 'On the Interrelation Between the Subjective and the Objective Sides of Knowledge'. The decisive question of the subjectivity of the sense-data is, however, not posed radically enough. Then G. A. Podkorytov treats – unfortunately without critical reference to the preceding studies of Rozental', Alekseev, Il'enkov and others – the interrelation between the 'Logical' and the 'Historical'. He presents some useful methodological advice but leaves completely undiscussed the problematic central thesis that the logical order of the statements in a system must follow the historico-genetic order in which the phenomenon under investigation developed. The last contribution, written by V. A. Štoff, is a study in the use of various models in contemporary science.

On the whole, the collection is a representative example of the contemporary style of specialized academic work in Soviet philosophy, of its merits as well as of its not yet surmounted shortcomings.

H. Fleischer

* *O pričinnosti i celesoobraznosti v živoj prirode* (On Causality and Finality in Organic Nature). 1961.

P. V. Kopnin: *Dialektika kak logika* (Dialectic as Logic). Kiev, Izd. Kievskogo Universiteta, 1961. 446 str.

This is definitely the best of the recent series of books on the 'materialist dialectic' and 'dialectical logic'. The first chapter, 'The Materialist Dialectic as a Science' (pp. 6–55), clearly explains that, although the materialist dialectic is one science (logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge coincide), it has three functions dealing respectively with the general laws of all reality (the materialist dialectic), with the general laws peculiar to thought ('dialectical' logic) and with the relationship between matter and thought (theory of knowledge – gnoseology). The second chapter, 'The Dialectic and Formal Logic' (pp. 56–96), presents 'dialectical' logic as assuming and carrying farther the work of formal logic while mathematical logic is put to the side as a 'special science' (like physics, biology, etc.). Here we find that the proper of 'dialectical' logic is the study of the 'subjective' dialectic. The third chapter, 'The Dialectic as a Logical System' (pp. 97–142), refutes the positivist contention that there is no such thing as a philosophical system and maintains that the 'dialectic' is a systematized series of categories expressing the mental reflection of the material world. The last three chapters, 'Thought as the Object of Dialectical Logic' (pp. 143–213), 'Logical Forms and Their Role in the Movement of Thought Toward Truth' (pp. 214–370), 'Forms of the Systematization of Scientific Knowledge' (pp. 371–443) form a quite coherent exposition of the categories and operations of 'dialectical' logic. There is little original in the elements presented, although a Soviet reviewer (G. P. Podkorytov in *VF* 1962, 5, 160) congratulates Kopnin for not having restricted his attention only to concept, judgement and reasoning – Kopnin includes in his treatment theory, idea, principle, hypothesis and science as forms of the systematization of knowledge. For the Western reader, however, these sections present an interest which is almost wholly archeological: what the author talks about is the worst form of early nineteenth century psychologistic 'logic': e.g. the judgement precedes the concept for without judgements the various notes of the concept cannot be distinguished; or, again, the word is 'the material form of the existence of the concept' but the concept is univocal (always) while the word may be ambiguous, etc.

Kopnin's book has received very favorable reviews in Soviet journals (s. K. M. Dolgov: *Leninskoe ponimanie sootnošenija logiki, dialektiki i teorii poznanija i ego razrabotka* (The Leninist Conception of the Relationship of Logic, Dialectic and Theory of Knowledge and its Elaboration) *VF* 1962, 5, 157–160 and *Ot redakcii VF* 1962, 5, 160–161) and, for our part, we have to admit that it represents a rather sound form of 'Bakradzism', i.e. the development of 'dialectical' logic as a logic which is rather an epistemology than a logic.

T. J. Blakeley

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

V. I. Čerkesov: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (The Materialist Dialectic as Logic and Epistemology). Moskva, Izd. MGU, 1962. 476 str.

Soviet philosophy which has had for a long time its *Anti-Dühring* now has its *Anti-Bakradze.* Professor Bakradze will probably not feel too bad, and this for two reasons: first, the arguments brought against his stand in logic serve by their inanity to confirm him as one of the more sensible (and senseful) Soviet philosophers in this domain; second, Professor Bakradze is not alone – Čerkesov's blacklist includes most of the prominent names in contemporary logic, Western and Soviet, formal and dialectical (e.g. Heyting, Brouwer, Bocheński, Wittgenstein, Russell, Carnap, P. V. Kopnin, M. N. Alekseev, V. I. Kondakov, V. F. Asmus). And, to whom does he pass out laurels? – M. B. Mitin and M. M. Rozental', of course!

Needless to add, the author is a convinced Hegelian. His basic thesis is that when Lenin spoke of the identity of dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge he meant 'identity' and nothing else. All the trouble comes from the fact – affirms the author – that people are not able to get themselves out of the formal logic way of thinking. This is why such 'nonsense' as the current distinction between formal and 'dialectical' logic has come about; Čerkesov denies the current opinion of Soviet philosophers that formal logic studies the 'forms of thought' whereas 'dialectical' logic studies the content of thought or, better, the dialectical relation of form and content in thought. According to Čerkesov, an error in the form is automatically an error in the content; therefore, logic seeks truth in all its forms; therefore, there is only one logic – 'dialectical' logic.

The first chapter (pp. 12–79) is a survey of Soviet literature on logic from the revolution up to the present. It is the work of a Soviet (therefore, 'party-minded') author but not without some interest. The second chapter (pp. 80–135) contains the author's 'demonstration' of the inseparability of logical correctness *(pravil'nost')* and truth *(istinnost').* His argument is that whenever a deduction is done from false premisses there will necessarily be a concomitant formal error – an *ativyāptih,* for example. The third chapter is entitled, 'Lessons in History of Philosophy' (pp. 136–215). The author runs the gamut of eminent philosophers who said anything about logic and comes to the conclusion that the vast majority of them held for the unity of logic and epistemology (theory of knowledge). Our only comment is that anything can be demonstrated from the history of philosophy if narrow enough principles of selection are used. In this case, the author puts in the same sack all the philosophers who said that logic seeks objective truth or who made the statement that logic has to do with things. Into this procrustean bed he manages to put most of Indian philosophy, Aristotle, Avicenna, Roger Bacon, Raymundus Lullus, Francis Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz and a variety of 'eminent' Russians. The fourth and fifth chapters are devoted to the full identity of logic, dialectics and theory of knowledge in Marxism-Leninism. In a monstrosity of a fifth chapter. 'The

Forms of Dialectical Thought' (pp. 357–476), the author explains, with copious illustrations and diagrams, how the three basic 'forms of thought' – concept, judgement and reasoning – are taken in formal logic (based on the law of contradiction) and in 'dialectical' logic (based on the 'law of the unity and conflict of opposites'). There is little new in the exposition: the concept is 'plastic' when it reflects 'mobile bonds' in reality; the judgement is already dialectical because of the difference in extension between the subject and predicate; the syllogism contains the dialectic of 'singular, particular and universal', etc. But, for the record, it should be noted that Čerkesov – in spite of his general 'reactionary' stand – does venture into unknown territory when, instead of taking as examples of 'dialectical reasoning' only Marx' *Capital* and Lenin's refutation of the mensheviks, he quotes Khrushchov on 'peaceful coexistence' and offers the following 'logical' analysis of Khrushchov's 'reasoning':

"... in current circumstances peaceful coexistence of governments with different social structures is possible. We can assume the following schema for underlining the logical peculiarities of this conclusion:

If there is A_b and $\bar{A}_b$, then B is possible.

In current circumstances there is A_o and $\bar{A}_o$.

Consequently, in current circumstances B is possible.

The symbols A_b and $\bar{A}_b$ stand for the forces of peace and the forces of war, taken generally, irrespective even of whether or not they exist in the given instant. The symbol B means 'the peaceful coexistence of governments with different social structures', and the symbols A_o and $\bar{A}_o$ stand for the particular status of the forces of peace and war in the current circumstances of the coexistence of two world-systems, socialism and imperialism. The first premiss of this deduction is a general judgement but of such a kind that does not exclude the peculiarities of the multitude of single situations but presupposes them. This latter is due to the dialectically contradictory character of the concepts and the relations among them. The antecedent *(osnovanie)* of this judgement is a unity of contraries *(A_b and $\bar{A}_b$)* which, no matter how the contraries are related, leads to the conclusion, 'B is possible'. This latter is also contradictory because it contains the whole multitude of multifarious situations of the real possibility B, including too the two, extreme, limiting cases: the transformation of the possibility B into reality (full and firm achievement of peaceful coexistence), and also the negation of the possibility B. In such a general judgement is concentrated extensive and profound information on the possible perspectives of development. In the second premiss is fixed the state of war of contraries in current circumstances *(A_o and $\bar{A}_o$)*. If in the second premiss there is a basis (*osnovanie* = 'middle term'), which is like that in the first premiss *(A_b and $\bar{A}_b$)*, then one can talk of the similarity of this deduction with the traditional *modus ponens* in which thought moves from antecedent to consequent according to the law of identity. In our case the relation of premisses and conclusion is different. It could be called dialectical: in the first premiss the antecedent is general *(A_b and $\bar{A}_b$)*, in the second it appears in a particular case, characteristic for current

circumstances (A_o and $\bar{A}_o$). The basis of the deduction is here not the law of identity but the dialectical relation of universal and particular. The presence of a particular relation of forces (A_o and $\bar{A}_o$) in current circumstances makes it possible to talk about the existence of a particular real possibility B with its particular perspectives and means of accomplishment." (pp. 468–470) *Vae, tergo meo!*

And, lest the author brush this appreciation off as due to 'bourgeois obscurantism', we might add that M. V. Émdin's criticism of this same book is properly devastating. (s. *V LGU* 1962, 23, 140–142) Émdin accuses Čerkesov of 'nihilism' in reference to Soviet philosophy of the past and of talking nonsense by putting sensation among the objects which logic studies.

T. J. Blakeley

M. N. Alekseev: *Dialektičeskaja logika* (Dialectical Logic). Moskva, 'Vyssšaja škola', 1960. 149 str.

This short initiation into the viscera of 'dialectical' logic was one of the first books to appear in the current rush of literature on the subject. In spite of an interesting and informative first chapter, 'The Object of Dialectical Logic' (pp. 3–33), the book as a whole is just another case of 'Rozental'ism' (M. M. Rozental wrote, among other things, *Voprosy dialektiki v "Kapitale" Marksa* (Questions of Dialectic in Marx' "Capital") where he showed himself as 'past-hack-master' in the 'inducing' of obscure, latter-day, Diamat logical categories from totally irrelevant 'classical' texts). The second chapter, 'The Concreteness of Concepts in Dialectical Thought', (pp. 34–47) should have never been taken back out of the waste-basket. Opening with the banal affirmation that sense-knowledge is concrete while concepts are abstract, the author goes on to mumble that in formal logic 'concrete' means 'less abstract', i.e. with more specifying notes in the definition; on the contrary, the 'concrete concept' of 'dialectical' logic is a *post-factum* result of the 'dialectical unity of general, particular and singular'. An example: formal logic uses the abstract concept 'matter' which is 'metaphysically' isolated from reality; the concept of 'matter' fathered forth by 'dialectical' logic is 'general' in as far as it designates 'objective reality' and 'independence from man' *and* 'particular' in as far as under it are subsumed such forms of matter as the inorganic, organic, mechanical, chemical, etc. This sort of thing goes on throughout the remaining chapters: 'Ascension from the Abstract to the Concrete' (pp. 48–108); 'The Historical and the Logical' (pp. 109–121); 'The Dialectic of Analysis and Synthesis' (pp. 122–134); 'The Interrelation of Induction and Deduction' (pp. 135–145).

However, the first chapter is of some interest because it takes account of the recent history of 'dialectical' logic in the Soviet Union and gives a rather clear presentation of the various positions which Soviet philosophers have adopted on some basic questions. Alekseev opens by stating that the question of the existence

of a 'dialectical' logic has already been decided in the affirmative and current discussion is only on its character and definition: one group of Soviet philosophers – K. S. Bakradze and V. P. Rožin are named – holds that 'dialectical' logic is 'Marxist gnoseology'. Alekseev refutes this position by pointing out that the 'Marxist dialectic' is a single, unified philosophic science and it is false to divide it into the 'dialectic of nature', 'dialectic of society' and 'dialectic of thought' (respectively, Diamat, Histomat and dialectical logic). Further, these same people are wrong in claiming that formal logic is logic *tout court* because only dialectical logic takes into account the development of thought. The second school of thought on the nature of 'dialectical' logic holds the 'Leninist' point of view which – Alekseev claims – is the one defended in his book. Here the unity of 'Marxist philosophy' is stoutly defended and logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge are 'identical'. In another historical *discursus* Alekseev says that Soviet philosophers fall into three groups when it comes to interpreting Lenin's words (in the *Philosophical Notebooks*) that these three sciences are the same *(sovpadat')*. Some dismiss his words as a temporary, 'Hegelian' *lapsus*; others maintain that the '*sovpadenie*' is not meant as 'identity' (Lenin himself reproached Bazarov in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* for not paying attention to the ambiguity of this word); finally, the 'orthodox' (Alekseev and those who agree with him) take the word to mean 'identity' – but Alekseev hastens to add that this is not the 'abstract' identity of the metaphysician where everything is rigidly the same but the 'concrete' identity of the dialectician where 'moments of difference' are included in the 'identity'.

The fourth and most interesting part of this chapter deals with 'The Dialectic of Thought and Dialectical Thought', a distinction which any paleo-neo-Scholastic would be proud of. In fact, for a few lines one has the impression that the author is trying to tell us that Diamat is responsible for the distinction between the *conceptus subjectivus* and the *conceptus objectivus* – but he starts mumbling 'dialectical' before any such clarity is achieved. According to Alekseev, the 'dialectic of thought' is present to all thought because all thought, inasmuch as it is a reflection of 'dialectical' reality, must reflect the movement of things: for instance, the progress from confusion to clarity and the contradiction between the subject and predicate of any judgement are 'dialectical elements' without which even the anti-dialectician cannot do. On the other hand, 'dialectical thought', or the 'subjective dialectic' properly so-called, is the 'conscious knowing of the dialectic of the object' and is of two sorts: 'spontaneous' *(stixinij)* which is unsystematic, non-reflective grasping of the 'objective dialectic' – as was the case with Aristotle!; 'conscious' *(soznatel'noe)* which is systematic and reflective knowledge of objects according to the laws of the dialectic – this, Alekseev explains does not mean that the dialectic is applied *a priori* to objects of investigation; rather, the general laws of the dialectic of objects appear, in the course of 'conscious dialectical investigation', in their 'concrete manifestations' in specific objects.

Finally, in the fifth section of this introductory chapter, 'The Dialectic,

Dialectical Method and Dialectical Logic', Alekseev lets in by the back door the diversity of the component parts of 'Marxist philosophy' which he had spent so much time in refuting when it was presented by Bakradze and Rožin. The 'dialectic' is defined as the philosophic science which abstracts its laws and categories from the special sciences and which then gives them a method, the 'dialectical method'. But, the 'dialectical method' is more than the 'dialectic' because, as method, it involves 'ways of applying the laws and categories of the dialectic in concrete investigation and activity'. Finally, 'dialectical' logic is here defined as a sort of meta-logic or philosophy of logic: it is the theory of the Marxist dialectical method; it is the study of the specific action of the dialectical laws in the case of thought.

In conclusion, Alekseev's book – it can be hoped – will be a contribution to the only possible way of solving the question of 'dialectical' logic, 'kill it with clarity'.

T. J. Blakeley

M. N. Rutkevič: *Praktika – osnova poznanija i kriterij istiny* (Practice as the Foundation of Knowledge and Criterion of Truth). Moskva, Gospolitizdat, 1952. 242 str.

A. N. Iliadi: *Praktičeskaja priroda čelovečeskogo poznanija* (The Practical Nature of Human Knowledge). Moskva, 'Vysšaja škola', 1962. 167 str.

The differences between these two books represent the differences between two eras in Soviet philosophy. They provide concrete evidence as to the increasing dependence of Soviet philosophers on philosophical argumentation and genuine erudition rather than on brutal affirmation of classical premisses.

The book of Rutkevič has been for many years the classic presentation of 'practice' as the basic category of Marxist-Leninist epistemology in spite of the serious setback the author suffered in his dispute with Podosetnik (s. *VF* 1954, 3, 34–45; 1954, 5, 77–81; 1955, 1, 144–149). It makes lavish use of quotations from the 'classics', especially Stalin, in the four chapters which are: The Basic Difference Between Marxism and Previous Philosophy in the Conception of Practice and its Role in Knowledge; Practice as the Foundation of Knowledge; Practice as the Criterion of Truth; The Unity of Theory and Practice as the Guiding Light of the Party of the Proletariat.

As usual in books of this period, the author first identifies and disqualifies the enemy: both Hegel and the contemporary pragmatists reduce practice to will-acts, thereby trapping themselves in a vicious circle. This done, he proceeds to define practice as "the material activity of people toward modifying the world" (p. 35): „the world is known in the practical activity of society to modify it" (p. 38). In the second chapter the function of practice as the origin of knowledge is described in the traditional Marxist-Leninist manner: it is through work (i.e.

practical activity) that man becomes man; the 'practice' involved in knowledge is not the act of the individual but the cumulative, social experience of all of mankind; not only the content but also the (logical) forms of thought evolve and are perfected in the course of practical activity; practice provides the 'dialectical' link in the 'dialectical' relationship between sensation and reasoning and between the abstract and the concrete. Similarly, in the third chapter we find the stock-in-trade of Diamat on truth and its criterion. First, the 'idealists' – with emphasis on pragmatism – are condemned for the use of a solipsistic criterion of truth; the 'practice' of pragmatism refers exclusively to the subjective needs and wants of the individual subject. Thereupon follow the 'classical' definitions of objective, absolute and relative truth. Finally, the last chapter puts a shiny, 'socialist' finish on the whole edifice by showing how all that preceded is intimately bound up with the practical activities of Stalin and the Communist Party.

Iliadi's book is attractive from the outset because his division of the subject-matter seems to augur a new and original way of dealing with the question of 'practice'. The chapters are: Sensible-Practical Mastering of the World and its Sources; On Human Practice and its Forms; Direct-Practical Knowledge as the Point of Departure of Theory; Theoretical Mastering of the World and its Forms; The Nature of the Scientific and Artistic Forms of Knowledge in the Light of the Unity of Theory and Practice. It is regrettable that the development of the various themes does not live up to this first impression. The author seems more interested in art than in philosophy (cf. his article, 'Iskusstvo kak poznanie v svete leninskoj teorii otraženija' (Art as Knowledge in the Light of the Leninist Theory of Reflection) In *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta* 1957, 4, 69) and often sacrifices logical clarity for beauty of style.

The basic theses of Iliadi's book are essentially the same as those defended by Rutkevič; both remain within the limits of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. But, the resemblance ends there. Rutkevič seldom quotes the pragmatists and positivists whom he is constantly refuting; Iliadi quotes – often at length – Russell, Wittgenstein, Frank, Carnap and others. Rutkevič uses the traditional 'condemnation by assimilation', i.e. just enough of the author to be refuted is quoted to show that he is indeed a 'Machist', only fit to be cudgeled with the Leninist platitudes against Mach; Iliadi, on the contrary, tries to meet the arguments of his self-constituted enemies at their face-value. Rutkevič rarely quotes non-classical Soviet writers (Todor Pavlov, Lysenko and Molotov are exceptions); Iliadi makes frequent use of the work of his Soviet colleagues – he discusses the theory of reflection with Kiselinčev, Rjakin, Strašnikov and Ukraincev; D. I. Bloxincev, E. D. Škol'skij, A. I. Oparin and O. Ju. Šmidt are quoted on scientific questions; the views of V. P. Tugarinov and G. E. Glezerman on 'social being' as a category of Histomat are refuted in favor of a more 'existential' definition (p. 48).

Iliadi sees cognition as a mastering *(osvoenie)* of the world by man. Previous to Marx the idealists had succeeded in explaining knowledge only by excluding

the real (material) world and the materialists had not been able to harmoniously join the sensible and rational elements in knowledge. The 'classics' put epistemology on a sound basis by introducing 'social-historical practice' as the fundamental epistemological category. Coupled with the 'Leninist theory of reflection', 'practice' permits a consequent explanation of cognition.

'Reflection' is a property of all real (material) being. At the inorganic level it consists in the interaction *(vzaimdejstvie)* of objects, each of which undergoes a reorganization, corresponding to the influence exerted upon it by the other; all things vary their 'energetic balance' in the course of interactivity with other things and they develop the 'capacity of accumulating adapted structurations' *(sposobnost' k akkumuljacii otobraženij)* (p. 25). At the physiological and biological levels the reorganization is more internal and is called adaptation *(prisposoblenie)*, or 'biological intuition'. But, the peculiarity of man is that he is a social being; all he does and is is marked by what the author calls 'social being' and defines as 'the totality of vital, active processes (both material and spiritual) of man'. It is this 'practice' which is the all-pervading basis of cognition; it forms the concrete-sensible base of immediate sense-knowledge, it is the *fundamentum* of man's 'intellectual intuition' (which is social, not biological), and it is the ultimate basis of the 'logical modelling' done in abstract-logical thought. An interesting distinction is made by the author between 'adequate' and 'correlative' models – the latter offer a possibility for a Diamat explanation of error, something which has been sorely lacking up to now.

There are many other interesting elements in Iliadi's book but perhaps the most interesting thing about it is the fact that it confirms the suspicion which Sovietologists have had for some time – a fully-developed, Marxist-Leninist epistemology, based on dialectic, reflection and practice, naturally leads to a type of immanent-creative evolutionism of the species 'Teilhardus': the knower can know the known because both knower and known 'participate' in a common property, 'reflection'.

T. J. Blakeley

Eugene Kamenka: *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. XVI + 208 pp. 30 Sh.

The early works of Marx have in recent years been the object of much attention for the new perspective they throw on his later and better known works. Kamenka's study is an attempt to present and evaluate the moral content of Marx's early writings and to link it not only to Marx's later works but also to contemporary Soviet legal and moral theory. As a whole the book is uneven: some of what Kamenka says is undoubtedly correct, some very doubtful, and some at best unclear. His study of the early works is quite close; the section on contemporary Soviet ethics and law is done with such a broad brush that it is quite superficial.

Kamenka's book is built around the notion of freedom in Marxism: its meaning and importance, its theoretical development and distortion, and its inevitable demise. That Marx was in great part motivated in his early years by a quest for freedom is correctly emphasized by Kamenka. The first two parts of the book – which consist largely of direct quotations from Marx's writings prior to 1845 – present Marx's notions of freedom (as self-determination), of alienation and of the ideal of a 'truly human' society. Kamenka does not tidy up Marx's notions and in these sections he does not attempt to render them either consistent or unambiguous, but for the most part takes the extracts he quotes at their almost uninterpreted face value.

Interpretation is reserved primarily for the third section of the book which he calls a 'critical résumé'. Kamenka here all too swiftly presents his own views (based almost entirely on those of his former teacher, John Anderson) of ethics and freedom and then interprets and evaluates Marx's notion of freedom in the light of them. In the name of freedom Kamenka rejects all normative systems of ethics. Freedom he interprets as "an ethical quality bound up with the way in in which goods work" (p. 102), where 'goods' are those 'motives' which "cooperate with each other and display internal progress" and 'evils' those 'motives' which "conflict not only with goods but also with each other". The position as sketched by Kamenka is replete with difficulties: there is no indication of how progress is measured without norms, no mention of the criterion used to decide what progress and cooperation are, no justification of the claim that they are desirable, no clarification as to what he means by 'motives', no analysis of their relation to results (motives which cooperate are different from the resulting actions which may or may not cooperate), and little explanation of Anderson's notion of causality which he uses in criticizing Marx's notion of freedom. That his own position is neither clearly presented nor adequately defended is extremely damaging to Kamenka's critique and interpretation of Marx since his critique is not an immanent one (which would have been useful) but one that depends on his own questionable position. He claims that insofar as Marx implicitly agrees with his (Kamenka's) view of freedom he is correct and has something to tell us, but insofar as he disagrees with it he is in error and was

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

led down a mistaken path. Unfortunately much of Kamenka's case, as presented, is unconvincing.

Part Four, which deals with the later writings of Marx, argues that the fundamental weakness of Marx's thought lay in his "negative view of the proletariat as the *most suffering class*" to whom freedom will be *brought* by history. This defect – the transformation of freedom from something which creative men achieve into something despotically brought to others – was, he claims, perpetuated by Engels and then by the Communist Party. Why Kamenka begins Part Five (the greatest part of which appeared in article form in *Survey*, Dec. 1961) by repeating *verbatim* three full pages from the Preface of the book is not clear. In any event this section deals with Communism and Ethics and consists basically of the claim that the distorted portion of Marx's conception of freedom permeates Soviet ethical and legal theory, that it results in a normative system (all types of which Kamenka rejects), and that it fails to deal with many of the substantive problems of ethical theory. The third claim is correct, but its cause is not investigated; the first is very probably true but not supported by any close textual interpretation. Much of the section is based on secondary sources and there is no attempt to present any detailed analysis of Soviet ethical writings and little attempt to understand them; he rejects Engels' writings wholesale without examining them, and almost completely ignores Lenin. The result is a rather superficial presentation of some aspects of Soviet ethical thought built around the development of what he calls Marx's 'servile' notion of freedom. But this may well be all that Kamenka actually intended, and as a small portion of a book essentially on Marx it is perhaps all that should be expected.

The book is neither a major nor a really original contribution to either Marxology or Sovietology, but it serves to draw attention to the important and central notion of freedom in Marxism, and to its resultant development in Soviet thought and society.

Richard T. De George

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET ETHICS *

This bibliography is composed of Soviet books, pamphlets and articles in Russian dealing with questions of ethics and moral theory. The criterion followed in deciding which works were ethical in nature is that generally indicated by the books listed under "Ethics" in *Voprosy Filosofii,* and by such items as 219, 248, 257 and 272 of the bibliography. Of the 326 items listed 118 are books or pamphlets, 169 are articles and 39 are dissertations (indicated by (d)). Only one item (133) precedes 1945; entries for 1962 end with October, when this bibliography was prepared.

In breaking down the bibliography by years we find only five books in ethics published from 1945 to 1950. Forty more appeared in the next seven years and 1958 seems to mark the beginning of an increased and sustained interest in the field. Thus, while in 1954 there were three books in ethics, in 1955 seven, in 1956 nine, and in 1957 four, the number increased in 1958 to eleven, and in 1959 there were twelve, in 1960 twenty, and in 1961 sixteen. The same increase as of 1958 is also found in the periodical literature. There were ten articles on ethical questions in 1954, seven in 1955, three in 1956 and three in 1957; but in 1958 the number jumped to seventeen, in 1959 there were eighteen, in 1960 twenty-nine and in 1961 twenty-four.

A breakdown of the bibliography by subjects indicates those treated most often and serves as something of an index of Soviet interest and concern. Though the increase in quantity did not bring with it any significant change in the general quality of the works, there are some shifts of emphasis in the topics dealt with. The single most often treated theme is the teaching or spreading of Communist morality (forty books and articles, of which twenty-eight date from 1958). An additional nine works dealing with the role of morality in building Communism indicate a more recent variation on the theme. Of the forty-one books and articles (twenty-eight from 1958) dealing with various problems of ethics the presence of eight articles after 1958 (as opposed to one prior) dealing with 'ethical categories' is noteworthy. The relationship of the individual and society and the coincidence of personal and social aims, though a constant theme and a central problem for Soviet ethics, has lately been the subject of increasing interest. Of the twenty-five books and articles on this topic seventeen date from 1958. Discussions of freedom and necessity remain constant and little changed with four books and articles prior to 1958 and six afterwards. A relative newcomer, at least in quantity, is the critique of 'bourgeois' ethical writings: nineteen, of which fourteen come after 1958. Intuitionism is the favorite subject of criticism. To these critical works can be added an almost equal number of more polemical attacks on religious ethics.

* The study resulting in this bibliography was made under a fellowship granted by the Ford Foundation, which of course in no way assumes responsibility for its contents.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 1 (March 1963) © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland.*

From the above it is clear that the Soviet conception of the crucial questions of ethics differs considerably from the Western conception of them. The foundation of Soviet ethics is Marxism-Leninism and controversy on this topic is non-existent. If the much talked-of transition to Communism is the impetus for the increasing emphasis on ethical studies, the identification of individual and social aims and the education of the masses in Communist morality are understandably central topics. The interest shown in criticizing 'bourgeois' ethics and the incipient interest in questions of metaethics indicate at least some broadening of Soviet ethical perspectives. However, of all the works listed only three articles and one book deal with 'value'; only three articles are specifically concerned with the 'category of duty'; and only one chapter of one book is dedicated to the notion of 'good'. Though the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' were – and still are – often used interchangeably, there are some who are trying to make the distinction more clearly. The new *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija* indicates that there will be two articles in the forthcoming volumes, one on *etika* and the other on *moral'*. Arxangel'skij in an article in 1961 suggests that *moral'* be used to indicate the 'form of social consciousness' and *etika* the 'science of morals'.

Of the 197 authors listed in the bibliography only twenty have contributed three or more items. Of these A. F. Šiškin is without doubt the most important with at least fifteen works from 1947 through 1962, including the two major presentations of Soviet ethics (248 and 257). Of the newcomers to ethics (since 1958) V. P. Tugarinov seems to promise the most originality, and O. G. Drobnickij and K. A. Švarcman are noteworthy for their interest in and acquaintance with Anglo-American ethics.*

1. Aitov, N. A.: 'Nasuščnye problemy kommunističeskogo vospitanija' (Urgent Problems of Communist Education). *VF* 1961, 5, 144–150.
2. Akatov, L. S.: (Review of 14) *VF* 1960, 11, 177.
3. Amanaeva, B.: *O vospitanii v massax kommunističeskoj soznatel'nosti* (On Instilling Communist Consciousness in the Masses). Alma-Ata, 1958.

* In addition to the abbreviations listed on page 4, the following also appear in this bibliography:

Ak.	Akademija	per.	perevod
dop.	dopolnenoe	Pg.	pedagogičeskij (-kogo)
dr.	drugie	r.	redaktor
G	gosudarstvennuj (-nogo)	Soč.	sočinenija
Gt.	Gospolitizdat	Ss.	sbornik statej
In-t	Institut (-a)	SSR	Sovetskaja Socialističeskaja Respublika
isprav.	ispravlennoe		
iz.	izdanie	str.	stranici
Izd.	Izdatel'stvo	t.	tom
K.	Kiev (-skij)	Učz.	Učpedgiz
L.	Leningrad (-skij, -skogo)	V	Vestnik
M.	Moskva (-kosvkij)	Vyp.	Vypusk
ot.	otdelenie		

4. ANDREEV, G. L.: *Kakuju moral' propoveduet religija* (What Morality Does Religion Preach). M., Znanie, 1959. 31 str.
5. ANDREEV, G. L.: 'Kritika moral'nyx principov religii (obzor naučno-populjarnoj literatury)' (A Criticism of the Moral Principles of Religion (A Survey of the Scientifico-Popular Literature)). *VF* 1961, 2, 156–161.
6. ARBATOV, JU.: 'Voprosy kommunističeskogo vospitanija' (Problems of Communist Education). *Kommunist* 1959, 3, 61–74.
7. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L. M.: 'Obščestvennaja praktika i cel' poznanija' (Social Practice and the Goal of Knowledge). *FN* 1960, 2, 59–69.
8. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L. M.: 'Vospitanie nravstvennyx ubeždenij, čuvstv i privyček' (The Inculcation of Moral Convictions, Feelings and Habits). *VF* 1960, 5, 41–50.
9. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L. M.: 'O suščnosti etičeskix kategorij' (On the Essence of Ethical Categories). *FN* 1961, 3, 117–125.
10. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L. M.: 'O kommunističeskom nravstvennom ideale' (On the Communist Moral Ideal). *VF* 1961, 11, 126–137.
11. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L. M.: 'Tvorčeskoe issledovanie osnov marksistskoj etiki' (Creative Research on the Foundations of Marxist Ethics). *VF* 1962, 10, 150–153. (A Review of 257).
12. ARXANGEL'SKIJ, L., NESTEROV, V.: *Trud i moral'* (Work and Morals). Sverdlovsk, Sverdlovskoe knižnoe Izd., 1961. 128 str.
13. AVRAAMOV, D. S.: 'Brigady kommunističeskogo truda i vospitanie molodeži' (Brigades of Communist Labor and the Training of Youth). *VF* 1959, 10, 132–137.
14. AXMEDLI, D. T.: *Svoboda i neobxodimost'* (Freedom and Necessity). Baku, Izd. AN Azerb.SSR, 1960. 165 str.
15. AZAROV, N. I., EFIMOV, V. T.: 'Ser'ëznaja pomošč' prepodavateljam osnov marksistsko-leninskoj etiki' (Considerable Aid to Teachers of the Principles of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1960, 11, 133–135.
16. BAJKOVA, M. K.: *Kollektivizm kak odna iz osnovnyx čert ličnosti sovetskogo čeloveka* (Collectivism as One of the Fundamental Personality Traits of the Soviet Man). AON, 1953/54 (d).
17. BAKŠUTOV, V. K.: 'Nravstvennoe razvitie ličnosti v kollektivax kommunističeskogo truda' (The Moral Development of the Individual in the Collectives of Communist Labor). *FN* 1962, 1, 41–48.
18. BARANOV, P.: *O moral'nom oblike sovetskogo voina* (On the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Soldier). M., Izd. DOSAAF, 1955.
19. BASKIN, M. P.: *Moral' kak forma obščestvennogo soznanija* (Morality as a Form of Social Consciousness). M., 1946.
20. BASKIN, M. P.: *Materializm i religija* (Materialism and Religion). M., 1955.
21. BASKIN, M. P.: 'O kommunističeskoj morali' (On Communist Morals). *Molodoj Kommunist* 1955, 6, 22ff.

22. BAZAROV, A.: *O sootnošenii material'nyx i moral'nyx stimulov v proizvodstvennoj dejatel'nosti ljudej* (On the Correlation of Material and Moral Incentives in the Productive Activity of People). Dušanbe. 1961. 122 str.
23. BËK, G.: *O marksistskoj etike i socialističeskoj morali* (On Marxist Ethics and Socialist Morals). Per. s nemeckogo. M., IIL, 1962.
24. BEKON, FR. (Bacon, F.): *Novaja Atlantida. Opyty i nastavlenija nravstvennye i političeskie* (The New Atlantis. Moral and Political Experiences and Precepts). Per. Z. E. Aleksandrova. Izd. AN SSSR, 1954. 242 str.
25. BELJAEV, K. I.: *Moral' i byt sovetskogo čeloveka* (The Morals and Mode of Life of the Soviet Man). M., Kul'tprosvelizdat, 1956.
26. BELJAEV, K. I.: *Moral' i etika sovetskogo čeloveka* (The Morals and Ethics of the Soviet Man). M., Kul'tprosvelizdat, 1956. 53 str.
27. BELORUSOVA, V. V.: *Moral'nyj kodeks stroitelja kommunizma – osnova sportivnoj etiki* (The Moral Code of a Builder of Communism – Foundations of a Sporting Ethic). L., G In-t. Fizičeskoj kul'tury imeni P. F. Lesgafta. Naučnye zapiski. Vyp. 1, 1962.
28. BERDNIK, P. M.: *Prevosoxodstvo kommunističeskoj morali nad moral'ju buržuaznoj* (The Superiority of Communist Morals over Bourgeois Morals). LGU. 1951/52 (d).
29. BERNADINER, B. M.: 'O sčast'e' (On Happiness). In 301, pp. 156–160.
30. *Besedy klassnogo rukovoditelja ob etike* (Talks of a Class Teacher on Ethics). M., Izd. Ak. Pg. Nauk RSFSR, 1958. 253 str.
31. BEVZ, A. S.: *Rol' politiki kommunističeskoj partii Sovetskogo Sojuza v formirovanii kommunističeskoj morali v SSSR* (The Political Role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Formation of Communist Morals in the USSR). Voenno-političeskaja Ak. 1953/54 (d).
32. B'JARNASON, B. (Islandija): 'Počemu my postupaem tak, a ne inače?' (Why Do We Behave This Way and Not That?). *VF* 1960, 2, 97–104.
33. BLATIN, A. JA.: *O družbe i tovariščestve* (On Friendship and Comradeship). M., Znanie, 1955. 31 str.
34. BLAUBERG, I. V.: 'Stroitel'stvo socializma i novaja moral'' (The Building of Socialism and the New Morality). *VF* 1960, 12, 164–168. (Review of 23).)
35. BOGRAČEV, JA. L.: 'Voprosy kommunističeskoj étiki v naučnom nasledstve A. S. Makaranko' (Problems of Communist Ethics in the Scientific Heritage of A. S. Makarenko). *VF* 1949, 1, 244–264.
36. BOKAREV, P. L.: 'O principax kommunističeskoj morali' (On the Principles of Communist Morality). In 287.
37. BOLDYREV, N. I.: *M. I. Kalinin o vospitanij kommunističeskoj morali* (M. I. Kalinin on the Inculcation of Communist Morality). M., Pravda, 1951. 30 str.
38. BOLDYREV, N. I.: *Voprosy vospitanija kommunističeskoj morali* (Problems of the Inculcation of Communist Morality). M., 1951.

39. BOLDYREV, N. I.: *V. I. Lenin i I. V. Stalin o vospitanii kommunističeskoj morali* (V. I. Lenin and I. V. Stalin on the Inculcation of Communist Morality). Stenogramma publičnoj lekcii, pročitannoj v Moskve. M., Pravda, 1951.
40. BOLDYREV, N. I.: 'V. I. Lenin i I. V. Stalin o vospitanii kommunističeskoj morali' (V. I. Lenin and I. V. Stalin on the Inculcation of Communist Morality). In 190.
41. BOLDYREV, N. I.: *O moral'nom oblike sovetskoj molodeži* (On the Moral Make-up of Soviet Youth). M., 1954. 84 str.
42. BOLDYREV, N. I.: *Vospitanie kommunističeskoj morali u škol'nikov* (The Inculcation of Communist Morality in Schoolboys). Iz. 2-e, isprav. i dop. M., Učz., 1956. 232 str.
43. BOLDYREV, N. I.: 'O principax kommunističeskogo vospitanija molodogo pokolenija' (On the Principles of the Communist Education of the Young Generation). *VF* 1960, 12, 38–49.
44. BOXKAREVA, M. A.: *Propaganda literatury po voprosam kommunističeskoj morali; iz opyta massovyx bibliotek Moskvy* (The Propagation of Literature on the Problems of Communist Morality; From the Experience of the Popular Libraries of Moscow). M., G Izd-vo. 1955. 86 str.
45. BUNGE, M. (Argentina): 'Naučnyj podxod k étike' (The Scientific Approach to Ethics). *VF* 1961, 1, 76–90.
46. BURKOV, B.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo sovetskogo obščestva* (The Moral and Political Unity of Soviet Society). M., 1951.
47. BUŠIN, V. S.: 'A. S. Makarenko o svjazi étiki i éstetiki' (A. S. Makarenko on the Relation of Ethics and Esthetics). *VF* 1960, 1, 52–60.
48. BUSLOV, K. P.: 'V. I. Lenin o klassovoj suščnosti morali' (V. I. Lenin on the Class Nature of Morals). *Kommunist Belorusii*, 1957, 6.
49. CAJKOVSKIJ, V. V.: *K voprosu o moral'nom oblike sovetskogo čeloveka* (Towards the Problem of the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Man). MGU. 1951/52 (d).
50. CELIKOVA, O. P.: *Sočetanie obščestvennyx i ličnyx interesov pri socializme* (The Combination of Social and Personal Interests Under Socialism). IF. 1948/51 (d).
51. CELIKOVA, O. P.: 'Šire propagandirovat' principy kommunističeskoj morali' (To Propagandize the Principles of Communist Morality More Widely). *Kommunist* 1955, 10, 103–107.
52. CELIKOVA, O. P.: *Sočetanie obščestvennyx i ličnyx interesov pri socializme* (The Combination of Social and Personal Interests Under Socialism). M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1957. 100 str.
53. CIKOL', JA. N.: 'Marksistsko-leninskaja étika o suščnosti morali i eë progressivnom razvitii' (Marxist-Leninist Ethics on the Essence of Morals and its Progressive Development). In 287.
54. ČAGIN, B. A.: 'O značenii istorii étičeskix učenij' (On the Significance of the History of Ethical Teachings). In 301, pp. 215–222.

55. *Čelovek kraciv i slaven trudom* (Man is Made Beautiful and Fine by Work). M., Gt., 1962. 112 str.
56. ČERNYJ, M.: *O desjati zapovedjach* (On the Ten Commandments). Perm', 1959.
57. ČUDNOVSKAJA, E. JU.: 'O proekte programmy speckursa po marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (On the Draft Program of the Specialist Course in Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1951, 6, 218–226.
58. ČŽOU JUAN'-BIN: *O skromnosti i vysokomerii* (On Modesty and Arrogance). M., Gt., 1958.
59. DANIELJAN, M. S.: *Nekotorye voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki* (Some Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). Erevan, Izd. AN Armjanskoj SSR, 1962. 166 str.
60. DEMIDOVA, A. I.: 'Problemy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki' (Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *V AN SSSR*, 1959, 7, 120.
61. D'JAČENKO, F. F.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo sovetskogo naroda-dvižuščaja sila socialističeskogo obščestva* (The Moral and Political Unity of the Soviet People is a Motive Force of Socialist Society). KGU. 1951/52 (d).
62. DOLGAEVA, A. T.: 'Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo naroda - važnejšij faktor razvitija sovetskogo obščestva' (The Moral and Political Unity of the People is the Most Important Factor in the Development of Soviet Society). In *Naučnye Trudy* (Azerbajdžanskij In-t. nefti i ximii), Vyp. 22, Baku, 1960.
63. DROBNICKIJ, O. G.: 'Social'nye i ideologičeskie osnovy doktriny 'čelovečeskix otnošenij'' (The Social and Ideological Foundations of the 'Human Relations' Theory). *VF* 1960, 2, 77–86.
64. DROBNICKIJ, O. G.: 'K voprosu o kategorii dolga v marksistskoj étike' (On the Question of the Category of Duty in Marxist Ethics). *FN* 1960, 3, 107–117.
65. DROBNICKIJ, O. G.: 'SŠA "Ethics"' (USA "Ethics"). *VF* 1961, 3, 181. (Review of the Journal.)
66. DROBNICKIJ, O. G.: 'Popytka zaščitit' intuitivizm v étike' (An Attempt to Defend Intuitionism in Ethics). *VF* 1961, 6, 173–177. (Review of Oliver Johnson: *Rightness and Goodness*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.)
67. DROBNICKIJ, O. G.: 'Intuitivistskoe napravlenie v sovremennoj anglo-amerikanskoj buržuaznoj étike' (The Intuitionistic Trend in Contemporary Anglo-American Bourgeois Ethics). *FN* 1962, 2, 76–82.
68. DUBININ, G. M.: 'Vospitanie molodeži na revoljucionnyx i trudovyx tradicijax zavoda' (A Factory's Revolutionary and Work Traditions Used for the Training of the Youth). *VF* 1960, 12, 50–61.
69. DZERŽINSKIJ, F.: *Dnevnik. Pis'ma k rodnym* (Dairy. Letters to Kinsfolk). Molodaja gvardija, 1958.
70. EFIMOV, V. T.: 'Problema svobody i neobxodimosti v marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (The Problem of Freedom and Necessity in Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *FN* 1959, 2, 66–76.

71. EFIMOV, V. T.: 'Naučnoe soveščanie po voprosam marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (A Scientific Conference on the Question of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1959, 7, 187–190.
72. EFIMOV, V. T.: 'Za glubokuju razrabotku voprosov marksistsko-leninskoj étiki' (For the Profound Cultivation of the Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). In 301, pp. 198–204.
73. EFIMOV, V. T.: *Kommunizm i moral'* (Communism and Morals). Kiev, Gt. Ukrainskoj SSR, 1961. 105 str.
74. EFIMOV, V. T., KOSOLAPOV, S. M.: 'O literature po voprosam kommunističeskoj morali' (On the Literature Concerning the Questions of Communist Morality). *VF* 1958, 3, 165–169.
75. ÉNGST, JA.: *Nekotorye problemy naučnoj étiki* (Some Problems of Scientific Ethics). Per. s. češskogo. M., IIL, 1960. 295 str.
76. FEDORENKO, E. G.: *Kommunističeskaja nravstvennost'* (Communist Morals). K., Izd. KGU, 1959. 286 str.
77. FILONOVIČ, N.: 'O popularnoj literature po voprosam kommunističeskoj morali' (On the Popular Literature Concerning Questions of Communist Morals). *Kommunist* 1956, 8, 114–123.
78. *Formy obščestvennogo soznanija* (Forms of Social Consciousness). Učebnoe posobie. M., Izd. MGU, 1960. 379 str.
79. FRANCEV, JU. P.: 'Socialističeskij kollektivizm i formirovanie ličnosti' (Socialistic Collectivism and Personality Formation). *VF* 1961, 5, 34–46.
80. FRICGAND, M.: 'Učenie Marksa i gumanizm' (The Teachings of Marx and Humanism). *FN* 1959, 2, 96–105.
81. G. A., M. G.: 'Moral' i religija' (Morals and Religion). (Teoretičeskoe sobesedovanie v Institute filosofii AN SSSR.) *VF* 1958, 9, 174–175.
82. GAK, G. M.: 'Voprosy étiki v marksistsko-leninskom mirovozzrenii' (Problems of Ethics in the Marxist-Leninist World View). *Bol'sevik* 1948, 9, 25–40.
83. GAK, G. M.: 'Voprosy étiki v marksistsko-leninskom mirovozzrenii' (Problems of Ethics in the Marxist-Leninist World View). In 190, pp. 61–90.
84. GAK, G. M.: 'Obščestvennye i ličnye interesy i ix sočetanie pri socializme' (Social and Personal Interests and Their Combination Under Socialism). *VF* 1955, 4, 17–28.
85. GAK, G. M.: 'Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i vsestoronnee razvitie ličnosti' (The Building of Communism and the All-Round Development of the Person). *Kommunist* 1959, 12, 34–47.
86. GAK, G. M.: 'Kommunizm i ličnaja sobstvennost'' (Communism and Personal Property). *Kommunist* 1961, 1, 66–75.
87. GAK, G. M. i dr.: *Voprosy Marksistsko-leninskoj étiki* (Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). Ss. M., 1962. 165 str.
88. GAPOČKA, P. N.: *Sočetanie ličnyx i obščestvennyx interesov pri socializme*

(The Combination of Personal and Social Interests Under Socialism). AON. 1947 (d).

89. GAPOČKA, P. N.: 'Sočetanie ličnyx i obščestvennyx interesov pri socializme' (The Combination of Personal and Social Interests Under Socialism). *Bol'ševik* 1948, 6, 26–42.
90. GARODI, R. (Francija): *Grammatika svobody* (The Grammar of Freedom). M., IIL, 1952.
91. GARODI, R. *Marksistskij gumanizm* (Marxist Humanism). Pjat' polemičeskich očerkov. Per. s francuzskogo. M., IIL, 1959. 294 str.
92. GARODI, R.: 'O ponjatii 'otčuždenie'' (On the Notion of 'Alienation'). *VF* 1959, 8, 68–81.
93. GARODI, R.: 'Problema morali v sovremennoj francuzskoj filosofii' (The Problem of Morals in Contemporary French Philosophy). *VF* 1960, 10, 64–77.
94. GERMAN, L. I.: 'Buržuaznaja moral' – oružie imperialističeskoj reakcii' (Bourgeois Morals – A Weapon of Imperialist Reaction). *VF* 1951, 5, 184–189.
95. GLUŠČENKO, M. G.: *Obščestvennyj dolg sovetskogo čeloveka* (The Social Duty of the Soviet Man). KGU. 1953/54 (d).
96. GORBENKO, JU. I.: 'Étika i bor'ba s prestupnost'ju' (Ethics and the Struggle Against Criminality). In 301, pp. 140–143.
97. GORINA, I.: '"Étičeskij socializm" – ideologičeskoe oružie reformizma' ("Ethical Socialism" – An Ideological Weapon of Reformism). *Kommunist* 1960, 18, 76–86.
98. GRANATŠTEJN, E. M.: *Étičeskie vzgljady N. G. Černyševskogo i tradicii V. G. Belinskogo* (The Ethical Views of N. G. Chernyshevsky and the Traditions of V. G. Belinsky). LGU, 1951/52 (d).
99. GRANKIN, N. I.: *Marksizm-leninizm o zavisimosti moral'nogo duxa armii ot celej i xaraktera vojny* (Marxism-Leninism on the Dependence of the Morale of the Army on the Aims and Character of War). Voenno-Političeskaja Ak. 1953/54 (d).
100. GRIGOR'JAN, T. G.: *O principax kommunističeskoj morali* (On the Principles of Communist Morals). MGU. 1951/52 (d).
101. GRIGOR'JAN, T. G.: 'O sootnošenii ličnyx i obščestvennyx interesov v socialističeskom obščestve' (On the Correlation of Personal and Social Interests in Socialist Society). *VF* 1954, 2, 123–134.
102. GULIAN, K. I. (Rumynija): 'Za obogaščenie tematiki marksistskoj étiki' (For the Enrichment of the Themes of Marxist Ethics). In *Problemy Filosofii.* S. rabot sovremennyx rumynskix filosofov. (Per. s. rumynskogo.) M., IIL, 1960.
103. GULIAN, K. I.: 'Marksistskaja étika i problema cennosti' (Marxist Ethics and the Problem of Values). *VF* 1962, 1, 39–53.
104. GUMNICKIJ, G. K.: *Obščestvennye i ličnye interesy pri socializme* (Social and Personal Interests Under Socialism). MGU. 1951/52 (d).

105. GUSEV, A. D.: 'Sočetanie material'nyx interesov s moral'nymi stimulami k trudu v epoxu stroitel'stva kommunizma' (The Combination of Material Interests with Moral Incentives to Work in the Era of the Building of Communism). *VF* 1960, 2, 148–159.
106. IGITXANJAN, M. X.: 'Vlijanie sredy i obščestvennogo mnenija na nravstvennoe vospitanie ličnosti' (The Influence of Surroundings and of Public Opinion on the Moral Education of the Person). In 301, pp. 84–92.
107. IKONNIKOVA, S. N.: 'Nravstvennyj progress i sovremennaja buržuaznaja étika' (Moral Progress and Contemporary Bourgeois Ethics). *FN* 1962, 3, 60–67.
108. IL'IČEV, L.: 'Voprosy kommunističeskogo vospitanija trudjaščixsja' (Problems of the Communist Training of Workers). *Kommunist* 1959, 14, 47–61.
109. JANAGIDA KENDZJURO: *Filosofija svobody* (Philosophy of Freedom). Socekgiz, 1958, str. 186–193.
110. JULINA, N. S.: (Review of *Encyclopedia of Morals*, ed. V. Ferm. London, 1957). *VF* 1959, 4, 169–171.
111. JUROVICKIJ, O. G.: 'Obščestvennoe proizvodstvo i ličnye potrebnosti' (Social Production and Personal Needs). *VF* 1959, 11, 27–40.
112. KALININ, M. I.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii* (On Communist Education). 3-e iz. 1945.
113. KALININ, M. I.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii i obučenii* (On Communist Education and Instruction). Izd. APN RSFSR, 1948.
114. KALININ, M. I.: *Stat'i i reči o kommunističeskom vospitanii 1925–1945 gg.* (Articles and Speeches on Communist Education 1925–1945). M., Učz., 1951. 206 str.
115. KALININ, M. I.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii. Izbrannye reči i stat'i.* (1924–1945). (On Communist Education. Selected Speeches and Articles. (1924–1945)). M., Molodaja gvardija, 1956. 381 str.
116. KALININ, M. I.: *O vospitanii i obučenii. Izbrannye stat'i i reči* (On Education and Instruction). M., 1957, str. 35–139.
117. KALININ, M. I.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge. Sbornik statej i rečej* (On Communist Education and Military Duty. Selected Articles and Speeches). M., Voenizdat, 1962. 704 str.
118. KAMMARI, M. D.: 'Socializm i ličnost'' (Socialism and the Individual Person). In *O sovetskom socialističeskom obščestve*. Ss. Gt., 1949.
119. KAMYŠAN, M. A.: 'Ob ob'ektivnom kriterii nravstvennogo progressa' (On the Objective Criterion of Moral Progress). *FN* 1962, 5, 90–97.
120. KANSKIJ, JU.: 'Kategorija sčast'ja v marksistskoj étike' (The Category of Happiness in Marxist Ethics). *V MGU* 1961, 1, 60–70.
121. KARAPETJAN, R. A.: *Étičeskie vzgljady N. G. Černyševskogo* (The Ethical Views of N. G. Chernyshevsky). Erevan GU. 1953/54 (d).
122. KAREVA, M. P.: *Pravo i nravstvennost' v socialističeskoj obščestve* (Law and Morals in Socialist Society). M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1951. 182 str.

123. KASAVINA, G. Z.: 'Kommunističeskoe vospitanie i stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR' (Communist Education and the Building of Communism in the USSR). *V MGU* 1960, 6, 36–45.
124. KAŠIRIN, P.: *Rol' moral'nogo faktora v sovremennyx vojnax* (The Role of the Moral Factor in Present Day Wars). M., Gosvoenizdat, 1953. 144 str.
125. KELLE, V.: 'Materializm i gumanizm' (Materialism and Humanism). *Kommunist* 1961, 8, 98–110.
126. KITAJGORODSKAJA, R.: *Sovetskij čelovek. Zametki o kommunističeskoj morali* (The Soviet Man. Notes on Communist Morals). Stavropol', Knižnoe Izd., 1959. 111 str.
127. KLOČKOV, V. M.: *Étičeskie vzgljady N. G. Černyševskogo* (The Ethical Views of N. G. Chernyshevsky). IF. 1958 (d).
128. KOLBANOVSKIJ, V. N.: *O kommunističeskoj morali* (On Communist Morals). Stenogramma publičnoj lekcii pročitannoj v Moskve. M., Pravda, 1951. 45 str.
129. KOLBANOVSKIJ, V. N.: 'O kommunističeskoj morali' (On Communist Morals). In 190, pp. 91–152.
130. KOLBANOVSKIJ, V. N.: *Kommunističeskaja moral' i byt* (Communist Morals and Mode of Life). M., Voenizdat, 1955. 96 str.
131. KOLBANOVSKIJ, V. N.: 'Trud po istorii materialističeskoj étiki' (A Work on the History of Materialistic Ethics). *VF* 1961, 1, 162–165. (Review of 253.)
132. KOLBANOVSKIJ, V. N.: 'Moral'nyj kodeks stroitelja kommunizma' (The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism). *Kommunist* 1961, 15, 36–46.
133. KOLLONSTAJ, A.: *Novaja moral' i rabočij klass* (The New Morals and the Working Class). M., 1918.
134. KOLONICKIJ, P. F.: *Moral' kommunističeskaja i moral' religioznaja* (Communist Morality and Religious Morality). M., Znanie, 1952. 29 str.
135. KOLONICKIJ, P. F.: 'Kritika i samokritika dvižuščaja sila razvitija sovetskogo obščestva' (Criticism and Self-Criticism is a Motive Force in the Development of Soviet Society). *Kommunist* 1954, 7, 49ff.
136. KOLONICKIJ, P. F.: 'Moral' kommunističeskaja i moral' religioznaja nesovmestimy' (Communist Morality and Religious Morality are Incompatible). In 301, pp. 191–197.
137. *Kommunističeskaja moral' i vojnskij dolg* (Communist Morality and Military Duty). Ss. M., Voenizdat, 1960. 191 str.
138. *Kommunističeskoe vospitanie trudjaščixsja v period razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma* (Communist Education of Workers in the Period of the Large-scale Building of Communism). Novosibirsk, IF AN SSSR, 1961. 118 str.
139. *Kommunističeskoe vospitanie trudjaščixsja v sovremennyj period* (Communist Education of Workers in the Contemporary Period). Ss. R. A. F. Judenkov i dr. M., Izd. VPŠ, 1962. 251 str.

140. KON, I. S.: 'Étičeskie vozzrenija N. G. Černyševskogo' (The Ethical Ideas of N. G. Chernyshevsky). *VF* 1950, 2, 148–168.
141. KON, I. S.: 'Pravo i nravstvennost' v socialističeskom obščestve' (Law and Morals in Socialist Society). *VF* 1952, 2, 240–245.
142. KON, I. S.: *Razvitie ličnosti pri socializme* (The Development of the Person Under Socialism). L., 1954.
143. KON, I. S.: 'Marksistskaja étika i problema dolga' (Marxist Ethics and the Problem of Duty). *VF* 1954, 3, 62–77.
144. KON, I. S.: 'Razvitie ličnosti pri socializme' (The Development of the Person Under Socialism). *Kommunist* 1954, 8, 27 ff.
145. KONOPLEV, V. K.: *Sovetskaja voennaja nauka o roli moral'nogo faktora v sovremennyx vojnax* (Soviet Military Science on the Role of the Moral Factor in Present Day Wars). M., Oblastnoj Pg. In-t., 1953/54 (d).
146. KOVAL'ČUK, A. S., RAČKOV, P. A., ŠIŠKINA, V. I.: 'Teoretičeskaja konferencija po voprosam kommunističeskoj morali' (A Theoretical Conference on Problems of Communist Morals). *VF* 1957, 3, 203–205.
147. KOVALEV, A. G.: 'Za kompleksnuju razrabotku problem marksistskoj étiki, psixologii, i pedagogiki' (For the Complex Elaboration of the Problems of Marxist Ethics, Psychology and Pedagogy). In 301, pp. 211–214.
148. KOVALEV, A. G.: 'K voprosu o sootnošenii étiki s psixologiej i pedagogikoj' (On the Problem of the Relation of Ethics with Psychology and Pedagogy). *VF* 1960, 6, 99–103.
149. KOVALEV, S. M.: *Kommunističeskoe vospitanie trudjaščixsja* (Communist Training of Workers). M., Socekgiz, 1960. 525 str.
150. KRASNOV, JU. M., MASKULIJA, A. V.: *O kul'ture povedenija molodogo čeloveka* (On the Culture of the Behavior of the Young Man). M., Molodaja gvardija, 1962. 105 str.
151. KRJAŽEV, P. E.: *Obščestvo i ličnost'* (Society and the Person). M., Gt., 1961. 94 str.
152. KRJAŽEV, P. E.: 'Kommunizm i ličnost'' (Communism and the Person). *FN* 1962, 1, 33–40.
153. KRUPSKAJA, N. K.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii* (On Communist Education). Izbrannye stat'i i reči. M. 1956, str. 55–72, 119–124.
154. KURYLEV, A. K.: 'O vsestoronnem razvitii ličnosti pri kommunizme' (On the All Round Development of the Person Under Communism). *VF* 1961, 11, 29–41.
155. KURZANOV, M. I.: *Marksistsko-leninskoe učenie o svobode i neobxodimosti* (Marxist-Leninist Teaching on Freedom and Necessity). MGU. 1950/51 (d).
156. KUZ'MIN, I. G.: *Marksizm-leninizm o roli moral'nogo faktora v sovremennoj vojne* (Marxism-Leninism on the Role of the Moral Factor in Present Day War). Voenno-političeskaja Ak. 1951/52 (d).
157. LEJMAN, I. I.: 'Doklad akademika K. I. Guliana (RNR) "Za obogaščenie

tematiki marksistskoj étiki". Kratkij obzor.' (K. I. Gulian's Paper "For the Enrichment of the Themes of Marxist Ethics". A Short Review). *FN* 1958, 3, 214–215.

158. LEJMAN, I. I.: 'Soveščanie po marksistsko-leninskoj etike' (A Conference on Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *FN* 1959, 4, 183–186.
159. *Lekcii po marksistsko-leninskoj étike* (Lectures on Marxist-Leninist Ethics). R. V. T. Efimov, N. V. Kolbanovskij, K. A. Švarcman, G. M. Štraks. M., Izd. MGU, 1960. 157 str.
160. LENIN, V. I.: *O kommunističeskoj nravstvennosti* (On Communist Morals). M., 1961. 293 str.
161. LIFANOV, M. I.: 'Marksistsko-leninskaja étika. Proekt programmy speckursa dlja filosofskich fakul'tetov' (Marxist-Leninist Ethics. Draft Program for a Specialist Course in the Philosophy Faculty). *VF* 1951, 2, 192–196.
162. MAKARENKO, A. S.: *O kommunističeskoj étike* (On Communist Ethics). M., 1951.
163. MAKARENKO, A. S.: *O kommunističeskom vospitanii* (On Communist Education). M., 1952.
164. MAKARENKO, A. S.: *O kommunističeskoj étike* (On Communist Ethics). In *Soč.*, t. V., Izd. APN RSFSR, 1958.
165. MAL'KOV, V. A.: 'Ličnye i obščestvennye interesy i uslovija ix sočetanija pri socializme' (Personal and Social Interests and the Conditions of their Combination Under Socialism). *V LGU* 1958, 5, 54.
166. MAN'KOVSKIJ, B. S.: 'Protiv izvraščenij obosnovanija otvetstvennosti v sovetskom ugolovnom prave' (Against the Distortion of the Basis of Responsibility in Soviet Criminal Law). *VF* 1951, 6, 201–207.
167. MAN'KOVSKIJ, B. S. i dr.: *Formirovanie moral'nogo oblika sovetskogo rabočego* (The Formation of the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Worker). M., Profizdat, 1961. 113 str.
168. MANOFEEV, I. A., EZDINA, F. A., KOZYREV, L. A., AKSENOVA, T. A.: *Étičeskie besedy so skol'nikami* (Ethical Talks with Schoolboys). Učpedgiz, 1958.
169. *Marksistskaja étika. Xrestomatija.* (Marxist Ethics. A Reader). R. A. F. Šiškin. M., Izd. In-t. meždunarodnyx otnošenij, 1961. 511 str.
170. MASIČ, I.: *Čemy učit religioznaja moral'* (What Religious Morality Teaches). Odessa, 1960.
171. MATVEYENKOV, I. I.: 'Vospitanie novogo čeloveka' (The Moral Training of the New Man). *VF* 1961, 7, 151–156.
172. MINDLIN, I. B.: 'Novaja kniga po istorii étiki' (A New Book on the History of Ethics). *V AN SSSR* 1960, 7, 116.
173. MIŠIN, M. I.: 'O moral'noj otvetstvennosti kollektiva' (On the Moral Responsibility of the Collective). In 301, pp. 93–101.
174. MIXAILOV, F. T.: 'Kollektivizm – nravstvennyj princip stroitelja kommunizma' (Collectivism is a Moral Principle of the Builder of Communism). *VF* 1962, 1, 134–145.

175. MIXEEV, V. I.: 'Teoretičeskaja konferencija v Berline po probleme svobody' (A Theoretical Conference in Berlin on the Problem of Freedom). *VF* 1956, 4, 222–225.
176. MURATOV, N. M.: 'O social'no-klassovoj suščnosti morali islama' (On the Social-Class Nature of the Morals of Islam). In *Naučnye Trudy*. Uzbekskij GU, Vyp. 98. Samarkand, 1960.
177. MURAUSKAS, V. I.: *Sootnošenie nravstvennosti i prava v sovetskom socialističeskom obščestve* (The Correlation of Morals and Law in Soviet Socialist Society). IF. 1958 (d).
178. MUXARTOV, N. M.: 'Ponjatie nravstvennoj celi v marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (The Notion of Moral Force in Marxist-Leninist Ethics). In 287.
179. MXITARJAN, G. E.: *Marksizm-leninizm o svobode i neobxodimosti* (Marxism-Leninism on Freedom and Necessity). Erevanskij GU. 1953/54 (d).
180. NEMCOV, V.: *Volnenija, radosti nadeždy. Mysli o vospitanii* (Of Emotion, Joy and Hope. Thoughts on Moral Training). M., Gt., 1961. 319 str.
181. NESTEROV, V. G.: 'O sootnošenii obščestvennyx i ličnyx interesov pri socializme' (On the Correlation of Social and Personal Interests Under Socialism). In *Dialektičeskij i istoriceskij materializm*. M., Izd. VPŠ i AON, 1958, pp. 76–92.
182. 'Neustanno vospityvat' sovetskix ljudej v duxe kommunističeskoj morali' (Tirelessly Educate the Soviet People in the Spirit of Communist Morals). *Kommunist* 1954, 13, 3–12.
183. NIKOLAEV, L. V.: *Neobxodimost' i svoboda v sovetskom obščestve* (Necessity and Freedom in Soviet Society). AON. 1948/51 (d).
184. NIKOLAEV, L. V.: *O neobxodimosti i svobode* (On Necessity and Freedom). M., Znanie, 1956. 39 str.
185. NOVOSELOV, N. S.: *O prevraščenii truda v pervuju žiznennuju potrebnost'* (On the Transformation of Work into the First Vital Need). M., Izd. VPŠ i AON pri CK KPSS, 1961. 144 str.
186. 'Nravstvennost' (Morals). *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija* (2 iz.). G naučnoe izd., 1954. XXX, 205–207.
187. *Nravstvennost' i nravstvennoe vospitanie. Materialy naučnoj konferencii* (Morality and Moral Training. Materials for a Scientific Conference). Vyp. 5. R. M. G. Zuravkov i O. P. Celikova. Novosibirsk, Izd. Sibirskogo otdelenija AN SSSR, 1962. 168 str.
188. 'Nravstvennost' kommunističeskaja' (Communist Morals). *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija* (2 iz.). G naučnoe izd., 1954. XXX, 207–208.
189. OJZERMAN, T. I.: 'Marksistsko-leninskoe rešenie problemy svobody i neobxodimosti' (The Marxist-Leninist Solution to the Problem of Freedom and Necessity). *VF* 1954, 3, 16–33.
190. *O kommunističeskoj morali* (On Communist Morals). Ss. Izd. CK VLKSM "Molodaja gvardija", 1951. 200 str.
191. *O kommunističeskom vospitanii* (On Communist Education). Sostavil S. M. Kovalev. M., Gt., 1962. 487 str.

192. ORLOVCEV, F. JA.: *Položenie i razvitie ličnosti v socialističeskom obščestve* (The Status and Development of the Person in Socialist Society). AON. 1947 (d).
193. ORLOVCEV, F. JA.: *Socializm i ličnost'* (Socialism and the Person). M., Gt., 1956. 143 str.
194. *Osnovy kommunističeskogo vospitanija* (Foundations of Communist Education). Učebnoe posobie. (AON Ak. Pg. nauk RSFSR). M., Gt., 1960. 462 str.
195. 'Otdelenie filosofii Čexoslovacko-sovetskogo Instituta Praga. Obsuždenie voprosov marksistsko-leninskoj étiki v Čexoslovakii' (A Discussion of the Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics in Czechoslovakia). *VF* 1952, 1, 225–229.
196. OVČINNIKOV, V. S.: 'Cennoe posobie po étike' (A Valuable Ethics Textbook). *VF* 1962, 2, 160–163. (Review of 169).
197. PAPAZJAN, S. M.: *Ličnost' v socialističeskom obščestve* (The Person in Socialist Society). In-t. narodnogo xozjajstva. 1951/52 (d).
198. PARKIN, V. F.: 'K voprosu o svobode i neobxodimosti pri socializme' (On the Problem of Freedom and Necessity Under Socialism). In UZ Ul'janovskij G Pg. In-t., XVII, Vyp. 2, 1961.
199. PERSIC, M. M.: *Moral' i religija* (Morals and Religion). M., Znanie, 1957. 31 str.
200. PESTOV, N. A.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo - dvižuščaja sila razvitija sovetskogo obščestva* (Moral and Political Unity is a Motive Force of Soviet Society). Voenno-političeskaja AK, 1951/52 (d).
201. PETROSJAN, M. I.: 'Marksizm i gumanizm' (Marxism and Humanism). *VF* 1955, 3, 45–58.
202. PETROSJAN, M. I.: 'Nekotorye voprosy etiki i revizionizm' (Some Problems of Ethics and Revisionism). *FN* 1958, 4, 33–44.
203. PIONTOVSKIJ, A. A.: 'Ukreplenie socialističeskoj zakonnosti i nekotorye voprosy sovetskogo prava' (The Strengthening of Socialist Legality and Some Problems of Soviet Law). *VF* 1955, 1, 17–27.
204. PODMARKOV, G. V.: 'V. I. Lenin o neobxodimosti i svobode v socialističeskom obščestve' (V. I. Lenin on Necessity and Freedom in Socialist Society). In *Trudy jakutskogo filiala* (AN SSSR. Sib. otd.) Vyp. 1, 1958.
205. PODMARKOV, G. V.: *Neobxodimost' i svoboda v socialističeskom obščestve* (Necessity and Freedom in Socialist Society). IF 1959 (d).
206. POLJAKOV, K. P.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo sovetskogo naroda-dvižuščaja sila razvitija socialističeskogo obščestva* (The Moral and Political Unity of the Soviet People is a Motive Force in the Development of Socialist Society). AON 1953/54 (d).
207. POPOVA, I. JA.: *Razvernutoe stroitel'stvo kommunističeskogo obščestva i vsestoronnee razvitie ličnosti* (The Extensive Building of Communist Society and the All Round Development of the Person). *FN* 1960, 4, 146–150.

208. *Problemy kommunističeskogo vospitanija* (Problems of Communist Education). Ss. R. V. N. Kolbanovskij i dr. M., Izd. VPŠ i AON, 1960. 220 str.
209. PROKOF'EV, V. I.: *Moral' i religija* (Morality and Religion). M. 1952.
210. PROKOF'EV, V. I.: *Dve morali: moral' religioznaja i moral' kommunističeskaja* (Two Moralities: Religious Morality and Communist Morality). M., Molodaja gvardija, 1953. 55 str.
211. PROKOF'EV, V. I.: 'Antigumanističeskij xarakter religioznoj morali' (The Anti-humanistic Character of Religious Morals). *VF* 1959, 9, 29–42.
212. PROKOF'EV, V. I.: *Dve morali* (Two Moralities). M., Voennoe izd. ministerstva SSSR, 1961. 119 str.
213. PUBLIČNAJA BIBLIOTEKA: *Čto čitat' o kommunističeskoj morali* (What to Read on Communist Morals). M. 1947. 151 str.
214. PUBLIČNAJA BIBLIOTEKA: *Čto čitat' o kommunističeskoj morali* (What to Read on Communist Morals). M. 1960.
215. PUSTOVOJTOVA, V. K.: *Moral'nyj oblik sovetskogo molodogo rabočego* (The Moral Make-up of the Young Soviet Worker). M., 1957.
216. RAKITOV, A. I.: *V čem vred religioznoj morali pri socializme* (What is the Harm of Religious Morality Under Socialism). 1960.
217. RAZUMNYJ, V. A.: *Étičeskoe i éstetičeskoe* (The Ethical and the Esthetical). IF. M., Iskusstvo, 1959. 160 str.
218. REBRIN, V. I. i dr.: *Čelovek buduščego roždaetsja segodnja.* Ss. o kategorijax kommunističeskoj nravstvennosti (The Man of the Future is Born Today. A Collection of Articles on the Categories of Communist Morals). Novosibirsk, Knižnoe Izd., 1962. 158 str.
219. REDAKCIJA *VF*: 'Proekt programmy po kursu 'Osnovy marksistskoj étiki' dlja vysšix učebnyx zavedenij' (Draft Program for the Course 'Foundations of Marxist Ethics' for Higher Educational Institutions). *VF* 1959, 6, 178–185.
220. REDAKCIJA *V MGU:* 'O Nekotoryx Problemax Kommunističeskoj Morali' (On Some Problems of Communist Morals). *V MGU* 1957, 3, 188.
221. RYBAKOVA, N. V.: 'Étika trudovogo kollektiva' (The Ethics of the Working Collective). *V LGU,* 1961, 23, 111–119.
222. SADOVSKIJ, N. A.: 'Francuzskie marksisty dajut otpor katoličeskim kritikam marksizma (French Marxists Repulse the Catholic Critics of Marxism). *VF* 1958, 1, 128–131.
223. SARSENBAEV, N.: *Vospitanie trudjaščixsaja v duxe kommunističeskoj morali* (The Training of Workers in the Spirit of Communist Morals). Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat, 1955. 136 str.
224. SAVČENKO, I. JA.: 'Programma KPSS i nekotorye voprosy kommunističeskogo vospitanija molodogo pokolenija' (The Program of the CPSU and Some Problems of the Communist Training of the Young Generation). *V MGU* 1962, 4, 63–73.
225. SAXARAV, A. B.: 'Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i ukreplenie obščestvennogo

pravoporjadka' (The Building of Communism and the Consolidation of Social Law and Order). *VF* 1962, 9, 39–50.

226. SELEKTOR, M. Z.: 'Politika i moral' ' (Politics and Morals). *VF* 1951, 4, 62–79.
227. SELEKTOR, M. Z.: 'Pravo i nravstvennost'' (Law and Morality). *VF* 1954, 2, 71–88.
228. SELEKTOR, M. Z.: 'Socialističeskaja demokratija i ličnost'' (Socialist Democracy and the Person). *VF* 1958, 9, 23–38.
229. SELIVANOV, F. N.: *Étika. Očerki* (Ethics. Essays). Tomsk, Izd. Tomskogo U., 1961. 186 str.
230. SELZAM, G.: *Marksizm i moral'* (Socialism and Ethics). Per. S anglijskogo. M., IIL., 1962. 285 str.
231. SEVAST'JANOVA, S. T.: *Moral' kak forma obščestvennogo soznanija* (Morality as a Form of Social Consciousness). Voronežskij G Pg. In-t., 1956.
232. SEVJAN, V. K.: *I. V. Stalin o roli moral'nogo faktora v Velikoj Otečestvennoj vojne sovetskogo sojuza* (I. V. Stalin on the Role of the Moral Factor in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union). AON. 1951/52 (d).
233. SINICYN, V. G.: *Byt epoxi stroitel'stva kommunizma* (The Mode of Life of the Era of the Building of Communism). Čeljabinsk, Knižnoe Izd., 1960. 124 str.
234. SJUSJUKALOV, B. I.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo – dvižuščaja sila razvitija socialističeskogo obščestva* (Moral and Political Unity is a Motive Force in the Development of Socialist Society). MGU. 1953/54 (d).
235. SKIRDO, M. P.: *Rol' moral'nogo faktora v pobede sovetskogo naroda i sovetskix Vooružennyx sil v Velikoj Otečestvennoj vojne* (The Role of the Moral Factor in the Victory of the Soviet People and of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War). Voenno-političeskaja AK., 1953/54 (d).
236. SOKOLOV, V. V.: 'Étičeskie i sociologičeskie vozzrenija Spinozy' (The Ethical and Sociological Ideas of Spinoza). *VF* 1955, 3, 59–72.
237. STUL', JA. E.: 'Ob edinstve obščestvennoj i ličnoj žizni čeloveka socialističeskogo obščestva' (On the Unity of the Social and Personal Life of Man in Socialist Society). *FN* 1961, 1, 35–43.
238. ŠANDRA, V. A.: 'Pričiny soxranenija perežitkov kapitalizma v otnošenii k trudu i puti ix preodolenija' (The Causes of the Preservation of the Remnants of Capitalism in Relation to Work and the Means of Eliminating Them). *FN* 1961, 3, 31–40.
239. ŠARIJA, P. A.: *O nekotoryx voprosax kommunističeskoj morali* (On Some Problems of Communist Morals). M., Gt., 1951. 278 str.
240. ŠAXNAZAROV, G. X.: *Kommunizm i svoboda ličnosti* (Communism and the Freedom of the Person). M., Molodaja gvardija, 1960. 102 str.
241. ŠČERBAK, F. N.: *Nravstvennyj oblik razvedčikov buduščego* (The Moral Make-up of Future Scouts). L., Lenizdat, 1961. 187 str.
242. ŠESTAKOV, V. P.: 'Kategorija geroizma v istorii étiki' (The Category of

Heroism in the History of Ethics). In *Vestnik Istorii Mirovoj Kulturi*, 1960, 2.
243. Šexterman, E. I.: *Marksizm-leninizm o svobode i neobxodimosti* (Marxism-Leninism on Freedom and Necessity). Kazaxskij GU. 1953/54 (d).
244. Širjaev, Ju. I., Livencov, V. A.: (Review of 76) *VF* 1961, 1, 170–172.
245. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Teorija buržuaznogo amoralizma Džona D'jui' (The Amoral Bourgeois Theory of John Dewey). *VF* 1947, 2, 244–257.
246. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Marazm anglo-amerikanskoj etiki' (The Decay of Anglo-American Ethics). *VF* 1948, 3, 252–265.
247. Šiškin, A. F.: *Buržuaznaja moral' – oružie imperialističeskoj reakcii* (Bourgeois Morality is a Weapon of Imperialistic Reaction). IF. M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1951. 163 str.
248. Šiškin, A. F.: *Osnovy kommunističeskoj morali* (Foundations of Communist Morals). M., Gt., 1955. 320 str.
249. Šiškin, A. F.: *Osnovy marksistskoj étiki i kritika sovremennyx buržuaznyx étičeskix teorij* (The Foundations of Marxist Ethics and a Criticism of Contemporary Bourgeois Ethical Theory). *V AN SSSR*, 1955, 5, 103 (d).
250. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Nekotorye voprosy teorii kommunističeskoj morali' (Some Problems in the Theory of Communist Morals). *VF* 1956, 4, 3–17.
251. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Suščestvuet li obščečelovečeskaja moral'?' (Does a Morality Common to All Mankind Exist?). In *Pomošč političeskomu samobrazovanniju*, 1958, 8.
252. Šiškin, A. F.: 'K voprosu o moral'nyx cennostjax' (Concerning the Question of Moral Values). In *Doklady i Vystuplenija Predstaviteli Sovetskoj Nauki na XII Meždunarodnom Filosofskom Kongresse*. M., AN SSSR, 1958, str. 71–81.
253. Šiškin, A. F.: *Iz istorii étičeskix učenij* (From the History of Ethical Teachings). IF. M., Gt., 1959. 342 str.
254. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i nekotorye problemy marksistskoj étiki' (The Building of Communism and Some Problems of Marxist Ethics). *VF* 1959, 2, 14–28.
255. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i nekotorye problemy marksistskoj étiki' (The Building of Communism and Some Problems of Marxist Ethics). In 301, pp. 30–60.
256. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Voprosy étiki v trudax V. I. Lenina' (Problems of Ethics in the Works of V. I. Lenin). *VF* 1960, 4, 58–72.
257. Šiškin, A. F.: *Osnovy marksistskoj étiki* (Foundations of Marxist Ethics). M., Izd. IMO, 1961. 528 str.
258. Šiškin, A. F.: 'Nauka i moral'' (Science and Morals). *VF* 1961, 4, 134–141.
259. Šiškin, A. F.: 'O ličnom dostoinstve i česti sovetskogo čeloveka' (On the Personal Dignity and Honor of the Soviet Man). *VF* 1962, 4, 110–121.
260. Štejn, V. S.: (Review of 285.) *FN* 1962, 3, 118–120.
261. Šutnikov, F. A.: 'Buržuaznaja moral'' (Bourgeois Morals). In 190.

262. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: 'Socializm i ličnost'' (Socialism and the Person). *FN* 1958, 3, 31–42.
263. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: (Review of 52). *VF* 1958, 4, 148–151.
264. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: 'Apologija individualizma v ekzistencialistskoj étike' (The Defense of Individualism in Existentialist Ethics). *VF* 1959, 10, 20–30.
265. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: 'Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoi etiki – važnaja čast' našej ideologičeskoj raboty' (The Criticism of Contemporary Bourgeois Ethics is an Important Part of our Ideological Work). In 301, pp. 223–232.
266. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: *Kritika sovremennyx buržuaznyx filosofsko-étičeskix sistem* (A Criticism of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophico-ethical Systems). M. 1961. 52 str.
267. ŠVARCMAN, A. K.: 'Neopositivizm uničtožaet étiku' (Neopositivism Does Away With Ethics). *VF* 1961, 1, 64–75.
268. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: 'Intuitivizm – odno iz projavlenij krizisa buržuaznoj étičeskoj mysli' (Intuitionism is One of the Manifestations of the Crisis of Bourgeois Ethical Thought). *VF* 1962, 9, 88–99.
269. ŠVEČKOV, G. JA.: *Čto takoe kommunističeskaja moral'* (What is Communist Morality). L., Lenizdat, 1960. 63 str.
270. TAMBOVCEV, I. V.: *Rol' moral'no-političeskogo edinstvo sovetskogo naroda v postepennom perexode ot socializma k kommunizmy* (The Role of the Moral and Political Unity of the Soviet People in the Gradual Transition from Socialism to Communism). AON. 1953/54 (d).
271. TAŽIBAEV, T.: *O kommunističeskoj morali* (On Communist Morals). Alma-Ata, 1958.
272. 'Tematičeskij plan žurnala "Voprosy Filosofii": IV Marksistsko-Leninskaja étika' (Thematic Plan of the Journal "Voprosy Filosofii": IV Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1962, 1, 178–179.
273. TEREŠČENKO, S. I.: *Étičeskie vzgljady V. G. Belinskogo* (The Ethical Views of V. G. Belinsky). MGU. 1950/51 (d).
274. TITARENKO, S.: 'Leninizm – osnova kommunističeskogo vospitanija trudjaščixsja' (Leninism is the Foundation of the Communist Training of Workers). In 190.
275. TITARENKO, S.: 'Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo sovetskogo obščestva' (The Moral and Political Unity of Soviet Society). *Kommunist* 1954, 2, 27 ff.
276. TRIFONENKOV, P. I.: *Marksizm-leninizm o moral'nom faktore v sovremennyx vojnax* (Marxism-Leninism on the Moral Factor in Present Day Wars). LGU. 1953/54 (d).
277. TROFIMOV, N. A.: 'O perspektivax razvitija morali i prava v ix vzaimnom otnošenii' (On the Prospective Development of Morality and Law Taken in their Interrelation). *VF* 1962, 5, 23–29.
278. TROFIMOV, P.: 'Edinstvo étičeskix i éstetičeskix principov v sovetskom

iskusstve (The Unity of Ethical and Esthetic Principles in Soviet Art). *Bol'ševik* 1950, 18, 31–40.

279. TRUŠAGINA, E. F.: *Formirovanie čustva socialističeskogo dolga u sovetskoj molodeži* (The Formation of the Sense of Socialist Duty in the Soviet Youth). AON. 1948/51 (d).
280. TRUŠAGINA, E. F.: *Vospitanie čuvstva dolga u molodeži* (The Inculcation of the Sense of Duty in the Youth). M., Trudrezervizdat, 1959. 115 str.
281. TRUŠČENKO, V.: *O xristianskoj morali* (On Christian Morals). Irkutsk, 1959.
282. TUGARINOV, V. P.: *Sootnošenie kategorij istoričeskogo materializma* (The Relation of the Categories of Historical Materialism). L., LGU, 1958. 118 str.
283. TUGARINOV, V. P.: 'O kategorijax "obščestvennoe bytie" i "obščestvennoe soznanie"' (On the Categories "Social Being" and "Social Consciousness"). *VF* 1958, 1, 15–26.
284. TUGARINOV, V. P.: 'Socialističeskoe obščestvo i ličnost'' (Socialist Society and the Person). *Kommunist* 1960, 18, 25–37.
285. TUGARINOV, V. P.: *O cennostjax žizni i kul'tury* (On the Values of Life and of Culture). L., LGU, 1960. 156 str.
286. TUGARINOV, V. P.: 'Kommunizm i ličnost' (Communism and the Person). *VF* 1962, 6, 15–23.
287. *Učenye zapiski* (Scholarly Journals). Tambovskij G Pg. In-t. Kaf. fil. Vyp. XVIII. Izd. Tambovskaja pravda, 1958. 158 str.
288. ULEDOV, A. K.: *Obščestvennoe mnenie v uslovijax socializma i ego rol' v ukreplenii kommunističeskoj nravstvennosti* (Public Opinion in Conditions of Socialism and Its Role in Strengthening Communist Morality). M., MGU, 1958.
289. ULEDOV, A. K., ANDREEV, G. G., ALEKSEEV, V. V., VORONKOV, S. V.: 'Nravstvennost'' (Morality). In *Formy obščestvennogo soznanija* (Učebnoe posobie). M., MGU, 1960, str. 97–138.
290. UL'KO, G. S.: *Rol' socialističeskogo truda v formirovanii kommunističeskoj morali* (The Role of Social Work in the Formation of Communist Morals). M., G Pg. In-t. 1953/54 (d).
291. UTKIN, S. S.: *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki. Kurs lekcij* (The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics. A Course of Lectures). Rostov-na-Donu, Rostovskij GU, 1961. 240 str.
292. VASIL'EV, O.: *Ix moral'* (Their Morals). Gt. 1959.
293. *V čeloveke dolžno byt' vse prekrasno* (In Man All Must Be Beautiful). Ss., 2-e pererabotannoe i dopolnennoe izdanie. L. 1960. 304 str.
294. VIPPER, R. JU.: 'Étičeskie i religioznye vozzrenija Seneki' (The Ethical and Religous Views of Seneca). In *Vestnik drevnej istorii,* 1948, 1, 43–63.
295. VIPPER, R. JU.: 'Moral'naja filosofija Avla Gellija' (The Moral Philosophy of A. Gellius). In *Vestnik drevnej istorii,* 1948, 2, 58–64.
296. VLADIMIROV, V.: 'O novom sbornike po voprosam marksistsko-leninskoj

étiki' (On the New Collection of Articles on Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *FN* 1959, 4, 161–163. (Review of 287).
297. VLADIMIROV, V.: 'Ob osnovnyx pravilax obščežitija' (On the Fundamental Rules of Social Intercourse). *VF* 1960, 6, 140–143.
298. VOLČENKO, L. B.: 'Marksistsko-leninskaja étika o sovesti' (Marxist-Leninist Ethics on Conscience). *VF* 1962, 2, 134–144.
299. *Voprosy kommunističeskaja vospitanija* (Problems of Communist Education). Ss. R. G. M. Gak i dr. M., Izd. MGU. 177 str.
300. *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki* (Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). UZ Tambovskogo G Pg. In-t. Vyp. 18. Tambov, 1958. 158 str.
301. *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki* (Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). R. A. F. Šiškin. IF. M., Gt., 1960. 263 str.
302. *Voprosy nravstvennogo vospitanija škol'nika* (Problems of the Moral Training of Schoolboys). Ss. R. A. A. Gorcevskij i dr. L., LGU, 1960. 132 str.
303. 'Vospityvat' sovetskix ljudej v duxu kommunističeskoj morali' (To Educate the Soviet People in the Spirit of Communist Morals). *Bol'ševik* 1947, 12, 1–7.
304. XAXALEVA, P. M.: *O sočetanii ličnyx i obščestvennyx interesov v socialističeskom obščestve* (On the Combination of Personal and Social Interests in Socialist Society). MGU. 1953/54 (d).
305. XAJKIN, A. L.: *Étika Belinskogo* (The Ethics of Belinsky). R. N. A. Okatov i dr. Tambov, Izd. G Pg. In-t., 1961. 355 str.
306. XAMIDOV, P. X.: 'O nekotoryx čertax islamistskoj morali' (On Some Traits of Islamic Morality). In *Naučnye Trudy* (Taškentskij G medicinskij In-t.), Vyp. 24, 1960.
307. XANJUTIN, JU.: 'Problemy socialističeskoj morali v fil'max poslednogo vremeni (Problems of Socialist Morality in Recent Films). In *Voprosy kinoiskusstva.* M., 1958.
308. XARČEV, A. G.: *Brak i sem'ja pri socializme* (Marriage and the Family Under Socialism). Izd. MVO SSSR, 1959.
309. XARČEV, A. G.: 'Problema nravstvennogo vospitanija ličnosti pri socializme' (The Problem of the Moral Training of the Individual Under Socialism). *FN* 1959, 1, 73–87.
310. XARČEV, A. G.: *Sem'ja v sovetskom obščestve* (The Family in Soviet Society), L., Lenizdat, 1960. 112 str.
311. XARČEV, A. G.: 'O sootnošenii istoričeskogo materializma i istoričeskoj nauki' (On the Correlation of Historical Materialism and Historical Science). *VF* 1961, 1, 103–113.
312. XOLOSTOVA, T. V.: 'Moral' kak predmet étičeskix issledovanij' (Morals as the Subject of Ethical Research). *V LGU* Vyp. 1, 1962, 5, 97–110.
313. ZAKLADNAJA, V., CELIKOVA, O.: *Esli v sem'e est' deti* (If there are Children in the Family). M., Moskovskij rabočij. 143 str.
314. ZAMOŠKIN, JU. A.: 'Sovremennyj kapitalizm i duxovnaja žizn' ličnosti'

(Contemporary Capitalism and the Spiritual Life of the Person). *VF* 1960, 6, 43–57.

315. ZAMOŠKIN, JU. A.: 'Bjurokratizacija buržuaznogo obščestva i sud'by ličnosti' (The Bureaucratisation of Bourgeois Society and the Fate of the Person). *VF* 1961, 4, 71–85.
316. ZAPOROŽEC, I. F.: *Voprosy kommunističeskoj nravstvennosti v trudax V. I. Lenina posleoktjabr'skogo perioda* (Problems of Communist Morality in the Works of V. I. Lenin of the Post-October Period). IF 1953/54 (d).
317. ZAVADSKAJA, N. V.: 'Marksistskij gumanizm' (Marxist Humanism). *VF* 1958, 8, 155–159. (Review of 91).
318. *Za zdorovyj byt* (For a Sound Mode of Life). Leningradskoe otdelenie Obščestvo po rasprostraneniju političeskix i naučnix znanij, 1956.
319. ZAZERSKIJ, G. D.: 'Material'nye i moral'nye stimuly k trudu i ix sočetanie v period stroitel'stva kommunizma' (Material and Moral Incentives to Work and Their Combination in the Period of Building Communism) *V LGU* Vyp. 2. 1962, 11, 63–71.
320. ZIS', A. I.: *O kommunističeskoj morali* (On Communist Morals). M., Gt., 1948. 39 str.
321. ŽURAVKOV, M. G.: 'Novyj trud po marksistskoj étike' (A New Work on Marxist Ethics). *VF* 1955, 4, 198–202. (Review of 248.)
322. ŽURAVKOV, M. G.: *Moral' sovetskogo obščestva i osobennosti eë formirovanija* (The Morals of Soviet Society and the Peculiarities of Its Formation). *V AN SSSR* 1956, 5, 115 (d).
323. ŽURAVKOV, M. G.: 'XXII s'ezd KPSS i nekotorye voprosy étiki' (The 22nd Congress of the CPSU and Some Problems of Ethics). *VF* 1962, 2, 3–14.
324. ZVEROLOVLEV, V. A.: *Moral'no-političeskoe edinstvo sovetskogo naroda – dvižuščaja sila socialističeskogo obščestva* (The Moral and Political Unity of the Soviet People is the Motive Force of Socialist Society). LGU. 1953/54 (d).
325. ZYBKOVEC, V. F.: *Nauka i religija o proisxoždenii nravstvennosti* (Science and Religion on the Origin of Morality). Obščestvo po rasprostraneniju političeskix i naučnyx znanij, RSFSR, 1959.
326. ZYBKOVEC, V. F.: *Ot boga li nravstvennost'? Nauka i religija o proisxoždenii nravstvennosti.* (Morals from God? Science and Religion on the Origin of Morals). M. Gt., 1961. 145 str.

Richard T. De George

CHRONOLOGY

1961

22 Dec. A. I. Ivanov defends his doctoral dissertation, *Rol' mirovozzrenija v tvorčestve pisatelja* (The Role of *Weltanschauung* in the Artist's Creation), at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Moscow. (*VF* 1962, 10, 132)

26 Dec. Conference at the University of Leningrad on the Twenty-Second Party Congress. (*V LGU* 1962, 17, 144–147)

1962

11 Jan. I. D. Nazarenko defends his doctoral dissertation, *Bor'ba T. G. Ševčenko za revoljucionno-demokratičeskuju ideologiju v filosofii i éstetike* (The Fight of T. G. Ševčenko for a Revolutionary-Democratic Ideology in Philosophy and Esthetics), at the Institute of Philosophy. (*VF* 1962, 10, 131)

Spring Founding of a *kafedra* for Scientific Communism under the direction of A. M. Kovalev, at the University of Moscow. (*V MGU* 1962, 6, 90–91)

27 March I. D. Andreev defends his doctoral dissertation, *Dialektika processa poznanija* (The Dialectic of the Process of Knowledge), at the Institute of Philosophy. (*VF* 1962, 10, 131)

April Conference on philosophic problems of elementary particles at the Institute of Physics of the AN SSSR. (*VF* 1962, 10, 143–148)

Conference at the Institute of Philosophy on 'The development of Communist Social Relations'. (*VF* 1962, 11, 141–145)

Conference on the structure of a course on the fundamentals of scientific Communism, in the philosophic section of the Institute for the Amelioration of the Qualifications of Teachers of Social Sciences of the University of Moscow. (*FN* 1962, 5, 125–130)

17 April V. M. Kaganov receives the title of Doctor of Philosophy from the Institute of Philosophy without a dissertation. (*VF* 1962, 10, 132)

19 April Conference at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University

of Leningrad on 'V. I. Lenin and Problems of Communist Education'. (*V LGU* 1962, 23, 143–144)

May Meeting in Leningrad of the editorial staff of the *Filosofskaja Encyklopedija* with the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Leningrad to discuss the first volume of the *FE*. (*VF* 1962, 12, 150–153)

Meeting at the University of Kišinev (Moldavia) on 'The Tasks of the Development of Philosophy in the Light of the Decisions of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CP of the SU'. (*VF* 1962, 10, 149)

14–19 May Symposium at the University of Kiev on 'The Logic of Scientific Investigation'. (*VF* 1962, 10, 133–141)

22 May D. P. Gorskij defends his doctoral dissertation, *Voprosy abstrakcii i obrazovanie ponjatij* (Questions of Abstraction and the Formation of Concepts), at the Institute of Philosophy. (*VF* 1962, 10, 131)

31 May Meeting of the Bureau of the Science-Soviet on 'Philosophic Problems of Contemporary Science'. (*VF* 1962, 10, 148–149)

1–2 June Meeting in Moscow on philosophical problems of cybernetics. (*VF* 1962, 5, 184–189; *VF* 1962, 11, 146–153 and 153–154)

2–5 June All-Union scientific session on 'Laws of the Transition of Formerly Backward Peoples to Socialism and Communism, Avoiding the Capitalist Stage', in Dušanbe (Tadžikistan). (*FN* 1962, 6, 114–117)

8 June A. P. Belik defends his doctoral dissertation, *Estetika N. G. Černyševskogo* (The Esthetics of N. G. Černyševskij), at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Moscow. (*VF* 1962, 10, 133)

26–30 June Meeting in Krasnojarsk on Communism and work. (*VF* 1962, 12, 144–150)

3 July Defence at the Institute of Philosophy of doctoral dissertation of A. V. Gulyga. (*VF* 1962, 10, 132)

2–8 Sept. Fifth International Congress of Sociology in Washington, D.C. with participation of eighteen Soviets, lead by F. V. Konstantinov. (*VF* 1962, 11, 19–35)

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

Appointments: Professor R. Ruffieux, member of the Board of Directors of the Institute, was elected as the Executive Director of the Swiss National Library in Bern. He will cease his teaching in the Institute. – Professor O. Halecki will assume the teaching of Russian History in the Institute as of the Summer Term of 1963.

Teaching Program: The program for the Summer Term, 1963 (beginning on April 22, 1963) includes the following lectures:

Program F: Russian Language – Proseminar in Russian (two) – History of Russia – History and Organization of the Communist Party – General Introduction to Communism – Communist Ideology – Proseminar on Communist Ideology (two).

Programs H and K (second and third years): Karl Marx – Seminar on Karl Marx' Early Writings – Soviet Epistemology – Soviet Doctrine of Categories – Soviet Philosophy of Physics – Seminar for Soviet Philosophy – Discussion Group on Current Soviet Philosophy. For Program *K*, also philosophy and history of philosophy according to a schedule to be determined individually.

Program P: all lectures and seminars of Program *F*, plus: Mathematical Logic – Introduction to General Philosophy of Nature – Soviet Philosophy of Physics – Theoretical Physics (with seminar) – Seminar in Soviet Philosophy of Physics.

Electives: Polish Language – Slavic Literature – Selected Problems of Orthodox Theology.

Registration for the Summer Term is not recommended to beginners (in Sovietology) as most lecture courses began in October, 1963; but candidates who, have at least a reading knowledge of Russian may be accepted.

The requirements are: *F*, B.A. or B.Sc.; *H*, M.A.; *K*, B.A.; *P*, M.A. in theoretical physics.

KARL G. BALLESTREM

SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

Historiography of philosophy – or in Soviet terminology 'history of philosophy as a science'[1] – is a part of Soviet philosophical activities. It seems, that only scant attention has been paid to it in Western countries. Some passages in the books by G. A. Wetter,[2] J. M. Bocheński,[3] and G. L. Kline[4] are the few places we know where questions of Soviet historiography of philosophy are treated.

Yet this field seems to be of no little importance, as results already from the considerable number of such publications since the early period of Soviet philosophy as the following pages will try to show. We shall first give the general characteristics of Soviet historiography of philosophy. We shall then describe the choice of philosophers and philosophies in history and the way they are treated; finally we shall give a sketch of the developments in this field up to now.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

Soviet philosophy provides an explicit theory explaining what 'history of philosophy as a science' should be.[5] It should be opposed to all bourgeois explanations of the history of philosophy (like Hegel's, Windelband's etc.) and should follow the general Marxist-Leninist conception of history and of philosophy: history mainly consists in the evolution of society through the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes, as expressed in historical materialism. Philosophy is a form of social consciousness. To the basic question of philosophy only two answers are possible – materialism or idealism. The method of philosophy can be either dialectical or metaphysical. Consequently, the history of philosophy is the battle between progressive and reactionary, materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics in the different periods of history.

In this interpretation, history of philosophy is considered as the

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 2 (June 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

specific *object of Soviet historiography of philosophy*. But this object presents two different aspects. First, one can consider the developments in philosophy mainly as developments in the ideological superstructure of society. If this aspect predominates, the origin and development of materialism (above al) and idealism as the ideological positions of the social classes will be the main object of the whole of this research. Second, one can also consider the developments in philosophy as the appearance, fight and disappearance of the different ideas and theories themselves. In this case, the research will concentrate on the analysis of the content of those theories, their dependance on former theories, their relations to analogical theories in natural sciences, etc.

Soviet historiography of philosophy, in defining its own object, has changed the accent from the first of these aspects to the second. Although both considerations are still present, one has lately shown more interest in the second and has thereby come much closer to what is considered serious work by Western historians of philosophy.

In his famous speech in 1947 A. A. Ždanov still defined the object of 'history of philosophy as a science' as: "the history of the birth, of the appearance and of the development of the scientific materialistic *Weltanschauung* and its laws. As materialism grew and developed in the battle against idealistic currents, the history of philosophy is also the history of the battle between materialism and idealism."[6]

This definition was still accepted in 1954 in the fourth edition of the *Short Philosophical Dictionary*.[7]

A new definition is given in the first volume of the large *History of Philosophy* (1957): "The object of history of philosophy as a science is the history of the development of philosophical ideas in the different periods of the development of society, above all the history of the origin, of the formation and of the development of the basic philosophical tendencies – materialism and idealism – and of the struggle between them."[8]

Finally, in a definition of 1960 the second aspect is clearly accepted: "The object of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the origin and development of doctrines about the general bases of being and knowledge, that give one or another solution to the basic question of philosophy. History of philosophy as a science regards the doctrines about the general laws of being and thinking that originate in the process of development of philosophical thought. The object of history of philosophy as a

science is the history of the philosophical thought of mankind, above all the history of the formation and development of the basic philosophical tendencies – materialism and idealism – of the struggle between them and the herewith tightly connected history of the formation, the development and the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics." [9]

It is evident, that in the spirit of this last definition, it is not only the history of the origin and development of materialism, the *Weltanschauung* of the progressive classes, which has to interest the historian of philosophy.

The *periodization of the history of philosophy* is of course, based upon the Marxist periodization of history in general. But this scheme is not univocally applied. First, as philosophy only rose as an expression of the social conciousness of classes, there was no philosophy in the times of primitive society. Secondly, the history of philosophy is divided into two main parts: the period before the revolution which Marx' philosophy is said to have effected in the history of philosophy and the period subsequent to it. They are again subdivided in the following way:

1. Philosophy in the slave-holding society.
2. Philosophy in feudal society.
3. Philosophy in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism.
4. Philosophy in the period of the establishment of capitalism before the origin of Marxism.
5. Philosophy in the period of pre-monopolistic capitalism.
6. Philosophy in the period of imperialism and of the proletarian revolutions (Leninism).
7. Philosophy in the period of the construction of socialism, of the transition to Communism and of the intensification of the general crisis of the capitalist system.[10]

For Marxism-Leninism, philosophy is class-bound because it is a form of the social consciousness of a given class in society. The developments of social consciousness are determined (if not completely, yet decisively) by developments in the field of social being. This is the foundation for another characteristic feature in Soviet historiography of philosophy: *the principle of party-mindedness.* Just like the systematic philosopher, the historian of philosophy has to follow this principle. He must always represent the interests of his class, judge the theories he describes and distinguish the progressive trends in the history of philosophy from the reactionary ones.

Another principle of Soviet historiography of philosophy is to always analyze philosophical theories in *relation to contemporary theories in natural sciences.* This is only a consequence of the general scientism in Soviet philosophy: philosophy should work upon what is already elaborated by the natural sciences. Thus, we very often find the following procedure: description of the general socio-economic situation, description of the achievements in the field of natural sciences and only then the philosophical theories themselves.

A last, but very typical side of Soviet historiography of philosophy is its *fight against the Western 'Eurocentrism'* in treating history of philosophy. Soviet historians of philosophy think that all people developed at a certain stage progressive and therefore equally valuable philosophical ideas and systems. In practice they sponsor studies of all kinds of philosophies in history, above all the Asian and South-American traditions. They also force the studies of the Soviet Union's and especially Russia's history of philosophy. The intention to decentralize history of philosophy certainly offers many advantages insofar as unknown philosophers are made accessible. But, if in a general history of philosophy the Mexican philosopher Diaz de Gamarra is said to have held that "philosophy is the knowledge of the true by means of reason and understanding" and that in his opinion "logic is an instrument for the knowledge of truth"[11], this is most misleading. It misleads, not so much because of the profundity of these statements, but because the unprepared reader will attribute their profundity to Diaz de Gamarra, whose merits, if any, must definitely be placed somewhere else. Nevertheless the Soviet historian of philosophy will have to mention Diaz de Gamarra, because progressiveness is for them a higher criterion than the originality and scientific quality of a philosopher.

CLASSES OF PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHIES

Soviet historiography of philosophy disposes of a simple and generally applied scheme to classify philosophers and philosophies in history. The basic distinction in philosophy between materialism and idealism serves as the foundation of this scheme. Thus all philosophers and all philosophical theories in history are said to be either *materialistic* or *idealistic* or *in between.*

Before Marx, before the discovery of dialectical and historical materialism, there was no perfect materialism in history. But there were forms of pure materialism, although they were naive and mechanistic, instead of being scientific and dialectical. These forms of materialism were the progressive philosophies in history.

Many types of philosophers and philosophies are described as being in between materialism and idealism. To this class belong all those, who do not clearly decide and who vacillate between materialism and idealism, take some of their ideas from one, some from the other. To this class are also said to belong those, who have a dialectical approach to reality and those who are against mysticism and religion in philosophy. Philosophies of this type are no pure forms of materialism, but they are called 'progressive' and 'with a rational nucleus'.

To the third, the class of idealism, belong all those philosophies, that are against materialism, against dialectics and science, and for mysticism and religion. They are said to be the reactionaries in philosophy.

The following are examples of such classifications of philosophers.[12]

First some examples of *materialists*. In the slave holding period the first materialistic tendencies are found in Indian and Chinese philosophy; later also in Greek philosophy. The following are considered ancient Greek materialists: Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes and Heraclitus. Further, there are the philosophers of the fifth century: Anaxagorase, Empedocles, Leucippus and – the greatest materialist of ancient Greece – Democritus. Epicurus is the last great materialist of ancient Greece. Ancient Rome has one great materialist: Titus Lucretius Carus, who is considered very important. The times of feudalism brought some materialists in Asia, like Wang Tschung and Wang Fu in China and the members of the later Cārvāka-school in India. In Europe, philosophy was so dominated by the Church, that no consequent materialism could exist at that time.

During the period of transition to capitalism, consequent materialism was getting stronger again. Pietro Pomponazzi and later Giordano Bruno in Italy, Juan Huarte in Spain, established a materialistic tradition. Soon afterwards there is the mechanistic materialism of Galileo, the English, materialism of Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes. Pierre Gassendi, John Toland and Jean Meslier, but also Baruch Spinoza and Isaac Newton are declared to be prominent materialists. At a later period,

but during the transition to capitalism in their country, the Russian revolutionary democrats (Belinski, Herzen, etc.) are mentioned, who were all pure materialists. The French materialists of the eighteenth century (Lamettrie, Diderot etc.) as well as the French utopian Communists already see the establishment of capitalism. The American materialists, J. Priestley and T. Cooper are the representatives of progressive philosophy in their country. The last great materialist before Marx is Ludwig Feuerbach.

It is also interesting to see who is said to belong to the second class of philosophers, i.e. to those who are in between materialism and idealism, but who were progressive and with a rational nucleus. The most prominent of this class in the first period of philosophy is Aristotle, who solved many problems materialistically and who knew already and applied the dialectical method. In the times of feudalism as the Church dominated all of European philosophy, the progressive ideas developed as nominalism, as criticism of the social system and of the Church. So the following are considered as progressive and important: Roger Bacon, Siger of Brabant, Duns Scotus and William Ockam. During the transition to capitalism are treated as progressive, although not as consequent materialists: Nicholas of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus from Rotterdam, Montaigne, Thomas More, and Campanella, later Montesquieu and Rousseau, Voltaire and Condillac. Finally, Hegel is considered most progressive as the founder of a really developed dialectical method and as solving many problems with a rational nucleus.

Most philosophers before the Marxian revolution in philosophy belonged to the third class, that of reactionary idealists. This is still so in the countries, where Marxism-Leninism is not yet the dominant ideology. It is, therefore, not astonishing to find philosophers like Plato, Plotinus, St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant etc. in this category. They are, of course, also treated in Soviet historiography of philosophy, but less exhaustively. It is the occasion to criticize them, to underline what might be progressive even in them (with the exception of those who happen to be saints, where nothing is acceptable) and to describe the (regrettable) influence they had on their time.

In describing this system of classification in Soviet historiography of philosophy, we did not want to suggest that classification is the only thing done in this field. There is and always has been some real research and

analysis of philosophical theories and systems in history. This is especially true for monographic studies and exhaustive articles, but also for the general outlines of the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, all analysis has to consider and is only possible within these primary classifications. Moreover, the fact that the progressiveness of a philosopher is a higher criterion than the scientific quality of his writings determines from the very beginning the choice, extension and importance of a research work on him.

The Soviet way of treating philosophers and philosophies in history is, finally, characterized by a clear preference for recent philosophy, especially after the origin of Marxist philosophy and an even clearer preference for the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy itself. The *History of Philosophy*, the sixth volume of which is just about to appear, treats in its first volume everything from the beginnings of philosophy to the first quarter of the nineteenth century! All the five following volumes treat philosophy after that date. Philosophy before Marx and philosophy after Marx are really incomparable!

DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

The Soviet literary production in historiography of philosophy can be divided in two parts: *editions* (Russian and foreign works) and *studies* in the form of general outlines, monographs and articles. It very often happened that the edition of the works of a certain philosopher was at the beginning of a number of publications concerning this philosopher. Editions always stimulate the historian of philosophy but in the Soviet Union they often even supply the conditions for further studies, because original and foreign editions are difficult or impossible to obtain. Editions must therefore be considered of primary importance. To describe and judge the developments in Soviet historiography of philosophy, we shall first consider the editions of works, then the studies, finally the most recent activities in this field.

1. Editions

The following considerations are limited to editions of the works of Western philosophers before the nineteenth century. History of Western philosophy in the twentieth century is considered anyhow as an object

of 'criticism of bourgeois philosophy' rather than of 'history of philosophy as a science'.

A further limitation must be seen in the fact that, given the insufficiency of Soviet bibliography of philosophy, our bibliographical knowledge of editions and studies in historiography of philosophy is rather poor. Anyhow we know of editions in translation of works of 53 philosophers, of whom 28 are 'materialists', 8 'idealists' and 17 'in between'. The number of these editions is 110, some of them in several volumes.[13]

Collected works appeared of Diderot, Hegel and of the Roman, Epicurean satirist Lucianus. Several works appeared of: Aristotle, Francis Bacon, G. Bruno, Condillac, Erasmus from Rotterdam, Feuerbach, Fichte, Fourrier, Helvetius, Herder, Hobbes, Holbach, Kant, Lamettrie, Leibniz, Leonardo da Vinci, Locke, Mably, Montaigne, Montesquieu, R. Owen, T. Paine, Plato, J. Priestley, Rousseau, Saint-Simon, Schelling, Spinoza, J. Toland, Turgot and Voltaire. Single works appeared, e.g., of Abelard, Berkeley, V. d'Acosta, T. Dezani, T. Campanella, Lucretius Carus, Macchiavelli, T. More, Morelli, Robinet, etc.

It is interesting to note when these editions were published (in volumes): there are 17 between 1920 and 1930, 68 between 1931 and 1940, 18 between 1941 and 1950, 44 between 1951 and 1960. From this it appears that most editions were done between 1931 and 1940, during the 'dead period in Soviet philosophy'. This is confirmed by A. A. Ždanov's statements in 1947, that criticized the historicism of Soviet philosophers.[14] A. F. Okulov, in an article of 1962, explains that Stalin's "cult of personality led many philosophic cadres to turn away from actual problems to the problems of history of philosophy".[15] It seems indeed very probable that the fear philosophers had during this period of being condemned and punished for their theories made them look for a relatively safe field in philosophy and, therefore, concentrate their activities almost exclusively on studies in history of philosophy and especially on editions. Yet the number of editions in translation between 1951 and 1960 proves, that this activity has not come to an end after the revival of philosophy in 1947, although it is now nothing more than one field among others.

It was and still is a principle that editions of works in translation include an extensive introductory or concluding article, written by either the editor or another prominent scholar. These articles are to expose and explain the edited work, but also to set the frame in which

the appreciations of the reader and of forthcoming studies are to be set.

2. Studies

Studies on history of philosophy can be found already in the earliest period of Soviet philosophy. In the 1920's, with their generally strong philosophical activities, also a number of studies in this field appeared, of which A. M. Deborin's article on 'Marx and Hegel' in 1926[16], A. F. Losev's book on Aristotle[17], and the book of V. F. Asmus on Kant[18] (both in 1929) may serve as examples. As indicated above, studies very often developed around and after the edition of the works of a philosopher. Thus the many editions of the 1930's also brought a large number of studies. For example, there was the edition of Aristotle's works in 11 volumes, 9 volumes of which appeared between 1927 and 1940. At that same time, at least two books and at least 13 articles appeared on Aristotle's philosophy.[19] Of an edition of Hegel's works in a total of 14 volumes, 11 volumes appeared between 1929 and 1940. During this time, we know of 4 books and 8 articles on Hegel's philosophy.[20] This may seem little in comparison with publications on Aristotle and Hegel in other countries. But if one takes into account that a well established philosophical tradition, facilities of working, access to original texts and editions – in other words normal working conditions as in other countries – are lacking here, then this seems to be a good and rather promising start. We took Aristotle and Hegel as examples, because these two seem to form more and more the center of interest for Soviet historians of philosophy. Spinoza must also be put at their level since – as concerns the number of publications – he is probably considered even more often than Aristotle, but less than Hegel.[21] Apart from these three, one finds studies on almost all philosophers whose works have appeared in a Soviet edition, and on others – especially those who are classified as materialists. Many of the articles on history of philosophy were published in the philosophical journal *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism).

At the end of the 1930's the first Soviet general outline of the history of philosophy was prepared. Its first volume appeared in 1940, the second and third followed in 1941 and 1943.[22] This work was not found satisfactory, especially its third volume was criticized as not being nationalist enough and as overestimating the German classics.[23]

G. F. Aleksandrov, although himself one of the editors of this first 'history of philosophy', was given the task of writing another work to replace it. His book appeared in 1946 under the title of *History of Western European Philosophy*.[24] This book, the discussion about it, its condemnation and the self-criticism of the author, certainly form the most widely known event in Soviet historiography of philosophy.[25] The first number of the newly founded philosophical journal *Voprosy filosofii* (1947, 1) was entirely devoted to a reprint of this discussion. In rejecting the content of the book, the principles of Soviet historiography of philosophy were for the first time explained in detail. But A. A. Ždanov, who represented the political authority at this discussion, did not so much teach Soviet philosophers how to write the history of their science, but how to get away from their historicism and how to treat current problems in an original way.

This may explain the general revival of Soviet philosophy after 1947 and the relatively little interest in the history of philosophy. Only after 1954 or 1955 studies in history of philosophy became more frequent again. Only then began preparations for a new general outline of the history of philosophy, for which one had still not found a satisfactory solution. The *History of Philosophy* was announced and the two first volumes appeared in 1957. It was originally planned in four volumes, but a fifth volume appeared already in 1961 and a sixth was announced for 1962.[26] Another general outline of the history of philosophy in one volume appeared in 1960.[27] The philosophers who contributed to these general outlines are currently the most prominent historians of philosophy in the Soviet Union, like V. F. Asmus, M. A. Dynnik, M. T. Iovčuk, T. I. Ojzermann, O. V. Traxtenberg. But many other philosophers of all categories, like K. S. Bakradze, B. M. Kedrov and M. B. Mitin have published at least one study in history of philosophy.

3. Recent developments

It is difficult to determine a general trend in recent Soviet historiography of philosophy. A. F. Okulov, in the article we mentioned above[28], describes the directions in which the efforts are being made today, in the following way: (1) Examination of the materialistic tradition in the history of philosophy and of science and especially the history of Marxist philosophy. (2) Elaboration of the philosophical and socio-political

doctrines in Russia. (3) Investigation of the historical connections between philosophy (above all the materialistic) and natural sciences and the investigation of philosophy in Asia. (4) Analysis of the progressive tendencies in contemporary foreign philosophy and criticism of reactionary tendencies in philosophy and sociology. (5) The publication of the *History of Philosophy*.

If this description is correct, the efforts of Soviet historiography of philosophy would go in a very limited direction nowadays. The future alone can show, whether Soviet historians of philosophy will concentrate in such an exclusive way on the elaboration of the materialistic tradition, especially on Marxist philosophy, on Russia and on the criticism of reactionary tendencies. But it seems that Okulov's words were meant as a recommendation, rather than as a description of facts. This would seem to exclude an intensive study of Western philosophy but the facts show, on the contrary, that the history of philosophy in Western countries is not of only secondary importance in recent writings. Moreover, the materialistic traditions in these countries are not even in the center of interest. There are, of course, studies on materialistic philosophers like the two recent books on Democritus[29] and three books on Giordano Bruno.[30] But there is a considerable number of publications on progressive but non-materialistic philosophers, like the book by V. F. Asmus on Descartes[31] and six recent books on Hegel.[32] The most astonishing fact in this context is the number of books on Kant: there are six since 1957.[33]

It would be wrong to conclude that those publications which treat of non-materialistic philosophers, are purely criticism and polemic. They mostly explain their subject-matter extensively and are based on solid knowledge. An extensive and basic criticism is never lacking. This criticism is often brought in in a rather primitive and *a priori* manner. But it is this critical side, where Soviet philosophers have to take a stand in front of all kinds of philosophies, that makes these publications an interesting part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

To sum up shortly:

The object of Soviet historiography of philosophy is the history of philosophy in the Marxist-Leninist interpretation, i.e. mainly the struggle between materialism and idealism in the different periods of history.

It divides the history of philosophy in periods, following the general periodization of Histomat.

It applies the principle of party-mindedness.

It analyzes philosophical theories in relation to contemporary theories in natural sciences.

It investigates the history of philosophy in the whole world, not only in a privileged area.

It classifies philosophers in history as materialists, idealists or as holding an intermediary position.

This classification of a philosopher sets the frame, within which the analysis and explanation has to remain.

Soviet historiography of philosophy has two main activities: (1) The editing of works of philosophers in history, (2) the publication of studies.

These activities have both shown considerable results. Most editions were brought out during the thirties. Studies have recently become more and more frequent.

Many recent Soviet studies in history of philosophy can be characterized by (1) the differentiation of the subject treated, (2) the intention to really analyze and explain the subject on the basis of a good knowledge and (3) the never lacking strong and often primitive criticism from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint.

It is indeed probable, that Soviet philosophers at the beginning became historians of philosophy in order to escape the risks involved in the field of systematic philosophy. But this move has certainly not damaged the developments of systematic philosophy. On the contrary, the intensive study of the history of philosophy has enlarged and ameliorated Soviet philosophy in at least three regards: (1) It has enlarged the number of problems and fields known and studied by Soviet philosophers; (2) it has taught them to see systematic problems in their historical context (one finds more and more references to historical positions in books and articles on systematic philosophy); (3) it has established the study of the history of philosophy as a branch of Soviet philosophy.

REFERENCES

1. Cf. e.g. *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* (Short Philosophical Dictionary). Pod. red. M. Rozentalja i P. Judina. Moskva 1954. Izd. 4-e. Str. 207. Henceforward: *KFS*.

2. Wetter, G. A.: *Der dialektische Materialismus* (Dialectical Materialism). Wien. 1958. 4. Aufl. SS. 215-218. (Engl.: London. 1958).
3. Bocheński, J. M.: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism). Bern. 1960. 3. Aufl. SS. 42-43.
4. Kline, G. L.: *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*. A series of essays selected and translated and with an introduction. New York – London. 1952. pp. 1-47.
5. The general characteristics of Soviet historiography of philosophy are explained in: *KFS*. Str. 207-210; *Istorija filosofii* (History of Philosophy). Pod red. M. A. Dynnika i dr. Moskva. 1957. T. I. Str. 9-28; *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* (Short outline of the History of Philosophy). Pod red. M. T. Iovčuka i dr. Moskva. 1960. Str. 5-20.
6. Ždanov, A. A. .: *VF* 1947, 1, 257.
7. *KFS*. Str. 209.
8. *Istorija filosofii*. T.I. Str. 10.
9. *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii*. Str. 6.
10. Ibid. Str. 18.
11. *Istorija filosofii*. T.I. Str. 623.
12. *Istorija filosofii*. T.I. was our main source for this classification.
13. Cf. 'Bibliography of Soviet Historiography of Philosophy: Editions in Russian Translation' on pp. 170-175 of this issue.
14. Ždanov, A. A.: *loc. cit.* Str. 268.
15. Okulov, A. F.: 'Nekotorye voprosy razvitija sovetskoj filosofii posle XX s'ezda KPSS' (Some Questions of the Development of Soviet Philosophy after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU). *VF* 1962, 1, 26.
16. Deborin, A. M.: 'Marks i Gegel' ' (Marx and Hegel). In his *sbornik*: *Filosofija i Marksizm* (Philosophy and Marxism). Moskva-Leningrad. 1926.
17. Losev, A. F.: *Kritika Platonizma u Aristotelja* (Aristotle's Criticism of Platonism). Moskva. 1929.
18. Asmus, V. F.: *Dialektika Kanta* (Kant's Dialectic). Moskva. 1929.
19. *Books:* Aleksandrov, G. F.: *Aristotel'. Filosofskie i social'no-političeskie vzgljady* (Aristotle. Philosophical and Social-Political Views). Moskva. 1940; Losev, A. F.: *op. cit.*
    Articles [only the most important, which appeared in the official philosophical journal of that time, the *Pod znamenem marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism)]: Aleksandrov, G. F.: 'Logika Aristotelja' (The Logic of Aristotle). *Pod znamenem marksizma* 1938, 9, 138-168; Cejtlin, Z.: 'O "fizike" Aristotelja' (On Aristotle's "Physics"). *Ibid.* 1937, 3, 167-175; Kondakov, N.: 'Učenie Aristotelja o forme i materii' (Aristotle's Doctrine on Form and Matter). *Ibid.* 1937, 4-5, 180-199; Serežnikov, V.: 'Dialektika mira po Aristotelju' (The Dialectic of the World according to Aristotle). *Ibid.* 1936, 7, 82-97; Svetlov, V.: 'Ob élementax dialektiki v "metafizike" Aristotelja' (About the Elements of Dialectic in the "Metaphysics" of Aristotle). *Ibid.* 1936, 5, 70-88.
20. *Books:* Byxovskij, B.: *Method i sistema Gegelja* (Hegel's Method and System). Moskva. 1941; Černyšev, B. S.: *O logike Gegelja* (On Hegel's Logic). Moskva. 1941; *Gegel' i dialektičeskij materializm* (Hegel and Dialectical Materialism). Sbornik statej k 100-letiju so dnja smerti Gegelja. Moskva. 1932; Mitin, M.: *Gegel' i teorija materialističeskoj dialektiki* (Hegel and the Theory of Materialist Dialectic). Moskva. 1932.
    Articles [only those, which appeared in the *Pod znamenem marksizma*]: Byxovskij,

B.: 'Mladogegel'janstvo' (Young-Hegelianism) *Pod znamenem marksizma* 1940, 10; Kammari, M.; '"Filosofija prava" Gegelja' (Hegel's "Philosophy of Law"). *Ibid.* 1935, 2; Kol'man, E., Janovskaja, S.: 'Gegel' i matematika' (Hegel and Mathematics). *Ibid.* 1931, 11-12; Judin, P.: 'Bor'ba na dva fronta v filosofii i gegel'evskaja dialektika' (The Battle on two Fronts in Philosophy and the Hegelian Dialectic). *Ibid.*; Vandek, V., Timosko, V.; 'Gegel' i Kant' (Hegel and Kant). *Ibid.*

21. Cf. Kline, G. L.: *op. cit.* p. l.
22. *Istorija filosofii* (History of Philosophy). Pod red. G. F. Aleksandrova, B. E. Byxovskogo, M. B. Mitina, P. F. Judina. Moskva. T. I., 1940; T. II, 1941; T. III, 1943.
23. Cf. Bocheński, J. M.: *op. cit.* S. 42.
24. Aleksandrov, G. F.: *Istorija zapadnoevropejskoj filosofii* (History of Western European Philosophy). Moskva. 1946.
25. Wetter, G. A. *loc. cit.*
26. *Istorija filosofii* (History of Philosophy). Pod red. M. A. Dynnika, M. T. Iovčuka, B. M. Kedrova, M. B. Mitina, O. V. Traxtenberga (in vol. III-V instead of O. V. Traxtenberg: T. I. Ojzerman and A. F. Okulov). Moskva. TT. I-II, 1957; TT. III-IV, 1959; T. V, 1961.
27. *Kratkij očerk istorii filosofii* (Short Outline of the History of Philosophy). Pod red. M. T. Iovčuka, T. I. Ojzermana, I. Ja. Ščipanova. Moskva. 1960.
28. Okulov, A. F. *op. cit.* Str. 34.
29. Asmus, V. F.: *Demokrit* (Democritus). Moskva. 1960; Timošenko, V. E.: *Materializm Demokrita* (The Materialism of Democritus). Moskva. 1959.
30. Kornienko, V. S.: *Filosofija Džordano Bruno* (The Philosophy of Giordano Bruno). Moskva. 1957; Rožicin, V. S.: *Džordano Bruno i inkvizicija* (Giordano Bruno and the Inquisition). Moskva. 1955; Ščeglov, V. P.: *Džordano Bruno i ego kosmologija* (Giordano Bruno and his Cosmology). Taškent. 1956.
31. Asmus, V. F.: *Dekart* (Descartes). Moskva. 1956.
32. Bakradze, K. S.: *Sistema i metod filosofii Gegelja* (System and Method of Hegel's Philosophy). Tbilisi. 1958; Ojzerman, T.: *Filosofija Gegelja* (Hegel's Philosophy). Moskva. 1956; Ovsjannikov, M. F.: *Pervye filosofskie raboty molodogo Gegelja* (The First Philosophical Works of the Young Hegel). Učen. Zap. Mosk. obl. ped. in-ta. M. 1956. T. 42; Ovsjannikov, M. F.: *Filosofija Gegelja* (Hegel's Philosophy). Moskva. 1959; Šamovskij, V. A.: *V. I. Lenin ob osnovnyx principax istoriko-filosofskoj koncepcii Gegelja* (V. I. Lenin on the Basic Principles of Hegel's Historical-Philosophical Conception). Moskva. 1958; Sokolov, V. V.: *Filosofija Gegelja* (Hegel's Philosophy). Moskva. 1959.
33. Asmus, V. F.: *Filosofija Immanuila Kanta* (The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant). Moskva. 1957; Grigor'jan, B. T. : *Neokantianstvo* (Neo-Kantianism). Moskva. 1962; Karapetjan, A. A. *Kritičeskij analiz filosofii Kanta* (Critical Analysis of Kant's Philosophy).
Erevan. 1958; Popov, S. I.: *Kant i Kantianstvo* (Kant and Kantianism). Moskva. 1961; Šaškevic, P. D.: *Teorija poznanija Immanuila Kanta* (The Theory of Knowledge of Immanuel Kant). Moskva. 1960.

RICHARD T. DE GEORGE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARXIST-LENINIST ETHICS*

Marxist-Leninist ethics has at last come into its own. After a decade of sporadic Soviet discussion concerning a course in the subject, The Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education of the USSR has designated an ethics text for students of higher educational institutions. The book, the first to be so characterized, is Professor A. F. Šiškin's latest work, *Osnovy marksistskoj étiki* (The Foundations of Marxist Ethics).[1] This and the *Xrestomatija* (Reader) of Marxist ethics[2] (which was produced under Šiškin's general editorship) provide ample textual material for a course in the Foundations of Marxist Ethics – a course which has until now been conspicuously absent from the Soviet philosophical and general university program of studies. Such a course has recently been recommended for inclusion in the curriculum of all institutions of higher education.

The first draft program for a course in Marxist-Leninist ethics was drawn up by M. I. Lifanov and appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii* in 1951.[3] A report of the discussion of the draft program was printed several months later.[4] Though hailed as a welcome first attempt the draft was quite severely criticized by a number of philosophers, among whom was A. F. Šiškin who suggested, as did others, an alternative plan for the course. Following the discussion, interest in establishing the course seems to have waned and during the next several years nothing more appeared about it. In 1955 Šiškin published his *Foundations of Communist Morality*[5], which in content largely coincided with his suggestions for the organization of a course, but which was not specifically designated as a text. His proposed criticism of bourgeois ethics was largely missing from the book, however, as well as the proposed neat division of ethical categories into principles, norms and moral qualities. Of course, whereas he had suggested in 1951 that the theme of Stalin as the embodiment of

* The study resulting in this publication was made under a fellowship granted by the Ford Foundation. However, the conclusions, opinions and other statements in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Ford Foundation.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 2 (June 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

the "mind, conscience and honor of our epoch" be developed, this gave way to a chapter (IV) entitled "The Communist Party – The Mind, Conscience and Honor of our Epoch".

The impetus for a course in ethics was generated anew by the Twenty-First Congress of the CP in 1959 (Jan. 27-Feb. 5) which declared that the Soviet Union had entered the period of the full-scale building of Communist society and that one of the major tasks was educating the masses in the Communist spirit of collectivism, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, and the other "lofty principles of Communist morality".[6] On March 18-21, 1959, a conference was called by the IF AN SSSR, the Ministry of Higher and Special Secondary Education SSSR and the Leningrad Department of Philosophy to discuss a new draft program for a course in the Foundations of Marxist Ethics. The speeches, discussions and draft program were published in book-form under the title *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj ėtiki* (Problems of Marxist-Leninist Ethics)[7] and reported on in *Voprosy Filosofii*[8] and *Filosofskie Nauki.*[9] One of the three main papers at the conference was given by Šiškin, in which he began by pointing out the absence of courses and texts in ethics and the generally intolerable situation with respect to the lack of both books and specialists in the field, given the task of Communist education underlined by the Twenty-First Party Congress. The draft program, which had been prepared by a committee under the direction of Professor Šiškin, outlined a thirty-two hour course. It had been discussed previously by the philosophy departments of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Sverdlovsk and other cities. Yet is it interesting to note that the ten themes presented and the order of their presentation correspond so closely to the course plan sketched by Šiškin eight years earlier in his criticism of Lifanov's plan that his direction is clearly evident in the resulting product.

Despite a good number of disagreements the members of the conference recommended approval of the draft program with instructions that a committee of the Ministry of Higher Education study the various suggestions in completing the final course program. Also discussed was the publishing of a *Xrestomatija* and the preparation of text-books in ethics by 'author-collectives'.

How much the discussed draft program was changed as a result of the conference is difficult to ascertain. A draft program – possibly the revised one – prepared by a Committee on Higher Education SSSR and the

IF AN SSSR under the direction of A. F. Šiškin was published in *VF* 1959, 6, 178-185. Some of the wording describing the course content in this draft varies slightly (though the themes and the overwhelming portion of the text are identical) from the text published as the draft discussed in March. The uncertainty concerning the status of the *VF* text arises from the fact that though it appeared in June, which is three months later than the conference, the text of the conference and the presumably original draft did not appear until 1960, and the report of the conference did not appear in *VF* until issue 7 (July) of 1959. The matter is somewhat complicated by the fact that the *Xrestomatija* which was published in 1961 and "compiled in conformity with the draft program of the course 'Foundations of Marxist Ethics'"[10] is divided into seven sections whereas a division into nine sections would have been expected, unless the course program had been changed. The division, moreover, differs significantly from Šiškin's book (13 chapters) which, though recommended as a text and though it coincides quite well in content with the draft program, does not conform specifically to the thematic division of the program. It has in fact been criticized by Soviet reviewers as a text-book because it handles in too much detail as well as too tediously many of the questions of ethics.

The two Soviet reviewers, Arxangel'skij[11] and Sadykov[12], both refer to Šiškin's book as a step forward, despite its shortcomings. As the author admits, it covers a great deal of what he had already covered in his earlier book, though the structure is different (and improved) and the concern with the inculcation of the masses with Communist morality is more pronounced and developed. Šiškin makes a greater attempt to clarify the meaning of terms such as 'morals', 'ethics', 'custom', 'principle of morality' and the like than any other Soviet philosopher previously. He develops the notion of the "relative" independence of the development of morals *vis-à-vis* the material conditions of society and the other elements of the social superstructure, and he gives a reasonably clear presentation of the unity of moral goals and the means of their achievement. He attempts to show how the morals of collectivity, the new morals of the new man in Communist society, follow from the development of the new society. Central questions, such as the moral freedom of the individual person, the relation of personal and collective conscience and obligation, the derivation and justification of ethical categories, the

relation of the simple norms of morality to the notion of the development of moral progress, and the elaboration of categories such as good and evil are quite poorly and inadequately treated and have in some cases received better treatment at the hands of other Soviet philosophers (e.g. in Tugarinov's *O cennostjax žizni i kul'tury*[13]). The book is best in its earlier sections dealing with theoretical questions, most tedious in the presentation and application of moral norms and qualities.

As the major statement of Marxist-Leninist ethics, published in an edition of 100 000 copies, and destined as a text for general use in institutions of higher education it is intended to serve as a presentation of the *foundations* of Marxist ethics. It may so function for Soviet students. For anyone except a Marxist, however, it cannot so serve because it assumes and proceeds from the 'truth' of the Marxist-Leninist classics: it assumes the validity of the Marxist interpretation of history, of the distinction between base and superstructure, of the inevitable triumph of Communism, of the coincidence of the aims of the proletariat and those of 'all mankind', of the position of the Communist Party as the vanguard and defender of the aims of the proletariat, and so on. These assumptions are not generally made explicit, but it is within their framework that Šiškin proceeds.

The book begins with a discussion of the subject-matter of ethics (ethics is the science of morals; its proper study is moral teachings, the explanation of the origin of morals, the nature of moral ideas and judgments, the criteria of morals, etc.[14]) and with a statement that the materialist understanding of history is the basis for a scientific theory of morals. This is followed by a general discussion of different types of morals (those of primitive society, slave holding society, feudal society, etc.). There then follows a chapter on the relation of morals to politics, law, art, science, and religion. The three chapters form a unit and are the most interesting portion of the book. From a brief discussion of freedom and necessity Šiškin then presents Communism as the moral ideal of mankind and as the criterion of morality. This is the basis for deriving the basic principles of Communist morality, the highest of which is devotion to Communism; this in turn is the basis for collectivism. Love of the socialist fatherland, love of other socialist countries and solidarity with workers of all countries are presented in one chapter, conscientious work for society in another, Communist humanism in a third, and the

moral basis of marriage and family in a fourth. Having dealt with moral principles, Šiškin in Chapter X summarily and perfunctorily turns to the Marxist understanding of the concepts of duty, conscience, honor, and happiness. These are clearly subsidiary considerations for him, as are (surprisingly) the simple elementary laws of society and (not surprisingly) questions of decorum, propriety, good form and etiquette. Then follows a list of the moral virtues and character traits of the fighters for Communism. The last chapter is devoted to the means of educating workers in the spirit of Communist morality.

Šiškin's book raises a number of points which could be discussed at length. His misstatements and oversimplifications of Western philosophical and religious positions are especially disturbing to the Western reader, as are his caricatures of capitalist society in terms of Marx's nineteenth Century descriptions and predictions without the least effort to document their present-day factual applicability. He completely ignores many ethical questions, such as "why should I be moral?", individual freedom, and the distinction between material, formal and subjective rightness. Even the Soviet reviewers complained that too often Šiškin presents his position rather than arguing to it or defending it. The Communist Party, the supposed vanguard of the progressive elements of mankind, is quoted by Šiškin with authority in moral questions. But he does not make clear whether what the Party prescribes is right because it prescribes it, or whether it prescribes what it does because it is right. This latter seems to be Šiškin's position, but he does not disclose the method by which the Party discovers the needs of mankind, how it determines the moral demands of a given situation, nor how it decides which qualities are the moral ones that should be aimed at by the new man.

There are only two points, however, that I shall examine in any detail. I choose these because they are central and peculiar to Marxist-Leninist ethics. The first is the basis of ethics, the second is the claim that Communism is the moral ideal of humanity and the criterion of morals.

I. BASIS OF ETHICS

According to Marxism-Leninism, as presented by Šiškin, morals have their origin in customs or dispositions[15] based upon the material

conditions of life and the relations existing between persons, as well as between an individual and his society, class, state, country, family, and so on.[16] Morals appear only with society because only then do men have real relations with others. In working together men develop thought, speech, society, and customs necessary for working together.[17] Moral views and feelings which thus developed became expressed in principles or norms of conduct.[18] Social necessity and norms of conduct became in turn the subjective need of the individual, his moral duty.[19] As society developed into classes, different classes developed different moral customs. Each change in the conditions of life, moreover, brought about corresponding changes in customs and so in morals, though social consciousness lagged behind social being, especially when a class either within or without a country conserved remnants of the old order.[20] Historical variations in moral concepts, feelings and norms are thus the result of varying economic relations. Each epoch had its ruling morality which expressed and defended the interests of the ruling class and which was imposed on the ruled or exploited class, and accepted by them if they were not conscious of their own needs. If they were made conscious of their needs, however, they formed new norms and traditions. Marx and Engels in discovering the laws of social development discovered those moral ideas which are founded on the development of reality and are expressive of its future.[21] They found this truly human morality, which will eliminate the exploitation of man by man and which will create a society of truly human relations, in the morality of the working class.[22] The founders of Marxism then gave the workers a clear consciousness of their condition and a goal towards which to struggle, namely the goal of Communism wherein there would be no exploitation and every person would receive enough for his all-round development.[23] Thus Marxism, while admitting the class character of morals, holds that Communist morality expresses the highest ideals of humanity.[24] Communist morality is not a relative morality because it is an objectively true, just, truly human morality.[25] Just as mankind will progress to a classless society, so it will progress morally to the state of Communist morals, which will embrace all of humanity.

Now in this presentation there are three major claims which I shall consider: (1) morals are the result of material (primarily economic) relations; (2) morality is relative to historical conditions, though this

relativity is of a special type since it is determined by material conditions of life; (3) there is an all-human morality, discovered in its roots by Marx and Engels, which will eventually triumph.

With respect to (1) what Šiškin really means is by no means clear. If he merely means that, for instance, there must be private property before there can be theft and so before theft can be considered wrong, then his claim is certainly – though trivially – true. But he gives no indication of whether, for example, stealing property is wrong because the property owner does not like it, or because the propertied class as a whole does not like it or because of some other reason. Šiškin neither clearly specifies the meaning of 'determine' nor does he show in any concrete case or in any detail how the economic conditions determine morality. The situation is complicated by the fact that he admits that politics, religion, philosophy, education, etc., also influence morality[26]; and that these are also supposedly determined by economic relations does not help matters. Unless the *meaning* of the alleged determinism is clarified, the truth of the claim cannot be fruitfully discussed.

(2) The difficulty just stated infects the second claim also. We know that customs change and that moral norms vary from society to society and from age to age. Šiškin is on firm ground in pointing this out, and he is certainly correct that the concrete circumstances of time and place to some extent affect what is held to be right and wrong. But when he claims that morality is *determined* by historical conditions he must demonstrate it. This he does not do (and indeed cannot do until our first difficulty of meaning is cleared up). Furthermore his oversimplified thesis does not adequately explain the differences between the morality advocated by Stoicism and by Epicureanism in Greek society, for example, nor the continuity of Christian morality in slave societies, feudal societies and capitalistic societies. Nor does he explain differences among individual members of a class with respect to their moral judgments. Citizen "A" may know that his class considers action x to be good and yet believe that it is bad. Clearly what "A" means here by 'good' is not that his class feels a certain way. I am not sure what he can mean on Šiškin's thesis. But it seems clear that Šiškin must explain how the economic relations of his society produce this non-conformist – and in the stablest societies there seem to be such people. The closest Šiškin comes to explaining this is to refer to the influence of past morality. Though this

accounts for some divergencies it does not account for all; and these latter are not considered by him.

(3) Behind the relativism of morals, Šiškin seems to claim, there is an absolutism or a morality expressive of the interests of all mankind and in conformity with developing reality. This morality emerges historically as Communist morality. The difficulty with his position, however, seems threefold. First, to speak of progress implies a criterion by which to judge it. If there is an absolute or ideal norm of morality (and it seems that there must be one if progress is to be judged), then in fact what is moral is not dependent merely on economic relations or conditions. A capitalist may think exploitation of his workers is good because it brings him wealth; and his class might think it good; and together they might convince the workers of it also. Yet it would not in fact be good, if by 'good' we mean anything other than how a given class is 'determined' to react towards certain relations as a result of socio-economic conditions. If the proletariat and the capitalist differ about the morality of exploitation it is not true that each is correct from his point of view and there is no possibility of deciding between them. For Šiškin the proletarian judgment is more correct because more progressive and more expressive of the aims of humanity. It seems therefore that there is a dual meaning of 'good' in Šiškin's position. There is a relative sense of 'good', held by a class or individual, and a truer, ideal sense of 'good' which historical actions fall short of, but towards which the progressive elements of humanity are moving. The relationship of these relative meanings and of the ideal meanings of 'good', 'right', etc. are not dealt with by Šiškin but they clearly pose a problem to which he must speak if his position is to be tenable. Furthermore it seems that both the relative and the ideal moments of the moral judgment must be explained in terms of the economic determinism governing morality. Whether this can successfully be done remains to be seen. My only point here is that it must be considered, and is not in this book.

The second point to be made is that the basis of the ideal of morality in terms of which progress is judged by Marxist-Leninist morality seems to be the "interests of mankind". But neither 'interests' nor 'mankind' is explained in such a way as to render it useful in making moral judgments. There seems to be the assumption that mankind is for some unspecified reason the same as the historically exploited classes (exploiters

express their own interests, not those of mankind). Concretely speaking any given individual might be thought to express his own interests. But, according to Šiškin, it seems that while this is true of exploiters, the exploited either express not their own interests but those of mankind or in expressing their own interests they in fact express those of mankind. It is not clear whether this is an *a priori* statement based on the nature of man (which is doubtful since Šiškin seems opposed to any notion of man's 'nature') or whether it is an empirical generalization (how Šiškin has learned of 'mankind' interests is not clear, unless it was from Marx and Engels) or whether it enjoys some other unexplained status. A hint as to the meaning of 'interests' seems to be given by the claim that all men desire freedom from exploitation. But what else humanity desires or the means by which one determines this is not stated.

Thirdly, we are concerned with the factual claim that Communist morality alone expresses the interests of mankind and is in conformity with developing reality. This claim presupposes certain knowledge of how reality is developing (as well as the intelligibility and truth of scientific socialism). Insofar as the future development of humanity seems problematic Šiškin here seems to introduce an element of Communist faith. Moreover, the coincidence of the aims of Communism and the interests of mankind are at best vaguely stated, and the claim amounts to little more than the statement that both are opposed to the exploitation and oppression of man by man and aim at the free development of all men. These are certainly noble and worthy aims. But Šiškin's appropriation of them for communism alone is *a priori* and can, I think, be empirically challenged.

II. COMMUNISM AS THE MORAL IDEAL OF HUMANITY AND AS THE CRITERION OF MORALITY

It is on the basis of the claim that Communism is the moral ideal of humanity and the criterion of morals that Šiškin derives his moral principles (principles of morality are its most general and important norms[27], though how one decides exactly which norms are principles is not clear since Šiškin himself has given varying lists), such as collectivism, devotion to Communism, and humanism. It is thus basic to the Marxist-Leninist system of morality, as Šiškin presents it, and so worthy of examination

here. Šiškin claims that Communism is the moral ideal of humanity because it creates those social conditions in which the free development of each man is the condition for the free development of all[28] and because only a Communist society (in which man is no longer dominated by personal property, no longer fears other men or sudden ruin or unemployment) can make possible the all-round development of the human person. Insofar as Communism is man's moral ideal the struggle for Communism is the objective standard of the valuation of human acts.[29] What helps the struggle is good; what hinders it is bad.

Now here also there seem to be three points that require discussion. For the claim to stand, the following are required: (1) a clear notion of what is meant by Communism; (2) a demonstration that this is truly what humanity desires (or should desire); (3) the assurance that this criterion can be fruitfully used in making concrete moral judgments.

(1) Unfortunately precisely what Šiškin means by Communism is not made clear. It was of course not made clear by Marx, Engels or Lenin, and has not been delineated in detail by the Program of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU. We cannot therefore blame Šiškin for his lack of precision here. Communism is a future condition, not a present one. Yet if it is in fact a moral ideal from which moral principles and virtues are to be drawn, it must have content. Under conditions of Communism, we are told, there will be no private property, no exploitation or oppression, and each man will be free to work towards the all-round development of his personality. If we were to grant that these are the essentials of man's moral ideal (whatever that may mean), there is still a major difficulty for Šiškin. For, following Marx, Engels and Lenin, he seems to hold that the ideals mentioned above which are realized under the conditions of Communism result necessarily when there is no private property and the remnants of bourgeois society have been eliminated. That the free all-round development of each person follows from the social relations of a non-private property society is not demonstrated by Šiškin (nor by his predecessors). Nor is it clear how it could be demonstrated since the conditions do not exist. That a society in which private property no longer exists automatically leads to conditions favorable to the free all-round development of each person in society, however, must be *shown* if this ideal is to serve as the moral ideal of all humanity and if it is not merely a tenet of faith. More concretely this

means that the content must be known so we can judge when we are approaching it. And if someone else, for example, the Communist Party is leading society to this goal, it is necessary that we know how they determine the content of the ideal, lest whatever they determine become in fact the content of humanity's ideal.

(2) If we were to accept the vague content of Communism as meaningful, we would still have to examine whether it is in fact the only and proper moral ideal of mankind. It must be shown that people in fact do desire this (a problem comparable to that on page 128-129) and that they should desire it. This latter requirement asks for some justification for basing the moral ideal on any given set of 'human' inetrests as opposed to another set. It is to ask for some criterion by which we decide what is properly 'human' and what improperly human, and it is to ask for some discussion of values, especially of the value of each person. Such discussion is lacking in Šiškin's book.

(3) That the criterion of any moral system be applicable and that it be applicable in all cases is a necessary requirement for any criterion. For if it is not applicable it cannot be used in making moral judgments and so some other standard will have to be used; likewise, if it is not applicable in all instances, wherever it is not applicable another standard will be required. But wherever another standard is required either both will be derivative from a prior standard (in which case Communism could not be the ultimate standard as it is in Marxist-Leninist ethics) or we would have a dual (or multiple) standard, which is quite obviously not Šiškin's intent. But our prior discussion concerning the vagueness of the content of Communism as an ideal infects as well the struggle for it and so creates (at best) uncertainty in the latter's application as a criterion of moral judgment. In many cases it will serve, and these are developed by Šiškin. But in a great many others, including cases (as raised by Firsov in *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki*)[30] of sexual morality, for example, the struggle for Communism seems an extremely remote and little useful criterion. The proximate criterion in fact becomes the Communist Party and its pronouncements. But how they utilize so vague a criterion in making their decisions remains unanswered by Šiškin.

My brief analysis does not demonstrate that Marxist-Leninist ethics is untenable. This was not my intent. I do hope, however, to have shown

that Šiškin's presentation of Marxist-Leninist ethics leaves a great many questions unanswered which will have to be dealt with either by him or by others. Marxist-Leninist ethics has come into its own, but it still has, it seems, a long way to grow.

REFERENCES

1. Šiškin, A. F.: *Osnovy marksistskoj étiki* (The Foundations of Marxist Ethics.) Moskva. 1961. 528 Str.
2. *Marksistskaja étika, Xrestomatija* (Marxist Ethics. A Reader). (Oščaja redakcija A. F. Šiškin.) Moskva. 1961. 512 str.
3. Lifanov, M. I.: 'Marksistsko-leninskaja étika (Proekt programmy speckursa dlja filosofski fakul'tetov' (Marxist-Leninist Ethics [Draft Program for a Specialist Course in the Philosophy Faculty]). *VF* 1951, 2, 192-196.
4. Čudnovskaja, E. Ju.: 'O proekte programmy speckursa po marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (On the Draft Program of the Specialist Course in Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1951, 6, 218-226.
5. Šiškin, A. F.: *Osnovy kommunističeskoj morali* (Foundations of Communist Morals). Moskva. 1955. 320 str.
6. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* Moscow. 1960. pp. 719 and 726.
7. Moscow, 1960.
8. Efimov, V. T.: 'Naučnoe soveščanie po voprosam marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (A Scientific Conference on Questions of Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *VF* 1959, 7, 187-190.
9. Lejman, I. I.: 'Soveščanie po marksistsko-leninskoj étike' (A Conference on Marxist-Leninist Ethics). *FN* 1959, 4, 183-186.
10. *Marksistskaja étika. Xrestomatija,* p. 4.
11. Arxangel'skij, L. M.: 'Tvorčeskoe issledovanie osnov marksistskoj étiki' (Creative Research on the Foundations of Marxist Ethics). *VF* 1962, 10, 150-153.
12. Sadykov, F. B.: 'Novyj naučnyj trud po marksistskoj étike' (A New Scientific Work on Marxist Ethics). *FN* 1962, 6, 95-96.
13. Tugarinov, V. P.: *O cennostjax žizni i kul'tury* (On the Values of Life and Culture). Leningrad. 1960).
14. Šiškin, *Osnovy marksistskoj étiki,* p. 14.
15. *Ibid,* p. 8.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 58.
18. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 58.
20. *Ibid.,* p. 109.
21. *Ibid.,* p. 147.
22. *Ibid.,* p. 40.
23. *Ibid.,* p. 36.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 43.
25. *Ibid.,* p. 41.
26. *Ibid.,* p. 109.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 7 fn.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
30. Firsov, B. A.: 'Glubže raskryvat' ideal kommunizma, lučše otvetit' na voprosy molodeži' (The More Profoundly the Communist Ideal is Revealed, the Better the Questions of Youth Will Be Answered). in *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj étiki*, pp. 82-83.

ARNOLD BUCHHOLZ

THESEN ZUR GEISTIGEN PROBLEMATIK DES ZUKUNFTSKOMMUNISMUS

Auf dem Wege zum Zukunftskommunismus entstehen eine Reihe neuer Probleme für die sowjetische Ideologie, die es nicht ausgeschlossen erscheinen lassen, daß eines Tages eine tiefgreifende geistige Umorientierung im kommunistischen Bereich erfolgt. Als Anregung für die Diskussion dieser Problematik werden die Überlegungen des Verfassers nachstehend in zehn kurzen Thesen zusammengefaßt:

1. *Das entscheidende geistige Bindeglied der kommunistischen Ideologie ist ihr Zukunftsideal.* Die kommunistische Weltbewegung wird trotz aller Belastungen durch 'Polyzentrismus', 'Revisionismus' und 'Dogmatismus' durch den Glauben an das gemeinsame Zukunftsziel zusammengehalten. Gleichzeitig bedeutet dies, daß die heutige kommunistische Bewegung ihr Wesen erst dann verändern würde, wenn sich die Auffassungen über die erstrebte zukünftige Welt und ihre geistigen Voraussetzungen wandeln.

2. Die Zukunftsziele des Kommunismus, welche bei Marx und Lenin nur spärliche Bestimmungen hatten und bei Stalin fast völlig aus dem Blickfeld der Ideologie entschwunden sind, müssen auf Grund des 20-Jahresprogramms des Übergangs zum Kommunismus zunehmend durchdacht und schrittweise realisiert werden. Bislang war es leicht, idealisierte Vorstellungen in das nebelhafte Zukunftsziel hineinzuverlagern. *Nunmehr treten eine Reihe neuer Probleme ins Blickfeld der Ideologie, die bislang immer hinausgeschoben werden konnten.*

3. *Die Zentralprobleme des Zukunftskommunismus sind Probleme des Menschen.* Auch in der innerkommunistischen Diskussion ist man sich darüber klar, daß die wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Struktur des Zukunftskommunismus nur verwirklicht werden kann, wenn die Menschen sich besser verhalten als dies bislang der Fall war. Einstweilen werden viele moralische Forderungen an den sowjetischen Menschen im Hinblick auf den Zukunftskommunismus gestellt, man hat sich aber noch

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 2 (June 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

kaum Gedanken darüber gemacht, welche Erwartungen auf Grund einer über Jahrtausende reichenden geistesgeschichtlichen Erfahrung tatsächlich an den Menschen gestellt werden können. Es ist auch noch nicht ausreichend durchdacht worden, ob der Mensch umgeformt werden soll oder ob er im Kommunismus seine "wahren" Eigenschaften entfalten soll. Im zweiten Fall wäre genauer zu prüfen, was denn die wahren Eigenschaften des Menschen sind. Die entscheidenden Probleme aber ergeben sich aus dem Bereich der geistigen Freiheit. Werden die geistigen Entfaltungen des Menschen, wenn er im erstrebten 'Reich der Freiheit' (Engels) steht, tatsächlich identisch sein mit dem Rahmen des dialektischen Materialismus? Zu diesen und anderen Fragen gibt es zwar manche Deklarationen, aber noch keine umfassenden Untersuchungen.

4. *Die wichtigste Zukunftsaufgabe der kommunistischen Philosophen liegt in der Ausarbeitung einer Anthropologie.* Das Fehlen einer philosophischen Anthropologie führt auf Marx zurück. Nachdem der junge Marx ursprünglich mit einer Anthropologie ('Entfremdung') begonnen hat, richtete sich später sein Interesse ganz auf die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse des Menschen und die Begründung einer geschichtlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit. Damit aber ist der Einzelmensch zunehmend als ein subjektives und 'störendes' Element aus der Ideologie ausgeklammert worden. Nimmt man heute ein Lehrbuch des Marxismus-Leninismus zur Hand, so findet man darin zwar eingehende Abhandlungen über die Materie, die Dialektik, die Erkenntnistheorie, den Klassenkampf und die gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen des Menschen, aber keine problembewußte und abgerundete Anthropologie.

5. *Wenn man eine Anthropologie mit den Voraussetzungen des dialektischen Materialismus durcharbeitet, werden alsbald schwere Mängel sichtbar.* Die entscheidenden Komponenten einer marxistischen Anthropologie liegen bei der Bestimmung des Menschen als eines materiellen und gesellschaftlichen Wesens. Diese Ansätze haben zwar durchaus ihre Berechtigung, reichen aber nicht aus, um zentrale philosophische Fragen, welche durch den Menschen gestellt werden, zu beantworten. Diese 'leeren Felder' der kommunistischen Ideologie liegen z.B. bei der totalen Sinnfrage, dem Todesproblem, dem inneren Erleben und den erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen der geistigen Freiheit. Um keine Miß-

verständnisse aufkommen zu lassen, sei darauf hingewiesen, daß eine Anthropologie, welche nur auf existenzielle oder metaphysische Fragen gerichtet ist und die gesellschaftlichen Belange unberücksichtigt läßt, viele Unzulänglichkeiten aufweist; umgekehrt aber kann man sagen, daß ein Menschenbild ohne eine tiefgreifende Einbeziehung dieser Fragen auf die Dauer geistig nicht tragfähig ist.

6. *Die Weiterentwicklung des dialektischen Materialismus in Richtung auf die 'leeren Felder' führt nicht zu einer Vervollkommnung der Ideologie, sondern zu einer Reduktion des totalen Wahrheitsanspruchs.* Es gibt in der heutigen Sowjetphilosophie verschiedene Ansätze, um die 'leeren Felder' durch Bemühungen auf dem Gebiet der Ethik, Pädagogik, Psychologie usw. aufzufüllen. Hierbei aber kann man mit Sicherheit folgendes vorhersagen: Je mehr sich die Sowjetphilosophen bemühen, die bislang unbewältigten Bereiche des Menschenbildes mit Inhalten aufzufüllen, umso eher stoßen sie auf prinzipielle Grenzen der rationalen Erkenntnis. So endet z.B. die totale Sinnfrage mit dem Ansatz des dialektischen Materialismus in totaler Sinnlosigkeit; andererseits aber kann diese Frage aus einer dem Menschen angemessenen Philosophie nicht ausgeklammert werden. Erst die Anerkennung prinzipieller Begrenztheiten der rationalen Erkenntnis führt zu weiterreichenden Einsichten. Der große 'Fortschritt' der Philosophie im Übergang vom neunzehnten zum zwanzigsten Jahrhundert kann geradezu darin gesehen werden, das das 'Wissen um das Nichtwissen' zu einem unaufhebbaren geistigen Problem wurde. Zugleich ist die damit verbundene Reduktion des totalen Wahrheitsanspruchs die Voraussetzung für geistige Freiheit.

7. *Gebundenheit des geistigen Lebens an ideologische Postulate, (z.B.: Alles ist ein Produkt der Materie) und echte geistige Freiheit,* die wiederum mit dem Wahrheitsproblem zusammenhängt, *sind unvereinbar.* Der Drang nach Wahrheit und geistiger Freiheit aber wächst in der Sowjetunion in dem Maße, wie der Mensch auf dem Weg zum Zukunftskommunismus durch Überwindung von Not, durch Bildung und Freizeit die Voraussetzungen erhält, sich sich selbst zuzuwenden. Eine fast dreitausendjährige Geistesgeschichte und auch die Erfahrungen mit dem heutigen geistigen Leben der Sowjetunion zeigen hinreichend, daß die großen philosophischen Fragen des Menschen nicht 'überwunden' werden

können. Wichtig ist dabei zu erkennen, daß es bei den 'leeren Feldern' des kommunistischen Menschenbereiches nicht um schwer überschaubare Fachfragen geht, sondern um elementare Fragestellungen des 'einfachen' Menschen, die mit seiner geistigen Entfaltung unmittelbar zusammenhängen. Es kann kaum ein Zweifel daran bestehen, daß bei den 'leeren Feldern' des kommunistischen Menschenbildes das schwächste Glied der Ideologie und auf weite Sicht ihre Bruchstelle liegt.

8. *Entscheidende Einflüsse auf eine Strukturänderung der kommunistischen Ideologie erwachsen aus Bereichen, die jenseits des politisch-ideologischen Geschehens liegen.* Vieles deutet darauf hin, daß wir an einer tiefgreifenden geschichtlichen Zeitwende stehen. Es sei erinnert an die Erschließung der atomaren Kräfte, an die modernen Vernichtungswaffen, das 'Kleinerwerden' der Welt und den Sprung in den Kosmos. Erstmalig in der Weltgeschichte ist dem Menschen die Möglichkeit der Selbstvernichtung in die Hand gegeben, und erstmalig hat er auch reale Voraussetzungen für die Gestaltung einer friedlichen Welt. Die kommunistische Ideologie bemüht sich zwar, diese neuen Voraussetzungen, die völlig unabhängig vom Marxismus aufgewachsen sind, in ihr Lehrgebäude einzubauen, kann aber dennoch nicht zu einer umfassenden geistigen Form einer friedlichen Welt vorstoßen. Die von den kommunistischen Führern erwartete freiwillige Anerkennung ihrer Lebensordnung in der ganzen Welt wird letzten Endes immer an der entschiedenen Ablehnung ihres einseitig festgelegten materialistischen Welt- und Menschenbildes scheitern. Dies gilt nicht nur für die westliche Welt, sondern scheint auch für nahezu alle Entwicklungsländer zuzutreffen.

9. *Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, daß im kommunistischen Bereich eines Tages aus Eigeninteresse eine Umstrukturierung der Ideologie vorgenommen wird.* Die maßgebenden Führer könnten eine Chance darin sehen, durch eine Reduktion des totalen Wahrheitsanspruchs für die letzten Fragen des Menschen neue Wirkungen in der Welt hinsichtlich der kommunistischen Sozialordnung auszulösen. Derartige Überlegungen sind zumindest in Polen in verschiedenen Varianten angestellt worden. Ob allerdings eine nach einem Bruch des materialistischen Dogmas entstehende neue geistige Form noch Kommunismus genannt werden könnte, sei dahingestellt. An dieser Stelle muß jedoch differenziert

werden, daß ein Umbruch in der geistigen Konzeption des Kommunismus keineswegs einen Umsturz in der bestehenden Sozialordnung im Gefolge zu haben braucht.

10. Unter den heutigen Bedingungen würde eine tiefgreifende Umstrukturierung der kommunistischen Ideologie den Zusammenhalt des ganzen Ostblocks sprengen. Sie ist deshalb nicht kurzfristig zu erwarten, aber innerhalb einer Zeitspanne von zehn Jahren durchaus möglich. Es gilt zu erkennen, daß die tiefgreifenden Weltveränderungen eine angemessene geistige Bewältigung herausfordern. Es liegt ein noch ungeformter 'geistiger Rohstoff' vor uns, der eine große Chance und Gefahr zugleich in sich trägt. Eine große Chance ist für jene Seite gegeben, welche tragfähige geistige Grundlagen einer Welt des gesicherten Friedens unter den neuen Voraussetzungen sichtbar macht und eine Gefahr für jene Seite, die wegen geistiger Überformung als 'Sonderfall' nachfolgen muß. *Wir dürfen es deshalb zumindest nicht ausschließen, daß wir auch auf geistigem Gebiet in einer Konkurrenzsituation mit dem Osten stehen, um nicht eines Tages von einem 'weltanschaulichen Sputnik' des Kommunismus überrascht zu werden.*

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

MARXISM-LENINISM IN HIGH SCHOOL

A recent publication by V. V. Bojkov, *Study of the Theme "Marxism-Leninism as Theoretical Foundation of the Construction of Communism" in the Course "Fundamentals of Political Knowledge" (Izučenie temy "Marksizm-leninizm – teoretičeskaja osnova stroitel'stva kommunizma" v kurse "Osnovy političeskix znanij"*. Akademija pedagogičeskix nauk RSFSR: Institut obščesgo i politexničeskogo obrazovanija. Moskva. 1962. 172str.) presents Marxist-Leninist philosophy as it should be taught in high school.

The author teaches in Public School 123 in Leningrad and his book represents the results of his experience in trying to teach Marxism-Leninism to high-school seniors. The subject-matter is layed out in lesson-plan form: the object to be pursued in the lesson; an outline of the major themes of the lesson; elaboration of the major themes and suggestions on how to get them across; homework and refresher questions.

Since this book is of great interest to those who want to know how much and how Marxist-Leninist philosophy is being taught to the future leaders of the Soviet Union, we give here an English translation of the titles, objects and outlines of the eightteen lessons proposed by the author.

INTRODUCTORY LESSON (pp. 5–21)

Object: "To show the students that in our time when the basic content, basic tendency and basic peculiarities of the historical development of mankind are determined by the socialist world-system, by forces fighting against imperialism and for a socialist reconstruction of society, when the Soviet Union is carrying out the large-scale construction of Communism, mastery of the Communist *Weltanschauung* is a vital necessity for every Soviet man. The consciousness, vitality and creative work of the popular masses is the primary condition of our continued, victorious forward-motion." (p. 5)

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 2 (June 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

This lesson has no outline.

LESSON 1: The Forerunners of Scientific Communism. (pp. 21-31)

Object: "To show that socialist ideas arose long before Marxism as reflection of the protest against the exploitation of man by man: to remind the students of the basic views of the leading utopian socialists of the West and of the revolutionary democrats in the Russia of the nineteenth century; to bring the students to an understanding of the importance of utopian socialism as one of the sources of scientific Communism." (p. 21)

Outline: 1. Communism as the Age-Old Dream of Mankind. 2. The Utopian Socialists; their Historical Contributions: a) criticism of the exploiter-society; b) idea of the establishment of an equitable society; c) recognition of work as a necessity for all members of society. 3. The Utopian Character of the Views of the Forerunners of Scientific Communism.

LESSON 2: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as Genius-Founders of Scientific Communism. (pp. 31-38)

Object: "To reveal the historical predispositions to the coming-to-be of scientific Communism; to show that Marx and Engels created the revolutionary theory of scientific Communism and elaborated its program and tactics."

Outline: 1. The Coming-to-be of Marxism in the Course of the Class-War of the Proletariat Against the Bourgeoisie. 2. The Transformation of Socialism from Utopia to a Science. 3. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as the Genius-Founders of Scientific Communism, the Great Revolutionary Fighters for the Working Class, and Founder sof the First Communist Party – the "League of Communists".

LESSON 3: V. I. Lenin as Genius-Heir of the Doctrine and Activities of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. (pp. 38-45)

Object: "To diversify and make more profound the students' knowledge of the development of Marxist theory by V. I. Lenin; to show that Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation of the construction of Communism." (p. 38)

Outline: 1. Russia as the Fatherland of Leninism. 2. The Further Creative Development of Marxism by V. I. Lenin. 3. Marxism-Leninism as the Theoretical Foundation of the Construction of Communism.

LESSON 4: The Basic Question of Philosophy. (pp.45-55)

Object: "To expose to the students the essence of the basic question of philosophy and to show the practical importance of the answer to it." (p. 45)

Outline: 1. The Concept of Philosophy. 2. Materialism and Idealism as the Basic Tendencies in Philosophy. 3. Matter and Consciousness. 4. The Practical Importance of the Answer to the Basic Question of Philosophy.

LESSON 5: The Materialist Dialectic as the Most Profound and All-Round Doctrine on Development. (pp. 55-63)

Object: "To show the students that the dialectical and historical materialism, established by Marx and Engels, was a revolutionary transformation in peoples' views on the development of nature and society; to expose in popular form the concept of the materialist dialectic; to explain its importance for the practical, purposive activity of people." (p. 55)

Outline: 1. The Basic Errors and Limited Character of Pre-Marxian Materialism. 2. The Historical Context and Predispositions of the Coming-to-be of Dialectical Materialism. 3. The Establishment of Dialectical and Historical Materialism as a Revolutionary Transformation in Philosophy. 4. The Materialist Dialectic as the General Method of Scientific Knowledge, Necessary for all Sciences.

LESSON 6: The Materialist Dialectic as the Most Profound and All-Round Doctrine on Development (continued). (pp. 64-78)

Object: "To expose the dialectic conceived as the science of universal bonds and of development, as the science of the most general laws of every motion and development." (p. 64)

Outline: 1. The Materialist Dialectic as the Doctrine on Universal Bonds and on Development. 2. The Basic Laws of the Materialist Dialectic: a) the law of the unity and conflict of opposites: b) the law of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative; c) the law of the negation of negation.

LESSON 7: Marxism-Leninism on the Knowability of the World. (pp. 78-90)

Object: "To acquaint the students with the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the knowability (*poznavaemost'* = intelligibility) of the world and to show the importance of the materialist dialectic in the revolutionary transformation of the world." (p. 78)

Outline: 1. Marxism-Leninism on the Objective Character of the Laws of the Development of Nature and Society. 2. The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on the Knowability of the World: a) can man correctly know the world around him? b) knowledge as the reflection – in man's head – of the objective world and of its laws; c) social-historical practice as the basis and goal of knowledge: d) the role of practice in the establishment of the truthfulness of our knowledge. 3. The Importance of the Materialist Dialectic for the Conscious, Practical Activity of People.

LESSON: 8 The Means of Production as the Material Foundation of the Life of Society. The Popular Masses as the Decisive Force in the Development of Society. (pp. 90-100)

Object: "To give a short characterization of the object of historical materialism; to make the students familiar with the concept 'means of production' and to expose the great, decisive importance of the means of production in the life of society; to summarize and make more profound the students' knowledge on the role of the working masses as the real creators of history." (p. 90)

Outline: 1. The Concept of Historical Materialism. 2. The Role of Work in the Coming-to-be and Development of Human Society. 3. Forces of Production and Relations of Production as the Material Foundation of the Life of Society.

LESSON 9: The Means of Production as the Material Foundation of the Life of Society. The Popular Masses as the Decisive Force in the Development of Society (continued). (pp. 100-108)

Object: As in Lesson 8.

Outline: 1. The Development of the Forces of Production and of the Relations of Production. 2. The Law of the Correspondence of the Relations of Production to the Character of the Forces of Production. 3. The Working Masses as the Creators of Material and Spiritual Goods, and as the Decisive Force in the Development of Society.

LESSON 10: Marxism-Leninism on the Development and Displacement of Social-Economic Formations. (pp. 109-115)

Object: "To expose the laws (*zakonomernosti*) of the development and displacement of social-economic formations and to show the role of class-war in the development of an exploiter-society." (p. 109)

Outline: 1. Marxist-Leninist Teaching on Base and Superstructure. 2. The Laws *(zakonomernosti)* of the Development and Displacement of

Social-Economic Formations. 3. Class-War as the Driving-Force in the Development of an Exploiter-Society.

LESSON 11: The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine on Government. (pp. 115-119)

"In their courses on history, the students have become familiar through innumerable examples with the prerequisites for the coming-to-be, the class-essence, historical types and forms of government. (p. 115) Therefore, this lesson... should take the form of a seminar... (p. 116) In the lesson, the following questions should be thoroughly discussed: 1. Why do the representatives of bourgeois science try to confuse the issue on government? 2. What is government? 3. When and why did government arise? 4. What types of exploiter-government has history known? 5. About which forms of exploiter-government did V. I. Lenin speak? 6. What forms of contemporary bourgeois government are known to you? Does their exploiter-essence change with changes in their form? 7. What is the basic difference between the Soviet government and the bourgeois governments?" (p. 117)

LESSON 12: The Essence of Capitalist Exploitation. (pp. 120-127)

Object: "To make more profound the students' knowledge on the basic traits of the capitalist structure and to expose the essence of capitalist exploitation." (p. 120)

Outline: 1. The Concept of Political Economy. 2. Plus-Value and Capital. 3. The Essence of Capitalist Exploitation.

LESSON 13: Marxism-Leninism on the Basic Contradiction of Capitalism. (pp. 127-134)

Object: "To expose the basic contradiction of capitalism, i.e. the contradiction between the social character of production and the private capitalist form of appropriation; to stress its antagonistic character and thus to bring the students to understand the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism." (p. 127)

Outline: 1. The Accumulation of Capital and the Pauperization of the Proletariat as a Law of Capitalism. 2. The Contradiction Between the Social Character of Production and the Private-Capitalist Form of Appropriation as the Basic Contradiction of the Capitalist Means of Production.

LESSON 14: Imperialism as the Highest and Final Stage of Capitalism (pp. 134-146)

Object: "On the basis of the students' knowledge of monopolistic

capitalism, to show the historical place of imperialism; to acquaint the students with some of the new processes going on in contemporary imperialism." (p. 134)

Outline: 1. Imperialism as Monopolistic Capitalism. The Transformation of Monopolistic Capitalism into State-Monopolistic Capitalism. 2. Imperialism as Rotting and Dying Capitalism, as the Harbinger of the Socialist Revolution. 3. The General Crisis of Capitalism and its Stages. 4. The Leninist Theory of Proletarian Revolution.

LESSON 15: The Worldwide-Historical Mission of the Working Class and of its Party. (pp. 146-157)

Object: "To make more profound the students' knowledge on the role of the working class as grave-digger of capitalism and founder of the new, socialist society; to expose the basic forms of the class-war of the proletariat; to show that the transition from capitalism to socialism always has a revolutionary character." (p. 146)

Outline: 1. The Worldwide-Historical Mission of the Working Class and of its Party. 2. The Basic Forms of the Class-War of the Proletariat. 3. The Doctrine on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as the most Important one in Marxism. 4. The Great October Socialist Revolution as the Beginning of a new Epoch in the History of Mankind. 5. The Fundamental Distinction of the Socialist Revolution from Previous Social Revolutions.

LESSON 16: The Triumph of Marxist-Leninist Ideas in the Social-Historical Practice of Mankind. (pp. 157-165)

"In the concluding lesson... is to be summed up the work done on the concept 'Marxism-Leninism' and the knowledge of the students on the three component parts of Marxism-Leninism and their unity; by selected examples, is to be shown the practical confirmation of the vitality of the Marxist-Leninist ideas, their further development by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the fraternal Communist and workers' parties. (pp. 157-158)

Outline: 1. Marxism-Leninism as a Complete and Structured Doctrine. The Unity of its Component Parts. 2. The Confirmation of the Vitality of Marxist-Leninist Ideas by Social-Historical Practice. 3. The Further Development of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and by the Fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties. 4. The Fight for the Purity of Marxist-Leninist Theory. 5. The Fight for

the Unity of the International Communist Movement on the Basis of the Principles of Marxism-Leninism.

LESSON 17: Repetitive-Summarizing Lesson on the Theme "Marxism-Leninism as the Theoretical Foundation of the Construction of Communism". (pp. 165-167)

Object: "To review and sum up the important material in the theme studied. Special attention should be payed to the efficacity of Marxist-Leninist theory, stressing the importance of Marxism-Leninism as a tool in the revolutionary transformation of the world.

The lesson should be carried out according to the following plan: 1. What is Marxism-Leninism and of what parts is it made up? 2. In what consists the revolutionary transformation accomplished by Marx and Engels in peoples' views on the development of nature and society? 3. Of what significance are dialectical and historical materialism for the establishment and development of scientific Communism? 4. What is at the root of the development of human society and why does its development have a gradual, progressive character? 5. Why are the downfall of capitalism and victory of Communism inevitable throughout the world? 6. In what consists the further creative development of Marxism by V. I. Lenin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Communist and Workers' parties? 7. What is the importance of the theory of Marxism-Leninism for successful Communist construction in our country? Illustrate with concrete examples."

In his commentary on the outline of each chapter the author provides practical, pedagogical hints for the teacher and even includes sample dialogues on selected questions. The following shows how the student is to be lead along the correct 'line':

"*Question:* What is a cell?

Answer: It is the smallest particle of the living being, visible only in the microscope.

Q: What organisms are made up of cells?

A: All plants and animals – including man – on earth.

Q: What conclusion from the doctrine of Marx and Engels is confirmed by the cell-structure of living organisms?

A: The cell is the material principle of the living organism, i.e. of the plant and animal.

Q: How does the animal or plant organism develop?
A: By multiplication of cells.
Q: What conclusion can be drawn from this concerning the origin of living organisms?
A: All plants and animals come from simple, monocellular living organisms. These, in turn, are formed from living albumen which is a product of the long, chemical transformation of inorganic matter into organic matter.
Q: What affirmation of metaphysical materialism is refuted by the cell-theory?
A: The affirmation that everything in the world is unchanging, there is no development."

In the bibliography of this little text we find – in addition to the works of the 'classics', some purely programmatic statements of the current Party leadership, and works of a purely pedagogical nature – the following non-classical, Soviet works on philosophy:

Osnovy marksizma-leninizma (Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism). Učebnoe posobie. Moskva, Gospolitizdat. 1959.

Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii (Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy). Iz. 2. Moskva, Gospolitizdat. 1962.

Kniga dlja čtenija po marksistskoj filosofii (Book of Readings in Marxist Philosophy). Moskva, Gospolitizdat. 1960.

Afanas'ev, V. G.: *Osnovy filosofskix znanij* (Fundamentals of Political Knowledge). Populjarnyj učebnik. Iz. 2. Moskva, Socekgiz. 1962.

Drujanov, L. A.: *Čto takoe materija* (What is Matter?). Moskva, Učpedgiz. 1961.

Tarxova, M. A.: *Kak čelovek poznaet i preobrazuet okružajuščij mir* (How Man Knows and Transforms the World Around Him). Moskva, Učpedgiz. 1961.

Three further volumes in this series have been announced by the same publisher:

Bojkov, V. V., Kaljužnyj, V. I., Nikodimov, P. M., Ovčinnikova, M. P.: *Izučenie temy "Socializm – pervaja faza kommunizma" v kurse "osnovy političeskix znanij"* (Study of the Theme "Socialism as First Phase of Communism" in the Course "Fundamentals of Political Knowledge").

Bojkov, V. V., Kaljužnyj, V. I., Nikodimov, P. M., Ovčinnikova, M. P.: *Izučenie temy "Postepennoe pererastanie socializma v kommunizm" v. kurse "Osnovy političeskix znanij"* (Study of the Theme "Gradual Development of Socialism into Communism" in the Course "Fundamentals of Political Knowledge"). (Among the authors, A. M. Lušnikov replaces Nikodimov.)

Lušnikov, A. M.: *Izučenie razdela "Vospitanie čeloveka kommunističeskogo obščestva" v kurse "Osnovy političeskix znanij"* (Study of the Section "Education of the Man of Communist Society" in the Course "Fundamentals of Political Knowledge").

NOTES AND COMMENTS

CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM

In the recently published book, *XXII s"ezd KPSS i zadači kafedr obščestvennyx nauk. Materialy vsesojuznogo soveščanija zavedujuščix kafedrami obščestvennyx nauk vyssix učebnyx zavedenij 30 janvarja – 2 fevralja 1962 goda* (The Twenty-Second Congress of the KPSS and the Tasks of the Chairs of Social Sciences. Materials of the All-Union Conference of the Heads of Departments of Social Sciences of the Vuzes from 30 January to 2 February 1962), (Moskva. 1962. 525str.), the Western teacher of philosophy will find a rather complete list of the grievances of his Soviet counterpart.

One of the main preoccupations of the philosophers who spoke was the lack of qualified personnel. According to V. I. Stepanov, head of the Department of Dialectical and Historical Materialism at the University of White Russia, there are 362 teachers of social sciences (humanities) in that Republic, of whom only 204 have the necessary academic minimum, i.e. are candidates or associate professors; among these teachers there are only four doctorates. A. Artykov, head of the Department of Philosophy at the Taškent Polytechnical Institute, says that of the some 180 philosophers in Uzbekistan only one is a professor, one has the Ph.D. and about 30 are candidates or associate professors. At the Taškent Polytechnical Institute itself, he says that only 5 of the 14 people teaching philosophy have training in this discipline – the others are historians!

Each year, according to V. P. Rožin, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Leningrad, the LGU receives more than 100 requests for teachers of philosophy and psychology of which no more than 25 or 30 can be satisfied, whereas the antiquated plan of enrollment allows for only 15 philosophers and 5 psychologists. Among the teachers of philosophy of the LGU there will be seven more doctorates in the next five years, Rožin promised.

Special attention was given by many of the speakers to the shortcomings and prospects of the Institute for the Amelioration of the Qualifications of Teachers of Social Sciences of the University of Moscow. G. M. Štraks, listed as acting head of the Department of Philosophy

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 2 (June 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

of the Institute for the Amelioration of the Qualifications of Teachers of Social Sciences of the University of Moscow, reported that in the eleventh session which had just ended (i.e. in December 1961) of 200 participants 50 were working on dissertations; in the twelfth promotion some 80 people were already working on dissertations or monographs; in the course of 1961, four people had defended doctoral dissertations and 13 had presented themselves for the defence of candidate theses.*

However, there are people who expect considerably more from this institute. Pronouncing his discontent, M. N. Rutkevič remarked that this institute hardly fulfils its purpose by arranging candidate examinations. It should become an organizing and inspiring center of scientific research, which would presuppose its strengthening by serious and creative cadres. (507)

The target of criticism are also the current publications. The *učenye zapiski* published by many universities and other schools are mostly wasted paper: nobody reads them because the majority of their articles are written on a low theoretical level and don't add anything new to what had been written before, as again M. N. Rutkevič said. Highly remarkable is a criticism offered by V. I. Vojtko. He complains about the ephemeral validity of the textbooks: the publisher demands that they contain everything up to the latest decree of the Supreme Soviet, "but it is well known that such material quickly becomes obsolete, and the textbook is equal to a newspaper". (p. 478)

S. T. Meljuxin demands for the philosophers the right not only to confine themselves to the traditional three basic laws of the dialectic, but to discover new ones. (p. 473) M. N. Alekseev asks the provoking question: where are the original works on those problems which always used to be indicated as an evidence of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism? "To our regret, we haven't produced such books. How are things in reality? The Central Committee of the CPSU poses and solves new questions, and we, the high school teachers, confine ourselves to propagating and popularizing the decisions of the party." "Many of the comrades who spoke here justly pronounced themselves for the necessity of structuring the teaching program of Diahistomat in a strictly logical manner. But, the question is how logically to construct

* Cf. the notes by H. Fleischer in *SST* II (1962) 223-226.

the program of the course when the constructors themselves don't have a notion of logic, no opinion about what it means to logically construct a program?" (p. 484-485). *H. F., T. B.*

PHILOSOPHY AND 'SCIENTIFIC COMMUNISM'

One of the most remarkable developments on the Soviet ideological scene are the current discussions and organizational measures the aim of which is to transform the 'Theory of Scientific Communism' into an independent discipline with own courses and specialized teaching personnel. Not a few Soviet ideologists and philosophers consider it regrettable that the most important and central part of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine which functions immediately as 'guide to action, the programmatic and strategical theory of Socialism-Communism', had up to now been lodged, so to say, as a 'subtenant' in the theoretical buildings of other disciplines – Histomat, Political Economics, History of the Party. As a consequence of this, the said disciplines are overburdened with obligations which are not properly in their competence, that the theory of Communism does not find due elaboration and systematic unity, and that many theoretical statements are placed twice or three times without any differentiation of the point of view. As M. N. Rutkevič said it seems hardly plausible even to the students that they hear the same things from three different teachers *(XXII s"ezd KPSS i zadači kafedr obščestvennyx nauk*, p. 506).

All of these points, as well as the practical consequences that should be drawn, have now been subjected to public discussion; even some organizational novelties have already been decided. Since the middle of 1961 there has appeared hardly one issue of the journal *Filosofskie nauki* without a contribution to this debate; it was also reported that two special conferences were held to promote the exchange of opinions. Here is the list of the authors of the *FN*-articles: L. N. Suvorov (1961, 2), S. I. Semenov (1961, 4), A. D. Šeršunov (1962, 1), D. I. Česnokov (1962, 2), L. N. Kogan (1962, 3), M. A. Stepanskij (1962, 4), V. G. Smol'kov (1962, 5), M. S. Džunusov, F. Š. Aptikaev (1962, 6).

The big conference of the social sciences which took place in February 1962 has decided to introduce a new university course on Scientific Communism and to establish special sections *(kafedry)* of Scientific

Communism at the universities of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev; their task is to elaborate the required program *(templan)* for the new course (*VF* 1962, 5, 150), and also the programs of the courses on Dialectical and Historical Materialism have to be changed in a corresponding way (*ibidem*, p. 148)

A representative view of the problem can be found in an article written by C. A. Stepanjan, 'O predmete kursa "Osnovy naučnogo kommunizma"' (On the Subject of the Course "Foundations of Scientific Communism") published in *VF* 1962, 6.

According to the opinion of the majority it is groundless to fear that the establishment of the new discipline might lead to an 'impoverishment' of the others, especially Histomat. On the contrary, such a 'disburdening' would be a great advantage since the Histomat philosophers will now be able to concentrate their attention on the properly philosophical and generally sociological aspects of social life. Up to now entire sections of the Histomat courses (and also of the compendia) had been dedicated to the highly concrete questions of the social and political organization of Soviet society. This went so far that many specialists of Histomat have even ceased to occupy themselves with the specifically philosophical problems of their field (Stepanjan, *loc. cit.*, p. 31). Of course, philosophy must be concerned also with contemporary social life, but on a higher level of abstraction than the theory of Communism which has to deal also with the details of social organization.

By way of some examples Stepanjan shows where runs the 'line of demarcation' between the philosophical investigation of Histomat and the investigations in the framework of the 'Theory of Scientific Communism' (of course, based on general Histomat premises). "The general doctrine on social revolution as the locomotive of history, as a law of the transition from one formation to the other, is a subject of Historical Materialism. On this level Historical Materialism treats also the socialist revolution as the highest and final form of social revolution which guarantees the transition of humanity from its pre-history to its proper history. Based on the general theoretical data of Marxist philosophy the course of Scientific Communism fully elaborates the political laws and motive forces of socialist revolution." (*loc. cit.*, p. 32).

In the course of the discussion, paradoxically opposite opinions were uttered: while the one author complained that hitherto hardly anyone

was occupied with the problems of Scientific Communism (L. N. Suvorov, *FN* 1961, 2, 107), others asserted that in fact many colleagues have been busy in this field (D. M. Zerkin and G. P. Lem, as reported in *FN* 1961, 4, 144). It seems to us that both groups are right. When one looks through the Histomat sections of the bibliography and of the subject indexes of the journals one will find that, in fact, the greatest part of the writings is dedicated to the concrete, *non-philosophical* investigation of Soviet society and its programmatic perspectives. For such writings 'philosophy' is apparently a pseudonym, and for the same reason a social philosophy which reduces itself to political and cultural sociology must be labeled as a pseudo-philosophy. We hope that the 'disburdening' about which some Soviet authors spoke will not only externally free philosophy from the manifold obligations foreign to its proper business, but also open the horizon and cultivate a sense for the authentically philosophical.

H. F.

SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

Knowledge of recent Soviet work in psychology is incomplete in the West and, with the exception of a very few books (some out of date today), no adequate picture is available of the evolution and significance of the typically Soviet conception of psychology and its task (cf. also review of *Recent Soviet Psychology*, *SST* II, 3, 251-253). Vladimir Satura strives to give a comprehensive if concise picture of the field in his article 'Die Russisch-Sowjetische Psychologie' in *Slovak Studies* II (Philosophica I) 39-67. Šatura is aware of the difficulties empirical psychology faces in a culture dominated by materialist philosophy, and believes that the study of Soviet psychology is of particular interest not only to the specialist, but to all who wish to gain insight into the creative processes of Soviet life.

Šatura gives a short outline of the development of Soviet psychology prior to the October revolution, in order to place the current stand into a correct perspective. The transition from a primarily speculative to a mainly empirical psychology took place only in the nineteenth century in Russia, although it is impossible to distinguish clear demarcations between the two branches. The works of Vellanskij, Odojevskij, Galič and Elkblast were speculatively oriented, while the theories of Sečenov, Lomonosov, Koselskij, Radiščev (and others) were more materialistic.

Kavelin and Straxov adopted a spiritualistic premiss in their polemics against the materialism of Sečenov, and the *Moscow Psychological Society* (founded in 1885) as well as the first Russian psychological review *Voprosy filozofii i psyxologii* (founded in 1890) also embraced spiritualist psychology. Nevertheless, Sečenov was to influence with his *Refleksy mozga* (Reflexes of the Brain) the thought of Pavlov, who played a major role in the evolution of Soviet psychology.

Pavlov's conditioned reflex theory, and to a lesser extent his typology and signal-theory, together with Bexterev's 'objective-psychology' (later termed 'reflexology') dominated Russian psychology before the October revolution. That both researchers continued to exercise influence on Soviet psychology as well, Šatura attributes to the fact that Pavlov's theory could be interpreted concordantly with the Communist ideology, in that a purely physiological conception of psychic processes could be construed as materialism, and the signal-theory could provide a physiological support for Lenin's epistemology (thought as the reflection of reality). While Bexterev applied his reflexology to pedagogy, industrial and criminal psychology (cf. his *Collective Reflexology*), today his value is considered mainly historical: the current tendency is to stamp him as a 'mechanistic' psychologist.

The fate of psychology under Communist rule is divided into three periods by Šatura. The first, from 1917 to 1930, is characterized by the struggle to win legitimacy for the discipline. The dominant trait of this period is a form of behaviorism. The specifically spiritualist psychologists (Losskij, Frank, and others) were obliged to go into exile; Pavlov and Bexterev were the leaders of a movement which was directed against 'psychology' itself, in the sense wherein the term means spiritualist psychology alone, a discipline based on the assumption of the consciousness as representative of a typically psychic manifestation. Pavlov and Bexterev fought this school because they found it not sufficiently scientific, and not because of their materialist convictions. As the new trend in Soviet psychology was determined by the compatibility of the theses with the established ideological dogma, and not by empirical research, a form of behavorism crystallized as the dominant school of this epoch: this premiss provided sufficient flexibility to accord with the ideology, while its bases were clearly positive, seeing the ground and object of psychology in the ostensive character-traits of men. Kornilov, the director of the

experimental psychological institute in Moscow, suggested the construction of the entire discipline on the basis of the study of reactions, which are measurable as to form and content, intensity and rapidity. Freudian psychology was rejected, because (as the Soviet Encyclopedia of 193 formulates) it is ultraindividualist, dominated by the idea of sexuality, equates healthy men with neurotics, and leaves society out of consideration.

Toward the end of this period psychology appeared to have gained its right of existence, and was firmly allied with pedagogy. The previous theory, according to which heredity and environment are determinant of the consciousness, has been enlarged to include the third factor: rational and purposive education. The adoption of behaviorist psychology divorced from the Pavlov-Bexterev form of strict physiological determination can be traced to the rejection of mechanistic materialism in philosophy: if the organic stage of material evolution has its own qualitative level, and its own specific laws, then explanation of psychic phenomena in biological and physical terms is fallacious.

The second period in the development of Soviet psychology, from 1930 to 1950, is dominated by Stalinist dogmatism. Diversity in psychological theoretization was reduced to a unilateral officially sanctioned premiss, from which an over-careful behaviorism, plagued by fear of persecution, refuting physiologism as well as spiritualism, finally emerged.

Šatura's third period, from 1950 to today, is characterized by a renewed interest and a freer atmosphere, giving rise to greater activity and to more diversified theses. Since 1954 congresses on psychology again may take place, and 1955 marked the foundation of the journal devoted exclusively to psychology *Voprosy psixologii*. The accent in contemporary Soviet psychology lies on pedagogy. However, even the emphasized area is unevenly accented: the education and upbringing of the child is relatively neglected, with hardly any attention devoted to children under three years of age. In other areas the psychology of personality, characterology, typology, and animal psychology suffer much neglect. Šatura includes here work-psychology as well; however, there appears to be renewed interest in that field just lately (cf. note on the article of Leontiev and Panov in this issue, pp. 156-157). Religious and social-psychology is rejected and condemned. Instead, much attention is devoted to the psychology of the 'Soviet Man'. Discussions are more theoretical than empirical in this respect, however.

The current premiss of Soviet psychology is that there is a psychic element in man, irreducible to the physiological, yet this element is not a soul, but is identical with the consciousness. Consciousness (following Marxist-Leninist philosophy) is then seen as determined by its two primary relations: to the brain, and to the external world. The psychic and the physical are united in man, with the psychic in secondary position. Consciousness is a property of a particular organizational form of matter. As such it is not capable of being accounted for in physical, biological (i.e. physiological) terms and processes. However, consciousness, though specific, is a reflection of the external world. Consciousness is formed in practical activity, and manifests itself through practice. This leads to the conclusion that changes in the content and form of environmental practice call forth changes in the organization and evolution of psychical processes.

In conclusion, Šatura finds positive as well as negative traits in contemporary Soviet psychology. He criticizes the unqualified statement that the psychical is a product or aspect of the brain functions, without explanation of how a manifestation such as consciousness can derive from the known and observed brain processes. He considers the absence of depth, social, religious psychology, psychodiagnostical instruments, the underdeveloped and misshaped form of the psychology of personality and psychopathology, and the insufficiently studied conception of the psychical, to be due to the negative influence of the ideology. On the other hand, positive value is attributed to the lessening of determinism, to the emphasis of purposive willfully directed elements, to the psychological evaluation of thought processes and to the refusal of exaggeration in animal-psychology. Šatura concludes that one can only hope that the unnatural external pressure on Soviet psychology would cease, permitting the evolution of that discipline in the USSR in a form corresponding to its promising beginnings before the revolution.

While providing an excellent insight into the historical development of psychology on Russian soil, the evaluation of the direction of this development suffers from a failure to consider the theory of consciousness of Marxism-Leninism from a point of view other than materialism. Exploration of the implications of the alleged *social* content of consciousness (making the individual a 'socialized human being') for psychology, could not only account for the refusal and condemnation of depth

psychology, of the psychology of personality and for the absence of psychodiagnostics, but would also provide a ground for the estimation of the chances of a development of these disciplines in a culture dominated by a collectivist ideology. Correspondingly the mitigation of the causal determination of the individual by the social system (introduced to allow room for rational direction of human affairs) would account for the lessening of determinism in Soviet psychology's concept of the psyche, and give a coherent explanation for the encouragement of the thesis positing the importance of willful, rationally controlled elements in the consciousness. Psychology, as a study of man is of particular importance in a holistically planified society. How empirical research in psychology is qualified by theoretical directives 'from above' could provide ground for the assessment of the correspondence of social realities and ideological objectives in the Soviet Union. If such an assessment is to be undertaken it is imperative that not only the evolution of Soviet psychology be taken into account (which Šatura presents brilliantly), but that the evolution of Soviet philosophy, together with the major factors acting upon it, be kept in sight as well. In the final analysis, if any evaluation is to be made of Soviet psychology as such, it must not fail to include an evaluation of the factors which determine the course of this discipline. The collectivism of Marxism-Leninism's view of the mind is a factor of as great an importance in this respect, as is that ideology's materialism.

Ervin Laszlo

Two psychologists, A. N. Leontiev and D. I. Panov, report on the topics discussed at a meeting in Moscow devoted to the study of the problems of the higher nervous system's physiological and philosophical questions, in *VF* 1962, 8. The premiss of the discussions is the linkage of human spiritual development to actual work performed. While in the past psychology studied merely the purely spiritual phenomena of the mind, in the twentieth century the relation of the psyche to work as social production, has been taken into account as well. Man, as a social subject disposes of specific properties: he is productive. It is the achievement of Soviet psychology to have conceived the human psyche as a product of social-historical evolution. To live in society, man must dispose of social-historical experience, consisting primarily of familiarity with the in-

struments of production. Thus such an instrument is not only a physical object, endowed with mechanical properties, but it is also a social object, wherein the historically evolved forms of productive activity become realized. As a result a study of the relation of the worker to his tools (machines) has become very necessary in the highly mechanized societies of our times. The authors expound their views on the differences between machine, and mental operations, and schematize the latter through two processes: 'interiorization' whereby internal psychical activities derive from external operations, and 'exteriorization' through which internal processes are translated into external activities. The former testifies to the conditioning of the psyche by practice (work), and the latter affords the possibility of creativity, through 'embodying' psychical processes in work and in the instruments of production. It appears, however, that in ontogenesis interiorization precedes exteriorization, conditioning the latter, and lending a primacy to the character of external conditions (the means and relations of production) which, if pursued to its logical conclusion, implies the historical-social determination of the psyche, with a margin for creative evolution. *E. L.*

KNOWLEDGE

B. M. Kedrov's article 'The Inter-Connection of the two Stages of Knowledge' *(Vzaimosvjaz' dvux stupenej poznanija)* in *FN* 1962, 5, 50-58 is remarkable for two reasons, – first, it does *not* treat what appears to be announced in the title, and second, *what* it says is of relatively great philosophic interest among the mass of Soviet banalities. The article is a shortened presentation (in thesis form) of Kedrov's address to the Third International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (1960) at Stanford, California.

In a quite Aristotelian way scientific knowledge is described as the discovery of 'the essence', i.e. the laws and causes, the inner ' 'mechanism' of processes and 'structure' of things' '. These are said to be wholly contained – although more or less hidden – in the 'immediate phenomena'. Through the action of things on human senses these phenomena are known as unconnected, individual, 'atomic' facts, which form the 'empirical material' of all sciences. On this 'first stage' science needs 'abstract thought, theoretical approach and logic' in order to unite and generalize

the 'atomic' facts in hypotheses, laws and theories, i.e. to reach the knowledge of objective laws and essences which constitutes the second, the theoretical stage of knowledge.

The reader now expects an analysis of the inter-connection *(vzaimosvjaz')* of these two stages of knowledge, as the title seems to promise. But Kedrov explicitly turns away from this task (end of thesis 14) and develops an interesting theory of the steps in the essence *(mnogostupenčatost' suščnosti)* instead. Scientific progress consists of the replacement of old theories by new ones which better explain the facts (scientific revolution) and the addition of new and more general theories to the old ones. Kedrov sets the steps to higher theories strictly parallel to those of 'deeper essences' of things, 'deeper sides of the object'. The progress to a broader theory corresponds strictly to the progress to deeper knowledge of essences and the hierarchy of theories is a 'reflection' of the real essential structure of the object. In the progress of science, the theories become more perfect and more general as deeper steps in the essence are known. But this development has no final, definite term. The sequence of steps in the essence is infinite and so is the progress of science.

One would like to see this interesting synthesis of scientific methodology with ontological theories more thoroughly discussed (and one regrets a propagandistic use of historical categories like 'Metaphysician') but the originality, factuality and relevance of Kedrov's arguments are striking.

Wolfhart F. Boeselager

THE CLASSICS REVISITED

In the preface of his recent book, *The Materialist Dialectic as Logic and Theory of Knowledge* (reviewed in *SST* III, 1), V. I. Čerkesov explains why Soviet philosophers respect the 'classics'. He complains that the 'Jesuits' distort Marxist-Leninist fidelity to the 'classics' and try to make out of it something analogous to religious faith. This is a dastardly perversion of the facts. Just as Euclid, Archimedes, Newton, Darwin, Lobačevskij, etc., are accepted as authorities because of the scientific character of their ideas, so "when we turn again and again to the works of V. I. Lenin in order to better and more fully understand his scientific-philosophic ideas, we know in advance *(zaranee)* and are confident that

in them are included important objective truths which we cannot ignore". (p. 10) What Čerkesov fails to mention is that whereas the ideas of the above-mentioned scientists can be questioned, rejected, refuted, etc. whenever *anyone* has a valid reason for so doing, the same is not true of the ideas of Lenin. One might also add that the above scholars have no authority outside of their field (e.g. the philosophic views of Newton) – while the so-called 'classics' had no field but have authority in every field. *T. B.*

A. KOLMAN

A congratulatory address, published recently by the *Filosofický Časopis* (Philosophical Review, Prague), contains a quantity of biographical information concerning the well-known Soviet philosopher of Czech origin, Arnošt (Ernest) *Kolman.* Here are the data: born December 6, 1892; prisoner of war in Russia, 1915; admission to the CPSU, 1918. After 1918, he taught 'Marxist philosophy' at the Sverdlov Communist University in Moscow as well as at the Moscow Party School, at the Party School of the 5th Army Corps of the Eastern front, at the International School of Marxism-Leninism, etc. From 1929 to 1933 he taught mathematics as well as philosophy of mathematics both at the Institute of Red Professors and at the University of Moscow (according to D. Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-1932*, New York, 1961, p. 376, Kolman belonged to the small group around M. B. Mitin which, though in the beginning Deborinite, eventually went over to the 'Bolshevizers'). In 1930, by a resolution of the CK KPSS he was appointed member of the editorial staff of the review *Pod znamenem marksizma* (Under the Banner of Marxism); he held this position until the abolition of this review in 1943. In 1934, Kolman became doctor of philosophical sciences (his doctoral dissertation probably was *Predmet i metod sovremennoj matematiki* (Subject and Method in contemporary mathematics), Moscow, 1936; the first articles of Kolman are from 1929, see e.g. D. Joravsky, *op. cit.*, p. 403). In 1939, he was appointed professor of mathematics; from 1939 to 1945, he was head of the section for dialectical materialism at the IF. On November 1, 1945, Kolman was appointed professor at the Charles University in Prague where, from 1945 to 1948, he was lecturing on philosophy and mathematical logic. During the years 1945-1948, he was among other things member of the

Scientific Council of the Czechoslovak government, member of the Committee for Higher Learning and chairman of the Czech Antifascist Society. After his return to the Soviet Union in 1948, he worked at the Moscow Institute for the History of Science and Engineering. In 1960, Kolman was appointed Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; on April 4, 1960, he was nominated full member of the said Academy. Moreover, since 1962, he is chairman of the Scientific Board for Philosophy *(Vedecke kolegium filosofie)* (Cf. *Filosofický Časopis* 1962, 6, p. 926 f.).

In view of this information, it would seem that Kolman is the only eminent, living Soviet philosopher on whom so many biographical details are known to Western scholars. *N. L.*

NEW BOOKS

Among the books announced for this year by the publishing house of the AON, we find the following of philosophic interest:

Istoričeskij materializm (Historical Materialism). Učebnoe posobie.

Rozental', M. M.: *Lenin i dialektika* (Lenin and the Dialectic).

Kursanov, G. A.: *Dialektičeskij materializm o ponjatii* (Dialectical Materialism on the Concept).

Gajdukov, Ju. G.: *Rol' praktiki v processe poznanija* (The Role of Practice in the Process of Knowledge).

Rešetnikov, N. A.: *Cerkov' – klerikalizm – fašizm* (The Church, Clericalism and Fascism). (s. *Novye Knigi* 1963, 1) *T. B.*

The Gospolitizdat has announced for this year:

Naučnyj kommunizm. Kurs lekcij (Scientific Communism. Lectures).

Česnokov, D. I.: *Kommunizm i ličnost'* (Communism and the Person).

Lem, G. P.: *O protivorečijax v obščestvennom razvitii* (On Contradictions in Social Development).

Karpušin, V. A.: *Individualizm i kollektivizm* (Individualism and Collectivism).

Novik, I. B.: *Kibernetika, eë filosofskie i sociologičeskie problemy* (Cybernetics; its Philosophic and Sociological Problems).

Kedrov, B. M.: *Edinstvo dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija* (The Unity of Dialectic, Logic, and Theory of Knowledge).

Osipov, A. A.: *Katexizis bez prikras* (The Catechism in its True Light).
Žigulev, G. I.: *Ateističeskie poslovicy i pogovorki* (Atheistic Sayings and Proverbs).
Čertkov, A. B.: *Pravda o žitijax svjatyx* (The Truth on the Lives of the Saints).
Zybkovec, V. F.: *O černoj i breloj magii* (On Black and White Magic).
Ojzerman, T. I.: *Put' v nikuda* (Path into Nowhere).

The last named is described as a criticism of "bourgeois theories which are the last word of the imperialistic social-demagoguery of the apologists of capitalism". (s. *Novye Knigi* 1963, 2). *T. B.*

REVIEWS

Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija (Dialectic and Logic. The Laws of Thought). (IF) Pod. obščej redakciej B. M. Kedrova. Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR, 1962. 334str.

This volume forms a series with the book reviewed below. It is made up of an introduction and four sections. The introduction ('Dialectic and Logic' (pp. 7-62) by P. V. Kopnin and P. V. Tavanec) and the first two sections ('The Object of Marxist Dialectical Logic and its Distinction from the Object of Formal Logic' (pp. 63-137) and 'The Laws of Marxist Dialectical Logic and their Relation to the Laws of Formal Logic' (pp. 138-218), both by B. M. Kedrov) form a whole, the object of which is to give an exhaustive characterization of the nature and content of 'dialectical' logic.

A striking characteristic of this section of the book is the fact that, up to page 150 it is a very clear and almost convincing presentation of the case for 'dialectical' logic; but, precisely at the point where one is lead to expect the decisive demonstration of 'dialectical' logic's *raison d'être* Kedrov goes off on an eight-page ramble (pp. 157-164) of Lenin's statements on revolution and other logically irrelevant themes – and he never comes back to the case in point.

There are three basic points made throughout these three articles.

(a) 'Dialectical' logic is distinct from formal logic and from mathematical logic. Mathematical logic is a 'special science' (like physics and chemistry) standing somewhere between logic and mathematics: it is "the application of mathematical means to the solution of logical tasks and, at the same time, the logical side of mathematics itself" (p. 86). Formal and 'dialectical' logic both belong to the domain of the philosophical. Formal logic treats of the fixed, static, rigid forms of thought; 'dialectical' logic treats of the plastic, 'flowing', evolving forms of thought which reflect the real motion of the material world.

(b) In respect to method, 'dialectical' logic is distinct from formal logic and from 'metaphysics'. 'Dialectical' logic, since it treats of plastic, evolutive concepts – i.e. those which 'reflect' reality as it really is – gives a 'concrete' and complete treatment of all the possible modes of thought, reflecting reality 'objectively' and 'profoundly'. Formal logic 'abstracts' from the motion of the real world and treats concepts as if they reflected static beings; it is, therefore, not false but only one-sided and limited in comparison to 'dialectical' logic. 'Metaphysics' is the 'absolutization' of the abstraction of formal logic; whereas formal logic abstracts from motion, 'metaphysics' denies it.

It is here that the authors – particularly Kedrov – introduce a quite intriguing distinction. Formal logic, they argue, takes it upon itself to provide man with forms of thought which are guaranteed free of any contradiction, subjective or objective. Its main tool for this is abstraction – abstraction from the real motion of objects in the world. Now, in abstracting the forms it needs, formal logic leaves behind it a vast 'residue' which is composed not only of 'subjective

contradictions' ('logical errors'), the avoidance of which is formal logic's main task, but also the totality of 'objective ('real') contradictions, about which formal logic is incapable of talking for two reasons; first, formal logic excludes, *by definition*, any form of contradiction and, second, formal logic abstracts from motion, the root of which is precisely the interplay of the 'objective contradictions'.

This is where 'dialectical' logic comes in. 'Dialectical' logic not only assumes and carries to a higher plane the laws and forms of formal logic but it also – and above all – takes into its purview the 'objective contradictions' contained in the 'residue' left untouched by formal logic. And, now the point becomes to find out how 'dialectical' logic permits the 'dialectician' to distinguish, in the 'residue', the 'subjective' (fallacious) contradictions from the real, 'objective' ones. It is at this point – as pointed out above – that Kedrov leaves the reader, never to come back. Perhaps the next volume will throw some light on this crucial point.

(c) Finally, Kedrov gives an elaborate treatment of the basic laws of logic, carefully distinguishing the form they take in formal logic from that they take in 'dialectical' logic. Kedrov offers a schema which is well worth translating here (see below).

The third section ('The Concept of Identity in Formal and Dialectical Logic' (pp. 219-266), by V. A. Lektorskij and N. V. Karabanov) contains little which is original. The authors first describe what identity means in formal logic.

The Laws and Their Formulations in

	Dialectical Logic	Formal Logic	Metaphysics
1. Law of Identity	Law of concrete, relative identity ($a = a \,\&\, a \neq a$)	Law of abstract identity ($a = a$)	'Law' of absolute identity ($a = a$)
2. Law of Contradiction	Law of objective, real contradiction ($a =$ not-a)	Law of subjective ('logical') non-contradiction ($a \neq$ not-a)	'Law' of absolute non-contradiction ($a \neq$ not-a)
3. Law of Excluded Middle	Law of resolution (overcoming) of real contradiction ('either – or')	Law of resolution ('exclusion') of contradiction ('either – or')	'Law' of resolution ('exclusion' of contradiction ('either – or')
Middle =	Apparent 'reconciliation' of antagonistic contrad.	Fallacious ('logical') contradictions	Absolutely all contradictions

The Laws and Their Formulations in			
	Dialectical Logic	Formal Logic	Metaphysics
4. Law of Included Middle	a) Law of resolution (overcoming) of real contrad. ('both – and')	None	None
Middle = unity of contraries	= assumption of non-antagonistic contradictions into a higher synthesis	Middle is fully ignored and prohibited	Middle is fully negated
	b) Law of expression of real contradiction ('both – and') ('neither – nor')	By the formula 'either – or' are allowed only abstract-polar contraries	By the formula 'either – or' are allowed only abstract-polar contraries
5. Law of Sufficient Reason (in Russian = 'foundation')	Law of concrete, objective reason	Law of abstract ('sufficient') reason	'Law' of subjective 'reason'
Reason =	Taking account:	Abstraction	Denial and arbitrary ignoring
	a) of the many-sided bonds of phenomena	a) from bonds of phenomena (abstract, one-sided approach)	a) of bonds of phenomena (absolutely one-sided approach)
	b) of their development	b) from their development (fixation of the abstract moment of unchangeability	b) of their development (complete rigidification of the object)
	c) of practice as sum of concrete acts, events, etc.	c) from practice	c) of practice (pulling isolated facts from their general bonds)
	d) of the concreteness of truth	d) from living reality (abstractness of truth	d) of living reality (lifeless schematism

Because it is formal, formal logic cannot analyse the real conditions of identity. It is then shown that 'concrete identity' is dialectical, the main part of the evidence being drawn from the works of Piaget. Finally, Lektorskij and Karabanov distinguish two types of dialectical identity: the simple, which presupposes differences; the concrete, which is the unity of opposites.

The fourth section ('The Concept of Contradiction in Dialectical and Formal Logic' (pp. 267-334) is under divided authorship: the section, 'Dialectical and Formal Logic on Objective and Subjective Contradictions and the Criterion for Distinguishing Them', is due to J. Élez; that on 'The Irreducibility of the Marxist Dialectical Treatment of Contraditions to Formal-Logical Schemata' is the work of B. M. Kedrov.

The main theme of Élez is that the contradictions dealt with by dialectical logic are objective, i.e. 'real'; those eliminated by formal logic are subjective, i.e. erroneous; only practice can tell which contradictions are objective and, therefore, true. Interesting in this section is the long passage on the views of Kant and Hegel on logic.

Kedrov's closing consideration is that all attempts to universalize formal logic – i.e. to give it competence in those domains where only dialectical logic should be used – stumble on real contradictions which can only be revealed by 'contentful' analysis.

T. J. Blakeley

Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija (Dialectic and Logic. The Forms of Thought). (IF) Pod obščej redakciej B. M. Kedrova. Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR, 1962. 310str.

When discussing the criterion of practice in epistemology contemporary Soviet authors like to quote Engels' affirmation that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. This same idea is true of dialectical logic. The very generic description of dialectical logic in reference to formal logic, as exemplified in the first book in this series (reviewed above), only takes on significance when it can be shown how this new logic applies in 'practice'. And this seems to be the task assigned to *Formy myšlenija.* Unfortunately, B. M. Kedrov is the only author who reappears in this volume; hence there is a regrettable lack of continuity. Instead of having won for dialectical logic its *droit de cité* these two books merely continue the current Soviet line of affirming and not proving.

In the first article ('The Application of Dialectical Logic to the Study of the Processes of Thought' (pp.5-41)), D. P. Gorskij presents a thematic of dialectical logic, pointing out the main problems to be treated in this section of the Marxist dialectic and providing for each problem the pertinent classical quotations. The second section of Gorskij's contribution is a vulgarized repetition of one of his previous articles (*VF* 1952, 4, 64-77) wherein dialectical logic is distinguished from formal logic by the fact that in reference to all the logical operations dialectical logic includes motion and formal logic excludes it in principle. For instance, negation in formal logic is always in function of 'true or false'; negation in dialectical logic is a question of 'true or truer'.

B. M. Kedrov is the author of the second section, 'Operation with Scientific Concepts in Dialectical and Formal Logic' (pp. 42-141), where he deals with

definition and division. Formal logic defines by presentation of only the essential properties; dialectical logic does this and more, including the thing's relations, its genesis, the relation of general and particular, etc. The division used by formal logic is completely exclusive; that of dialectical logic includes 'transitions between concepts'. For formal logic there is an inverse proportion between the extension and intension of concepts; dialectical logic takes these two aspects as correlative in the historically developing concept.

The third section ('Modes and Categories of Dialectical and Formal Logic', pp. 142-222) is a rather uneven combination of articles by three Soviet authors. I. G. Gerasimov provides a solid, 'dialectical' account of analysis and synthesis. Formal logic analyses the formal rules and structures of science; dialectical logic consists in the analysis of developing concepts which are necessarily to be taken in their 'real inter-relatedness'. É. V. Il'enkov's account of abstract and concrete offers little which has not already been said better elsewhere but does contain a historical sketch (pp. 177-196) which is an interesting example of a 'dialectical' analysis of the history of philosophy. The third article is by L. P. Gokieli who presents in a shortened form his theory of *korennyj vyvody* (literally: radical conclusions) which first appeared in his book *On the Nature of the Logical* (*O prirode logičeskogo*. Tbilisi. 1958). As far as this reviewer could tell the 'radical conclusion' is a statement with at least two characteristics: a) the organic unity of negative and positive as the root of the dialectical unity of singular and general; b) the unity of 'word' and 'thing' (of theory and practice).

In the fourth section ('On the Structure of Scientific Knowledge in Dialectical and Formal Logic', pp. 223-310) A. A. Zinov'ev and B. M. Kedrov share the honors. Zinov'ev limits himself to a sober appreciation of the advantages and disadvantages of deductive theory and formalization in scientific investigations, ending up with an account of Marx' 'ascent from abstract to concrete' (*vosxoždenie ot abstraktnogo do konkretnomu*), which seems inferior to his presentation of it in the *Philosophical Encyclopedia* (Vol. 1, pp. 295-298). Kedrov's final word is a real disappointment. The reader rightly expects that he would confront his classicist views on the classification of sciences with the modernist and formalist views of Zinov'ev. As it turns out, the two articles might as well have been published in different books. Kedrov repeats a series of clichés on the structure of scientific knowledge: the dialectic of abstract and concrete, of the general and particular. Thus, the 'logical' analysis of science follows the historical evolution of science – 'in a shortened form' – proceeding from concrete to abstract and from particular to general. The correct approach to the classification of sciences is dialectical (taking into account 'bonds') and materialist (determined by the 'object').

These two books bring a few very minor insights into the so-called dialectical logic; they fail completely to touch the major question – the viability of dialectical logic as a logic.

T. J. Blakeley

M. M. Rozental': *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki* (Principles of Dialectical Logic). Moskva, Socekgiz, 1960. 476str.

The 'master of the dialectical method' has undertaken in this work to give an exhaustive justification and description of Marxist dialectical logic.

The first four chapters are devoted to general remarks on the nature of dialectical logic and to the distinction between formal and dialectical logic. Logic is presented as having a 'historical' nature, i.e. it has evolved and developed. Dialectical logic supersedes formal logic, which only regarded the forms of thought, by synthesizing in one logic consideration of both the forms and moving, contradictory 'content' of thought. Therefore, dialectical logic does study the forms of thought studied by formal logic, but deeper and more completely. Rozental' maintains that (formal) logic and (dialectical) epistemology can be considered separately *in actu philosophandi*, but in reference to the essence of philosophy they are identical. The laws of being are the laws of thought. Thought is dialectical because it is a reflection of dialectical reality. But, in a more profound sense, it is dialectical because of the opposition of the 'subjective and objective', 'theory and practice', 'sense and reason', etc. The laws of the dialectic are all at work in thought. For example, there is a quantity-quality 'leap' from sensation's collection of information to reason's synthesizing function. The 'logical' is ontogenetic in reference to the 'historical': it is dialectically identical not only to the 'historicity' of thought but also to that of real things.

The principle virtue of this part of Rozental''s book is that he takes a position on some of the key questions involved in the elaboration of dialectical logic and tries to dialectically defend it. There is little of the classical confusionism so typical of his earlier works. Thus, he admits that logic and epistemology can be distinguished as distinct philosophical activities; but adds that 'as to essence' they are identical. This is extremely clear: logic is epistemology and logic is not epistemology. Further, our author is completely lucid in distinguishing formal logic and dialectical logic. One is formal and the other 'contentful'. But, dialectical logic also assumes the tasks of formal logic and carries the study of forms of thought further by making it 'deeper'. Thus, dialectical logic is formal logic and then some. This is clear. And we later learn that the laws of thought are the laws of being and the laws of thought. This also is clear.

The subsequent chapters of the book are devoted to a detailed analysis of the structure of dialectical logic. Here, too, the password is 'clarity'.

The concept is the ultimate constituent of knowledge because it is the 'point of departure' and 'sum' of knowledge (against Kopnin and the 'Hegelianizing' dialectical logicians). The concept of formal logic is abstract and limited; that of dialectical logic is the 'unity of singular and general'. In dialectical logic the extension and intension of the concept are not inversely proportional but correlative. The dialectical concept is 'twice blessed': it is dialectical because its content is a reflection of the dialectical character of dialectical reality; it is

dialectical because, as the dialectical result of the dialectical evolution of thought, its very form is dialectical. Important concepts are called categories; their 'paired-ness' *(parnost')* reflects a basic duality in reality. The judgement is a unity of contradictions (singular and general, etc.) Dialectical logic treats of thought's reflection of 'real' contradictions which, because they are universal, cannot be false; the contradictions dealt with by formal logic are 'subjective' and 'erroneous'. Only practice can tell the difference. Reasoning is a dialectical unity of singular, particular and general whose form – says Rozental' – is not so important since it has a moving, changing content.

Rozental' reaches the ultimate in lucidity when talking about 'analysis and synthesis' and 'abstract and concrete' – as an example of this latter he says that the 'part' is 'abstract' in relation to the 'whole' which is 'concrete' (p. 429).

It is to be hoped that in the near future Soviet philosophers will succeed in founding a nationwide philosophical society, and it is to be even more ardently desired that people like Rozental' (and Mitin) – who have definitely outlived their usefulness even for dialectical materialism – will be explicitly relegated to the translation and proof-reading section.

T. J. Blakeley

D. P. Gorskij: *Voprosy abstrakcii i obrazovanie ponjatij* (Questions of Abstraction and the Formation of Concepts). (IF) Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR. 1961. 344str.

G. A. Gevorkjan: *O roli abstrakcii v poznanii* (On the Role of Abstraction in Knowledge). Erevan, Izd. AN Armjanskoj SSR 1957. 168str.

V. T. Pavlov: *Otnošenie meždu ponjatijami* (Relation Between Concepts). Kiev, Izd. Kievskogo universiteta. 1961. 175str.

In contemporary Soviet philosophy there are two distinct tendencies in the treatment of questions concerning knowledge. The first is that evidenced by the 'logicians', i.e. those Soviet philosophers who are engaged in developing logic – traditional or mathematical – and related fields of study (methodology of science, philosophy of mathematics, etc.) They tend, in general, to take the classics of dialectical materialism as an impetus or guideline for further studies, but do not neglect the advances that logic and philosophy have made outside of Soviet philosophical circles. The second group is a relatively recent offshoot of the strictly classical tradition (Rozental', Mitin, and cohorts) which has taken upon itself the positive development of a 'dialectical' logic – these are the 'dialectical logicians'.

D. P. Gorskij is definitely among the logicians. His *Questions of Abstraction and the Formation of Concepts* is a doctoral dissertation defended at the IF on May 22, 1962 (Cf. *VF* 1962, 10, 131). Always remaining within the limits of

orthodox dialectical materialism, Gorskij manages, nevertheless, to provide a lucid and convincing analysis of the function of abstraction in human thought. The salient characteristic of Gorskij's book – and of the work of the logicians in general - is the fact that only after having distinguished the various forms of abstraction, having described each of them, and having taken up the special problems they occasion, does he turn late in the book (p. 327) to point out that there is a difference between abstraction as treated by formal logic and as dealt with by dialectical logic. It should also be noted in passing that Gorskij's book is unusual in that it has both a name and subject index.

Gevorkjan's book is one of the better specialized studies done by a dialectical logician. Whereas Gorskij's presentation is markedly an attempt to make contemporary logical analysis (as developed by Carnap, Church, Quine, *et al.*) at home in the dialectical-materialist context, Gevorkjan provides a verbose but clear statement of the orthodox doctrine on the subject. Gorskij works at the level of logical analysis; Gevorkjan takes the point of view of 'dialectical genesis'. Thus, his chapters treat of abstraction on the level of sense-knowledge, the transition to abstraction on the rational level, the ultimate transition from abstract thought to practice.

The third book, V. T. Pavlov's *Relation Between Concepts*, is similar to V. I. Čerkesov's recent excursion into dialectical logic (see the review in *SST* III, 1) in that it shows the Hegelian extremes to which the dialectical logicians can go. The bulk of the book is devoted to a rather abstruse discussion of 'comparable and incomparable concepts', identity of concepts, relations of partial coincidence and subordination, coordinated concepts, contradictory concepts, contrary concepts. But it is in the first chapter – where the extension and intension of concepts are discussed – where logic (and objective science in general) is assassinated. Pavlov maintains that 'content', extension and form are three dialectically distinct aspects: but the extension *(ob'ëm)* is not only the 'conceptual objects' in a given concept but also the 'coordination of the marks' *(sootnesennost' priznakov)* expressed in the content of the concept. For all practical purposes, extension and intension are identical.

It is to be hoped that contemporary Soviet philosophy will move more and more in the direction indicated by Gorskij's book and hold to an absolute minimum the dialectical divagations evidenced by the other two works.

T. J. Blakeley

BIBLIOGRAPHY

OF SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY: EDITIONS IN RUSSIAN TRANSLATION

ABELJAR, P. (Abelard): *Istorija moix vedstvij* (Historia calamitatum mearum). Red. N. A. Sifdorova. Moskva. 1959.

Antičnaja filosofija. Fragmenty i svidetel'stva (Ancient Philosophy. Fragments and documents). Moskva. 1940.

Antičnye filosofy. Teksty (Ancient Philosophers. Texts). Moskva. 1935.

Antičnye filosofy. Svidetel'stva, fragmenty i teksty (Ancient Philosophers. Documents, Fragments and Texts). Kiev. 1955.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Poétika* (Poëtica; Poetics). Leningrad. 1927.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Metafizika* (Metaphysica; Metaphysics.) Primeč. A. V. Kubickogo. Moskva-Leningrad. 1934.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Afinskaja politija* (On the Constitution of Athens). Moskva. 1937.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *O častjax životnyx* (De partibus animalium; Parts of Animals). Moskva. 1937.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Fizika* (Physica; Physics). Moskva. 1937.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *O duše* (De anima; The Soul). Primeč. P. S. Popova. Predisl. V. K. Serežnikova. Moskva. 1937.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Kategorii.* S priloženiem 'vvedenija' Porfirija k 'kategorijam' Aristotelja (Categoriae, Porphyrii 'Isagoge'; The Categories, with the 'Introduction' of Porphyrius to the 'Categories' of Aristotle). Red., vstup. st. i primeč. G. F. Aleksandrova. Moskva. 1939.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *O vozniknovenii životnyx* (De generatione animalium; On the Generation of Animals). Moskva-Leningrad. 1940.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Analitika, pervaja i vtoraja* (Analytica priora et posteriora; Prior and Posterior Analytics). Moskva. 1952.

ARISTOTEL' (Aristotle): *Ob iskusstve poézii* (De arte poesiae; On the art of Poetry). Komment. F. A. Petrovskogo. Moskva. 1957.

BAUÉR, B. (Bauer): *Trubnyj glas strašnogo suda nad Gegelem* (Die Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen; Trumpet-Call of the Last Judgement on Hegel the Atheist and Anti-Christian). Predisl. B. S. Černyševa. Moskva. 1933.

BÉKON, F. (Francis Bacon): O principax i načalax (De principiis atque originibus). Moskva. 1937.

BÉKON, F. (Francis Bacon): *Novyj organon* (Novum organum). Moskva-Leningrad. 1938.

BÉKON, F. (Francis Bacon): *Novaja Atlantida. – Opyty i nastavlenija nravstvennye i političeskie* (New Atlantis. – Moral and Political Essays and Instructions). St. i primeč. F. A. Kogan-Bernštejn. Moskva. 1954.

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BERKLI, Dž. (Berkely): *Tri razgorova meždu Gilasom i Filonusom* (Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous). Moskva. 1937.

BRUNO, Dž.: *Dialogi: Pir na peple. O pričine, načale i edinom. O beskonečnosti, vselennoj i mirax. Tajna pegasa, s priloženiem Killenskogo osla* (Cena della ceneri. Della causa, principio et uno. De l'infinito, universo e mondi. Cabala del cavallo Pegaseo con l'aggiunta del' asino Cillenico). Red. i vstup. st. M. A. Dynnika. Moskva. 1949.

BRUNO, Dž.: *O geroičeskom entuziazme* (De gli eroici furori). Predisl. E. Egerman. Moskva. 1953.

DAKOSTA, U. (d'Acosta): *O smertnosti duši. – Primer čelovečeskoj žizni* (Sobre a mortalidade da alma do homen. – Exemplar humanae vitae; About the Mortality of the Human Soul. Example of Human Life). Moskva-Leningrad. 1934.

DAKOSTA, U. (d'Acosta): *O smertnosti duši čelovečeskoj i drugie proizvedenija* (Sobre a mortalidade da alma do homen; About the Mortality of the Human Soul and Other Works). Red. M. S. Belen'kogo. Vstup. st. I. K. Luppola. Moskva. 1958.

DEZAMI, T. (Dézamy): *Kodeks obščnosti* (Code de la communauté; The Codex of the Community). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1956.

DEKART, R. (Descartes): *Kosmogonija.* Dva traktata (Cosmogony. Two Treatises). Moskva-Leningrad. 1934.

DEKART, R. (Descartes): *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Red. i vstup. st. V. V. Sokolova. Moskva. 1950.

DEKART, R. (Descartes): *Rassuždenie o metode s priloženijami: diopitrika, meteory, geometrija* (Discours de la méthode, plus la dioptrique, les météores et la géométrie: Discourse on Method, plus 'Dioptric', 'The Meteors' and 'Geometry'). St. i komment. G. G. Sljusareva i A. P. Juškeviča. Moskva-Leningrad. 1953.

DIDRO, D. (Diderot): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Red. i predisl. A. Deborina. TT. 1-2. Moskva-Leningrad. 1926.

DIDRO, D. (Diderot): *Sobranie sočinenija* (Collected Works). TT. I-X. Moskva-Leningrad. 1935-1947.

DIDRO, D. (Diderot): *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija* (Selected Philosophical Works). Moskva. 1941.

DIDRO, D. (Diderot): *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Red. A. A. Smirnova. Moskva-Leningrad. 1951.

DIDRO, D. (Diderot): *Izbrannye ateističeskie proizvedenija* (Selected Atheistic Works). Red. i st. X. N. Momdžjana. Moskva. 1956.

ÉRAZM ROTTERDAMSKIJ (Erasmus from Rotterdam): *Poxval'noe slovo gluposti* (laus Stultitiae). Moskva. 1938.

ÉRAZM ROTTERDAMSKIJ (Erasmus from Rotterdam): *Poxvala gluposti* (Laus Stultitiae). Moskva. 1960.

FEJERBAX, L. (Feuerbach): *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija v dvux tomax* (Selected Philosophical Works in two Volumes). Red. i vstup. st. M. M. Grigor'jana. TT. I-II. Moskva. 1955.

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

FIXTE, I. G. (Fichte): *Zamknutoe torgovoe gosudarstvo* (Der geschlossene Handelsstaat; The Closed Commercial State). Moskva. 1923.

FIXTE, I. G. (Fichte): *O naznačenii učenogo* (Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten; The Vocation of the Scholar). Moskva. 1935.

FIXTE, I. G. (Fichte): *Jasnoe kak solnce soobščenie širokoj publike o podlinnoj suščnosti novejšej filosofii* (Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum über die neueste Philosophie; A Clear as Day Report to the Public on Recent Philosophy). Moskva. 1937.

FUR'E, Š. (Fourrier): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. TT. I-IV. Moskva-Leningrad. 1951-1954.

GEGEL', G. V. F. (Hegel): *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works). T. 1, Moskva-Leningrad. 1929, izd. 4-e 1930; T. 2, Moskva-Leningrad. 1934; T. 3, Moskva. 1956; T. 4, Moskva. 1959; T.5, Moskva. 1937; T. 6, Moskva. 1939; T. 7, Moskva-Leningrad. 1934; T. 8, Moskva-Leningrad. 1935; T. 9, Leningrad. 1932; T. 10, Moskva-Leningrad. 1932; T. 11, Moskva-Leningrad. 1935; T. 12, Moskva. 1938; T. 13, Moskva-Leningrad. 1940; T. 14, Moskva. 1958.

GEKKEL', É. (Haeckel): *Monizm* (Der Monismus; Monism). Gomel'. 1924.

GEKKEL', E. (Haeckel): *Mirovye zagadki. – Monizm i zakon prirody* (Die Welträtsel. – Der Monismus und das Naturgesetz; Riddles of the Universe. – Monism and the Law of Nature). Red. A. A. Maksimova. Moskva. 1937.

GEL'VECIJ, K. A. (Helvetius): *Istinnyj smysl sistemy prirody* (Le vrai sens du systéme de la nature; The Real Meaning of the System of Nature). Red. A. Deborina. Moskva. 1923.

GEL'VECIJ, K. A. (Helvetius): Sčast'e. – Poéma (Le bonheur. – Poème; Happiness – A Poem). Vstup. st. M. A. Dynnika. Moskva. 1936.

GEL'VECIJ, K. A. (Helvetius): *Ob ume* (De l'Esprit; On Reason). Moskva. 1938.

GEL'VECIJ, K. A. (Helvetius): *O čeloveke, ego umstvennyx sposobnostjax i ego vospitanii* (De l'homme, des ses facultés et de son éducation; On Man, his Faculties and his Education). Moskva. 1938.

GERDER, I. G. (Herder): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Moskva-Leningrad. 1959.

GOBBS, T. (Hobbes): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Predisl. A. Deborina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1926.

GOBBS, T. (Hobbes): *Leviafan ili materija, forma i vlast' gosudarstva cerkovnogo i graždanskogo* (Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil). Predisl. i red. A. Českisa. Moskva. 1936

GOL'BAX, P. A. D. (Holbach): *Izbrannye antireligioznye proizvedenija* (Selected Anti-religious Works). T. I. Moskva. 1934.

GOL'BAX, P. A. D. (Holbach): *Sistema prirody ili o zakonax mira fizičeskogo i mira duxovnogo* (Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde morale; The System of Nature or on the Laws of the Physical and Moral Worlds). Moskva. 1940.

GOL'BAX, P. A. D. (Holbach): *Pis'ma k Evgenii. – Zdravyj smysl* (Lettres à

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Eugénie. – Le bon sens; Letters to Eugénie. – Common Sense). Red. i st. Ju. Ja. Kogana. Moskva. 1956.

IBN SINA (Avicenna): *Daniš-name. Kniga znanija* (Book of Knowledge). Predisl. A. M. Bogoutdinov. Stalinabad. 1957.

IBN SINA (Avicenna): *Kanon vračebnoj nauki v pjati knigax* (Canon of the Medical Science in five Books). Taškent. 1960.

KABE, É. (Cabet): *Putešestvie v ikariju* (Voyage en Icarie; Trip to Icaria). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1948.

KAMPANELLA, T. (Campanella); *Gorod solnca* (La città del sole). Komment. F. A. Petrovskogo. Moskva-Leningrad. 1954.

KANT, I.: *Prolegomeny ko vsjakoj buduščej metafisike, moguščej vozniknut' v kačestve nauki* (Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können; Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics). Izd. 1-e, Moskva. 1934. Izd. 2-e, Moskva. 1937.

KANT, I.: *Sočinenija* (1759-1777 gg.) (Works 1759-1777). T. II. Moskva. 1940.

KOMENSKIJ, JA. A. (Comenius): *Mir čuvstvennyx veščej v kartinkax ili izobraženie inaimenovanie vsex vaznejšix predmetov v mire i dejstvij v žizni* (Orbis sensualium pictus...). Moskva. 1957.

KONDIL'JAK, É. B. (Condillac): *Traktat ob oščuščenijax* (Traité des sensations; Treatise on the Sensations). Red. i vstup. st. E. Sitkovskogo. Moskva. 1935.

KONDIL'JAK, É. B. (Condillac): *Traktat o sistemax, v kotoryx vskryvajutsja ix nedostatki i dostoinstva* (Traité des systèmes...; Treatise on Systems...). Red. E. Sitkovskogo. Moskva. 1938.

KONDORSÉ, Ž. A. (Condorcet): *Éskiz istoričeskoj kartiny progressa čelovečeskogo razuma* (Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain; Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind). Moskva. 1936.

KUZANSKIJ, N. (Cusanus): *Izbrannye filosofskie sočinenija* (Selected Philosophical Works). Moskva. 1937.

LAMETRI (Lamettrie): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Moskva-Leningrad. 1925.

LAROŠFUKO, F. DE (La Rochefoucauld): *Maksimy i moral'nye razmyšlenija* (Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales; Reflections or Sentences and Moral Maxims). Moskva-Leningrad. 1959.

LEJBNIC, G. V. (Leibniz): *Novye opyty o čelovečeskom razume* (Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain; New Essays Concerning Human Understanding). Moskva-Leningrad. 1936.

LEJBNIC, G. V. (Leibniz): *Polemika G. Lejbnica i S. Klarka po voprosam filosofii i estestvoznanija* (The Polemics of G. Leibniz and S. Clarke on Questions of Philosophy and Natural Sciences). Leningrad. 1960.

LEONARDO DA VINČI: *Kniga o živopisi* (Trattato della pittura; Treatise on Painting). Moskva. 1934.

LEONARDO DA VINČI: *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). TT. I-II. Moskva-Leningrad. 1935.

LOKK, DŽ. (Locke): *Mysli o vospitanii. – O vospitanii razuma. – Pedagogičeskie*

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

sočinenija (Thoughts on Education. – On the Conduct of the Understanding. – Educational Writings). Moskva. 1939.

LOKK, DŽ. (Locke): *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija. V 2-x tomax* (Selected Philosophical Works in two Volumes). T. 1. Moskva. 1960.

LUKIAN (Lucanus): *Sobranie sočinenij* (Collected Works). TT. 1-2. Moskva-Leningrad. 1935.

LUKIAN (Lucanus): *Izbrannye ateističeskie proizvedenija* (Selected Atheistic Works). Moskva. 1955.

LUKRECIJ (Lucretius): *O prirode veščej* (De natura rerum). TT. I-II. Leningrad. 1945-1947.

MABLI, G. (Mably): *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Komment. F. B. Šuvaevoj. Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1950.

MAKIAVELLI, N. (Machiavelli): *Sočinenija* (Works). T. I. Moskva-Leningrad. 1934.

Materialisty drevnej Grecii. Sobranie tekstov Geraklita, Demokrita i Épikura (Materialists of Ancient Greece. A collection of texts by Heraclitus, Democritus and Epicurus). Red. i vstup. st. M. A. Dynnika. Moskva. 1955.

MEL'E, Ž. (Meslier): *Zaveščanie* (Testament). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. TT. I-III. Moskva. 1954.

MONTEN', M. (Montaigne): *Opyty*. Kniga pervaja (Essais. Livre premier: Essays. First book). Vstup. st. F. A. Kogan-Bernstejn i M. P. Baskina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1954.

MONTEN', M. (Montaigne): *Opyty*. Kniga 3-a (Essais. Troisième livre; Essays. Third book). Moskva-Leningrad. 1960.

MONTESK'E, Š. (Montesquieu): *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Red. i vstup. st. M. P. Baskina. Moskva. 1955.

MONTESK'E, Š. (Montesquieu): *Persilskie pis'ma* (Lettres persanes; Persian Letters). Vstup. st. S. D. Artamonova. Moskva. 1956.

MOR, T. (More): *Utopia*. Komment. A. I. Maleina i F. A. Petrovskogo. Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Izd. 1-e. Moskva-Leningrad. 1947. Izd. 2-e. Moskva. 1953.

MORELLI (Morelly): *Kodeks prirody ili istinnyj dux ee zakonov* (Code de la nature...; Code of Nature...). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1956.

N'JUTON, I. (Newton): *Matematičeskie načala natural'noj filosofii* (Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica; Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy). Leningrad. 1936.

OUÉN, R. (Owen): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). TT. 1-2. Moskva-Leningrad. 1950.

PEJN, T. (Paine): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Moskva. 1959.

PLATON (Plato): *Polnoe sobranie tvorenij Platona v 15 tomax* (The Collected Works of Plato in 15 Volumes). TT. I, IV, V, IX, XIII, XIV. Leningrad. 1922-1929.

PLATON (Plato): *Teétet* (Theaitetos). Primeč. V. Serežnikova. Moskva-Leningrad. 1936.

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

PRISTLI, D. (Priestley): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Red. i predisl. L. A. Českisa. Moskva. 1934.

ROBINÉ, Ž. B. (Robinet): *O prirode* (De la nature; On nature). Red. i predisl. E. Sitkovskogo. Moskva. 1936.

RUSSO, Ž. Ž. (Rousseau): *Ob obščestvennom dogovore ili principy političeskogo prava* (Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique; The Social Contract or the Principles of Political Law). Moskva. 1938.

RUSSO, Ž. Ž. (Rousseau): *Ispoved'.–Progulki odinokogo mečtatelja* (Confessions. – Promenades d'un rêveur solitaire; Confessions. – Strolls of a Solitary Dreamer). Moskva. 1949.

ŠELLING, F. V. I. (Schelling): *Ob otnošenii izobratel'nyx iskusstv k prirode* (Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zur Natur; On the Relation of Plastic and Graphic Arts to Nature). Leningrad. 1935.

ŠELLING, F. V. I. (Schelling): *Sistema transcendental'nogo idealizma* (System des transzendentalen Idealismus; System of Transcendental Idealism). Vstup. st. I. Širokova. Leningrad. 1936.

SEN-SIMON (Saint-Simon): *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). TT. I-II. Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1948.

SPINOZA, B.: *Principy filosofii Dekarta* (Renati des Cartes Principiorum philosophiae; Principles of Descartes' Philosophy). Leningrad. 1926.

SPINOZA, B.: *Perepiska* (Correspondence). Moskva. 1932.

SPINOZA, B.: *Étika* (Ethica; Ethics). Moskva-Leningrad. 1932.

SPINOZA, B.: *Traktat ob usoveršenstvovanii razuma* (Tractatus de intellectus emendatione). Leningrad. 1934.

SPINOZA, B.: *Bogoslovsko-političeskij traktat* (Tractatus theologico-politicus). Moskva. 1935.

SPINOZA, B.: *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Red. i vstup. st. V. V. Sokolova. TT. I-II Moskva. 1957.

TJURGO, A. R. (Turgot): *Izbrannye filosofskie proizvedenija* (Selected Philosophical Works). Moskva. 1937.

TOLAND, Dž. *Izbrannye sočinenija* (Selected Works). Predisl. A. Deborina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1927.

UINSTÉNLI, D. (Winstanley): *Izbrannye pamflety* (Selected Pamphlets). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva-Leningrad. 1950.

VOL'TER (Voltaire): *Izbrannye proizvedenija* (Selected Works). Vstup. st. V. P. Volgina. Moskva. 1947.

VOL'TER (Voltaire): *Filosofskie povesti* (Philosophical Narrations). Red. E. F. Knipovič. Moskva. 1954. Izd. 2-e. Moskva. 1960.

VOL'TER (Voltaire): *Pis'ma.* Novye teksty perepiski Vol'tera (Letters. New texts of the correspondence of Voltaire). St. i primeč. V. S. Ljublinskogo. Moskva-Leningrad. 1956.

Karl G. Ballestrem

This content downloaded from 136.159.235.223 on Sun, 31 Jul 2016 21:34:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CHRONOLOGY

1962

June (beginning) Meeting of psychologists in Tambov on the psychological problems of educating the new man. (*VP* 1962, 6, 185-186)

3 July Conference on the essence of life, organized by the Scientific Committee on Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, the October local committee of the KPSS in Moscow and by the party committee of the Presidium of the AN SSSR. (*VF* 1963, 1, 148-152)

21 Sept. Joint session of the Presidium of the AN SSSR, Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and Presidium of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR on 'The Results of the All-Union Conference on Philosophic Questions of the Physiology of Higher Neural Activity and Psychology'. (*VF* 1963, 1, 126-128)

19-20 Oct. General Assembly of the AN SSSR on tasks of the development of social sciences during the large-scale construction of Communism. (*VF* 1963, 1, 128-138)

RICHARD LÖWENTHAL

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY FOR THE SELF-PRESERVATION OF A TOTALITARIAN REGIME*

1. The Soviet regime is the totalitarian dictatorship of an ideological party. The rule of that party is not justified pragmatically by a task with definite limits in geography and time (such as the task of forced national modernisation in the 'development dictatorships' since Kemal Ataturk), but ideologically by a goal without such limits – the achievement of the 'End of History' on a world scale. Lenin's transformation of Marxism consisted precisely in making the fulfilment of that historical vision dependent on the achievement, preservation and expansion of party rule. Hence Leninist ideology is the necessary legitimation both for the permanence of the party dictatorship and for its irreconcilable conflict with the non-Communist world, as preconditions for unending social revolution within and unlimited pressure towards expansion without.

2. All aspects of Leninist ideology that are peripheral to this basic political function are liable to extensive reinterpretation in response to changing internal and external situations. In particular, there is no binding ideological prescription of the means required to achieve the ideological goals: varying means may be chosen according to expediency. Neither the inevitability of war nor the need for peaceful coexistence, neither forced collectivisation of the peasant economy nor its creeping transformation according to Bukharin's or Gomulka's ideas, neither Stalinist methods of detailed administrative planning from the center nor Titoist methods of a market economy in a planned framework are necessary elements of the basic doctrine. Of course, individual Communist leaders and factions can and do insist on such 'ideologies of means' in their struggle for factional power, claiming that they are indispensable parts of the ideological structure; but in fact the survival of the regime as such does not depend on these points. What is really bindingly prescribed is the final goal – internal as well as external –, the direction of development

* Résumé of an adress delivered at a Sovietology conference in Cologne, July 5 and 6, 1963.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

towards it, and the function of the party regime: he who doubts these essentials is a true 'revisionist', i.e. a danger to the system.

3. For transforming Soviet society in the direction of the final goal, and particularly for 'socialising' the peasant economy and for preventing the consolidation of new privileged classes in the course of industrial construction, Stalin developed the technique of his 'permanent revolution from above' (forced collectivisation, blood purge of the elites). The methods of mass terrorism, forced labour camps, etc., used for this purpose also proved effective methods for the 'primitive accumulation of capital' and for enforcing mass discipline in the stage of basic industrial construction. As a result, the dynamics of social development were during that period determined by ideologically inspired political power to a higher extent than ever before in the history of mankind.

With the completion of industrialisation, however, mass terrorism has ceased to be a productive force and becomes an obstacle to further productive advance. If the regime continued to use force in daily economic life to the same extent, severe economic setbacks would now ensue and would impair its power relation to the outside world. Besides the logic of ideology, which demands further social revolutions (assimilation of the collective farms to the state farms, reduction of the role of the private plots and livestock of the peasants, agrotowns, universal polytechnical education), the logic of economic efficiency now demands a reduction of the role of coercion in favour of the role of incentives – and both use the power interests of the regime as their premise. Thus while previously an ideology armed with dictatorial force could impose its dynamics on society like a steamroller, we have now two dynamic tendencies whose changing compromises result in a zigzag development.

4. In relation to the outside world, the Soviet Union has never possessed overwhelming force; hence it could not approach its ideological goals abroad in a steamroller type of movement, but had always to adjust to changing constellations of forces and to await its chance to exploit favourable opportunities. Stalin's annexations of Eastern Poland and the Baltic States in 1939–1940, and his Sovietisation of Eastern Europe in 1944–1947 illustrate the continuity of objectives, preserved, despite an enforced pause of expansion that lasted fifteen years. At present Khrushchov has reached a point where, after a five-year offensive effort that was largely based on miscalculations, he is forced to accept another pause.

But while Stalin had long conceived of the spread of Communist party rule by world revolution as wholly comprised in the expansion of Russian state power, this identity has been destroyed by the independent Communist revolutions in Yugoslavia and China; and Khrushchov's expectation of inevitable harmony among independent Communist states has proved equally illusionary. As a result, the various centers of Communist power have come to develop different views of the chances and appropriate methods of further Communist expansion in the light of their respective state interests: the application of the ideology to foreign policy no longer yields indisputable results and has, therefore, ceased to guarantee the practical solidarity of the Communist powers.

5. The ideology is the motivating force of the ruling party, not necessarily of its subjects; but in order to legitimise the party's rule in the eyes of the subjects, it must remain reasonably credible for the latter, at least within the limited chances of independent information and criticism open to them. Since outward conformity can no longer be enforced by everyday terrorism to the previous extent, such credibility becomes all the more important; hence the intense efforts of the Soviet Communist leadership to revive ideological interest, to adjust the doctrine to the changed situation, to recodify it in new textbooks and as a party program in order to facilitate its propaganda, and to use the ideology as an instrument of social discipline both directly and by means of the party control of creative cultural activity. But this effort to achieve a 're-ideologisation from above' is running up against a growing 'de-ideologisation from below'. This seems to be due not only to the internationally familiar decline of ideological needs with the improvement of material conditions and to the increased frankness with which, following the end of mass terrorism, people tend to show their ideological indifference or even to express doubt, but also to the fact that the internal zigzags and external setbacks of the regime have impaired the credibility of its statements. The dismantling of the Stalin myth, the shock of the Hungarian revolution, the holes in the monopoly of information created by increased admission of foreign (including Polish and Yugoslav) publications and increased official travel abroad, the ups and downs between the toleration and suppression of modern art forms, between concrete promises of material improvement and their withdrawal, between optimistic and pessimistic versions of the policy pursued by the 'imperialist camp', finally the stark

disappointment of all hopes in a necessary harmony of interests among Communist powers – these are so many factors undermining the willingness of Soviet man to believe what he is told.

6. In the last few years, the growing difficulties of effective domestic or foreign action in the direction prescribed by the ideology, as well as the growing resistance to ideological mass education have created what may be called a half-conscious tendency to water down the ideological legitimation of party rule in response to the actual needs of the masses. The changes in social structure required for reaching the higher stage of Communism are presented less and less as immediate political tasks, more and more as consequences that may be expected to flow from a steady rise in productivity; this rise is now presented as the main task not only of the economic administration but of the party itself, with Lenin's formulation about the primacy of economic tasks after the seizure of power serving as justification. The party reorganisation of November 1962 was largely intended to make the party more directly responsible for production, thus paving the way for legitimising its rule primarily by its economic achievement. Such an attempt, however, is pregnant with new difficulties and conflicts. No doubt a shift in the legitimation of the party from the program of permanent revolution at home and abroad, for which its subjects care less and less, to the improvement of the national wellbeing, for which they care more and more, would in case of economic successes increase the authority of the party in the short run; but in the long run it would expose the whole regime to being judged by the yardstick of mere economic rationality. On the other hand, the reorganisation forces the party bureaucracy to cling even more tightly than hitherto to its administrative powers over economic life; but this will make rational economic reforms that would reduce the scope for bureaucratic intervention and increase the scope for the forces of the market more difficult, even though such reforms are urgently needed.

7. The total picture, then, shows; (a) a growing difficulty for the leaders in acting according to ideological principles; (b) a declining willingness of the masses to believe in the ideology; (c) hence an increasing reflection of the objective contradictions of the regime in phenomena of ideological crisis.

These factors, however, do not produce a steady decline in the importance of ideology, but a zigzag course due to the opposite tendencies

towards re-ideologisation and de-ideologisation, which are closely linked to the struggle of the party machine to preserve its political and administrative power. Under the present constellation of political power in the Soviet Union, a consistent success of 'non-ideological' tendencies towards 'pure' economic rationality is as impossible as is consistent action according to 'purely ideological' prescriptions. The liberation of Soviet economic life from ideological shackles, like the liberation of Soviet cultural life or the bridging of the ideological gulf between the Soviet Union and the non-Communist world, presupposes the liberation of the Soviet state from the primacy of the party.

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

UN PROBLÈME CENTRAL DE L'ÉPISTÉMOLOGIE SOVIÉTIQUE*

De nos jours la théorie de la connaissance – 'gnoséologie' dans la terminologie soviétique – prend une place de plus en plus importante dans la philosophie soviétique contemporaine. Ceci est dû en majeure partie aux efforts frénétiques auxquels se livrent les philosophes soviétiques pour façonner une logique 'dialectique' qui pourrait prétendre au titre de 'logique'. En effet, depuis des années les adeptes du matérialisme dialectique continuent à affirmer l'existence d'une logique dialectique qui aurait été fondée par Marx, Engels et Lénine et qui recevrait sa 'plus profonde' application et son 'plus fructueux' dévelopment dans le *Capital*, de Marx. Mais, alors que les philosophes soviétiques contemporains se moquaient des philosophes occidentaux, qui ignoraient les modes de la pensée dialectique, et invoquaient les 'foudres des classiques du Marxisme' contre les 'néo-Machistes' qui osaient nier l'existence d'une logique autre que la logique formelle, ils étaient fort embarrassés de ne pas même pouvoir citer une loi ou une règle qui servirait à distinguer la logique dialectique de son prédécesseur formel.

D'où un véritable raz de marée d'ouvrages – à partir de 1958 – qui se donnent pour tâche principale la justification de la logique dialectique.[1] Un examen de ces ouvrages raffermit l'impression qu'avaient les philosophes occidentaux qui suivent l'évolution de la philosophie soviétique – impression explicitement confirmée par K. S. Bakradze lors de la discussion de 1950-1951 sur la logique [2] – que la soi-disant logique dialectique recelait non pas une logique mais une espèce de théorie de la connaissance, encombrée de différentes considérations psychologiques, ontologiques, métaphysiques et autres.

Donc, la situation en ce qui concerne la théorie de la connaissance dans la philosophie Soviétique a radicalement changé en très peu de temps.

* Ces reflexions sont le fruit de recherches entreprises avec l'appui de la Fondation Rockefeller et ont été rendues publiques pour la première fois lors d'une conférence tenue au Collège St-Michel à Fribourg. Ni la Fondation ni le Collège ne sont responsables des propos de l'auteur.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

Sous Staline les questions épistémologiques appartenaient aux 'problèmes déjà résolus par les classiques'. La plupart des gnoséologues Soviétiques se contentaient de répéter ce que les classiques avaient dit ou se perdaient dans des questions de détails où le glaive de la 'critique et de l'autocritique' ne pourrait les atteindre. Avec la résurgence de la question dialectico-logique les philosophes prolétariens se voient contraints de répondre à maintes questions, qu'ils avaient auparavant – suivant en ceci les classiques – passées sous silence. Mais avant tout ils se voyaient dans l'obligation de mettre de l'ordre dans l'épistémologie marxiste-léniniste en supprimant les inconséquences graves qui guettaient cette théorie.

Notre sujet ici n'est ni la logique dialectique en général ni la théorie Soviétique de la connaissance, mais uniquement une des questions – celle de la réflexion – où les philosophes Soviétiques commencent à mettre de l'ordre. Avant de traiter ce problème en détail nous le situerons dans le contexte général de la philosophie Soviétique.

POINT DE DÉPART DE LA THÉORIE SOVIÉTIQUE DE LA CONNAISSANCE

Rappelons que la philosophie pour les marxistes-léninistes est 'la science des lois les plus générales de la nature, de la société et de la connaissance humaine' et qu'elle se divise en matérialisme dialectique (science des lois de la nature et de la connaissance) et matérialisme historique (science des lois de la société et de l'histoire). Le matérialisme dialectique, qui nous intéresse ici, peut se ramener à trois thèses fondamentales:

(1) La seule réalité existante est la matière, qui est définie comme ce qui existe en dehors et indépendamment de toute connaissance.

(2) La réalité est dialectique. Le mot 'dialectique' indique ici deux états de fait distincts quoique complémentaires. D'une part la réalité est dialectique parce qu'elle est en mouvement évolutif continuel. D'autre part la réalité est dialectique en tant qu'elle se conforme au cours de son mouvement aux trois lois de la dialectique. Les trois lois de la dialectique sont: la loi de l'unité et la lutte des contradictoires; la loi de la transition de changements quantitatifs en changements qualitatifs; la loi de la négation de la négation. Parmi ces trois lois la première est censée indiquer la cause efficiente, le moteur du mouvement; la deuxième décrit la cause formelle, la nature du mouvement; enfin, la troisième spécifie la voie

suivie par le jeu des changements – c'est une sorte d'observation méthodologique.

(3) La connaissance est un reflet de la matière et une fonction de celle-ci.

Avec ce point de départ la théorie soviétique de la connaissance – tout au moins dans son développement actuel – s'occupe de quatre problèmes principaux qui peuvent être présentés sous forme de question:

(a) Le reflet qui constitue la connaissance, de quelle nature est-il?

(b) Si le mot 'reflet' est pris dans son sens strict, comment expliquerait-on l'erreur?

(c) Quel critère nous permet d'établir qu'une connaissance est exacte?

(d) Si la connaissance, en tant que reflet de la réalité, suit l'évolution de cette dernière, que fait-on des lois logiques?

VERS UN DUALISME MATÉRIALISTE?

La 'théorie Léniniste de la réflexion' met les philosophes soviétiques contemporains en présence de deux problèmes bien distincts. D'abord il s'agit de déterminer la valeur épistémologique (cognitive) du reflet: est-il du même genre qu'un cliché photographique comme le laissent supposer la plupart des affirmations de Lénine. Ou une image qui reproduit la réalité d'une façon analogique comme les gnoséologues 'réalistes' l'affirment? Ou, enfin, un simple symbole arbitrairement établi pour les exigences de la communication entre les hommes comme affirment les 'Machistes'? Ensuite, quelle continuité relie le reflet cognitif aux autres niveaux de la réalité matérielle?

Jusqu'à la période la plus récente de la philosophie soviétique le deuxième de ces problèmes ne se posait même pas. Avant d'aborder les spéculations récentes à son sujet, nous esquisserons la doctrine soviétique, concernant le premier problème, qui constitue l'orthodoxie marxiste-léniniste quant à la connaissance.

La connaissance appartient à la dialectique subjective dont font partie également la volonté et les passions. La dialectique subjective doit son nom au fait qu'elle est censée être le reflet de la dialectique objective. La dialectique objective est la réalité matérielle en tant que soumise aux trois lois fondamentales de la dialectique. La dialectique subjective est doublement dialectique. En soi elle est l'activité réelle de sujets réels donc soumise aux mêmes lois que ceux-ci. Comme reflet de la réalité elle reproduit

des objets qui sont eux-mêmes soumis aux lois de la dialectique. Ainsi et la forme et le contenu de la pensée sont dialectiques. Ce n'est pas seulement l'image de la pomme qui est dialectique, car la pomme elle-même l'est, mais aussi et surtout les formes générales de la pensée (concept, jugement, raisonnement, hypothèse, etc.) qui comme telles suivent le mouvement dialectiquement rythmé de tout-ce qui est. Il s'ensuit qu'aucune considération théorique ne peut nous renseigner sur l'exactitude de notre connaissance parce que cette considération théorique elle-même fait partie de la dialectique subjective. Donc la question de la vérité ou de la fausseté doit se décider sur le plan de la praxis. Enfin, les lois logiques elles-mêmes découlent des schèmes pratiques maintes fois répétés; parmi toutes les réflexions de la dialectique objectives elles seules jouissent de cette constance extraordinaire qu'on appelle 'logique', ce qui permet de les distinguer d'autres lois. Telles étaient les grandes lignes de la théorie sovietique de la connaissance au moment où de nombreux philosophes soviétiques se mirent à la recherche d'une logique dialectique.

Une question capitale qui fut toujours sous-jacente dans les spéculations épistémologiques des Soviétiques mais que cette nouvelle évolution pose d'une façon particulièrement aiguë est de déterminer le statut ontologique du reflet cognitif dans le soi-disant matérialisme moniste du matérialisme dialectique, ou, pour reprendre notre formulation antérieure: quelle continuité relie le reflet cognitif aux autres niveaux de la réalité matérielle? En effet, si tout est matière et que la connaissance en est une fonction, le reflet cognitif doit être lui-même matériel – une conclusion unanimement rejetée par les philosophes soviétiques comme du 'matérialisme vulgaire', résultat d'une mode 'métaphysique' (i.e. non-dialectique) de pensée. Aussitôt surgit la question de savoir comment un résultat 'immatériel' peut provenir d'une cause totalement matérielle. Ainsi, la réponse marxiste-léniniste à cette question doit être recherchée en évitant le Scylla du matérialisme méchanique qui réduit tous les phénomènes à un jeu mécanique de particules matérielles et le Charybde de l'idéalisme dualiste qui admettrait un étant immatériel comme base ontique de l'immatérialité de la pensée – ce qui d'après le Léninisme ouvrirait la porte à Dieu. Les philosophes soviétiques contemporains qui s'occupent de la connaissance pensent avoir trouvé la solution idéale dans ce qu'ils appellent 'la théorie léniniste de la réflexion comme propriété de toute matière'.

La 'reflexion' comme propriété universelle permet – nous expliquent

les penseurs soviétiques – de relier la connaissance à sa base matérielle d'une manière entièrement 'matérialiste'. Le trait essentiel de cette réflexion est l'interactivité (*vzaimodejstvie*) qui existe à tous les niveaux.

L'interactivité la plus simple se trouve au niveau des êtres inanimés, des 'choses'. L'exemple classique maintes fois répété par les philosophes soviétiques est le cas d'une boule de billard qui entre en choc avec une autre boule de billard. Trois éléments sont impliqués dans cette interactivité: l'agent (la première boule), le patient (la deuxième boule) et l'activité (le transfert d'énergie). L'interactivité est déterminée par trois genres de facteurs: (a) les propriétés (masse, direction, vélocité, etc.) de la première boule de billard; (b) les propriétés de la deuxième boule; (c) les changements que subissent tous les deux comme résultat du choc. Parmi ces derniers les soviétiques distinguent les changements 'intérieurs' des changements 'extérieurs'. Dans le cas présent les changements extérieurs sont les variations de vitesse, de direction, etc. des deux boules dues au choc et au transfert d'énergie qui s'ensuit. Les changements dits 'intérieurs' sont les modifications de structure subies par l'agent et le patient. Dans le cas des deux boules de billard c'est la redistribution moléculaire qui intervient à l'instant du choc ou, – si le choc est très violent – la perte de masse par une des boules, qui constitue le changement 'intérieur'.

Une autre interactivité marque le niveau auquel la matière commence à s'organiser en cellule. L'irritabilité (*razdražimost'*) se distingue par une vraie intériorité. La cellule est capable non seulement de réagir aux influences extérieures mais aus side retenir – dans certaines limites – les changements de structure qui lui permettent de mieux vivre dans son milieu.

Au stade proprement biologique de l'évolution de la matière – quand les cellules s'organisent en tissus et organes – l'interactivité se nomme sensibilité (*čuvstvitel'nost'*) et se caractérise par le pouvoir d'accomplir des changements structurels qui sont complexes et qui durent.

L'animal possède un système nerveux qui accomplit l'adaptation au milieu par une interactivité qui est composée de réflexes. Le réflexe est inconditionné (une réaction immédiate à la présence d'un facteur qui a une signification vitale pour l'organisme) ou conditionné (une réaction à un facteur non-vital qui se trouve souvent présent en même temps qu'un facteur vital). Les réflexes conditionnés forment *le premier système de signalisation* qui est l'activité cognitive propre à l'animal mais présente aussi à l'homme.

Le système nerveux de l'homme est encore plus perfectionné et centralisé. Il se distingue par la formation d'un *deuxième système de signalisation* où le mot sert de 'signal des signaux' et 'd'incarnation de la pensée'. Ainsi l'interactivité entre l'homme et son milieu est médiate, elle implique une certaine distance entre le sujet connaissant et l'objet connu – selon les philosophes soviétiques la pensée humaine est de ce fait *abstraite*.

Avec 'la théorie léniniste de la réflexion comme propriété de toute matière' les philosophes soviétiques contemporains pensent avoir expliqué la connaisance sans recours ni au mécanicisme des matérialistes vulgaires ni au spiritualisme des 'idéalistes'. Le premier est évité par le fait que l'interactivité de chaque niveau est qualitativement distincte de celle des autres niveaux. Le spiritualisme se trouve dépassé en tant que le caractère fondamental de toutes les interactivités reste le même à tous les niveaux – nul n'est besoin d'avoir recours à une base autre que la matière.

QUELQUES REMARQUES

La théorie que nous venons d'esquisser est en ce moment en pleine évolution. Dans ces conditions il ne s'agit pas encore d'en faire une critique approfondie. Néanmoins, elle comporte deux inconséquences qui doivent être relevées de prime abord.

D'une part 'la réflexion comme propriété de toute matière' ne semble pas apte à jouer le rôle que lui attribuent les Soviétiques. En effet, si le trait essentiel en est l'interactivité et celle-ci *par définition* implique des changements dans l'agent et le patient, alors on est en droit de demander si l'objet connu n'est pas modifié par le fait qu'il est connu. Si tel est le cas 'ayant été connu par x' devient un attribut ontologique et on se trouve en présence d'un idéalisme encore plus farouche que ceux que combat le marxisme-léninisme. Si, par contre, on voudrait prétendre qu'aux niveaux supérieurs de l'évolution de la matière seul le sujet connaissant subit des changements, on romprait la continuité entre l'*interactivité* des niveaux inférieurs et celle où l'activité n'est présente que d'un côté; le résultat serait un émanationnisme à la Locke.

En outre même si les gnoséologues soviétiques pensaient que notre première objection n'est pas sérieuse, il reste un aspect du problème qu'ils n'ont pas abordé jusqu'à maintenant. L'interactivité entre une boule de billard et une autre est facile à concevoir et à expliquer dans les termes

que nous avons repris plus haut. Mais les choses deviennent singulièrement plus compliquées quand il s'agit d'expliquer en termes de 'reflexion' l'interactivité entre objets de niveaux différents, comme entre le vivant et sa nourriture, ou entre deux êtres vivants dont chacun est pour l'autre un objet, par exemple, entre deux hommes.

Parmi d'autres faiblesses de cette théorie relevons pour terminer que les Soviétiques semblent inconscients du fait qu'ils sont en train de mettre la 'reflexivité' à la base de l'intelligibilité, s'éloignant ainsi de Engels qui y a mis la matérialité, et se rapprochant singulièrement des Thomistes pour lesquelles l'intellect qui est une forme comprend les choses en fonction de leurs formes.

RÉFÉRENCES

1. Voici les principaux ouvrages développant ce thème: *Voprosy teorii poznanija i logiki* (Problèmes de la théorie de la connaissance et de la logique). (AN) Moskva. 1960. 342 str. (articles par I.D. Andreev, N. K. Vaxtomin, N.Z. Paramonov, V. F. Glagolev, Ju. G. Gajdukov et N. I. Kondakov).
Rozental', M.M.; *Principy dialektičeskoj logiki* (Principes de logique dialectique). Moskva. 1960. 478 str.
Kopnin P.V.; *Dialektika kak logika* (La dialectique comme logique). Kiev. 1961. 448 str.
Čerkesov, V.I.: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija.* (La dialectique matérialiste comme logique et théorie de la connaissance). Moskva. 1962. 476 str.
Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija (Dialectique et logique. Les lois de la pensée). Moskva. 1962. 334 str. (articles par B. M. Kedrov, P. V. Kopnin, P. V. Tavanec, N. V. Karabanov, V. A. Lektorskij et J. Élez).
Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija (Dialectique et logique. Les formes de la pensée). Moskva. 1962. 310 str. (articles par B. M. Kedrov, I. G. Gerasimov, L. P. Gokieli, D. P. Gorskij, A. A. Zinov'ev, É. V. Il'enkov). Mentionnons enfin deux volumes qui dépassant de loin tous les autres:
Alekseev, M. N.: *Dialektika form myšlenija* (La dialectique des formes de la pensée). Moskva. 1959.
Alekseev, M. N.: *Dialektičeskaja logika* (La logique dialectique). Moskva. 1960. 150 str.
2. Voir son article, *Protiv nenaučnoj i nedobrožosatel'noj kritiki* (Contre une critique non-scientifique et de mauvaise foi). *VF* 1956, 2, 218–224. A propos de la discussion concernant la logique, voir G. A. Wetter: *Le matérialisme dialectique*, Desclée-De Brouwer, 1962, p. 556–568 et J. M. Bocheński: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (Le matérialisme dialectique de la Russie Soviétique), Bern, 1960, SS. 66–68.

SIEGFRIED MÜLLER-MARKUS

V. P. BRANSKIJ: DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE BEDEUTUNG DES ANSCHAULICHKEITSPROBLEMS IN DER MODERNEN PHYSIK *

Branskij greift ein Grundproblem der Wissenschaftsphilosphie mit weit über den Titel hinausgehenden Überlegungen auf, indem er eine Kategorialanalyse im Hinblick auf die begrifflichen Grundlagen der modernen Physik versucht. Im Gegensatz zur älteren Philosophenschule erkennt er ohne Vorbehalt den irreversiblen gedanklichen Schritt gegenüber der klassischen Physik an; er bekennt sich in dieser Hinsicht ausdrücklich zu Heisenberg. Erkenntnistheoretisch vertritt er einen dem M. A. Markov'schen ähnlichen Standpunkt, der ja 1947 unter der orthodoxen Philosophen so heftige Reaktionen auslöste.

Branskij zeigt einleitend die Meilensteine der heutigen Physik zu einer immer wachsenden Unanschaulichkeit. Dabei versteht er unter 'anschaulich' zunächst mit Frank und March die Beschreibbarkeit mit hilfe von unmittelbaren Sinnesdaten bzw. sinnlichen Bildern, die aus unmittelbaren Sinnesdaten durch Verallgemeinerungen der Alltagserfahrung gebildet wurden. Die Entdeckung des Wirkungsquants *h* brachte erstmalig ein Element der Unanschaulichkeit dieser Art, dann folgten die weiteren Schritte: Aufhebung des Äthers als Träger von Lichtwellen, Relativität der Gleichzeitigkeit, metrische Struktur des Schwerefelds, Bohr-Modell (womit das Demokrit'sche Atom unanschaulicher wurde als die 'verborgenen Qualitäten' der Alchimisten), De Broglie'sche Wellen und ihre Wahrscheinlichkeits-Deutung, Unbestimmtheitsrelation. In der Quantenfeldtheorie verliert sogar der Begriff 'Kraftlinie' seinen Sinn, da u.U. Koordinate und Feldstärke nicht mehr gleichzeitig exakt bestimmbar sind; Teilchen mit einer von Null verschiedenen Ruhmasse sind nicht mehr Quellen des Felds, sondern Feldquanten; selbst Mineralien und Tiere sind nicht mehr aus festem Stoff gebaut, sondern Erscheinungsformen verschiedener Quantenfelder.[1] Die Relativitätstheorie (im folgenden RT) machte die Megawelt unanschaulich, die Quantenmechanik (im folgenden QM) die Mikrowelt. Beide Theorien weisen darin eine erstaunliche

* Die Originaltitel von Branskijs Buch lautet: *Filosofskoe značenie problemy nagljanost v sovremennoj fizike.* Izd. Len. Univ. 1962. 192 Str.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

Symmetrie auf; der Anschaulichkeitsverlust ist für die ganze moderne Physik kennzeichnend.

Wir haben es hier mit einem neuen Denkstil (Born) zu tun, der zum Gesetz des physikalischen Forschens wurde. Immer führten bestimmte Tatsachengruppen zum Bankerott anschaulicher Erklärungen. "Dies bringt uns auf den Gedanken, dass in der Natur der Dinge selbst etwas liegt, was die Möglichkeit ihrer anschaulichen Beschreibung ausschließt." [2] Dabei erklärt die Physiek heute das Anschauliche aus dem Unanschaulichen, da auch unsere irdische Welt Gegenstand der RT und QM ist: Das Anschauliche wird damit zur Erscheinungsform des Unanschaulichen. Der weitere Fortschritt der Physik ist an einen noch vollständigeren Verzicht auf Anschaulichkeit geknüpft und das Unanschaulichkeitsprinzip wird zum Prinzip der Erkenntnistheorie schlechthin.

Die erkenntnistheoretische Seite des Problems besteht in der Herstellung eines bestimmten sinnlichen Bildes des Gegenstandes. Es gibt indes auch eine ontologische Problematik, sie betrifft die innere und äußere Struktur, den inneren und äußeren Mechanismus des Gegenstandes, wobei unter "Struktur" z.B. die atomistische Struktur, Ätherwirbel, verborgene Qualitäten oder das stoffliche Modell verstanden werden. Erst der Diamat stellte ein attributives Modell der Materie auf(!). Branskij versteht darunter die dialektische Analyse der universalen Attribute (Momente) der Materie, ausgehend von den gegensätzlichen Momenten 'Wesen' und 'Erscheinung'.

Damit bietet sich eine neue Definition der Anschaulichkeit an: 'Ontologisch anschaulich' ist 'modellartig'. Das Modellartige bezieht sich dabei stets auf die Erscheinung, während alles mit dem Wesen Zusammenhängende nicht-modellartig, also unanschaulich ist. Alle Momente der Erscheinung sind etwas Einzelnes und somit auch die Struktur, alle Momente des Wesens allgemein. Die Erkenntnis der Erscheinung liefert die anschauliche Vorstellung, die des Wesens die Erklärung. Der Diamat steht damit im Gegensatz sowohl zum Idealismus, der die Welt als unanschaulich (nicht-modellierbar) bezeichnet[3], und zum metaphysischen Materialismus, der sie als modellierbar ansieht: Das materielle Objekt ist die dialektische Einheit beider Bestimmungen. Die Unfähigkeit zur Wesensvorstellung ist somit nicht erkenntnistheoretischer, sondern objektiver Art und absolut. Branskij bezeichnet sie als Unanschaulichkeit erster Art. Im Gegensatz dazu sind relativ im Sinne von aufhebbar die

Unanschaulichkeit zweiter und dritter Art: Störungen bei der Begriffsbildung bzw. bei der 'Wechselwirkung'[4] zwischen Begriffen und sinnlichen Bildern und Störungen in der Sinneswahrnehmung. Branskij gibt nun eine "dialektische" Analyse der Erscheinung, die sich an klassische Schemata anlehnt und nichts Neues bringt (Quantität-Qualität, Inhalt-Form, (worunter er "Struktur" versteht), Kontinuität-Diskretheit, Ding an sich – Ding für andere, Bewegung – Ruhe, Raum – Zeit. Dabei ist bemerkenswert, daß er "Ding an sich" und "für andere" als Momente des unveränderlichen Etwas und dieses wieder unter die Erscheinung subsumiert; unter "Ding an sich" versteht er z.B. den Täter, der aus Fingerabdrücken überführt wird(!).

Unter "Wesen" versteht Branskij die "Grundlage" (*osnovanie*) im Sinn von "Basis", z.B. den Kohlenstoff als Basis des Diamanten, andererseits aber auch die Fallbewegung schlechthin als Grundlage der verschiedenen Fallbewegungen. Das Wesen zerfällt seinerseits in Grundlage und Gesetz. Die Grundlage zerfällt wieder in das Allgemeine und Besondere. Der Sinn dieser Definitionen bleibt dem Leser dunkel, ja widersprüchig, wenn man etwa unter Wesen den hier und jetzt faktisch seienden Kohlenstoff und zugleich die Fallbewegung schlechthin als nur intentionales Objekt definiert. Meint Branskij aber den Kohlenstoff schlechthin (die Bedeutung des Symbols Co ohne Rücksicht auf die Faktizität), so verhält sich dieser zum faktischen Kohlenstoff im faktischen Diamanten wie das εἶδος zum sinnlichen Etwas, während das Verhältnis des faktischen Kohlenstoffs zum faktischen Diamanten das von ungeordneten Elementen zu einer geordneten Ganzheit darstellt.

Im Sinne der Modellierbarkeit durch die genannten Attribute ist also die Welt für Branskij anschaulich, wobei unter "Welt" das dialektische Modell des Objektes, d.h. die Welt im ontologischen Sinn verstanden sein soll. So genommen würde Branskij auf die Vorstellbarkeit des Objekts verzichten und nur eine kategoriale Modellierbarkeit fordern, m.a.W. "anschaulich" und "kategorial bestimmbar" würden synonym. Andererseits erklärt er aber das Wesen und seine "Momente" als absolut unanschaulich (nicht-modellierbar), womit alle Wesenskategorien (im Sinne Branskijs) in einen sowohl ontischen als erkenntnistheoretischen Gegensatz zu den Phänomenkategorien gestellt würden. Dieser Gegensatz wird aber nirgends herausgearbeitet, er könnte – wenn überhaupt – nur darin bestehen, daß etwa eine sogenannte Phänomenkategorie wie die

Struktur nur "diese Struktur dieses Benzolrings da" bedeutet, nicht aber die Struktur des Benzolrings schlechthin – eine Auffassung, die dem wissenschaftlichen Sprachgebrauch widerspricht, wo von "Struktur des Benzolrings" schlechthin im Sinne von "Benzolheit" gesprochen wird. Ja wenn kategoriale Modellierbarkeit mit Anschaulichkeit gleichgesetzt wird, dann sind auch Wesenskategorien anschaulich, weil auf andere Kategorien zurückführbar (analysierbar). Andererseits definiert Branskij das Wesen als "Substanz" und diese als sich selbst gründende Grundlage und als Gesetz; so hat nach der Kant-Laplace'schen Hypothese das Sonnensystem seinen Grund in sich selbst. Auch diese Definition ist dunkel; was Branskij wohl meint, ist ein eigenseiendes Etwas im Sinne Spinozas (auf den er sich ausdrücklich beruft) und eine immanente Ursächlichkeit (Spontaneität). Die letztere trifft aber – wenn überhaupt – gerade auf das einzelne *concretum* zu; im vorliegenden Fall ist das Sonnensystem durchaus modellierbar, und zwar nicht nur kategorial, sondern auch visuell.

Der eigentlich positive Teil des Buchs liegt nun im Aufweis der Variabilität der Materieattribute: Die Unanschaulichkeit der RT und QM betrifft nicht das Wesen ihrer Objekte, sondern das sinnliche Abbild der Erscheinungen, sie ist also nicht die Unanschaulichkeit erster Art (die für alle Wesensaussagen gilt).[5] Nun geben beide Theorien ein erschöpfendes und exaktes Bild der Erscheinungen, so daß auch Unanschaulichkeit 3 entfällt (Störung im sensuellen Bereich). So bleibt also nur Unanschaulichkeit 2, d.h. eine Störung in der "Wechselwirkung" von Begriffen mit sinnlichen Bildern (Paradoxien). Die hier auftretenden Paradoxen sind anders als in "gewöhnlichen" irdischen Fällen: Die Lichtbrechung wäre nur paradox, wenn man gerade Lichtbahnen als absolute Eigenschaft des Lichts ansähe. Die Brechung verlangt also keine Revision eines Materieattributs, wohl aber die Lichtablenkung in Schwerefeldern, denn hier werden die Attribute "Raum" und "Zeit" revidiert. Ebenso tangiert die optische Interferenz kein Materieattribut, wohl aber die Interferenz von Teilchen das Attribut "raumliche Veränderung". Die RT und QM liefern uns also Paradoxien im Quadrat.[6]

Solche Revisionen der Materieattribute gibt es nun viele: Während Bolzano den Zusammenhang von Unendlichkeit und Nicht-Abzählbarkeit nicht antasten wollte, sah Cantor darin einen rein empirischen Sachverhalt und postulierte die Unendlichkeit als im allgemeinen Fall ababzählbar, mit verschiedenen Mächtigkeiten von Mengen. Damit erweist

sich das Attribut "Unendlichkeit" als relativ-universal. Ebenso mußte die QM den Bahnbegriff aufgeben, während noch Schrödinger und De Broglie nicht mit den "alten ontologischen Axiomen" brechen konnten. Erst Heisenbergs scharfer Geist erkannte, daß die Bahn eine rein empirische Besonderheit des Attributs "Bewegung" ist. Seine Gedankenexperimente besitzen einen viel tieferen als nur technischen Sinn: "Sie stellen nichts anderes dar als die ontologische Mikroanalyse der Attributs 'Bewegung', die ihrer Natur nach völlig z.B. der Analyse der Gleichzeitigkeit durch Einstein analog ist."[7] Damit ist aber die Quantenstatistik nur formalmathematisch jener der klassischen Objekte ähnlich, dort ist sie die Folge des zufälligen Charakters der Bewegung, hier hat sie nichts mit dem Zufall zu tun, sondern ausschließlich mit der Bahnlosigkeit des Attributs "Bewegung". Wenn wir aus der Quantenstatistik auf die Bahnlosigkeit schließen, so wird ähnlich der camera obscura die wirkliche Beziehung zwischen Bahnlosigkeit und Statistik um gekehrt. Die QM lieferte somit den strengen Beweis, daß konkrete Besonderheiten des Attributs "Bewegung" wie Bahn und Kontinuität nur relativ-universal sind.

Auch die Spiegelsymmetrie ist nur ein empirisches Axiom über das Attribut "Qualität", nachdem die Nichterhaltung der Parität nachgewiesen wurde. Im Gegensatz zu Makroqualitäten ändern in schwachen Wechselwirkungen Mikroqualitäten bei der Inversion ihre physikalischen Eigenschaften: In der Mikrowelt kann man nicht "in den Spiegel sehen". Starke Wechselwirkungen führen ihrerseits zu einer "Änderung des universalen Inhalts der Kausalität; d.h. des ontologischen Axioms, daß ein Ereignis nur auf künftige, nicht aber vergangene Ereignisse wirkt (Kausalitätsprinzip der Quantenfeldtheorie). Bogoljubov lieferte 1956 den mathematischen Beweis, daß mit Hilfe dieses Prinzips die Dispersionsrelationen bewiesen werden können. Stimmen die Dispersionsrelationen aber nicht mit dem Experiment überein, so verliert das Kausalitätsprinzip (in der obigen Formulierung) für sehr kleine Raumzeit-Gebiete seinen Sinn. Aber selbst wenn dies nicht der Fall ist, kann es zum universalen Inhalt des Attributs "Kausalität" Axiome geben, die in der Mikrowelt ihren Sinn verlieren.

Alle diese Sachverhalte konvergieren im allgemeinen Prinzip der *Inhomogenität** des universalen Inhalts der Materieattribute, wie sie z.B.

* Besser würde Branskij wohl 'Variäbilität' sagen

von Locke völlig übersehen wurde. Wir sind also genötigt, die ontologische Mikroanalyse auf alle Materieattribute auszudehnen. Dabei können wir uns vom Absoluten ebensowenig wie vom Relativen befreien, wie die Invariantentheorie der RT oder die Tatsche zeigt, daß der Raum unabhängig von der Art seiner Krümmung immer eine Krümmung schlechthin besitzt. Das relativ und absolut Universale sind polare Momente eines Ganzen, die nur in der Abstraktion in reiner Form auftreten. Damit wird auch die Russell'sche Alternative aufgehoben (sind alle ontologischen Axiome empirischer Herkunft, dann ist wegen der Begrenztheit der Erfahrung absolutes Wissen unmöglich, ist aber absolutes Wissen möglich, dann sind nicht alle Axiome der Erfahrung entnommen), da jede Erfahrung uns sowohl Axiome über das Einzelne wie über das Allgemeine (für alle künftigen Erfahrungen) gibt.[8]

Vor Kant fragte kein Philosoph, ob die traditionellen Attribute die einzig möglichen seien, aber er gab sofort eine negative Antwort, ohne die Frage überhaupt genau zu formulieren. "Die Arten des Raums, der Zeit, Bewegung, Qualität, Quantität, Grundlage, Zufälligkeit usw. sind im ontologischen Sinn ebenso unerschöpflich wie das Atom und Elektron im naturwissenschaftlichen".[9] Mit dem Auftreten der QM muß daher der Philosoph entweder ihren physikalischen Inhalt leugnen oder das Vorhandensein einer ontologisch neuen Bewegungsart zugeben.

Branskijs eigentliches Interesse gilt aber der Natur der Erkenntnis schlechthin. Hier setzt er in Anlehnung an die Rolle des Geräts in der QM zwischen Objekt und Subjekt noch den vermittelnden Faktor "Erkenntnisbasis". Ihr jeweiliger Charakter erleichtert einerseits die Erkenntnis und erschwert sie andererseits, insofern sie eine bestimmte Klasse von Kennzeichnungen des Objekts ausfiltert. Damit kommt es zu einem Zentrismus der Erkenntnisbasis, der etwa für einen Tiefwasserfisch die Form des Aquazentrismus annimmt und – wäre er ein Philosoph – sich als "Urelement" des Thales äußerte. Die antike Philosophie brachte überhaupt einen sowohl räumlich-kosmischen als naturwissenschaftlichen *Geozentrismus*. Darunter versteht Branskij die implizite Ausfilterung aller nicht dem menschlichen Organismus zugänglichen Informationen der Außenwelt, so daß der Ausdruck nicht glücklich gewählt ist. Branskij spricht hier von einem "realen selektiven Subjektivismus", den er dem Eddington'schen und dem Operationalismus entgegenstellt. Er fordert nun angesichts des physikalischen und mathematischen Trends einen radikalen

Nicht-Geozentrismus, d.h. eine "Vieleigenschaftlichkeit" der Materiezustände [10] (*mnogokačestvennost'*), und dementsprechend eine Vielzahl von "Welten" unter dem Aspekt sowohl des Phänomens als des Wesens, d.h. der Gesetze, im astronomischen, physikalischen, chemischen, biologischen usw. Sinn. Dabei ist freilich die "Welt" nicht definiert, vor allem ist nicht ganz klar, ob Branskij darunter nur ein ideales Modell versteht oder echte bewußtseinstranszendente Seinsreiche. Er scheint das letztere zu meinen, wenn er von einer Pluralität der Welten im ontologischen Sinn innerhalb des Universums spricht, von einer Inhomogenität des allgemeinen Inhalts der Attribute, wobei er freilich die Möglichkeit ausschließt, daß materielle Seiende die bisher bekannten Attribute schlechthin durchbrechen und gänzlich neue Attribute aufweisen: Damit, so meint Branskij, würde die Welt vergeistigt. Wenn man aber schon eine Pluralität der Merkmale von Attributen zugibt, so wäre es nur ein weiterer Schritt, auf bestimmten Seinsstufen das Verschwinden bestimmter Attribute, z.B. der Raumzeitlichkeit, und das Einsetzen neuer Attribute, z.B. der Personhaftigkeit anzunehmen. Davon ist Branskij noch weit entfernt. Dabei versteht sich von selbst, daß er alle pluralistisch aufgefaßten Merkmale der universalen Attribute nur auf die Materie bezieht.

Branskij läßt dabei die Möglichkeit einer apriorisch (gemeint ist axiomatisch) aufgebauten nicht-geozentrischen Welt zu. So kann sich der Raum z.B. als mehr als 3-dimensional herausstellen, die Zeit als umkehrbar (Wiegner und Schwinger für die Quantenfeldtheorie, Gödel für die Kosmologie). Freilich würden wir uns auch dann nicht von der Räumlichkeit der Welt schlechthin befreien, anderenfalls nur ein leerer Klang überbleibe. Den Reichtum der ontologisch verschiedenen Welten vermag jedoch nicht die Philosophie sondern nur die Einzelwissenschaft aufzuhellen, darin besteht gerade die Leistung der RT und QM. Dennoch besteht gemäß dem Korrespondenzprinzip zwischen den ontologisch verschiedenen ("disharmonischen") Welten ein Zusammenhang, zo daß weder der Platonismus noch die Monadologie oder der Agnostizismus daraus ableitbar sind. Die ontologische Pluralität setzt vielmehr einen materialistischen Monismus voraus. (Für diese gewagte These bringt Branskij leider keine weitere Begründung). Im weiteren untersucht Branskij damit zusammenhängende Erkenntnisprobleme und gelangt zum Ergebnis: Klassische und moderne Physik enthalten sowohl Elemente der Anschaulichkeit als auch der Unanschaulichkeit, ihr wirklicher

Unterschied liegt im Verlassen des ontologischen Geozentrismus. Dieses Los betrifft alle Naturwissenschaften, ihr Fortschritt ist gerade an diesen Verzicht gebunden. Ein Anschaulichkeitsproblem als solches gibt es nicht; dennoch ist es kein Pseudoproblem, sondern stellt eine irrationale psychologische Form dar, unter der ein völlig anderes Problem zutage tritt, nämlich die Analyse des allgemeinen Inhalts der Materieattribute.

Branskijs Buch ist ein Index für das Bemühen der jungen Philosophengeneration, die Probleme der Wissenschaftsphilosophie mutig anzupacken. Leider vermag er sich dabei, ähnlich wie Sviderskij in seiner Analyse von Raum und Zeit[11], dem er offenbar nahesteht, nicht von traditionellen spekulativen Schematismen frei zu machen: Die Flucht nach vorne von Lenin zu Hegel verheißt für diese Art des Denkens nichts Gutes. Hier wäre eine gründliche methodisch-positive Besinnung von Nutzen. Erst nach Durchschreiten dieser Phase könnte dann die Metaphysik wieder zu Wort kommen, vor allem als eine auf die Physik orientierte Kategorialanalyse, zu der Branskij bisher nur einen wenig geglückten Anlauf nimmt. Diese Mängel werden indes durch Branskijs Konzeption vom 2. Erkenntnisfaktor und der Pluralität der ontologischen Modelle aufgewogen. Hier stellt das Buch einen echten Fortschritt im sowjetischen Denken dar.

Das eigentliche Problem präsentiert sich dem Berichterstatter wie folgt: Anschaulich im strengen Sinn des Wortes ist, was im Wahrnehmungsfeld des leiblichen Auges aufspannbar ist.[12] Anschaulich im erweiterten Sinn, d.h. anschaulich zu machen, ist jedes Seiende, das einem Anschaulichen im strengen Sinne zuzuordnen ist. So ist das ideale Dreieck anschaulich zu machen, obwohl es *per definitionem* nicht der Realwelt angehört. Das Ganze läßt sich kybernetisch formulieren: Wir haben ein Transformationssystem O (den menschlichen Organismus), ein Störungssystem S (die Außenwelt) und ein mit O gekoppeltes Reglersystem A (das Auge). A vermittelt die von S kommenden inputs an O, das sie zu den visuellen Wahrnehmungen im Bewußtsein als outputs transformiert. A wirkt dabei als restriktiver Kanal, da es aus der Varietät der möglichen Informationen nur einen beschränkten Datenbereich aussondert. Das Auge wirkt also sowohl als Empfänger wie als Filter. Ein zweites Transformationssystem G (der individuelle menschliche Geist) wandelt nun ebenfalls mit Hilfe eines hier nicht näher erläuterten Reglersystems unanschauliche Gegenstände in die outputs des Systems $O + G$ um. Der Operator, welcher diese Transformation bewirkt, heiße Verräumlichung[13]; er ist ein Sonderfall

des allgemeineren Operators "Zuordnung". Die Operanda von *G* können sowohl ideal-Seiende, z.B. Zahlen und Begriffe, als auch outputs von *O* sein, die durch andere Reglersysteme als *A* erzielt wurden, z.B. Tastempfindungen, oder das Zeitgefühl. Nun stellt sich bei Tests mit willkürlich gewählten Operanda von *G* heraus, daß nur eine beschränkte Zahl in die outputs von $O + G$ umzuwandeln ist, d.h. nicht alle Seiende sind anschaulich zu machen. Es ist a *priori* nicht ausgemacht, ob ein *A* analoges informationsrestriktives Reglersystem in *G* diese Einschränkung vornimmt oder ob ein außermenschliches Reglersystem die anschaulich zu machenden Operanda bereits aussondert, bevor sie überhaupt zu Operanda von *G* werden, m.a.W. ob die Unanschaulichkeit der modernen Physik durch die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes oder der physischen Wirklichkeit begründet ist. Das Problem ist also, ob für alle Seiende, reale wie ideale, unabhängig von der Verräumlichung durch den menschlichen Geist, Geometrisierbarkeit, d.h. Lokalisierbarkeit in einem räumlichen Ordnungsschema, auszusagen ist oder ob sich eine Klasse von Seienden dieser Geometrisierbarkeit dank ihrer eigenen Natur entzieht. Sollte letzteres für physisch Seiende der Fall sein, so wäre ein Materialismus nicht mehr zu halten, in dem die Materie als das mit der "Daseinsform" Raum Ausgestattete definiert wird.

Die von Branskij angeführten Beispiele können dabei nur zum Teil den Nachweis für den Anschaulichkeitsverlust in der Physik bringen: Die Aufgabe des Äthers als Träger der Lichtwellen hindert nicht deren Darstelbarkeit in Kurvenscharen; was dabei verloren geht, ist nur die Abbildbarkeit von elektromagnetischen Wellen auf das Kategorienpaar (den zweikomponentigen Vektor) Substrat und Accidens, d.h. die bisherige ontologische Modellierbarkeit. Aber selbst dieser Verlust wird durch die Photonennatur des Lichts wettgemacht, durch die wieder die Abbildbarkeit auf die Kategorie "Substrat" möglich wird. Nicht möglich ist hingegen die geometrische Darstellung des Lichts als eines Ganzen aus den komplementären Aspekten "Welle" und "Photon". Hier zwingt die Natur des Raums zur Alternative: "Welle' oder (im Sinne der Ausschließung) "Bahn". Wohl kann jeder Aspekt für sich verräumlicht werden, nicht aber der Begriff "Licht", wenn wir ihm beide Aspekte zugleich zuschreiben.

Was andererseits die von Branskij angeführte Raumkrümmung betrifft, so ist sie auf die geometrische Operation der Parallelverschiebung

eines Vektors mit Winkel zur Ausgangslage bei Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt abzubilden, ist also anschaulich zu machen. Nicht nur dies: Die Verschiebung der Sternkonfigurationen bei Sonnenfinsternissen (Lichtablenkung) macht die Raumkrümmung sogar im strengen Sinne anschaulich. Fraglich ist hingegen, ob im Riemann'schen Fall die $G\mu r$ anschaulich zu machen sind.

Man muß sich also hüten, von einem Trend zur Unanschaulichkeit schlechthin bei der Physik zu sprechen; gerade die Relativitätstheorie mit ihrem geometrisierenden Verfahren brachte einen Gewinn an Anschaulichkeit, während das Komplementaritätsprinzip mit einem Verlust an solcher operiert.

Was nun die Branskij'sche These von der Pluralität der relativ-universalen Inhalte der Materieattribute betrifft, so ist folgendes zu unterscheiden: Soweit die Kategorienmodelle der Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft empirischer Herkunft sind, unterliegen sie der Selektierung (Filterung) von Informationen aus der Wirklichkeit durch die spezifisch menschlichen Sinnesorgane und der Umformung (Verschlüsselung) durch das System der menschlichen Informationskanäle. Dies hat nichts mit einem Geozentrismus zu tun, sondern ist die Folge der durch den Menschen in sich selbst vorgefundenen Struktur der Datenaufnahme- und Verarbeitung. Relativitätstheoretisch: Der Einzelmensch mit seiner ihm schicksalhaft zugeteilten Struktur ist das notwendige Bezugssystem all seiner Informationen über die Wirklichkeit, dem er durch keine physische Manipulation entrinnen kann. Das gesamte Erfahrungsmaterial ist durch dieses Bezugssystem, dieses – metaphysisch gesprochen – "Schicksalssystem", vorgeformt. Dies ist der exakte Sinn der Branskij'schen "Erkenntnisbasis"; sie stelt ein eigenartiges Pendent zum Kant'schen Apriori dar und enthüllt sich in ihren physikalischen Konsequenzen erst in der QM mit dem von Bohr unablässig betonten Zwang der Übersetzung von Mikrowirkungen in die dem Menschen zugewiesene Sprache. Ich finde für diesen Sachverhalt keinen besseren Ausdruck als "menschlich-existentiale Relativität".

Nun weist Branskij zu Recht darauf hin, daß wir sie durch gedankliche Operationen durchbrechen können. Das beste Beispiel bietet uns die RT: Können wir auch nicht zugleich Erdbeobachter und Kosmonaut spielen, so vermögen wir dennoch mit Hilfe der Lorentz-Gruppe jeden beliebigen inertialen Standpunkt rechnerisch-operationell, wenn auch

nicht physisch-operationell einzunehmen, indem wir die realmöglichen Meßwerte in K' errechnen, wenn sie in K bekannt sind. Ebenso wie dabei räumliche und zeitliche Ausmessungen aus "Bezugs-Konstanten" (Invarianten) zu "Bezugs-Variabeln" (relativ) werden, so können wir versuchsweise die Konstanten eines ontologischen Modells, d.h. die Prädikate von Kategorien, variabel machen und jeweils empirisch gewonnene Werte einsetzen.

Dies ist in der Tat ein fundamentaler Schritt und führt zu weitreichenden Konsequenzen nicht nur für die Denkmethoden der Physik, sondern auch für Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Mit Dyson F. I.: 'Field Theory'. *Scientific American* 1953, Vol. 188, Nr. 4.
2. Branskij V. P.: *Filosofskoe značenie problemy nagljadnosti v sovremennoj fizike*, S. 14.
3. Dies ist natürlich falsch: Wenn "anschaulich" gleich "kategorial modellierbar" bedeuten soll, dann sind die "Metaphysik" von Aristoteles und Hegels "Logik" *die* Theorie der Anschaulichkeit schlechthin.
4. Branskij meint wohl "Kombination", denn eine Wechselwirkung liegt nur zwischen agierenden Wesenheiten vor.
5. Es wäre interessant zu erfahren, ob Branskij der Physik überhaupt eidetischen Charakter zubilligt, dann würde ihr Unanschaulichkeit wesensmäßig zukommen.
6. Die exakte Formulierung dieser "Unanschaulichkeit" wäre demnach "Ersetzung des konstanten Prädikats P eines Attributs A durch die Variable π". Im vorliegenden Fall ist die Raumzeit das Argument A, "metrisch geordnet", die Variable π. π kann dann u. a. die Werte π_g (= galileisch) und π_r (= riemannisch) annehmen.
7. Branskij, S 140.
8. Branskij will also einen apodiktischen Charakter von Erfahrungssätzen aus ihren Invarianten ableiten, übersieht jedoch, daß wir auf den Charakter eines Merkmals als Invariante aus der Erfahrung immer nur mit Wahrscheinlichkeit schließen können. Branskij begeht hier eine *petitio principii*. So liefert uns das Michelson-Experiment keinen Beweis für die Invarianz der Lichtgeschwindigkeit, selbst wenn wir es beliebig oft reproduzieren, sondern erst das spezielle Relativitätsprinzip, das die Invarianz von c als optischen Sonderfall enthält (sofern man das Prinzip entsprechend formuliert). Hier zeigen sich die Mängel des Empirismus.
9. Branskij, S. 150.
10. Branskij entnimmt diesen Ausdruck V. I. Sviderskij: 'K probleme mnogokačestvennosti javlenij'. *Vestnik LGU*, 1958, Nr. 17.
11. Sviderskij V. I.: *Prostranstvo i vremja*. Moskau. 1958.
12. s. Müller-Markus in *SST* II, 1962, 289–300.
13. Dies ist das "Auge der Vernunft", von dem Branskij spricht.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

A VISIT

The following comments are based on a series of meetings in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Kharkov with a total of almost two dozen Soviet Professors, teachers and students, concerned primarily with ethics and esthetics. The meetings took place in May. Though these comments are personal generalizations they are presented here for their possible interest to others.

In all the Universities and Institutes which I visited I received a very warm and courteous reception. There was no apparent reluctance to meet and discuss philosophical questions with a Westerner, at least via an officially arranged meeting. There was however a reluctance on the part of most professors and teachers to discuss at length questions which had not been treated in the Soviet periodical literature. Buchholz' empty domains remained closed even when approached via a Marxist problematic. Though there were questions to which Soviet professors admitted they had no definite answers as yet, the impression I was generally given was that after the problem had been adequately discussed a correct Marxist-Leninist solution, with which all would agree, would be found. There was a general tendency to deny that any basic or serious differences existed among Soviet philosophers on any question; and I found no exception to the belief that the laws of social development had been found and were known with certainty by Marxist-Leninists. The differences I did observe among Soviet philosophers were based on differing interpretations of Marxism. At Leningrad I also found a certain pride in the fact that many of the professors were dealing with questions which were new in the Marxist tradition, especially with respect to the various branches of value theory. A somewhat surprising feature was a general consensus in all the cities I visited that only the literature of the past several years was worthwhile and that in general all the older Soviet philosophical literature was now uninteresting and no longer worth reading.

Ethics is now a required subject in the higher educational institutions. There are several different Programs for courses on 'The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Ethics' depending on the type of educational institution. Though basically similar they are not identical. Šiškin's book remains the

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

only official text, is generally used, and was generally praised. Utkin's *Očerki po marksistsko-leninskoj etike* enjoys a more mixed reputation and is considered to be simpler and more popular. Both books are available at almost all book stores and Utkin's was on sale even at a number of corner kiosks. Though students of ethics are required to read certain sections of the classics, the *Xrestomatija* seems to have produced a mixed reaction among teachers and there is reluctance on the part of some to either use or recommend it. The increasing emphasis on ethics, evident from the increasing amount of literature in the field, seems parallelled by an increasing emphasis on morality, evident in the widespread dissemination and propagation of the 'Moral Code of the Builders of Communism'. One finds this on posters in the Moscow underpasses, it is discussed in the newspapers, and it was even emblazoned in gold letters on a red banner hanging in the lobby of a Kharkov hotel. From a check of the Moscow Lenin State Library catalogue the following addenda can be made to the 'Bibliography of Soviet Ethics' (*SST* III, 83-103):

ALEKSANDROV, A. C.: *O moral'nom oblike sovetskogo čeloveka* (On the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Man). Moskva, 1948. 116 str.

Formirovanie moral'nogo oblika sovetskogo rabočego. (The Formation of the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Worker). Profizdat, 1961. 112 str.

Marksizm i étika (Marxism and Ethics). Ss. pod red. Ja. S. Rozanova. Izd. 2-e, znač. dop. Kiev, 1925. 442 str.

O moral'nom oblike sovetskogo molodogo čeloveka. (On the Moral Make-up of the Soviet Young Man). Stenogrammy besed po radio. Leningrad, 1949. 138 str.

ŠAXNAZAROV, G. X. *Kommunizm i svoboda ličnosti* (Communism and the Freedom of the Person). M., "Molodaja gvardija", 1960. *R.D.G.*

ETHICS

The situation in the field of Marxist-Leninist (Soviet) ethics has not undergone any considerable improvement as the editorial, 'Za tvorčeskoe razvitie marksistsko-leninskoj étiki' (For the Creative Development of Marxist-Leninist Ethics) in *VF* 1963, 2, demonstrates. Here are some extracts from the *VF* editors' account: "The past few years have witnessed a significant rise of interest in the study of the theoretical problems of Communist morality and the first advances in this domain. A great role in

the organisation of investigatory work was played by meetings and conferences where important problems of the ethical development of Soviet society in the era of accelerated construction of Communism were discussed. In less than three years such meetings have taken place in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Saratov and other cities of our country. They permitted the activation of scientific forces and the solution of some disputed ethical questions but, above all, revived scientific investigatory work in this portion of Soviet philosophic science. ...

"A sector of ethics has been founded in the Institute of Philosophy of the AN SSSR; this has already yielded certain results in the organisation of scientific investigatory work and in the preparation of cadres for ethics. Sectors of ethics and esthetics have also been founded in some of the academies of sciences of the union republics. Revival of scientific work has made possible the opening of a contest for the composition of a popular textbook on the bases of Communist morality.

"But, taking into consideration the current state of elaboration of the theoretical problems of Communist morality, it must be admitted that our ethical science still owes a lot to the people and is lagging behind in reference to the tasks attributed to it by the Twenty-Second Party Congress and by the Party Program. Even now there are few books which elaborate the vitally important questions of ethics. The articles on ethical themes, published yearly in central theoretical and philosophical journals, can literally be counted on the fingers of one hand. The last two years have seen a decrease in the number of articles on ethics. Only a small circle of authors are responsible for them.

"The theoretical level of many of these works leaves much to be desired. Among the most widespread errors one must mention here a certain separation from life, from the practice of ethical education; the study of the real and often quite contradictory processes of the establishment of the morality of the new man and of its laws is often replaced by general judgements, listing and commenting of isolated facts, and concentration on questions which are not always bound up with the pressing tasks of the Communist education of workers in the present. Some authors avoid speaking about the complexities and contradictions of our life and put wishes for reality, forgetting that only a correct and strict exposure of the mistakes we meet on the road to Communism can arouse the masses to fight them and the remnants of the past in the consciousness and behavi-

our of people. Many works on ethics are written in a commonplace, dry and unexpressive language; they present the prescribed truths and, therefore, leave the reader cold.

"One has the right to ask how this unsatisfactory situation in reference to the publication of articles and studies on Marxist-Leninist ethics came to be.

"In the past there have been quite a few scientific workers and teachers working on the theoretical questions of Communist morality. But they worked in isolation which lead to unnecessary duplication and allowed important ethical questions to remain unnoticed. This is one cause of the backwardness in ethics.

"Another cause are the serious mistakes in the preparation of cadres. Some facts.

"It is known that one of the indications of the preparedness of cadres in a branch of science is the number of candidate and doctoral dissertations presented. How is it in ethics? In the period 1959–1962 altogether 425 dissertations were presented for the degree of candidate of philosophy. Of them, only 11 (a little more than 2%) dealt with questions of ethics. If one adds the three candidate works done between 1956 and 1959, the picture becomes even more dismal.

"The preparation of more highly qualified personnel, people with doctorates, is also unsatisfactory. In the last five years only two doctoral dissertations were presented." (pp. 10–12) *H.F.*

SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM

The current situation of 'scientific atheism' is graphically portrayed in a passage from *Philosophic Problems of Atheism* (cf. the reviews section of this issue of *SST* on page 219): 'Unfortunately, among the great number of recent books, pamphlets and articles of an anti-religious character there is a predominance of popular works where the important questions of criticism of religious ideology are treated superficially – with slogans. As concerns serious scientific works criticizing religion, the majority deal with historical problems (the origin of religion, the origin of Christianity, the history of Catholicism, the history of the Papacy, criticism of the Bible, etc.). We lack solid monographic studies criticizing the ideology of contemporary Orthodoxy, Baptistry, Lutheranism, Islam, Judaism, and

other religions represented in our country. Thus, there are some few books on the Vatican but absolutely nothing on Catholicism in the Soviet Union. And these would be the most necessary." (p. 23). *H.F.*

A revised edition of *Principles of Scientific Atheism* (cf. the review in *SST* II, 247–248) has been published in 100000 copies (as was the first). Outside of a rearrangement of the contents of the first chapter, there are no significant changes. *T.B.*

HUNGARY

István Gyarmati and János Sándor contributed an article to the *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle* (Hungarian Review of Philosophy) 1963,1, on 'The Role of Axioms and Models in Physical Cognition'. They summarize the characteristics of the latest developments of the natural sciences, particularly of physics, in three points: 1. Scientific workers employing modern research methods can attain in a relatively short time to the cognition of diverse, and often surprising properties of matter and physical phenomena. 2. The concepts and theses of particular scientific disciplines become progressively more abstract, and gain always further validity within further branches of scientific inquiry. As a result, the content and validity of concepts and laws undergo modifications of a revolutionary kind. 3. Discovery of the manifold but organically correlated attributes of nature leads to the differentiation of specific scientific disciplines. These points apply to natural science in general, but are most clearly manifest with respect to physics. The authors analyze the role of axioms and models in the method of physics, by treating successively: the role of axioms in theory; experiment and theory; experiment-model-theory; theory of models and axiomatics; theory-model-practice; and constructive axiomatics. They summarize their own findings in eight points: 1. Scientific explanation is made easier by the application of exact physical models, and by the accuracy of axiomatization. 2. Validity and limitations of axiomatic model theory are easier to survey in the event of its purposive conscious application than otherwise. 3. Only such application of axiomatic model theory permits the comparison of two models of a given discipline at different stages of development, through exact quantitative methods and from uniform points of view. 4. Clarification of the deficiencies of existing models and their determining axiomatic systems stimulates

improvement of the model, of the system of axioms, and of the theory. 5. The axiomatic system determining the fundamental properties of axiomatic model theory is based on induction, and is immediately related to reality. 6. Axiomatic model theories are correct insofar as they reflect relations existing in the real world. This statement is valid for the system and for all theses deducible from it. 7. The model serves as an important intermediate stage between experience and theory, and theory and practice. The model permits understanding between experimental researchers, engineers, and theoretical researchers, providing firm bases for the latter to set up scientific theories. 8. Knowledge of physical model theories with axiomatic precision contributes significantly to the formation of correct dialectical materialist *Weltanschauung*. The authors are lecturers at the Faculty of Physical Chemistry at Budapest Technological University.

József Szigeti, the editor of the Hungarian Review of Philosophy, examined 'Problems of Philosophical Research' in the 1963-1-issue of that publication. Taking his clue from the directive of the CPSU's 22nd Congress for further development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Szigeti affirms the need for more than mere criticism of idealist views: a clear answer must be given to all questions raised by scientific and social progress in our age, and by the rapid development of socialist construction. Marxist-Leninist philosophy is anticipatory, capable of illuminating the dynamics of progress through the thorough analysis of facts. But this philosophy is not only a search for problems and solutions, but a system. It is an open system inasmuch as it makes use of revolutionary experience and of latest scientific findings. Yet it is an open *class* system since it eliminates everything that is irreconcileable with the interests of the working class. Szigeti notes the crisis of bourgeois philosophy, and the fact that even bourgeois philosophers acknowledge this. He cites the names of Bocheński, Stegmüller and Hans Freyer in support of his assertion.

The publication of the first volume of a work on esthetics by Georg Lukács has just been announced in Hungary. Lukács was imprisoned after the 1956 uprising, later released, but has neither been permitted to occupy a public post, nor to publish his writings. *E.L.*

SERGEJ LEONIDOVIČ RUBINŠTEJN

Sergej Leonidovič Rubinštejn is probably best known for his monumental work *Osnovy Obščej Psixologii*, first published in 1940 and which despite later criticism is perhaps the most complete presentation of contemporary Soviet psychology. The work of S. L. Rubinštejn is the most characteristic presentation of the new trend in Soviet psychology which began in 1930 as a reaction against the behaviourism and mechanism which dominated the Soviet psychology of the twenties. The concept of man in the psychologies of the twenties was that of a mechanism which reacted to external stimuli in such a way as to maintain a state of equilibrium between itself and its environment. Pavlov and Bexterev even went so far as to deny to psychology the status of an independent science holding that human behaviour could be fully explained in terms of two sciences – biology and sociology. Subjective concepts were considered suspect on the grounds of being 'idealist'.

In contrast the new direction taken by psychology after the philosophical controversies of the closing years of the nineteen twenties stressed the importance of subjective processes, and in particular of consciousness, and their irreducibility to the laws of physiology. The main lines of this new trend were laid down at the First All-Union Congress on Human Behaviour in January 1930, and reaffirmed by the decree 'On the Pedological Perversions in the Peoples Commissariat of Education, issued by the Central Committee of the Party on July 4th. 1936. Already in 1934 Rubinštejn published an article in *Sovetskaja Psixotexnika* entitled 'Problemy psixologii v truda K. Marksa' which was one of the earliest formulations of the new 'Marxist' trend in psychology. In this work he laid down the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity which was to be the governing principle in the psychologies of the thirties and forties. The fundamental ideas of this article were further elaborated in his *Osnovy Psixologii* which, in its turn, was the basis of his most important work *Osnovy Obščej Psixologii* for which he received the Stalin Prize. In these works Rubinštejn insists that the psychic, though in fact an epiphenomenon of matter, is nonetheless irreducible to the laws and concepts of physiology or biology. For Rubinštejn psychic phenomena, though they arise from the reflex activity of the brain, are 'new phenomena', qualitatively different from the corresponding physiological

phenomena and in fact constitute a new subject for investigation. This enables him to develop a psychology which is not merely a branch of physiology or biology but an independent science. In fact Rubinštejn so emphasises the qualitative distinction between psychic and physiological phenomena that in many places his concept of psychology is definitely Aristotelian.

His necrology in the *Voprosy Filosofii* (1960, 2) gives no information concerning Rubinštejn's early studies. The necrology merely states that he began his 'pedagogical activity' in Odessa in 1915. It is, therefore, interesting to note that Rubinštejn received his early training in Germany where he studied philosophy, mathematics and social science, first at the University of Freiburg (Summer semester 1909 and Winter semester 1909–1910) and then at Marburg where he studied under Hermann Cohen, founder of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, and his pupil Paul Natorp. On May 26, 1913 he presented a thesis to the philosophical faculty of Marburg University, entitled 'Eine Studie zur Problem der Methode. Absoluter und Dualistischer Rationalismus und die transcendentale Philosophie'.

A German translation by Peter G. Klemm of S. L. Rubinštejn's *Principy i puti razvitija psixologii* (AN SSSR, 1959) has just appeared under the title of *Prinzipien und Wege der Entwicklung der Psychologie.* It is published by the Akademie Verlag, Berlin and is the fourth of Rubinštein's works to be translated into German. The first to be translated was his *Osnovy Obščej Psixologii* which was translated by H. Hartmann and published in 1958 by the Volk und Wissen Volkseigener Verlag, Berlin, under the title of *Grundlagen der Allgemeinen Psychologie.* This was followed in 1961 by a translation of *O Myšlenii i putjax ego Issledovanija* (AN SSSR, 1958) also by P. G. Klemm and published under the title of *Das Denken und die Wege seiner Erforschung.* Rubinštejn's *Bytie i soznanie* also exists in German as *Sein und Bewußtsein.*

Robert Payne

REVIEWS

V. I. Sviderskij: *O dialektike élementov i struktury v ob"ektivnom mire i v poznanii* (Über die Dialektik der Elemente und der Struktur in der objektiven Welt und in der Erkenntnis). Moskva, Socékgiz. 1962. 275 str.

In jüngster Zeit haben einige sowjetische Philosophen intensiv daran gearbeitet, die in der modernen Wissenschaft entwickelten Vorstellungen von den Objekten als 'Systemen', die eine Gesamtheit von 'Elementen' in einer bestimmten 'Struktur' vereinigen, auch für die philosophische, besonders die ontologische Begriffsbildung fruchtbar zu machen. Bisher ist es in der sowjetischen Literatur üblich gewesen, sich einfach mit der Redeweise der Alltagssprache zu begnügen und von 'Dingen und Erscheinungen' mit ihren jeweiligen 'Eigenschaften' zu sprechen. Nicht wenige ontologische Erörterungen nahmen dadurch einen reichlich altertümlichen Charakter an. Um die neuen Objekt- und Strukturkategorien haben sich insbesondere folgende Autoren bemüht: O. S. Sel'kina (in: *Nekotorye filosofskie voprosy sovremennogo estestvoznanija*, Saratov, 1959), V.I. Sviderskij (*FN* 1960, 2), V.A. Lektorskij und V.N. Sadovskij (*VF* 1960, 8), I.S. Alekseev (*Vestnik MGU*, Ser. VIII, 1963, 2), N. F. Ovčinnikov (*VF* 1960, 6) und S. T. Meljuchin (*O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj prirody*, Moskva, 1960).

V. I. Sviderskij unternimmt mit seiner Buchmonographie den Versuch, die in der Philosophiegeschichte, in der zeitgenössischen sowjetischen und nichtsowjetischen Philosophie sowie in den positiven Wissenschaften vorliegenden Ansätze zu einer allgemeinen Strukturtheorie zu skizzieren, kritisch zu kommentieren und philosophisch zu verallgemeinern. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß die korrelativen Begriffe 'Elemente' und 'Struktur' den Rang universeller und fundamentaler philosophischer Kategorien beanspruchen dürfen und daß keine andere kategoriale Begriffsbildung. (etwa 'Inhalt' und 'Form') die gesonderte Analyse der Korrelationen zwischen Elementen und Strukturen überflüssig machen kann.

An seine früheren Arbeiten anknüpfend sucht Sviderskij im ersten Kapitel des Buches (S. 8–28) die Grundtatsachen des Vorhandenseins strukturierter Elementen-Komplexionen in der Welt aus der fundamentalen Charakteristik der Materie-Bewegung abzuleiten (wobei seine ausgeprägt 'prozessualistische' Konzeption zutage tritt). Die Strukturiertheit (*strukturnost'*) ist ein universelles Charakteristikum der realen Welt, weil die Bewegung nicht nur heterogene Zustände der Materie hervorbringt, sondern überdies auch ihre wechselseitigen Zusammenhänge bestimmt (S. 18). Unter Elementen hat man jegliche Erscheinungen oder *Prozesse* zu verstehen (S. 10) und die Korrelation von Elementen und Strukturen ist eine Korrelation von beharrenden und einander ablösenden *Prozessen* (S. 11); es gibt dabei wohl einen Typenunterschied zwischen 'statischen' und 'dynamischen' Elementen, dieser ist indessen relativ. (S. 14–15) Auffällig – und höchst problematisch – ist hier das Bestreben, die

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

Strukturiertheit nicht einfach als ein irreduzibles Urphänomen hinzunehmen, sondern es aus einem vorgeordneten kategorialen Prinzip der Bewegung und ihren universellen Eigenschaften (Materialität, Absolutheit, Relativität und Widersprüchlichkeit) abzuleiten (Vgl. auch S. 137). Die Bewegung ist materiell, d.h. letztlich stets Bewegung in und an einem materiellen Substrat; sie ist 'relativ', d.h. räumlich-zeitlich begrenzt (und ebenso folglich auch jede strukturelle Einheit – die Suche nach einer physikalischen Struktur der 'Welt im ganzen' ist daher prinzipiell sinnlos und unrechtmäßig (S. 141–142); und 'widersprüchlich' ist die Materie-Bewegung und sind alle Elemente-Struktur-Einheiten (wie Sviderskij in verschiedenen früheren Arbeiten ausgeführt hat) insofern, als sie durch eine Polarität von Konstanz und Variabilität konstituiert sind. Diese Widersprüchlichkeit manifestiert sich darin, daß eine Gesamtheit beharrender Elemente eine bestimmte Struktur bildet, daß diese Elemente als sich wandelnde jedoch eine andere Struktur schaffen (S. 19). Dieser Gedanke leitet über zu einer ersten Klassifikation der Elemente-Struktur-Einheiten: es gibt Strukturen als Korrelationen des Koexistierenden und als Korrelationen des Sukzessiven (oder extensive und intensive Strukturen), es gibt feste und unbeständige Strukturen, hauptsächliche und zweitrangige, fundamentale und abgeleitete, und in inhaltlicher Beziehung, physische, chemische, organische, gesellschaftliche, logische u.a. Hervorzuheben ist noch die These, daß den Elementen in gewissem Sinne ein Primat zukommt (wie Sviderskij gegen den 'Strukturalismus' von Smuts, Russell, Eddington, March u.a. geltend macht); von der Natur der Elemente hängt es ab, in welchen Strukturen sie sich anordnen (S. 19, 35–36, 128–129). Das strukturierte Ganze besitzt eine andere Qualität als die bloße Summe seiner Elemente (S. 46); doch nicht irgendein besonderer 'Ganzheitsfaktor', sondern die Vereinigung selbst ist es, die jenes qualitative Novum ins Spiel bringt (S. 45).

Im zweiten Kapitel (S. 29–81) erörtet Sviderskij, wie sich die philosophische Theorie der Elemente und Strukturen in das Lehrgebäude der materialistischen Dialektik einfügt, und zwar in einer zweifachen Weise: zum einen trägt diese Theorie zu einer Verdeutlichung zahlreicher traditioneller Positionen der Dialektik, zur Enthüllung ihres eigentlichen Sinnes bei; und zum anderen können die Gesetzesformeln der Dialektik die Beziehungen zwischen Elementen und Strukturen verständlich machen.

Ganz im Vordergrund steht dabei die Frage, wie sich die projektierte Strukturtheorie zu den traditionellen Feststellungen über die Korrelation zwischen 'Inhalt' und 'Form' verhält (S. 29–50). Es besteht hier eine weitgehende, aber keine vollständige Kongruenz, wie Sviderskij mehrmals betont (Ss. 6, 11–12, 29–30, 43–44). In einer ihrer Bedeutungsvarianten deckt sich die Inhalt-Form-Korrelation mit derjenigen von Elementen und Struktur – soweit nämlich der 'innere Inhalt' und die 'innere Form' in Betracht kommen; doch einige Nebenbedeutungen, welche die Kategorien Inhalt – Form in der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie besitzen, machen eine Identifikation unmöglich (so z.B. läßt sich die Gepflogenheit, den Staat in seinem Verhältnis

zur Ökonomie als 'Form' zu betrachten, nicht einfach in eine Elemente-struktur-Beziehung transponieren). Uns scheint, daß hier eine weitere Analyse geboten ist: möglicherweise entspringt die traditionelle 'Inhalt-Form'-Terminologie einem Stadium der unvollkommenen Analyse, ist also im Hinblick auf heutige Anforderungen veraltet und allenfalls für grobe Charakterisierungen brauchbar. Zum anderen scheint uns, daß der (aus einer vorwiegend sozialtheoretischen Orientierung stammende) starke *finale Akzent* der traditionellen Inhalt-Form-Lehre (die Form 'dient' dazu, die Entwicklung des Inhalts zu begünstigen) in einer *allgemein-ontologischen* Theorie radikal ausgeschaltet werden (und in eine regional-spezifische Theorie verwiesen werden) muß, was bei Sviderskij nicht geschieht.

Nach einer kürzeren Betrachtung der kategorialen Implikationen zwischen der Elemente-Struktur-Einheit und einigen anderen Begriffsbildungen (Wesen – Erscheinung, Notwendigheit – Zufall) demonstriert Sviderskij seine strukturtheoretische Interpretation der dialektischen Grundgesetze (S. 59–81). Wir wollen dazu nur allgemein bemerken, daß Sviderskij's Sicht auf diese Gesetze begreiflicherweise nicht genügend kritisch-distanziert ist, daß seine Überlegungen in manchen Punkten indessen sehr wohl dazu angetan sind, den 'rationellen Kern' dieses Lehrstücks sichtbar werden zu lassen; das gilt namentlich für das 'Gesetz des Umschlagens quantitativer in qualitative Veränderungen': hier geht es tatsächlich, wie Sviderskij sagt, um die Abhängigkeit von Veränderungen der Struktur von Veränderungen an den Elementen (S. 62). Interessant als ein neuer Versuch einer rationelleren Interpretation sind auch die Ausführungen zum 'Gesetz der Negation der Negation', das Sviderskij (ähnlich wie sein Leningrader Kollege M. F. Vorob'ev) einer Art 'Formalisierung' unterzieht (S. 69–80).

Das dritte Kapitel (82–149) ist der Darstellung der wesentlichsten Vorarbeiten zur philosophischen Elemente-Struktur-Theorie gewidmet. Aus der Philosophiegeschichte zieht Sviderskij die – naturgemäß terminologisch anders gefaßten – Überlegungen der Pythagoräer, Demokrats, Platons, Aristoteles', Bacons und Hegels heran, aus der zeitgenössischen 'bürgerlichen' Philosophie die von Smuts (S. 106–114), Russell (S. 115–129) und einiger 'physikalischer Idealisten' wie Eddington, March und Heisenberg (S. 130–142). Dann kommen einige Wortführer der Systemtheorie bzw. Strukturtheorie zur Sprache, deren Operationsbasis die verschiedenen Einzelwissenschaften sind, insbesondere L. v. Bertalanffy und die Teilnehmer der *Semaine de Synthèse*, die 1956 den Band *Notion de structure et structure de la connaissance* veröffentlicht haben (S. 142–149). Sviderskij hebt, bei allen Vorbehalten gegen die vorgeschlagenen Lösungen, die Legitimität und Fruchtbarkeit der Problemstellungen und zahlreicher Einzel-Theoreme hervor. Seine Kritik richtet sich vor allem gegen die Tendenz des 'Strukturalismus', gegen die Vernachlässigung der Elemente zugunsten einer abstraktiven und manchmal mystifizierenden Hervorhebung der Struktur, am nachdrücklichsten gegen den Versuch von Smuts (S. 112–113).

Wir möchten zu diesem Kapitel noch bemerken, daß man wohl auch den

Beitrag Nicolai Hartmanns zur philosophischen Theorie der Elemente und Strukturen ('Gefüge') als wesentlich anerkennen sollte; in seinem Werk über den *Aufbau der realen Welt* hat Hartmann diese Begriffe als ontologische Fundamentalkategorien präsentiert und in seiner *Philosophie der Natur* eine ziemlich ausführliche Exposition der Konzeption von den 'dynamischen Gefügen' geliefert.

Das umfangreiche vierte Kapitel (S. 150–268) zeigt an Hand zahlreicher Demonstrationsbeispiele, welchen zentralen Platz die Thematik der Elemente-Struktur-Beziehungen in der Begriffsbildung führender Einzelwissenschaften einnimmt: Mathematik, Physik, Biologie, Psychologie, Kybernetik und Sprachwissenschaft.

Eine Schlußbemerkung (S. 269–274) faßt den Gedankengang und die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung kurz zusammen.

Wer dem Verfasser darin zustimmt, daß die Ausarbeitung einer allgemeinen Theorie der Elemente und Strukturen zu einer der wichtigen Aufgaben der Wissenschaft des XX. Jahrhunderts geworden ist (S. 269), der wird das Buch Sviderskijs mit Interesse aufnehmen und bei der Lektüre an vielen Stellen das Bedürfnis empfinden, mit ihm in eine Diskussion einzutreten. Hier geht es nicht so sehr um summarische weltanschauliche Thesen und Antithesen, als vielmehr um die geduldige Kleinarbeit an den Details der ontologischen Begriffsbildung.

Eben in diesem Felde darf man produktive Entwicklungen erwarten.

Helmut Fleischer

A. X. Kasymžanov: *Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija* (po *Filosofskim tetradjam V. I. Lenina*) (The Problem of the Coincidence of Dialectic, Logic and Theory of Knowledge (on the Basis of Lenin's *Philosophic Notebooks*)). Alma-Ata, Izd. AN Kazaxskoj SSR. 1962. 198 str.

In several respects this book is typical of the almost imperceptible but continuous rise in the quality and pertinence of contemporary Soviet philosophic writing. Already in the Introduction (pp. 3–13) the author makes clear the various diverse interpretations which Soviet philosophers currently give to the *sovpadenie* in order to make his own position clear: his objectivity is all the more remarkable since one of these points of view (that of Bakradze) has already been condemned.

In the historical section of the book – chapters one through three – we find a solid analysis and presentation of the views of Kant and Hegel on logic, epistemology and psychology: the views of the 'classics' are here introduced more as guide-lines to analysis than as definitive pronouncements.

The systematic section (chapters four through nine) is less fortunate since the author is no more successful in reconciling the contradiction between Lenin's *sovpadenie* and the facts of scientific procedure than were his immediate Soviet predecessors (Rozental', Kopnin, *et al.*). However, the author's treatment of psychologism and anti-psychologism (Chapter VI) shows the same high quality of historical perspective and the same penetrating analysis as was evident in his presentation of the views of Kant and Hegel. In Chapter VIII we find the now traditional 'de-Stalinisation': according to Kasymžanov, the *kul't ličnosti* had four nefarious consequences for the *sovpadenie* question: (1) the *Philosophic Notebooks* were completely ignored; (2) the dialectic was impoverished by reduction to the 'four traits'; (3) the dialectic and epistemology were separated; (4) which all lead to the 'metaphysical' separation of thought and reality (pp. 178–179).

There are, however, two points on which it is necessary to take issue with the author. First, his presentation of the opinions of Soviet philosophers on *sovpadenie* seems somewhat over-simplified. He pretends that there are three main schools: the 'logicians' who hold that logic is independent of dialectic; the 'compromisers' who hold the *sovpadenie* to be a purely formal matter; the 'dialecticians' who hold for a 'unity of identity and difference' as the core of the *sovpadenie*. Now, the differences between Rozental', Kopnin and Alekseev (who are all put in the third group) are such that there should be at least a fourth group (Alekseev, etc.), or the whole principle of division should be changed to take into account the authors' views on the relationship of logic and dialectic, which is the real keystone of the *sovpadenie* question. In the second place, Kasymžanov plays much too lightly with the 'subjective' and 'objective' dialectics. Chapter VIII is devoted to this topic and it is the major confusion of the book. For instance, on page 163 the 'objective dialectic' is given four meanings: (1) it is the 'dialectic of things'; (2) it is the 'dialectic as reflected in thought';

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

(3) it is the theory of development; (4) it is a doctrine on the process of knowledge as a reflection of the dialectic. The next sentence says that the last three points are also a definition of the 'subjective dialectic'. The price paid here for *sovpadenie* seems rather exhorbitant.

T. J. Blakeley

Ju. P. Mixalenko: *Filosofija D. Juma – teoretičeskaja osnova anglijskogo pozitivizma XX veka* (The Philosophy of David Hume as the Theoretical Basis of English Positivism of the Twentieth Century). Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR. 1962. 150 str.

A. I. Korneeva: *Kritika neopozitivistskix vzgljadov na prirodu poznanija* (Critique of Neo-Positivist Views on the Nature of Knowledge). Moskva, Izd. VPŠ i AON. 1962. 226 str.

These books would not be worth mentioning in a review if they were not representative of the fact that not all domains of Soviet philosophy are benefiting from an increase in objectivity and a more extensive use of analysis. Among the most underdeveloped of philosophic disciplines we find the history of philosophy – especially as regards contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. It is true that the work of Narskij has given evidence of a steady amelioration of style and mode of presentation but the average contemporary Soviet book or article remains at the primitive level exemplified in these two books.

The earmark of this standard Soviet treatment of Anglo-American philosophy is the reduction of all of the diverse trends of this movement to 'positivism'. This 'positivism' is then reduced to the pseudo-Machian version which Lenin drew from Juškevič and the whole of the doctrine is further reduced to 'Berkeleyian subjective idealism'. The final stage – assassination through identification – consists in showing that Lenin's arguments against Juškevič, Mach, Berkeley, *et al.* retain their full force against contemporary proponents of any doctrines even remotely derived from these sources.

Mixalenko then devotes his 150 pages to showing that 'Humism' is assimilable to 'Berkeleyianism' and that the 'scepticism', 'agnosticism' and 'subjectivism' of Hume persist in the works of Russell, Ryle, Austin, etc. There are, however, some attempts at providing comic interludes to all this. For instance, logical positivism is almost indistinguishable from logical atomism (p. 50); and, Berkeley's 'subjective idealism' used some elements of 'objective idealism' by proving the existence of God (p. 32). The first confuses the history of philosophy; the second abandons a distinction for which Soviet philosophers have had to fight bitterly for some years.

There is little to distinguish Korneeva's book from that of Mixalenko except for the length. This is due to the fact that Korneeva quotes more from the *morituri:* among the most widely quoted and Leninistically 'refuted' are Russell,

Eddington, Frank, Ayer and Bridgeman. But, as to essentials, the procedure is the same: show how their doctrines are overt or covert varieties of 'Berkeleyianism' and 'refute' them with Lenin.

T. J. Blakeley

A. F. Begiašvili: *Metod analiza v sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (The Analytic Method in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Tbilisi, Izd. AN Gruzinskoj SSR. 1960. 198 str.

Although suffering from some of the hereditary defects of Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy, this book succeeds in presenting to the Soviet philosophic public a historically accurate and fairly objective version of the development of analysis as one of the earmarks of contemporary Anglo-American thought. The author makes it a point to let the Anglo-American philosophers talk for themselves. Whatever criticism Begiašvili has to offer is couched in a polite and philosophically relevant form. The reader appreciates, above all, the fact that the author does not feel it necessary to reduce all the diverse trends and various stages in the development of analysis to 'positivism' in order to club them with Lenin's arguments against Mach.

The first chapter, 'Analysis and Atomism' (pp. 7–55) treats of analysis in the context of the philosophic evolution of Russell. The second, 'Analysis and Mysticism' (pp. 56–71), deals briefly with Wittgenstein's basic views and their importance for analysis. In the third chapter, 'Analysis and Empirical Confirmation' (pp. 71–166), the author goes into great detail on logical positivism as one of the main forebears of analysis. The final chapter, 'Analysis in Pure Form' (pp. 167–198), goes into the goals and shortcomings of the analytic school properly so-called.

Among the hereditary defects of Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy to which we referred above the most obvious in this book is the inability of the dialectical-materialist to take a methodological point of view. Forever and always a given philosopher's reflections on method are tied into general philosophical tenets and judged on this basis. Such a prejudice can be particularly exasperating when the subject under discussion – like analysis – is almost completely of methodological significance.

Two further Marxist-Leninist failings are due to the Leninist heritage and the historicist bent of this doctrine. Lenin's insistence on always using 'materialism' to designate what most other philosophers call 'epistemological realism' has been retained in contemporary Soviet philosophy and its nefarious consequences are particularly evident in the treatment which the Soviets give to Anglo-American philosophy. Begiašvili, for example, insists that Russell and Moore are turning 'materialist' when they come to admit that sense-data have some non-sensual referent. The historicist bent of Marxism-Leninism makes even a philosophically well-balanced writer like Begiašvili turn violent when it

comes to a discussion of the sociological views (i.e. questions of historical materialism) of other philosophies.

T. J. Blakeley

Kritika religioznoj ideologii (Critique of Religious Ideology). Moskva, Izd. VPŠ i AON. 1961. 263 str.

Istorija i teorija ateizma, (History and Theory of Atheism). Moskva, Izd. "Vyssaja škola". 1962. 486 str.

Filosofskie problemy ateizma (Philosophic Problems of Atheism). Moskva, Izd. AN SSSR. 1963. 279 str.

Each of these books tries in its own way to demonstrate the inviability of religion and the necessity for the modern man to turn to 'scientific atheism'.

The first is another in the long series of naive, pseudo-scientific attacks on religion – this time on those still existing in the Soviet Union. It is a non-book made up of six articles of unequal interest. In the first article, 'The Time-Serving Tendency in the Ideology of Contemporary Orthodoxy in the USSR' (pp, 5–33), F. M. Priduvalov explains that religion has recently revived in the Soviet Union because of the Second World War: the wartime patriotism of the believers attracted many; and many have turned to religion because they do not know the true, Marxist-Leninist, explanation for the horrors of the war. The author concludes that atheistic propagandists have to take advantage of the contradiction in the position of the Orthodox Church which tries to remain religious while cooperating with an atheistic Soviet government. The second article, 'Critique of Contemporary Orthodox Morals' (pp. 34–69), is a smear by G. S. Simonov on various religious doctrines. L. P. Belov, in 'On the Peculiarities of the Religious Teaching of the Evangelical Christian-Baptists' (pp. 70–110), maintains that 'brotherhood in Christ' is anti-social because it distracts the attention of the workers from the even greater proletarian brotherhood. This is coupled with an attack on John Foster Dulles as a war-mongering representative of this sect. The case of the Soviet Catholics (mainly Latvian) is taken up by M. P. Mčedlov in 'On the Ideology and Tactics of Catholicism in the USSR' where the author compliments these Catholics on their fidelity to the Soviet Union but points out that, even though they don't follow the political and social line of the Pope, their Catholic ideology automatically puts them on the capitalist side. According to this author, devotion to Anthony of Padua and St. Joseph is on the increase. In 'On the Religious Ideology of the Contemporary Lutheran Church' (pp. 134–192) the author, K. A. Vimmsaare, concentrates his attention on Estonia and proceeds to correct a Lutheran pastor there who had said that Brigitte Bardot's suicide attempt was due to the godless society she lived in by pointing out that the correct version is that the society she lives in is

capitalist – one dogmatism against the other! The final article, 'On the Ideology of Contemporary Islam' (pp. 193–263), is T. Izimbetov's unoriginal remouthing of the standard accusations: that Islam is socially backward, anti-revolutionary, anti-scientific, etc.

All of these articles make a point – and this is something new – of recognizing the loyalty of religious believers to the Soviet regime. But, they all point out that efforts to adapt religion to the current social and political situation in the Soviet Union are vain since religion is *essentially* bad and must, therefore, disappear – especially since the successful launchings of the artificial satellites.

The second book is a more serious endeavor and will add significantly to Prof. I. D. Pancxava's reputation as the leading authority in scientific atheism. Under his direction some thirty-five members and collaborators of the Section of History and Theory of Atheism of the Philosophy Faculty of MGU have compiled a basic text-book presentation of all that the Soviet student has to know in order to pass his exams as an expert atheist. The introduction – as is to be expected in a good text-book – defines the terms involved (pp. 3–14). The first section is devoted to a brief, Marxist-Leninist history of religion (pp. 15–78). The second is a detailed history of pre-Marxian atheism (pp. 79–265) and offers a brilliant example of Soviet 'tailoring' of the history of philosophy. In the third section 'Marxist-Leninist Atheism" is presented in detail (pp. 266–374). The last section (pp. 375–482) deals with contemporary manifestations of religion and the atheist's answers to them. Innovations to be noted: Ancestor-worship is included among the primitive forms of religion: a whole chapter (pp. 422–429) is devoted to condemnation of missionary activities in the colonies.

The third work is a collection of disparate themes put together by I. P. Camerjan under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy and carrying on page 3 – of all things! – an editorial disclaimer according to which the views of the authors are not necessarily those of the publishers. Of course, the publishers hasten to add that the freedom to use a disclaimer is formalized in the resolutions of the last Party Congress! The articles are written by: I. P. Camerjan, L. N. Velikovič, Ju. A. Levada, N. I. Gubanov, G. A. Gabinskij, A. N. Anisimov, A. D. Suxov, and G. L. Andreev; there are 'notes and comments' by: A. B. Čertkov (advertised as an Orthodox ex-priest), É. Ja. Batalov, I. S. Šern-Borisova, Ju. G. Petraš, and T. S. Lapina. Camerjan opens with a listing and description of the tasks to be carried through in the furtherance of the war against religion and for atheism (p. 8 f.). Among the themes treated by the other authors we find: how missionaries aided colonialism and are now aiding neo-colonialism; the inferiority of 'bourgois sociology of religion' to Marxist-Leninist atheism; the anti-humanistic character of Christianity (with a list of Communist 'loves' which are superior to Christian loves, p. 118f.); the futility of Christian apologetics' answers to atheist propaganda; the Esquimeaux as living proof of Marxism-Leninism's theory on the origin of religion; the distinctions between animatism, animism, fetishism, totemism and magic; the atheism of the revolutionary-democrats; the superficial adaptation of Orthodoxy to life in the

Soviet Union; Zen Buddhism as bourgeois ersatz for an East-West philosophic synthesis; the aid of religion to apartheid; the remnants of pre-Islamic religion in Georgian place-names (this is philosophic?); the weakness of the atheism of contemporary English rationalism.

Leaving the two non-books aside, the newest work of Pancxava confirms the impression that the improvements in style in the presentation of scientific atheism are the harbingers of coming ameliorations in the type of argument used. Now would be the time for Professor Pancxava to turn to a serious philosophic treatment of some of the more important philosophic-religious questions which his *sborniki* have only touched upon.

T. J. Blakeley

BIOGRAPHY

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS I

The following biographical index has been compiled in the hope that it may supply to those interested in Soviet philosophy a fuller framework of reference when dealing with their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Given the unfortunate lack of personal contact and information available, and of biographical references in Soviet publications, most of the information has had to be culled from one major source – the *Filosofskaja Énciklopedija*, Volumes 1 and 2. Although *Voprosy Filosofii* and *Filosofskie Nauki* have yielded additional material, the present text conforms to the scope of *FE:* names covered by the first eleven letters of the Russian alphabet (A-K). As subsequent volumes of *FE* appear and as further information from other sources in collated, a second part will be added to this index.

The itemization for each entry is as follows: name; date of birth ('new calendar' dates given in parentheses); year of admission to the KPSS; place(s) of studies and year(s) of graduation; years of doctorate and professorate; teaching positions and other activities; special awards or other data; area of work, research or specialization in the subject. Following immediately in parentheses are the reference sources. At the very end, under '*Works:*' are the sources for his publications; the reference numbers are those of the *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie*, published in four volumes by our Institute. For the sake of reading ease, strict grammatical transliteration from the Russian has not been followed in all the abbreviations of names of institutes and universities, and certain of them have been translated.

In addition to the abbreviations listed on the inside back cover, the following also appear in the text:

b.	born	In-t	Institute
Corr.	Corresponding	KGU	Kievskij Gosudarstvennyj Universitet
Dr.	Doctor, doctorate		
Fac.	Faculty	Med.	Medicine, medical
FE	*Filosofskaja Énciklopedija*	Pg	Pedagogy, pedagogical
FN	*Filosofskie Nauki*	Phil.	Philosophy, philosophical
G	Gosudarstvennyj		
Grad.	Graduated	Prof.	Professor, professorate
		Russ.	Russia, Russian
Hist.	History, historical	Sc.	Science
		V	Vestnik

ALEKSANDROV, Aleksander Danielovič. b. 22/7 (4/8), 1912. KPSS 1951. Grad. LGU 1933. Prof. LGU 1944. Rector LGU 1952. Corr. member AN 1946. Editorial staff *VF* 1955–1959. Stalin Prize 1942. Mathematical scientist, also working in philosophical questions of natural science; basic work in geometry;

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

has also worked in theoretical physics in the light of dialectics; reviewed relativity theory from idea of unity of spatial-temporal cause-effect structure of world. (*FE*, I, 43; *VF* 1951, 3, 152; 1952, 1, 212–213; 1955, 5; *V LGU* 1959, 5, 139).

Works: 7 (1, 2); 1508; 2193; 3016 (1, 2); 5027 (1–6); see also *FE*, I, 43.

ALEKSANDROV, Georgij Fedorovič. b. 25/3 (7/4), 1908. KPSS 1928. Grad. Moscow In-t of Hist. and Phil. 1932. Prof. 1936. AN 1946; director IF 1947–1954. Working since 1955 in IF AN Belorussian SSR. Stalin Prize 1943, 1947. His *History of Western European Philosophy* was the basis of the philosophical discussion of CK KPSS in 1947. (*FE*, I, 43; *VF* 1947, 1, 66, 163, 245, 288–300; 1950, 1, 387; 1950, 2, 350–359; 390; 1951, 1, 246; 1952, 1, 215; 1953; 6, 230; 1953, 4, 232–936).

Works: 9 (1–19); 150; 175; 245; 314; 335 (1); 388; 487 (2); 600; 796; 802 (1–3), 1321; 3017 (1, 2); 3018; 5029 (1–13); 5050 (1); 7120.

ALEKSANJAN, Tigran Aleksanovič. b. 6 (18)/4, 1906. KPSS 1930. Grad. Phil. Fac. Moscow In-t of Hist. and Phil. 1934. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1954. Chair of Phil. and Political Economy, Erevan Med. In-t 1959. Works in criticism of contemporary bourgeois sociology and on problems of Histomat and hist. of phil. (*FE*, I, 43; *VF* 1947, 1, 301).

Works: 5033; see also *FE*, I, 44.

ALEKSEEV, Mitrofan Nikolaevič. b. 25/7 (7/8), 1915. KPSS 1949. Grad. Phil. Fac. MGU 1947. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1958. Heads Logic Fac. MGU 1958. Prof. 1959. Principal works in logic. (*FE*, 1, 44; *FN* 1962, 3, 126)

Works: 11 (1–3); 3019 (1–3); 5037, (1–9); 5038 (1,2); see also *FE*, 1, 44).

ALTMYŠBAEV, Asylbek Altmyšbaevič. b. May, 1912. KPSS 1940. Grad. Kirgiz G. Pg In-t 1942. AN Kirgiz SSR, 1954; in charge of its sections of phil. and law since 1958. Works in hist. of phil., especially of Kirgiz peoples; in charge of research on development of socialist cultures and peoples. (*FE*, 1, 45):

Works: 5043; see also *FE*, 1, 45.

AMBARCUMJAN, Viktor Amazaspovič. b. 15 (18)/9, 1908. KPSS 1940. Grad. LGU 1928, Prof. LGU 1934–1947. Prof. Erevan U. 1947. AN 1953. Pres. AN Armenian SSR, 1947. Stalin Prize 1946, 1950. Member of several foreign societies. Works principally in theoretical astrophysics and astronomy; famous for research on origins and development of celestial bodies. (*FE*, 1, 47).

Works: 5046 (1–3); see also *FE*, 1, 47.

ANAN'EV, Boris Derasimovič. b. (14)/4, 1907. Grad. Gorskij Pg In-t 1928; Aspirant Leningrad In-t for Brain Research, 1930. Dr. Pg Sc. 1940. Prof. Phil. Fac. LGU 1944. Director of scientific research, Leningrad Pg In-t, 1951, Akademija Pedagogičeskix Nauk RSFSR 1955. Most of works devoted to research on sensation, transition from sense to intellectual knowledge, internal speech, pedagogy, psychology, psychopathology, and hist. of Russ. psychology. (*FE*, 1, 57–58).

Works: 1003; 1144; 3027; 3733; 5051 (1–10); see also *FE*, 1, 58.

ARŽANOV, Mixail Aleksandrovič. b. 1 (14)/4, 1902. KPSS 1924. Grad. In-t of Red Professors 1930. Dr. of Juridical Sc. 1938. Corr. member AN, 1939. Since 1939, heads teaching and research on theory of state and of law; since 1955, senior scientific collaborator. IF (*FE*, 1, 90; *VF* 1951, 3, 219–220).
Works: 3049; 5092; see also *FE*, 1, 90.

ASMUS, Valentin Fernandinovič. b. 18 (30)/12, 1894. Grad. Hist.-Phil. Fac. KGU, 1919. Prof. Phil. 1935. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1940. MGU 1939, Fac. of Hist. of Foreign Phil. Senior scientific collaborator in esthetics, In-t of World Literature. Stalin Prize 1943. Works in hist. of phil. (especially German idealism and Russ. phil.), and of logic, esthetics and literature. Collaborated in *History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, 1940. (*FE*, 1, 102).
Works: 21; 38 (1-3); 771; 806 (1, 2); 1009 (1–3); 1272 (2); 1529; 2176; 3052 (1–2); 3840; 5099 (1–11); 5100; 5101; 5722; 6328;

AXMANOV, Aleksandr Sergeevič. b. 7 (19)/8, 1893; d. 5/6, 1957. Studied phil. at MGU, 1911-16. Taught phil., esthetics and logic in institutes of higher education from 1919. Worked in hist. of logic, including analyses of principles and laws of formal logic, and problems of correlation of logical and linguistic categories. (*FE*, I, 118).
Works: 594; 801; 3009; 5012, (1–4); 5013; see also *FE*, I, 118.

BAKRADZE, Konstantin Spiridonovič. b. 24/11, 1898. Grad. Phil. In-t Tbilisi GU, 1922. Teaching phil. since 1930, head of Logic Fac., Tbilisi GU 1940. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1959. Works in hist. of phil. (German classical idealism) and logic. Collaborated in Georgian texts on Diamat (1955) and Histomat (1957). (*FE*, I, 126; *VF* 1956, 3, 230; *VF* 1959, 2, 198).
Works: 11 (3); 49 (1–3); 807; 1011 (1, 2); 1535; 3063; 4260; see *FE*, I, 126.

BASKAKOV. Vasilij Georgievič, b. 7 (20)/2, 1914. KPSS 1943. Grad. Moscow G Pg In-t, 1939; Aspirant IF 1947; senior scientific collaborator IF 1952. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1956. Prof. 1958. Works in hist. of Russ. phil. and socio-political thought. Self-criticism *VF* 1950, 1, 399. (*FE*, 1, 132).
Works: 51 (1–4); 1014 (1, 2); 1050; 1141 (2); 3348; 5139 (1, 2); see *FE*, I, 132.

BASKIN, Mark Petrovič. b. 8 (20)/12, 1899. KPSS 1919. Grad. MGU 1919, Prof. 1930. Senior scientific collaborator IF 1944. Works in hist. of phil., esthetics, Western European sociology. (*FE*, I, 132; *VF* 1951, 1, 250; 1951, 4, 250; 1951, 6, 299; 1953, 4, 238; 1956, 5, 201; 1957, 2, 162).
Works: 52 (1–5); 53; 808; 1015 (1–3); 1086; 1182; 1183 (1); 1268 (2); 1538 (1, 2); 2097; 3070 (1–3); 3120 (1); 3574; 3585; 3752; 4005; 5140, (1–3); see also *FE*, I, 132.

BERESTNEV, Vladimir Fedorovič, b. 16 (29)/6, 1901. KPSS 1918. Grad. military academy 1924. Social Science Fac., and In-t of Red Professors 1931. Assistant director and instructor esthetics section of IF, periodically from 1939–1959. Prof. 1946. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1954. Research in Histomat, theory of culture, esthetics, and problems of Marxist education. Contributor to *Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii*, 1959. (*FE*, I, 149; *VF* 1950, 1, 389; 1956, 5, 220; 1957, 1, 216).

Works: 1508; 1554; 1555; 3368; 3737; 5175 (1–3); see also *FE*, 1, 149.

BERNADINER, Ber Moiseevič. b. 17 (30)/10, 1903. KPSS 1928. Grad. Phil. Fac. Moscow In-t of Hist. and Phil. 1932. Chair of Phil., Voronež U 1945. Prof. 1955. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1954. Works in hist. of phil. and Histomat. (*FE*, I, 151; *FN* 1959, 4, 185).

Works: 1556; 3488; 5179 (1, 2); see also *FE*, I, 151.

BLOXINCEV, Dimitri Ivanovič. b. 29/12, 1907 (11/1, 1908). KPSS 1943. Grad. MGU 1930. Physics In-t, AN 1935–50. Directed establishment of first atomic electricity station in USSR; since 1956, director, Joint Nuclear Research In-t. Corr. member AN 1958. Stalin Prize 1952. Lenin Prize 1957. Works on solid bodies, optics, acoustics, polar theory, quantum mechanics, atomic physics and techniques. Developed the position on the field structure of microparticles. Has also written on the theory of contemporary physics, Diamat, and against physical idealism. (*FE*, I, 174).

Works: 75 (1–3); 667 (3); 813; 3105; 5197 (1–5); see also *FE*, I, 174.

BOGOUTDINOV, Alautdin Maksimovič. b. 22/11 (5/12), 1911. KPSS 1941. Instructor in Phil. section, AN Tadžik SSR 1950; member, AN Tadžik SSR 1953. Prof. 1952. Chair of Phil., Tadžik U 1955. Specializes in hist. of Tadžik and medieval Arab phil. Contributor to *History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, 1957. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 1951, 1, 242. (*FE*, I, 179; *VF* 1951, 1, 242; 1955, 2, 229; *FN* 1959, 4, 171).

Works: 77 (1–3); 1719, 5207; see also *FE*, I, 179.

BUSLOV, Kazimir Pavlovič. b. 12 (25)/10, 1914. KPSS 1943. Grad. Smolensk Pg In-t 1938, and AON 1951. Director IF 1956. Teaching phil. Belorussian GU 1951. Works in Histomat, on questions of culture and humanism. (*FE*, I, 205).

Works: 4284; 5262 (1, 2); see also *FE*, I, 205.

BYXOVSKIJ, Bernard Emmanuilovič. b. 31/8 (12/9), 1898. KPSS 1920. Grad. Social Sciences Fac., Belorussian GU 1923. Prof. 1929. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1941. Chair of Phil. Moscow G. Economics Int. Stalin Prize 1944. Works in pedagogy and Diamat, hist. of western European phil. and contemporary foreign phil. (*FE*, I, 213–214; *FN* 58, 3, 170; 62, 4, 126).

Works: 102 (1–3); 1580 (1, 2); 1661; 1742; 3140; 5267 (1–4); see also *FE*, I, 214.

DEBORIN (Ioffe), Abram Moiseevič. b. 4 (16) 6, 1881. KPSS 1928. Grad. Phil. Fac. Bern U, 1908. Menshevik from 1907–1917. Editor-in-chief of *Under the Banner of Marxism* 1926–1930. AN 1929. Author of many books on hist. of phil. and Marxist phil. He was the central figure in the first important conflict in Soviet philosophy and receded into oblivion until the death of Stalin. (cf. I. M. Bochenski: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus*. Bern. 1960. pp. 39–40) Now occupied with research on hist. of socio-political thought and criticism of bourgeois ideology. (*FE*, I, 439; *VF* 1953, 6, 230; 1960, 6, 14).

Works: 144 (1–4); 4269; 5383 (1, 2); see also *FE*, I, 439.

DUDEL', Savva Pavlovič. b. 21/12, 1909 (3/1, 1910). KPSS 1939. Grad. Moscow Conservatory 1931, Moscow In-t of Hist., Phil. and Literature 1938. Chair Diahistomat All-Union Polytechnical Correspondence In-t 1956. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1959. Prof. 1960. Works on Diamat and dialectical development of Soviet society. (*FE*, II, 81–82; *FN* 1958, 1, 98; 1961, 4, 198).
Works: 157 (1–5); 1630 (1, 2); 5431 (1–3); see also *FE*, II, 82.

DUNAEVA, Ekaterina Andreevna. b. 22/11 (5/12), 1905. KPSS 1929. Grad. Moscow Academy of Communist Education 1931. Chair Marxism-Leninism, Moscow Heavy-Machinery In-t 1947–1961. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1961. Prof. Moscow Financial In-t 1961. Works mainly on nationality questions. (*FE*, II, 82).
Works: 3210; 5436 (1, 2); see also *FE*, II, 82.

DŽUNOSOV, Mackud Sadykovič. b. 18/21, 1919. KPSS 1943 Grad. Biology Fac., Kirgiz G Pg In-t 1940. Chair Phil., Kirgiz GU 1951. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1956. Prof. 1957. Works on nationality questions in Central Asian republics and on socialist revolution and construction of socialism in backward countries. (*FE*, I, 474; *FN* 1962, 6, 73)
Works: 3216; 3406; 4193; see also *FE*, I, 474.

EGOROV, Anatolij Grigor'evič. b. 25/10, 1920. KPSS 1944. Grad. Moscow G Pg In-t 1941. Aspirant IF 1951; corr. member AN 1962. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1961. Editor-in-chief *Political Self-Education* 1956–1961. Deputy chief of Agitprop CK KPSS for union republics, 1961. Elected member of Central Commission for revision of KPSS at XXII Congress KPSS. Works on esthetics, forms of social consciousness, base and superstructure, cultural matters. (*FE*, II, 102; *VF* 1951, 1, 241).
Works: 173 (1–3); 1640; 3220 (1, 2); 5451 (1–4); see also *FE*, II, 102.

ENEVIC, Fedor Fedorovič. b. 13 (26)/4, 1905, KPSS 1928. Grad. Hist. Fac. Moscow Pg In-t 1931, and Phil. Fac. Ukrainian Red Teachers In-t 1937. Dr. Phil Sc. 1952. Prof. 1952. Chair of Phil. Kiev Pg In-t 1958. Works in Diamat, hist. of Ukrainian phil., and socio-political thought. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 1951, 6, 214. (*FE*, II, 115; *VF* 1951, 6, 214)
Works: 5459; see also *FE*, II, 115.

GAGARIN, Aleksei Petrovič. b. 14 (26)/3, 1895; d. 6/9, 1960 (s.*SST* II, 327–330). KPSS 1918. Grad. In-t of Red Professors 1933. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1939. Prof. 1939. Dean Fac. MGU 1949–1953. Prof. MGU until 1959. Specialist in hist. of phil. and problems of atheism. (*FN* 1960, 4, 164; *VF* 1951, 3, 215).
Works: 215; 1092; 1290; 3321; 5539 (1–5).

GAK, Grigorij Moiseevič. b. 13 (25)/3, 1893. KPSS 1920. Grad. Psychoneurological In-t, Petrograd, 1917. Prof. 1943, AON Chair of Diahistomat, Humanities Fac., MGU. Editorial work on party theoretical journals. Works in Histomat, especially correlation of society and the individual. (*FE*, I, 317; *VF* 1947, 1, 19).
Works: 216 (1–3); 1674; 2186; 2187; 2201; 3275 (1, 2); 3276; 4143; 5544 (1–9); 5545; 5546; see also *FE*, I, 317.

GAPOČKA, Pavel Nikitič. b. 16 (29)/7, 1908. KPSS 1928. Grad. Moscow Pg In-t

1933, and In-t of Red Professors 1937. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1953. Prof. at AON 1953. Works in Histomat and theory of scientific communism. (*FE*, I, 322–323).
Works: 221; 1307; 1308; 4143; 5557 (1–3); see also *FE*, I, 323.

GEORGIEV, Filipp Ignat'evič. b. 3 (16)/7, 1904. Grad. In-t of Red Professors 1936; aspirant Moscow In-t Psychology 1936. Dr. Pg Sc. 1943. Prof. 1943. Editoral staff *FN* 1958. Prof. Diahistomat. Phil. Fac. MGU. Works in Diamat and phil. problems of natural science. (*FE*, I, 350; *VF* 1957, 2, 159; 1958, 1, 190; *FN* 1957, 2, 206; 1959, 1, 24; 1962, 5, 150).
Works: 229; 1658; 3287 (1, 2); 5578 (1–5); see also *FE*, I, 350.

GLEZERMAN, Grigorij Eruximovič. b. 31/12, 1906 (13/1, 1907). KPSS 1940. Grad. In-t of National Economics, 1930. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1950. Prof. 1951. Chair of Diahistomat, AON 1956. Stalin Prize 1951. Works in Histomat on class problems, base and superstructure of conditions for socialism, role of the masses and the person in hist., etc. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 1951, 6, 214. (*FE*, I, 374).
Works: 233 (1–6); 303 (10); 418; 832 (1, 2); 1207; 1316; 1585; 1692; 3298 (1–3); 5593 (1–12); see also *FE*, I, 374.

GOKIELI, Levan Petrovič. b. 7 (20)/12, 1901. Grad. Mathematical In-t, Tbilisi GU 1934. Dr. Physico-Mathematical Sc. 1935. Prof. 1936. Prof. Chair of Diahistomat, Tbilisi GU. Works in philosophical problems of mathematics and theory of logic, especially theory of deduction and critical investigation of contemporary logical theories. (*FE*, I, 378; VF 1956, 3, 230).
Works: 1504; 1691; 5601; see also *FE*, I, 378.

GOLOSOV, Viktor Fedotovič. b. 23/12, 1906 (5/1, 1907). KPSS 1925. Grad. Academy of Communist Education. 1930. Chair of Phil. and Political Economy, Krasnojarsk G Pg In-t 1951. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1955. Prof. 1955. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 1951, 6, 215. Works in hist. of 17–18th century phil. and on the phil. legacy of Lenin. (*FE*, I, 384; *VF* 1956, 6, 161; *FN* 1959, 2, 214).
Works: 240; 4102; 4277; 5604 (1–5); see also *FE*, I, 384.

GOROXOV, Fedor Aleksandrovič. b. 29/1 (10/2), 1902. Grad. Phil. Fac., In-t of Red Professors 1929. Director, IF of Communist Academy 1931. Party and Soviet work 1931-1938. Scientific collaborator AN 1938–1941. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1935. Prof. 1935. Works in Diahistomat. (*FE*, I, 391).
Works: 1697; see also *FE*, I, 391.

GRIGOR'JAN, Movses Manukovič. b. 6 (19)/3, 1905. KPSS 1926. Grad. In-t of Red Professors 1934. Collaborated in *History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, 2, Stalin Prize, 1944. Teaching phil., AON since 1948. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1958. Prof. 1958. Works on hist. of Western European phil. and of Russ. phil. (*FE*, I, 405).
Works: 253; 1039 (2); 1073; 3487; 5637 (1–5); see also *FE*, I, 405.

GUBANOV, Nikolaj Ivanovič. b. 18 (30)/6, 1899. KPSS 1927. Grad. Socio-Economic section, Pg Fac., MGU 1926; aspirant In-t of Scientific Phil., RANION (Russian Association of Scientific-Research Institutes of the Social Sciences) 1929. Senior collaborator IF 1954. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1957. Works on Histomat and scientific atheism. (*FE*, I, 411).

Works: 258; 1708; 3205; 3325; 5644 (1, 2); 5645; see also *FE*, I, 411.

GUSEJNOV, Geidar Nadžaf-ogly. b. 1908; d. 15/8, 1950. KPSS 1938. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1944. Prof. 1944. AN Azerbaidjan SSR 1945. Director In-t for Party History, CK KP Azerbaidjan. Chair of Phil., Azerbaidjan GU 1945–1950. Stalin Prize 1948. Worked on Histomat and Hist. of Azerbaidjan social and phil. thought. (*FE*, I, 420).

Works: 262; 1107 (1,2); 4281; see *FE*, I, 420.

IL'ICEV. Leonid Fedorovič. b. 2(15)/3, 1906. KPSS 1924. Grad. In-t of Red Professors 1937. Was Secretary-in-chief and editorial member of *Bolševik*; editor-in-chief of *Izvestija* 1944–1948, and of *Pravda* 1951–1952. Press chief and board member of MID SSSR 1953-58. Head of Agitprop CK KPSS for union republics since 1959. Elected Secretary of CK KPSS at XXII Party Congress; spokesman for the ideological commission of CK KPSS 1962. Lenin Prize 1960. AN 1962. Author of works on Diahistomat, external politics and internal relations of SSSR. (*FE*, II, 252).

Works: 5676; see also *FE*, II, 252.

IONIDI, Perikl Petrovič. b. 25/12/09 (7/1/10). KPSS 1943. Grad. Moscow Chemico-Technical In-t 1935, and aspirant there in 1939. Candidate in Chemical Sc. 1939. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1950. Prof. 1950. Chair of Phil., MVTU 1959. Research on natural science and technology. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 51, 1, 242. (*FE*, II, 312).

Works: 3348; 5681; see also *FE*, II, 312.

IOVČUK, Mixail Trifonovič. b. 6 (19)/11, 1908. KPSS 1926. Grad. phil. section Academy of Communist Education 1931. Aspirant in phil. at Communist In-t for Teachers of Social Sciences 1933. Party work 1933–1936, 1939–1949. Prof. 1939. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1946. Corr. member AN 1946. Prof. Hist. of Marxist-Leninist Phil., MGU 1953. Director at IF 1958. Editor-in-chief of *FN* 1958. Prof. of Hist. of the Phil. of the Peoples of SSSR, MGU 1957.

In charge of research on hist. of phil., hist. of Marxism-Leninism, hist. of materialism, hist. of 18–19th century Russ. phil., problems of theory and culture. Directed the collections of works of Belinskij, Dobroljubov, Herzen, Ogarev, Plexanov, and the Ukrainian revolutionary-democrat philosophers. Editorial staff of *FE* and *History of Philosophy*, 6 vols. (*FE*, II, 311; *VF* 1947, 1, 212; 1949, 1, 9; 1950, 2, 390; 1951, 1, 250; 1957, 2, 164; 1958, 4, 51; 1958, 4, 32; 1959, 2, 151; 1960, 6, 14; *FN* 1958, 2, 206; 1961, 4, 192; 1962, 4, 121).

Works: 271 (1–5); 273, 274; 902; 1114; 1197; 1508; 1658; 1729 (1–4); 1730; 1733; 1993 (1); 3282 (1); 3349 (1–6); 3482; 3690; 3813; 3943; 5682 (1–18); 5683; 5684; 5685; see also *FE*, II, 311.

KALANDARIŠVILI, Grigorij Matveevič. b. 7 (20)/3, 1904. KPSS 1957. Grad. Tbilisi GU 1931; aspirant Moscow In-t of Hist., Phil., and Literature 1935. Taught phil. 1940–1960. Head of logic section IF AN Gruzinskaja SSR 1960. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1962. Works in dialectical logic and hist. of modern logic. (*FE*, II, 411).

Works: 1121; 4007; 5479; see also *FE*, II, 411.

KAL'SIN, Fedor Fomič. b. 1 (14)/7, 1905. KPSS 1943. Grad. Economics Fac. Leningrad Polytechnical In-t 1930, aspirant Moscow In-t Hist., Phil. and Literature. Chair of Phil., Gorkij Pg In-t 1950. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1958. Prof. 1960. Research in theory of knowledge. (*FE*, II, 415).
Works: 1765; 3854; see *FE*, II, 415.

KAMMARI, Mixail Davidovič. b. 17/2 (1/3), 1898. KPSS 1919. Grad. in phil. and natural science from Institute for Red Professors 1931. Prof. 1935. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1950. Scientific collaborator (1945) and corr. member IF 1953. Editor-in-chief and member of editorial board *VF* 1954–1959. Works in role of masses and personalities in hist., development of national attitudes on Communism, Lenin's theory of Histomat. Doctoral dissertation *VF* 1951, 6, 214. (*FE*, II, 416–417; *VF* 1951, 1, 246, 250; 1951, 5, 155; 1953, 6, 229; 1956, 5, 220; *FN* 1959, 4, 171; 1962, 6, 114).
Works: 303 (1–10); 1125; 1207; 1508; 1769 (1–3); 2193; 3394 (1–2); 5050 (1); 5757 (1–8); 5758; 5759; see also *FE*, II, 417.

KARAPETJAN, Aramais Aršakovič. b. 10 (23)/8, 1910. KPSS 1939. Grad. Phil. Fac. LGU 1937. Prof. 1955. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1955. Head of Phil. Fac., Erevan Polytechnical In-t. Works on hist. of phil., esthetics and Histomat. (*FE*, II, 457).
Works: 1128; 1771; see *FE*, II, 457.

KARPOVIČ, Ernst. b. 21/9 (3/10), 1892. KPSS 1909. Grad. in natural sciences of In-t of Red Professors 1931. Prof., Chair of Phil., Latvian GU 1945. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1955. Prof. 1955. Works in problems of dialectics, natural sciences, and Hist. of materialist ideas in Latvia. (*FE*, II, 465).
Works: 5785; see also *FE*, II, 465.

KASUMOV, Mexbali Mamedovič. b. 5 (18)/5, 1906. KPSS 1930. Grad. Moscow In-t of Hist. and Phil. 1937. Chair of Phil. at Azerbaidjan GU 1953. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1957. Prof. 1957. Works on hist. of Azerbaidjan phil. thought. (*FE*, II, 469).
Works: 3403; see *FE*, II, 469.

KEDROV, Bonifatij Mixailovič. b. 1903. KPSS 1918. Philosopher, chemist, and historian of science. First editor-in-chief of *VF*. Self-criticism *VF*, 49, 1, 7. Chair of Hist. of Marxist-Leninist Phil. MGU. (*FE*, II, 488–89; *VF* 1947, 1, 38; 1951, 2, 212, 251; 1951, 5, 197; 1960, 6, 14; 1961, 1, 159; *FN* 1959, 1, 61).
Works: 227; 322 (1–15); 1021 (2); 1135 (1, 2); 1136; 1508; 1733; 1780 (1–4); 1896; 2193; 3413 (1–7); 5692 (3); 5806 (1–21); 5807; see also *FE*, II, 488–489.

KEMENOV, Vladimir Semenovič. b. 20/5 (2/6), 1908. KPSS 1939. Grad. Fac. of Literature and Art, MGU 1930; aspirant Academy of Art 1933. Taught phil. 1931–38, esthetics since 1938. Member Academy of Art SSSR 1955. Dr. of Criticism of Art 1958. Editor *VF* 1947. In charge of contemporary foreign art at In-t of Hist. of Art of Ministry of Culture SSSR 1960. Works on tendencies in modern capitalist art and esthetics, Russ. fine arts in the nineteenth century, problems of classical heritage. (*FE*. II, 492; *VF* 1947, 1, 249).
Works: 325 (1–3); 2193; 3415 (1,2); 5810; see also *FE*, II, 492.

KOLODJAŽNYJ, Vladimir Il'ič. b. 29/12, 1909. KPSS 1940. Grad. Moscow In-t of Hist., Phil. and Literature 1932; aspirant there in phil. 1935. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1954. Prof. 1954. Chair of Phil. Ukrainian Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Kiev, 1958. Works in philosophical questions of natural science, especially biology. (*FE*, II, 568; *FN* 1961, 4, 204).
Works: 3185; 5853 (1,2); see also *FE*, II, 568.

KOL'MAN, Arnošt. b. 6/12/1892. Prague. Dr. Phil. Sc. 1934. Prof. Mathematics 1939. Prof. Phil. 1946. Until 1959, worked in SSSR (except 1945–1948, Czechoslovakia). Member Czechoslovak AN 1960, and director IF AN Czechoslovak SSR. Research in Diamat, hist. of phil., philosophical questions of mathematics and physics, hist. of mathematics and natural sciences, logic and cybernetics. (*FE*, II, 572).
Works: 340, 341 (1–4); 1140; 1508; 1798; 2024; 2172; 3444 (1,2); 3554; 3808; 5851 (1–6); see *FE*, II, 572; *SST* III, 159–160.

KVITKO, David Jur'evič. b. 20/2 (4/3), 1889; d. 5/12, 1942. Belorussian KP 1928. In revolutionary movement since 1904, emigrated USA 1913 to escape arrest. Taught New York U 1915–1920; Harvard 1920–1921; Columbia 1921–1927. Communist Party USA 1919. M.A. 1923; Ph. D. 1927. Wrote and taught on Marxism and materialist phil. at New York Workers' U 1925–1926. Did first translation of *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* into English. Returned SSSR 1927, worked at Communist Academy, taught hist. of phil. at Moscow In-t of Hist., Phil. and Literature. Specialized in modern Anglo-American phil. (*FE*, II, 487).
Works: see *FE*, II, 487.

VALESKALN, Petr Ivanovič. 24/7 (6/8), 1899. KPSS 1917. Studied Physico-Mathematical In-t MGU 1920–1924; grad. In-t of Red Professors 1928. Prof. 1929. Member 1946, Secretary 1956 of AN Latvian SSR. Works in hist. of phil. and phil. questions of natural science. (*FE*, I, 223–224).
Works: 4253; see also *FE*, I, 223–224.

VASECKIJ, Grigorij Stepanovič. b. 10 (23), 1904. KPSS 1929. Grad. Xersonskij Pg In-t 1927. Prof. 1939. Director IF 1946–1947. Prof. Hist. of Phil. AON from 1946, and at MGU from 1949. Works in hist. of Russ. and Marxist-Leninist phil. (*FE*, I, 228; *VF* 1947, 1, 272; 1950, 1, 399; 1957, 2, 163, 166; *FN* 1958, 2, 206; 1958, 3, 210; 1958, 4, 12).
Works: 756; 902; 1291; 1296; 1658; 2014; 2168; 3097; 3719; 3870; 4093; 4205; 6559; 7008 (1–7); see also *FE*, I, 228.

VAVILOV, Sergei Ivanovič. b. 12(24)/3, 1891; d. 25/1, 1951. Physicist, taught MGU 1918–45. Prof. 1919. Member 1932, and President 1945–1951 AN. Stalin Prize 1943, 46, 51. Worked in physics of optics, nature of photo-illuminescence, quantum fluctuations in bodies, and dialectical nature of micro-objects. (*FE*, I, 219).
Works: 394, 573, 582 (18a); 656; 759; 1297; 3450 (2); 4097; 6008 (12); 7015 (1–3); see also *FE*, I, 219.

ZAPOROŽEC, Aleksandr Vladimirovič. b. 30/4 (12/5), 1905. Grad. Pg Fac.

MGU 1930. Dr. Pg Sc. 1959. Prof. 1960. Corr. member 1959, and director In-t of Child Education 1960, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of RSFSR. Works on development of free education, relation of practice to the teaching process, psychological bases of sensory education, guided activity in ontogenesis. (*FE*, II, 160; *VF* 1953, 5, 262; 1957, 2, 165).
Works: 7086; see also *FE*, II, 160.

ZAXIDOV, Vaxid Juldašovič. b. 1914. Grad. Socio-Literary Fac. Azerbaidjan Higher Pg In-t 1933. Aspirant Moscow In-t of Hist., Phil. and Literature 1938. Dr. Phil Sc. 1946. Corr. member 1947, and Secretary of Social Sciences section 1962, of AN Uzbek SSR. Works in hist. of socio-political and phil. thought, and literature of Central Asian republics. (*FE*, II, 161).
Works: 782; 7075; see *FE*, II, 161.

ZEGALKIN, Ivan Ivanovič. b. 22/7 (3/8), 1869; d. 28/3/47. Logician and mathematician. Dr. Physico-Mathematical Sc. Taught MGU 1917–1947, and directed seminars in mathematical logic. Worked mainly on logic and theory of higher numbers. (*FE*, II, 126–127).
Works: see *FE*, II, 127.

P. J. Beemans

BIBLIOGRAPHY

RECENT SOVIET WORKS ON NEOPOSITIVISM

This bibliography is composed of Soviet books, articles and pamphlets in Russian published between 1947 and the Spring of 1963 and dealing wholly or in part with 'Contemporary', 'Twentieth Century', 'Logical' or 'Neo-Positivism' or 'Empiricism'. Works on wider subjects (e.g. Contemporary Western Philosophy) or on related subjects (e.g. American Pragmatism) as well as those on specific questions customarily considered characteristic of Neopositivism (e.g. Empirical Verifiability and Scientific Sensefulness) were only included when they could be verified as having an explicit passage on Neopositivism.

The bibliography was compiled mainly from the bibliographies published or to be published in the Institute of East-European Studies at Fribourg and from the library of this Institute. However, very important additions were made from the collections and bibliographic materials of Dr. T. J. Blakeley and D. D. Comey, to both of whom I want to express my gratitude.

The titles of all books, articles and pamphlets are given in Russian with their English translations in parentheses. Titles of chapters and paragraphs within a book or article are given only in their English translation. (I want to thank Peter J. Beemans for checking most of these translations).

From this bibliography it can be seen to what extent the interest in the subject has grown in the last decade. This is in conformity with the general trend since 1947 in Soviet philosophic literature to study and discuss Western philosophers increasingly in extent and in detail. The method and value of the Soviet critique of Neopositivism are still to be studied.

In addition to the abbreviations customarily used in this journal (listed inside the back cover), the following also appear in this bibliography:

ch.	chapter	pt.	part
ed.	edition	R.	*redaktor* (*-cija*, ..)
fil.	*filosofija* (*-skij*, ..)	Ss.	*sbornik statej*
G.	*gosudarstvennyi* (*-nogo*, ..)	SSR.	*Sovetsjaka Socialističeskaja Respublika*
Gt.	*gospolitizdat*		
In-t.	*institut*	str.	*stranica* (*-i*, ..)
iz.	*izdanie*	t.	*tom*
L.	*Leningrad* (*-skij*, ..)	U.	*Universitet* (*-a*, ..)
M.	*Moskva* (*-ovskij*, ..)	V.	*vestnik*
p., pp.	page, pages	vyp.	*vypusk*
Per.	*perevod*	vol.	volume

All these *ad hoc* abbreviations are written with a period, differing in this from the ones customarilly used in this journal (except for 'Izd.').

Numbers in square brackets refer to the entries of this bibliography.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 3 (September 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

1. ABRAMOV, V.: 'Ajer (Ayer)'. In [45], vol. 1, p. 28.
2. ACHLIBINSKIJ, B. V.: 'Značenie leninskix idej dlja kritiki sovremennogo pozitivizma' (The Importance of Lenin's Ideas for the Critique of Contemporary Positivism). *Naučnye trudy*, vyp. XL, L. elektrotexničeskij In-t., L., 1960.
3. AJER, A. Dž. (Ayer, A. J.): 'Filosofija i nauka' (Philosophy and Science). *VF* 1962, 1, 96–105. [136].
4. AKČURIN, I.: 'Dingl (Dingle)'. In [45] vol. 2, p. 17.
5. ASEEV Ju. A.: 'Semantičeskaja problema v filosofii sovremennogo pozitivizma' (The Semantic Problem in the Philosophy of Contemporary Positivism). *V. LGU* 1957. 23, 79.
6. ASEEV, Ju. A.: 'Neopozitivizm i istoričeskij materializm' (Neopositivism and Historical Materialism). *V. LGU* 1958, 17, 64.
7. ASEEV, Ju. A.: 'Neopozitivizm i matematičeskaja logika' (Neopositivism and Mathematical Logic). In [171], pp. 80–92.
8. ASEEV, Ju. A.: 'Metodologičeskie osnovy leninskoj kritiki social'no-političeskogo soderžanija pozitivizma' (Methodological Principles of the Leninist Critique of the Socio-Political Content of Positivism). *V. LGU* 1960, 11, 86.
9. ASEEV, Ju. A., KON, I. S.: *Osnovnye napravlenija buržuaznoj filosofii i sociologii XX veka* (The Principal Trends in 20th Century Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology). Izd. LGU, L., 1961. 108 str. On Neopositivism: ch. I, 2. 'The Philosophy of Contemporary Positivism'. pp. 13–36.
10. ASEEV, Ju. A.: *Tri étapa razvitija pozitivizma* (Three Periods in the Development of Positivism). Izd. LGU, L., 1962.
11. ASEEV, Ju. A., GORSKIJ, D. P.: 'Dve knigi po kritike pozitivizma' (Two Critiques of Positivism. Review of [110] and [113]). *VF* 1962, 4, 172–175.
12. ASMUS, V. F.: 'Kritika buržuaznyx idealističeskix učenij logiki époxi imperializma' (Critique of Bourgeois Idealist Teachings on Logic in the Period of Imperialism). In [170] pp. 192–284.
13. BAKRADZE. K. S.: 'Logičeskij émpirizm – oružie imperialističeskoj reakcii' (Logical Empiricism, a Weapon of Imperialist Reaction). *VF* 1953, 3, 137–144.
14. BAKRADZE. K. S.: *Sub''ektivnyj idealizm – ideologija imperalističeskoj buržuazii. Kritika pragmatizma i logičeskogo émpirizma.* (Subjective Idealism, the Ideology of the Imperialist Bourgeoisie. Critique of Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism). Tbilisi, 1955. 124 str.
15. BAKRADZE K. S.: *Očerki po istorii novejšej i sovremennoj bouržuaznoj filosofii* (Studies on the History of Modern and Contemporary Positivism). Izd. 'Sovetskaja Gruzija', Tbilisi. 1960. 530 str.
16. BATIŠČEV, G.: 'Blek (Black)'. In [45] vol. 1, p. 174.
17. BEGIAŠVILI, A. F.: 'Ob odnom protivorečii v neopozitivistskoj filosofii' (On a Contradiction in Neopositivist Philosophy). *FN* 1959, 2, 164–170.

18. BEGIAŠVILI, A. F.: *Metod analiza v sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (The Method of Analysis in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Izd. AN Gruzinskoj SSR, Tbilisi, 1960. 198 str.
19. BEGIAŠVILI, A. F.: 'K voprosu ob osnovanii émpirizma v neopozitivistskoj filosofii' (On the Basis of Empiricism in Neopositivist Philosophy). *Naučnye trudy* IF AN Gruzinskoj SSR, t. IX. Tbilisi, 1960.
20. BODNAR, J.: *O sovremennoj filosofii SŠA*. Per. s slovackogo. (Contemporary Philosophy in the USA. Transl. from Slovak). Socékgiz, M., 1959. 248 str. On Neopositivism: pt. 2, V: 'Neopositivism and Semantics'. pp. 188–213. [21]
21. BOGOMOLOV, A. S.: 'Slovackij issledovatel' o sovremennoj amerikanskoj filosofii' (A Slovak Scholar on Contemporary American Philosophy. Review of the Slovak ed. of [20]). *VF* 1957, 4, 231.
22. BOGUSLAVSKIJ, V. M., BORISOVA, I. S.: 'Problema istiny i ee kriterija v neopozitivizme' (The Problem of Truth and of its Criterion in Neopositivism). In [140] pp. 393–418.
23. BORISOVA, I. S. See [22].
24. BRUTJAN, G. A.: 'Pozitivizm v prošlom i segodnja' (Positivism in the Past and Today). *FN* 1963, 1. 142–146.
25. BUNGE, M.: *Pričinnost'. Mesto principa pričinnosti v sovremennoj nauke.* Per. s anglijskogo. (Causality. The Place of the Principle of Causality in Contemporary Science. Transl. from English). IIL, M., 1962. 512 str.
26. BURXARD, A. I.: 'Značenie bor'by protiv sovremennogo buržuaznogo mirovozzrenija dlja kommunističeskogo vospitanija trudjaščixsja' (The Importance of the Struggle Against the Contemporary Bourgeois *Weltanschauung* for the Communist Education of the Workers). In [169] pp. 91–103. On Neopositivism: pp. 95–99.
27. BURXARD, A. I.: See [49].
28. BYXOVSKIJ, B.: 'Anglijskaja filosofija' (English Philosophy). In [45] vol. 1, pp. 61–66.

CORNFORTH, M. See KORNFORT, M. [69, 70, 71].

29. CVEJLING, K. See [62].
30. ČERKAŠIN, P. P.: *Gnoseologičeskie korni idealizma* (The Epistemological Roots of Idealism). Socékgiz, M., 1961. 240 str. On Neopositivism: pp. 188–202: 'Relativism, the Basis of Neopositivism'. [152]
31. ČERKESOV, V. I.: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (The Materialistic Dialectic as Logic and as Theory of Knowledge). Izd. MGU, M., 1962. 478 str. On Neopositivism: ch. II: 'Truth and the Formal Correctness of Thinking'. 5: 'Who is Closer to Logical Positivism?'. pp. 113–127.
32. *Dialektičeskij Materializm* (Dialectical Materialism). R. A. D. Makarov, A. V. Vostrikov, E. N. Česnokov. Izd. VPS i AON, M., 1960 (2. iz. 1962). 472 str. [155]

33. *Dialektičeskij materializm i sovremennyj pozitivizm.* (Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Positivism). R. I. S. Narskij i drugie. Izd. MGU, M., 1961. 244 str.
34. DOBRONRAROV, I.: 'Vitgenštejn (Wittgenstein)'. In [45] vol. 1, p. 263.
35. DOBRONRAROV. I. i drugie: 'Karnap (Carnap)', 'Logičeskie vzgljady' (Logical Opinions). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 462–463.
36. ERMOLENKO, D. V.: *Sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija v Soedinënnyx Statax Ameriki* (Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy in the United States of America). Izd. In-t Meždunarodnyx Otnošenij, M., 1957. 64 str. On Neopositivism: pp. 24–48.
37. ERMOLENKO, D. V.: *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Izd. 'Vyssaja škola', M., 1959. 58 str. On Neopositivism: pp. 30–39.
38. FATALIEV, X. M.: *Dialektičeskij materializm i voprosy estestvoznanija* (Dialectical Materialism and Questions of Natural Science). G. Izd. 'Sovetskaja Nauka', M., 1958. 135 str. On Neopositivism: ch. I: 'Neopositivism and Contemporary Natural Science'. pp. 5–24.
39. FATALIEV, X. M.: 'Vraždebnost' neopozitivizma sovremennoj nauke' (The Hostility of Neopositivism Toward Contemporary Science). In [85] pp. 318–334.
40. FATALIEV, X. M.: 'Neopozitivizm i nekotorye problemy sovremennogo estestvoznanija' (Neopositivism and some Problems of Contemporary Natural Science). *FN* 1958, 1, 156–167.
41. FATALIEV, X. M.: *Marksistsko-leninskaja filosofija i estestvoznanie* (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Natural Science). Izd. 'Vyssaja škola', M., 1960. 284 str. On Neopositivism: pt. I, ch. I: 'Neopositivism and Contemporary Natural Science'. pp. 7–26.
42. FATALIEV, X. M.: *Marksizm-Leninizm i estestvoznanie* (Marxism-Leninism and Natural Science). Izd. MGU, M., 1962. 352 str. [43]
43. FATALIEV, X. M.: 'Neopozitivizm i nekotorye problemy sovremennogo estestvoznanija'. Doklad, pročitannyi na filosofskoj sekcii Vsesojuznogo soveščanija zavedujuščix kafedrami obščestvennyx nauk v Moskve v ijune 1957 g. (Neopositivism and some Problems of Contemporary Natural Science. A Paper, read to the Philosophic Section of the All-Union Conference of Directors of Departments of Social Sciences, Moscow, June 1957). In his book [42]
44. *Filosofija marksizma i neopozitivizm* (The Philosophy of Marxism and Neopositivism). Ss. R. T.I. Ojzerman. Izd. MGU, M., 1963, 543 str.
45. *Filosofskaja énciklopedija* (Philosophical Encyclopedia). Glavnij R. F. V. Konstantinov. IF, G. naučnoe Izd. 'Sovetskaja énciklopedija', t. 1: 'A' – 'Didro'. M., 1960. 504 str.; t. 2: 'Diz"junkcija' – 'Komičeskoe'. M., 1962. 576 str. [1, 4, 16, 34, 35, 52, 56, 59, 81, 82, 100, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 149, 151]
46. *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoj formal'noj logiki* (Philosophical Questions

of Contemporary Formal Logic). IF, Izd. AN, M., 1962. 364 str. [119, 160, 161, 162, 167]

47. GORNŠTEJN, T. N.: 'Maks Plank i pozitivizm. K stoletiju so dnja roždenija'. (Max Planck and Positivism. On the Centenary of his Birthday) *FN* 1958, 4, 145–156.
48. GORNŠTEJN, T. N.: 'Sovremennyj pozitivizm i filosofskie voprosy fiziki' (Contemporary Positivism and Philosophic Questions of Physics). in [148] pp. 339–423.
49. GORSKIJ, D. P., BURXARD, A. I.: 'Rešenie neopozitivizmom osnovnogo voprosa filosofii' (The Neopositivist Solution to the Basic Question of Philosophy). *VF* 1956, 3, 123–136.
50. GORSKIJ, D. P.: 'Izvraščenie neopozitivizmom voprosov logiki' (The Neopositivist Distortion of the Questions of Logic). In [148] pp. 219–286.
51. GORSKIJ, D. P.: See [11].
52. GORSKIJ, D. P.: 'Abstrakcija', 'Istoričeskij obzor' (Abstraction; A Historical Review). In [45] vol. 1, p. 13.
53. GREČANOV, A. D., MELEŠČENKO, Ju. S.: *Značenie raboty V. I. Lenina "Materializm i émpiriokriticizm" dlja kritiki sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (The Importance of V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" for the Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Izd. 'Znanie', L., 1960. 56 str. On Neopositivism: pp. 40–47.
54. GULYGA, A. V.: 'Vozniknovenie pozitivizma' (The Origin of Positivism). *VF* 1955, 6, 57–69.
55. IL'ENKOV, É. V.: 'Truslivyj nigilizm "geroičeskogo pozitivizma"' (The Cowardly Nihilism of "Heroic Positivism"). *VF* 1959, 9, 99–107.
56. IL'ENKOV, É. V. i drugie: 'Zabluždenie' (Error). In [45] vol. 2. pp. 144–147.
57. JANOVSKAJA, S. A.: 'Problemy analiza ponjatij nauki i novejšij neopozitivizm' (Problems of Analysis of Concepts of Science and Recent Neopositivism). *VF* 1961, 6, 47–53.
58. JAROŠEVSKIJ, M. G.: 'Protiv pozitivizma i pragmatizma' (Against Positivism and Pragmatism). *Bol'ševik* 1951, 9, 74–79.
59. KARPUSIN, V.: 'Individualizm' (Individualism). In [45] pp. 260–262.
60. KEDROV, B. M.: 'Filosofija kak obščaja nauka' (Philosophy as Universal Science). *VF* 1962, 5, 44–58 and 6, 48–62.
61. KISSEL', M. A.: 'R. Kollingvud i bor'ba ob"ektivnogo idealizma s pozitivizmom v Anglijskoj filosofii XX v.' (R. Collingwood and the Struggle of Objective Idealism with Positivism in twentieth Century English Philosophy). *FN*. 1960, 2, 129–140.
62. KLAUS, G., CVEJLING, K.: 'Neopozitivizm' (Neopositivism). In [126] pp. 80–114.
63. KNIGIN, A. N.: 'Značenie raboty V. I. Lenina "Materializm i émpiriokriticizm" dlja kritiki neopozitivistskoj koncepcii istiny' (The Importance of V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" in the Critique of the Neopositivist Conception of Truth). In [164]

64. KON, I. S.: 'Neopozitivizm protiv istorizma. (O sociologičeskoj koncepcii K. Poppera)' (Neopositivism Against Historicism. On the Sociological Conception of K. Popper). *FN* 1958, 2, 81–93.
65. KON, I. S.: *Filosofskij idealizm i krizis buržuaznoj istoričeskoj mysli.* (Kritičeskie očerki filosofii istorii époxi imperializma) (Philosophic Idealism and the Crisis in Bourgeois Historical Thought. Critical Studies of the Philosophy of History in the Period of Imperialism). Socékgiz, M., 1959. 404 str. On Neopositivism: ch. 4: 'Neopositivism Against Historicism'. pp. 172–194.
66. KON, I. S.: See [9]
67. KORNEEVA, A. I.: 'Sovremennaja épistemologija kak teorija poznanija neopozitivizma' (Contemporary Epistemology as the Theory of Knowledge of Neopositivism). In [172] pp. 340–378.
68. KORNEEVA, A. I.: *Kritika neopozitivistskix vzgljadov na prirodu poznanija* (Critique of the Neopositivist Position on the Nature of Knowledge). AN, Izd. VPŠ i AON, 1962. 228 str.
69. KORNFORT, M. (CORNFORTH, M.): *V zaščitu filosofii. Protiv pozitivizma i pragmatizma* (In Defence of Philosophy. Against Positivism and Pragmatism). IIL, M., 1951. XXXVI + 304 str.
70. KORNFORT, M. 'Protivniki idealizma v sovremennoj anglijskoj buržuaznoj filosofii' (Opponents of Idealism in Contemporary English Bourgeois Philosophy). *VF* 1955, 4, 96–112. On Neopositivism: pp. 104–112.
71. KORNFORT, M. (CORNFORTH, M.): *Nauka protiv idealizma. V zaščitu filosofii protiv pozitivizma i pragmatizma.* Per. s anglijskogo. (Science Against Idealism. In Defense of Philosophy Against Positivism and Pragmatism. Transl. from English). IIL, M., 1957. 548 str.
72. KOVALGIN, V. M.: *Marksistskaja filosofija protiv idealizma i metafiziki* (Marxist Philosophy Against Idealism and Metaphysics). G. Izd. BSSR, Minsk, 1961. 135 str. On Neopositivism: 6.a: 'Positivism. "Semantic Philosophy"'. pp. 66–77.
73. KOZLOVA, M. S.: 'Lejbnic i neopozitivizm' (Leibniz and Neopositivism). *V. LGU* 1962, 17, 83–94.
74. *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* (Short Philosophical Dictionary). R. M. Rozental' i P. Judin. iz. 4. Gt., M., 1955. On Neopositivism: pp. 8–9: 'Agnosticism', p. 204: 'Logistics', pp. 240–241: 'Logical Positivism', pp. 377–378: 'Positivism', pp. 426–427: 'Semantic Philosophy', p. 554: 'Empiricism'.
75. *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii i revizionizma* (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy and Revisionism). Ss. Izd. VPŠ i AON, M., 1959. 360 str. On Neopositivism: p. 81, and [105]
76. KRËBER, K. See [82].
77. KURSANOV, G. A.: 'Reakcionnaja gnoseologija i "teorii" ponjatija neopozitivizma' (Reactionary Epistemology and the Neopositivist "Theories" of Concept). *Izvestija AN* 1948, 5, 422–436.
78. KURSANOV, G. A.: 'O nekotoryx koncepcijax istiny v sovremennoj idealis-

tičeskoj gnoseologii' (On some Concepts of Truth in Contemporary Idealist Epistemology). *VF* 1957, 2, 188–193.

79. KURSANOV, G. A.: 'Filipp Frank i ego filosofija nauki. (Vstupitel'naja stat'ja)'. (Philipp Frank and his Philosophy of Science. An Introduction) In Frank, F. (Frank, Ph.): *Filosofija nauki. Svjaz' meždu naukoj i filosofiej.* Per. s anglijskogo. (Philosophy of Science. The Bond Between Science and Philosophy. Transl. from English). IIL, M., 1960. 544 str., str. 5–35.
80. KUZNECOV, I. I.: 'Net! Filosofija – éto nauka' (No! Philosophy is a Science). *VF* 1962, 1, 106.
81. KUZNECOV, O. P.: 'Verificiruemosti princip' (Principle of Verifiability). In [45] vol. 1, pp. 241–242.
82. KUZ'MIN, N., KRËBER, K.: 'Zakon' (Law). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 149–151.
83. LINGART, I. (LINHART, J.): *Amerikanskij pragmatizm.* Per. s češskogo. (American Pragmatism. Transl. from Czech). IIL, M., 1954. 256 str. On Neopositivism: ch. VIII: 'Attempts at Uniting Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism'. pp. 184–209.
84. MAKAROV, V. T.: 'O pozitivistskoj suščnosti tak nazyvaemoj teorii dopolnitel'nosti' (On the Positivist Character of the so-called Theory of Complementarity). In *Učenye Zapiski* (Kafedra dialektičeskogo i istoričeskogo materializma VPŠ pri CK KPSS i mestnyx VPŠ) vyp. II, M., 1960.
85. *Materialy vsesojuznogo soveščanija zavedujuščix kafedrami obščestvennyx nauk* (Documents of the All-Union Conference of Directors of Departments of Social Sciences). Gt., M., 1958. 510 str. [39].
86. MELEŠČENKO, Ju. S. See [53].
87. MEL'NIKOV, V. M.: *Do pitanija pro prirodu filosofskix kategorij* (On the Question of the Nature of Philosophical Categories). Vidavnictvo AN Ukraïns'koï RSR, Kiïv, 1959. 215 str. (in Ukrainian) On Neopositivism: pt. III: 'The Question of the Nature of Philosophical Categories in the Empirico-Positivist Current of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy'. pp. 147–213.
88. MITIN, M. B.: '"Materializm i émpiriokriticizm" V. I. Lenina i bor'ba protiv sovremennoj idealističeskoj reakcii' (V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" and the Struggle Against the Contemporary Idealist Reaction). *VF* 1949, 1, 60–84. On Neopositivism: 73–74.
89. MITIN, M. B.: 'V. I. Lenin i bor'ba protiv sovremennogo pozitivizma' (V. I. Lenin and the Struggle Against Contemporary Positivism). *VF* 1961, 3, 3.
90. MITROXIN, L. N., MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: 'Novyj trud o sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii' (A New Work on Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Review of [148]. *VF* 1958, 10, 164–169.
91. MIXALENKO, Jv. P.: *Filosofija D. Juma – teoretičeskaja osnova sovremennogo pozitivizma* (The Philosophy of D. Hume, the Theoretical Basis of Contemporary Positivism). Izd. AN, M., 1961.

92. MIXALENKO, JU. P.: *Filosofija D. Juma – teoretičeskaja osnova anglijskogo pozitivizma XX veka* (The Philosophy of D. Hume, the Theoretical Basis of English Twentieth Century Positivism). IF, Izd. AN, M., 1962. 152 str.
93. MIXALENKO, JU. P.: 'Sovremennye pozitivisty v roli propovednikov fideizma' (Contemporary Positivists in the Rôle of Advocates of Fideism). In [147] pp. 154–186.
94. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: 'Filosofija neopozitivizma' (The Philosophy of Neopositivism). *VF* 1957, 2, 39–50.
95. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: 'Revoljucija li éto?' (Is this a Revolution?). *VF* 1958, 4, 156–158.
96. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: *Osnovnye tečenija sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (The Basic Currents of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). Gt. Ukrainskogo SSR, Kiev, 1961. 113 str.
97. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: *Filosofija neopozitivizma i semantiki* (The Philosophy of Neopositivism and of Semantics). Izd. VPŠ i AON, M., 1961. 88 str.
98. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: 'Slova ili veščі? (Vstupitel'naja stat'ja)' (Words or Things? An Introduction). In É. GELLNER: *Slova i veščі*. Per. s anglijskogo. (Words and Things. Transl. from English) ILL, M., 1962. 344 str., str. 5–23.
99. MŠVENIERADZE, V. V.: See [90]
100. MYSLIVČENKO, A.: 'Jërgensen (Jørgensen)'. In [45] vol. 2, p. 400.
101. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Neopozitivizm – filosofija sub"ektivnogo idealizma' (Neopositivism, the Philosophy of Subjective Idealism). *V. MGU* 1953.11, 21.
102. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Filosofija neopozitivizma i nauka' (The Philosophy of Neopositivism and Science). *Bol'ševik* 1955, 13, 70.
103. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Filosofskaja suščnost' neopozitivizma' (The Philosophical Character of Neopositivism). In [148] pp. 140–218.
104. NARSKIJ, I. S.: *Marksistskoe ponimanie predmeta filosofii i pozitivizm* (The Marxist Conception of the Object of Philosophy and Positivism). Izd. VPŠ i AON, M., 1959. 64 str.
105. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Kritika neopozitivizma po voprosu o vzaimootnošenii ponjatija istiny i kriterija istiny' (A Critique of Neopositivism on the Question of the Interrelationship Between the Concept of Truth and the Criterion of Truth). In [75] pp. 254–275.
106. NARSKIJ, I. S.: '"Materializm i émpiriokriticizm" V. I. Lenina i logičeskij pozitivizm' (V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" and Logical Positivism). In [165] pp. 331–359.
107. NARSKIJ, I. S.: '"Materializm i émpiriokriticizm" V. I. Lenina i sovremennyi pozitivizm' (V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" and Contemporary Positivism). *V. MGU* 1959, 2, 15.
108. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Kritika učenija neopozitivizma o kriterii istiny (Problema verifikacii). (Critique of the Doctrine of Neopositivism on the Criterion of Truth. The Problem of Verification). *VF* 1959, 9, 87–98.

109. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Metodologičeskie problemy kritiki sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii v svete itogov XXI s'ezda KPSS' (Methodological Problems of the Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy in the Light of the Results of the XXIst Congress of the KPSS). *FN* 1959, 2, 13–23.
110. NARSKIJ, I. S.: *Očerki po istorii pozitivizma* (Studies in the History of Positivism). Izd. MGU, M., 1960, 200 str. [11].
111. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'K ocenke neopozitivistskogo učenija o predmete filosofii' (An Evaluation of the Neopositivist Doctrine on the Object of Philosophy). *FN* 1960, 1, 128–138.
112. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Kritika učenija neopozitivizma o kriterii istiny' (Critique of the Neopositivist Doctrine on the Criterion of Truth). *VF* 1960, 9, 81–91.
113. NARSKIJ, I. S.: *Sovremennyj pozitivizm.* Kritičeskij očerk. (Contemporary Positivism. A Critical Study). IF. Izd. AN, M., 1961. 424 str. [11]
114. NARSKIJ, I. S.: *Tri problemy kritiki sovremennogo pozitivizma* (Three Problems of the Critique of Contemporary Positivism). Izd. AN, M., 1961.
115. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Filosofskie problemy "obščej" semantiki' (Philosophical Problems of "General" Semantics). *VF* 1961, 3, 164–169.
116. NARSKIJ, I. S.: *Filosofija Bertrana Rassela* (The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell). Izd. MGU, M., 1962. 40 str.
117. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Neopozitivisty v roli "kritikov" dialektičeskogo materializma' (The Neopositivists as "Critics" of Dialectical Materialism). *FN* 1962, 4, 57–64.
118. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Kritika osnovnyx principov teorii poznanija neopozitivizma' (Critique of the Basic Principles of the Theory of Knowledge of Neopositivism). *VF* 1962, 1, 62–70.
119. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Ponjatie "suščestvovanija", logičeskij pozitivizm i formal'naja logika' (The Concept of "Existence", Logical Positivism, and Formal Logic). In [46] pp. 152–186.
120. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Značenie' (Meaning). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 181–182.
121. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Idealizm. I. 2-j pol. 19 v. i epoxi imperializma'. (Idealism. The Idealism of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century and of the Period of Imperialism). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 214–218.
122. NARSKIJ.: 'Intersub"ektivnost'' (Intersubjectivity). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 297–298.
123. NARSKIJ, I. S.: 'Karnap (Carnap)'. Filosofskie vzgljady' (Philosophic Opinions). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 463–464.
124. NARSKIJ, I. S., OJZERMAN, T.: 'Istina'. 'Ponimanie I. v domarksistskoj i sovr. burž. filosofii'. (Truth. The Understanding of Truth in Premarxian and in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 345–347.
125. NARSKIJ, I. S., SUVOROV, L. N.: *Pozitivizm i mexanističeskaja revizija marksizma* (Positivism and the Mechanist Revision of Marxism). G. Izd. "Vysšaja Škola", M., 1962. 84 str.

126. *Nemeckaja buržuaznaja filosofija posle velikoj oktjabr'skoj socialističeskoj revolucii.* Per. s nemeckogo. (German Bourgeois Philosophy after the Great Socialist October Revolution. Transl. from German). IIL, M., 1960. 124 str. [62]
127. NIKITIN, E. P.: 'Priroda naučnogo ob"jasnenija i sovremennyj pozitivizm' (The Nature of Scientific Explanation and Contemporary Positivism). *VF* 1962, 8, 96–107.
128. OJZERMAN, T. I.: 'Sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija i religija' (Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy and Religion). *VF* 1959, 11, 149–158. On Neopositivism: pp. 153–156.
129. OJZERMAN, T. I.: See [124]
130. OMEL'JANOVSKIJ, M. E.:)'Fal'sifikatory nauki' (Falsifiers of Science). *VF* 1948, 3, 143–162.
131. OMEL'JANOVSKIJ, M. E.: 'Izmerenie' (Measurement). In [45] vol. 2, pp. 244–246.
132. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Principles of Marxist Philosophy). R. F.V. Konstantinov. IF, Gt., M., 1958. 688 str. (2 iz. 1959. 672 str.). On Neopositivism: ch. XIX, 2: 'Contemporary Subjective and Objective Idealism'. str. 645–654. (2. iz. str. 629–639).
133. *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma.* Učebnoe posobie. (Principles of Marxism-Leninism. A Handbook.) R. O.V. Kuusinen. 2. iz. Gt., M., 1962. 784 str. On Neopositivism: ch. 1,6: 'The Opponents of Philosophic Materialism'. 'The Attempt to Establish a "Third" Line in Philosophy'. pp. 35–38. and ch.1,7:'Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy'. 'The Would-be "Philosophy of Science"'. pp. 43–47.
134. PEREDERIJ, V. I.: 'Kritika neopozitivistskogo ponimanija predmeta filosofii' (Critique of the Neopositivist Concept of the Object of Philosophy). *FN* 1962, 2, 98–105.
135. *Peredovaja VF* (Editorial VF): 'Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii – važnaja zadača ideologičeskoj bor'by' (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy is an Important Task in the Ideological Struggle). *VF* 1962, 6, 3–13.
136. *Peredovaja VF* (Editorial VF): 'K stat'e A. Dž. Ajera "filosofija i nauka"' (On the Article of A. J. Ayer "Philosophy and Science"). *VF* 1962, 1, 94. [3]
137. POLIKAROV, A.: 'Obščaja xarakteristika sovremennogo idealizma i napravlenij ego kritiki' (General Description of Contemporary Idealism and of Trends in its Critique). *FN* 1961, 3, 84–97.
138. POMOGAEVA, E. F., TROFIMOV, P. S.: 'O nekotoryx predstaviteljax sovremennoj anglijskoj buržuaznoj filosofii' (On some Representatives of Contemporary English Bourgeois Philosophy). *VF* 1957, 1, 234–237.
139. POPOVIČ, M. V.: 'Filosofskij aspekt problemy značenija i smysla' (The Philosophic Aspect of the Problem of Meaning and Sense). *VF* 1962, 12, 35–46.

140. *Praktika – kriterij istiny v nauke* (Practice, the Criterion of Truth in Science). Ss. Ural'skij G.U. IF, Socékgiz, M. 1960. 463 str. [22]
141. 'Professor A. Ayer v Moskve i u sebja doma' (Professor A. Ayer in Moskow and at Home). *VF* 1962, 5, 155.
142. REZNIKOV, L. O.: 'Neopozitivistskaja gnoseologija i znakovaja teorija jazyka' (Neopositivist Epistemology and the Sign-Theory of Language). *VF* 1962, 2, 99–109.
143. SADOVSKIJ, V. N.: 'Kritika filosofii analiza' (A Critique of the Philosophy of Analysis). *VF* 1961, 11, 169–172.
144. SKAJSGIRIS, R. P.: 'Metafizičeskij otryv racional'nogo ot čuvstvennogo v teorii poznanija Bertrana Rassela' (The Metaphysical Divorce of the Rational from the Sensible in Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge). In *Kritika sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii i sociologii* (Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology). M., 1961. Izd. VPŠ i AON. 272 str., str. 3–58.
145. SMIRNOVA, E. D.: 'Neopozitivistskaja koncepcija analitičeskogo i sintetičeskogo znanija v svete leninskoj kritiki maxizma' (The Neopositivist Conception of Analytic and Synthetic Knowledge in the Light of Lenin's Critique of Machism). *Naučnye Trudy* (Tomskij G.U.) t. 149. Tomsk, 1960.
146. SOKOLOV, V. V.: 'Pozitivizm i pragmatizm – reakcionnaja filosofija anglo-amerikanskogo imperializma. O novoj knige M. Kornforta.' (Positivism and Pragmatism, the Reactionary Philosophy of Anglo-American Imperialism. On a new Book by M. Cornforth). *VF* 1951, 3, 205–213.
147. *Sovremennye religiozno-filosofskie tečenija v kapitalističeskix stranax* (Contemporary Religio-Philosophic Currents in Capitalist Countries). Ss. IF, Izd. AN, M., 1962. 236 str. [93]
148. *Sovremennyj sub"ektivnyj idealizm.* Kritičeskie očerki. (Contemporary Subjective Idealism. Critical Studies). R. M. P. Baskin, M. S. Baxitov. IF, GT., M., 1957. 528 str. [48, 50, 90, 103]
149. SPIRKIN, A.: 'Dialektičeskij materializm i sovremennaja buržuaznaja filosofija' (Dialectical Materialism and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). In [45] vol. 1, pp 492–493.
150. SUVOROV, L. N. See [125]
151. SVEČNIKOV, G.: 'Indeterminizm' (Indeterminism). In [45] t. 2, pp. 258–260.
152. SVEČNIKOV, G. A.: Review of [30]. *VF* 1963, 4, 161–162.
153. ŠAFAREV, V. S.: Review of James K. Feibleman: "Inside the Great Mirror. A Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Russell, Wittgenstein and their Followers". *VF* 1960, 10, 172.
154. ŠEPUTO, L. L.: *Voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma i medicina* (Questions of Dialectical Materialism and Medicine). Ministerstvo zdravooxranenija SSSR, Central'nyi In-t. usoveršenstvovanija Vračej, M., 1961. 158 str. On Neopositivism: ch. I,5: 'The Struggle of Materialism and Idealism on the Question of the Nature of Law'. pp. 21–29, cf. pp. 25–27.

155. ŠERŠENKO, L. A.: 'Kritika osnovnyx tečenij sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii' (Critique of the Basic Currents in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). In [32] pp. 414–469. On Neopositivism: 1: 'The Principal Features of 20th Century Bourgeois Philosophy'. and 2: 'Positivism'.
156. ŠVARCMAN, K. A.: *Kritika sovremennyx buržuaznyx filosofsko-étičeskix sistem* (Critique of the Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophico-Ethical Systems). Izd. 'Vysšaja Škola', M., 1961. 52 str. On Neopositivism: ch. I: 'Étika neopozitivizma' (The Ethics of Neopositivism). pp. 6–17.
157. ŠVYREV, V. S.: 'Aktual'nye problemy induktivnoj logiki' (The Current Problems of Inductive Logic). *VF* 1959, 1, 184.
158. ŠVYREV, V. S.: 'Kritika neopozitivistskoj koncepcii induktivnoj logiki' (Critique of the Neopositivist Concept of Inductive Logic). *VF* 1961, 3, 74–85.
159. ŠVYREV, V.S.: Review of M. J. Charlesworth: Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. Louvain, 1959. *VF* 1961, 5. 174–175.
160. ŠVYREV, V. S.:'Neopozitivistskaja koncepcija émpiričeskogo značenija i logičeskij analiz naučnogo znanija' (The Neopositivist Concept of Empirical Knowledge and the Logical Analysis of Scientific Knowledge). In [46] pp. 285–322.
161. TAVANEC, P. V.: 'Formal'naja logika i filosofija' (Formal Logic and Philosophy). In [46] pp. 3–15. On Neopositivism: pp. 13–14.
162. TAVANEC, P. V.: 'O semantičeskom opredelenii istiny' (On the Semantic Definition of Truth). In [46] pp. 140–151. On Neopositivism: pp. 148–151.
163. TROFIMOV, P. S. See [138].
164. *Velikoe proizvedenie marksistskoj filosofii.* K pjatidesjatiletiju vyxoda v svet knigi V. I. Lenina 'Materializm i émpiriokriticizm'. (A Great Product of Marxist Philosophy. On the 50th Anniversary of V.I. Lenin's 'Materialism and Empiriocriticism'). Ss. R. V.F. Golosov i drugie. Izd. Sibirskogo otdelenija AN, Novosibirsk, 1960. 240 str. [63]
165. *Velikoe proizvedenie voinstvujuščego materializma. O knige V.I. Lenina 'Materializm i émpiriokriticizm'.* (A Great Product of Militant Materialism. On V.I. Lenin's 'Materialism and Empiriocriticism'.) IF, Socékgiz, M., 1959. 495 str. [106]
166. VETROV, A. A.: 'O semantičeskom ponjatii istiny' (On the Semantic Concept of Truth). *VF* 1962, 9, 63–74.
167. VETROV, A. A.: 'Za dal'nejšuju razrabotku filosofskix problem sovremennoj formal'noj logiki' (For a Further Elaboration of the Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Formal Logic). *VF* 1963, 4, 152–156. Review of [46].
168. VOLKOV, G. A.: 'Konferencija po kritike neopozitivizma' (Conference on the Critique of Neopositivism). *VF* 1961, 9, 125.
169. *Voprosy kommunističeskogo vospitanija* (Questions of Communist Education). Ss. Izd. MGU, M., 1961. 178 str. [26]

170. *Voprosy logiki* (Questions of Logic). Izd. AN, M., 1955. [12]
171. *Voprosy logiki* (Questions of Logic). *Učenye Zapsiki* LGU 263, Serija fil. nauk, vyp. 14, Izd. LGU, L., 1959. 118 str. [7]
172. *Voprosy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* (Questions of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy). Izd. VPŠ i AON, M., 1959, 412 str. [67]
173. ZVEGINCEV, V. A.: 'Neopozitivizm i novejšie lingvističeskie napravlenija' (Neopositivism and the most Recent Linguistic Trends). *VF* 1961, 12, 92–101.
174. ŽURAVLEV, L. A.: *Neopozitivizm za službe religii* (Neopositivism in the Service of Religion). Izd. MGU, M., 1962. 56 str.

W. F. Boeselager

CHRONOLOGY

1962

June M. A. Dynnik represents the Soviet Union at the Rousseau celebration in Royaumont, France. His speech: 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Problems of Humanism' (*VF* 1963, 2, 159).

Sept. Fourth International Hegel Congress in Geneva with participation of M.B. Mitin and B.M. Kedrov (*VF* 1963, 2, 159).

Fall Symposium of Faculties of Philosophy and Law of MGU on 'Objective Truth in the Criminal Process' (*VF* 1963, 2, 165).

23 Oct. Meeting of philosophy seminar of MGU on the object of scientific Communism (*V LGU* 1963, 5, 154–155; *FN* 1963, 2, 167-169).

30 Oct. Conference on the work of the philosophical (methodological) seminars of the AN: participants from the Bureau of the Scientific Soviet of Philosophic Questions of Science and from the Central Bureau of Philosophical (methodological) Seminars, under the chairmanship of M.É. Omel'janovskij (*CF* 1963, 3, 157–159).

Nov. Meeting of seminar of Sector of Philosophic Questions of Science of IF (*VF* 1963, 4, 85).
Conference at the Kiev Medical Institute on 'Some Philosophic Questions of Medicine and Science' (*VF* 1963, 4, 141).

Dec. Philosophic seminar in Warsaw on problems of contemporary science with participation of a Soviet delegation lead by M.É. Omel'janovskij (*VF* 1963, 2, 157).

20 Dec. Conference in Saratov of readers of *VF* 1963, 3, 159–161).

End Conference in Moscow on scientific-atheistic education (*FN* 1963, 2, 169–172).

1963

28 Jan. Conference organized by the Ministry of Higher and

Middle Specialized Education, the AN and the Ministry of Culture of the RSFSR, on the 'Esthetic Education of Workers During the Accelerated Construction of Communist Society' (*VF* 1963, 3, 14f.; *VF* 1963, 4, 134–138.)

31 Jan.-4 Feb. Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Institute of Psychology of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR (*VP* 1963, 2, 181–186).

Feb. Philosophic seminar in Warsaw on concrete sociological methods with participation of a Soviet delegation lead by F. V. Konstantinov (*VF* 1963, 2, 158).

11 Feb. Meeting of readers of *VF* in Rjazan on 'Transformation of Socialist Relations of Production into Communist ones' (*VF* 1963, 4, 138–140).

Spring Conference of the Urals section of the Society of Psychologists on cognitive activity (*VP* 1963, 2, 187–189).

CHRONOLOGY

1962

June M. A. Dynnik represents the Soviet Union at the Rousseau celebration in Royaumont, France. His speech: 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Problems of Humanism' (*VF* 1963, 2, 159).

Sept. Fourth International Hegel Congress in Geneva with participation of M.B. Mitin and B.M. Kedrov (*VF* 1963, 2, 159).

Fall Symposium of Faculties of Philosophy and Law of MGU on 'Objective Truth in the Criminal Process' (*VF* 1963, 2, 165).

23 Oct. Meeting of philosophy seminar of MGU on the object of scientific Communism (*V LGU* 1963, 5, 154–155; *FN* 1963, 2, 167-169).

30 Oct. Conference on the work of the philosophical (methodological) seminars of the AN: participants from the Bureau of the Scientific Soviet of Philosophic Questions of Science and from the Central Bureau of Philosophical (methodological) Seminars, under the chairmanship of M.É. Omel'janovskij (*CF* 1963, 3, 157–159).

Nov. Meeting of seminar of Sector of Philosophic Questions of Science of IF (*VF* 1963, 4, 85).
Conference at the Kiev Medical Institute on 'Some Philosophic Questions of Medicine and Science' (*VF* 1963, 4, 141).

Dec. Philosophic seminar in Warsaw on problems of contemporary science with participation of a Soviet delegation lead by M.É. Omel'janovskij (*VF* 1963, 2, 157).

20 Dec. Conference in Saratov of readers of *VF* 1963, 3, 159–161).

End Conference in Moscow on scientific-atheistic education (*FN* 1963, 2, 169–172).

1963

28 Jan. Conference organized by the Ministry of Higher and

This content downloaded from 144.82.108.120 on Sat, 27 Aug 2016 15:02:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Middle Specialized Education, the AN and the Ministry of Culture of the RSFSR, on the 'Esthetic Education of Workers During the Accelerated Construction of Communist Society' (*VF* 1963, 3, 14f.; *VF* 1963, 4, 134–138.)

31 Jan.-4 Feb. Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Institute of Psychology of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the RSFSR (*VP* 1963, 2, 181–186).

Feb. Philosophic seminar in Warsaw on concrete sociological methods with participation of a Soviet delegation lead by F. V. Konstantinov (*VF* 1963, 2, 158).

11 Feb. Meeting of readers of *VF* in Rjazan on 'Transformation of Socialist Relations of Production into Communist ones' (*VF* 1963, 4, 138–140).

Spring Conference of the Urals section of the Society of Psychologists on cognitive activity (*VP* 1963, 2, 187–189).

This content downloaded from 144.82.108.120 on Sat, 27 Aug 2016 15:02:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

Personnel: Professor J. M. Bocheński has been elected Rector (President) of the University of Fribourg. He will take over this position on October 15, 1964, but will retain his position as Director of the Institute.

Professor O. Halecki has been appointed visiting professor at the University of California at Los Angeles for the Winter Term 1963–1964. He will resume his teaching in the Institute in the Summer Term, 1964.

Dr. H. Fleischer has been appointed as scientific collaborator at the Osteuropa Institut of the Free University of Berlin.

Professor R. DeGeorges left the Institute and resumed his teaching at the University of Kansas.

Mr. D. D. Comey left the Institute and returned to the United States.

Professor M. Faraon, of St. Michael's College in Santa Fe, joined the Institute for the Summer Term 1963.

Journeys and lectures: Professor J. M. Bocheński lectured in March, 1963 at the Russian Institute of Columbia University (New York), at the University of Notre Dame, and at the University of Kansas.

Professor R. DeGeorges travelled in the Soviet Union, visiting the centers of philosophic studies in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev (see Notes and Comments on page 204).

Dr. S. Müller-Markus delivered lectures at the Universities of Neuchâtel, Bern, Zürich, Bonn and Graz.

Examinations: The first examination session was held in the Institute on July 1 to 10 (the teaching program was started in Autumn, 1962). Eight candidates passed the final examinations of the Program F (basic Sovietology).

International conference: An international conference of the directors of studies of the main Sovietological and Marxological centers of Europe met in Fribourg at the Institute on May 24–25, 1963. The conference, which was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, was devoted to the problems of coordination of research and publications of studies in Marxism and Leninism. The Institute was represented at the conference by Professor J. M. Bocheński and Dr. T. J. Blakeley.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Sat, 17 Sep 2016 02:30:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Visitors: Professor Gerhard Niemeyer, professor at the University of Notre Dame and visiting professor at the University of Münich, spoke on June 19, 1963, at the Institute on 'The Various Concepts of Reality in Karl Marx'.

Professor M. L. Sondhi of the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi (India) paid a visit to the Institute on June 22, 1963.

Publications: The following new books have been published recently in the *Sovietica* series: Z. A. Jordan: *Philosophy and Ideology. The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland since the Second World War* (1963, XII + 600 pp.); H. Fleischer: *Kleines Textbuch der kommunistischen Ideologie. Auszüge aus dem Lehrbuch "Osnovy marksizma-leninizma" mit Register* (1963, XIII + 116 pp.).

The fourth issue of the *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* is in print and will appear Autumn 1963. The fifth issue, containing the indices of the four preceding issues, has been completed and will appear in 1964.

L. Vrtačič: *Einführung in den jugoslawischen Marxismus-Leninismus*, comprehending a complete bibliography of Jugoslav philosophical writings, is in print.

Research in progress: The following subjects are under active and advanced elaboration by the members of the Institute: Soviet philosophy of micro-physics; The notion of truth in the language of micro-physics according to Soviet philosophy; Soviet ethics; Soviet formal logic and cybernetics; Soviet ontology; Soviet epistemology; Soviet esthetics; Aristotle in Soviet philosophy; Soviet criticism of modern empiricism; S. L. Rubinštejn as a philosopher; Ideology and its relation to philosophy in Jugoslav Marxism-Leninism; Recent Hungarian Marxism-Leninism.

Dr. S. Müller-Markus has completed the second volume of his *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie*, covering the discussion on the general theory of relativity.

Programs of Studies: The Institute offers this year, as in the past, four distinct programs for graduate students:

F: Basic Sovietology; one year; B. A. or B. Sc. required.

H: Higher Sovietological studies; two years; completed program *F* or equivalent required.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Sat, 17 Sep 2016 02:30:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

K: Combined studies in philosophy and Sovietology; four to five years; B. A. required.

P: Special program for physicists; three years; M. A. or Ph. D. in theoretical physics required.

After successfully passing the examinations, the hearers of Program *F* may obtain the certificate of studies in Basic Sovietology; those of Programs *H* and *K*, the diploma of Sovietology which may be combined with an M. A. or even a Ph. D. in Philosophy. Program *P* offers the same diploma with the possibility of obtaining a Ph. D. in Philosophy or Physics.

The following special courses will be offered by the Institute during the academic year 1963–1964: Lenin, Scientific Atheism, Soviet Philosophy of Physics.

This content downloaded from 128.210.126.199 on Sat, 17 Sep 2016 02:30:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

CONTENTS

K. A. Wittfogel / Some Remarks on Mao's Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics

Mao Tse-tung / On Dialectical Materialism. A Fragment.

H. Fleischer / Der Kern der materialistischen Dialektik.

J. M. Bocheński / Research in Soviet Philosophy at the Fribourg Institute of East-European Studies 1958–1963.

Notes and Comments

Soviet Philosophers at the Thirteenth International Congress of Philosophy – A New Angle on Dialectical Logic – On Man – Kant's Collected Works in Russian – Hungarian Critique of Soviet Philosophy – A Useful Bibliography – National Conference on Ethics in Hungary – Controversy on Culture.

Reviews

V. P. Čertkov: Jadro dialektiki (H. Fleischer)
A. I. Uëmov: Vešči, svojstva i otnošenija (H. Fleischer)
Branko Bošjnak: Povijest filozofije kao nauka (L. Vrtačič)
Nikolaus Lobkowicz: Materialism and Matter in Marxism-Leninism (K. G. Ballestrem)

Chronology (1963)

Report from the Institute

Volume III (1963)

Index of Names
Index of Subjects
Table of Contents

The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by the editors or members of the Institute

Printed in The Netherlands

This content downloaded from 128.223.86.31 on Tue, 13 Sep 2016 11:30:08 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

KARL A. WITTFOGEL

SOME REMARKS ON MAO'S HANDLING OF CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS OF DIALECTICS[1]

I

The first volume of the official edition[2] of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works*, published initially in October 1951, contained an essay 'On Practice'. The second volume, published initially in March 1952, contained an essay 'On Contradictions'. Both pieces deal specifically with philosophical problems; and, according to introductory editorial notes, both were originally presented as lectures at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yenan in July and August 1937 respectively. The two pieces are noteworthy because they are the only discussions of Communist philosophy that Mao included in his *Selected Works*. They are noteworthy also for other reasons. In contrast to many of Mao's lectures that were given prior to or during World War II and printed (and sometimes even reprinted) before they appeared in the official edition of Mao's *Works*, 'On Practice' and 'On Contradictions' do not seem to have been published until 1951 and 1952 respectively.

And even in 1951–1952 the second of the two pieces was given rather unusual treatment. 'On Contradictions' – much longer and much more important than 'On Practice'–was not originally published in the first edition of the *Selected Works* at the end of Volume I where it belongs chronologically, but at the end of Volume II. An editorial note in the first Chinese and Russian editions of Volume II acknowledged that it was out of place and declared that in later editions it would be found at the end of Volume I, where indeed it now is.[3]

Why was the publication of 'On Contradictions' in the *Selected Works* so long delayed? The just-cited editorial note is silent on this point. But a second editorial note to the essay declares that "on its inclusion in the present collection the author has made certain additions, abbreviations, and corrections".[4] At first glance this statement seems superfluous, since a general announcement printed in Volume I and signed by the Editorial Board of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

Charge of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* advises the reader that Mao checked all items and made certain changes.[5] The first edition (1951) speaks of "some technical changes", the second (1952) of "changes... corrections and revisions". Did the supreme editor, Mao, through the second note inform a group of initiated readers that he had taken particular pains to revise 'On Contradictions'? And was the publication of the essay postponed until March 1952 because its revision was a complicated and time-consuming job?

II

The history of the publication of 'On Contradictions' confirms what is suggested by internal evidence and supported by external evidence – namely that in 1937 Mao actually lectured on contradictions and practice. Internal evidence: On the basis of a primarily theoretical inquiry, 'On Contradictions', like 'On Practice', asserts the correctness of the policy of a new united front with the Nationalists, a thesis which hardly needed proving in 1951–1952, but which was of crucial importance in 1937. External evidence: During my visit in Japan in November 1957 a distinguished former member of the Japanese foreign service told me that in September 1937 the head of Japanese military intelligence in Shanghai advised him of a speech on contradictions that Mao had shortly before made in Yenan.[6]

The history of the publication of 'On Practice' and 'On Contradictions' points to still another and much more fundamental fact. It shows that Mao, who could incisively formulate the essentials of a political and military situation, was not equally at ease when dealing with the conceptual abstractions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

This intellectual unevenness manifested itself in Mao's handling of such a key philosophical problem as the dialectics of contradictions. It manifested itself also – and quite dramatically – in Mao's only attempt to discuss Communist philosophy as a whole. The visible result of this attempt is Chapter I of 'On Dialectical Materialism', a translation of which is given below. This chapter, entitled 'Idealism and Materialism', was published in two instalments in a little Shanghai magazine, *Min Chu* (Democracy), in March 1940. To my knowledge no further chapters appeared. Certain events that followed the publication of the two instal-

ments make it likely that Mao never completed the manuscript. In any case, no full treatment of dialectical materialism, and not even the fragment of 1940, is included in Mao's *Selected Works.*

III

For a number of years the published chapter of Mao's study seems to have gone unnoticed. The Chinese History Project first found the second instalment in the Chinese Collection of Columbia University, and it obtained the initial instalment in 1962 through the courtesy of Mr. Eugene Wu, Curator of the East Asian Collection of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, who had acquired it in Taiwan. The problems presented by the fragment are high-lighted by a report on the critical attitude of high-ranking Chinese Communists toward Mao's 1940 venture. The information is contained in *Red Failure in Sinkiang*, an autobiographical account by General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who was governor of Sinkiang from 1933–1944. In 1933, while visiting in Moscow, General Sheng was made a member of the CPSU with the understanding that "at some later date" he would also be permitted to join the Chinese Communist Party.[7] He was a candidate of that party in 1942 when he broke with the Communists and returned to the Chinese Nationalist fold.[8] He moved with the Nationalists to Taiwan, where he wrote *Red Failure*, which Dr. Allen S. Whiting translated (from the manuscript) into English and published with some additional data as the second part of his book, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*

According to Sheng, in November 1940, there came to Tihua three Stalin emissaries who exacted from him a fifty-year lease of Sinkiang's tin mines for Soviet exploitation. "Not too long before", General Sheng had seen "the galley proofs of Mao's writings on 'Dialectics'": and after reading "the first section", he told the Chinese Communist, Fang Lin[9], that he would be interested in seeing more. But Fang, he continues, "turned aside my request for having Yenan send part two, saying: 'You had better not read it. From the theoretical point of view, Chairman Mao's "Dialectics" is full of errors'." When Sheng requested clarification Fang "refused to make any further comment".[10]

After the visit of Stalin's emissaries in November 1940 Chou En-lai passed through Sinkiang on his way to Moscow. General Sheng used this

opportunity to tell him of his conversation with Fang, quoting Fang's critical remarks and carefully avoiding, on his own part, any expressions of disrespect toward Mao. But this caution proved entirely unnecessary. "Chou surprised me... when he replied: 'Since Chairman Mao was too busy with his official duties at the time, he might have missed some of the theoretical points which he should have included in the book. It is very difficult for anyone to study philosophy, and errors can creep in without the writer's knowledge'." Sheng interrupted: "But even if Chairman Mao had made some errors, it is improper for Fang Lin to criticize them in public. Instead of attacking the theoretical concepts of his leader before others, he should suggest to Chairman Mao directly where corrections might be made." Thereupon Chou withdrew from the implications of his previous remark and replied: "You did quite right and I agree with you fully... Chinese Communist Party members, especially top-ranking ones, should not criticize political or theoretical errors of Chairman Mao in public. They should first discuss the matter privately with Chairman Mao himself."[11]

IV

To judge from Fang Lin's attitude and Chou En-lai's remarks, a number of high-ranking Chinese Communists felt that Mao in his discussion of dialectical materialism had committed "theoretical errors" and that he had disregarded certain points "which he should have included in the book". The "book": Did Chou know that Mao was planning a book-length presentation? Errors and omissions: According to whom? Any professional Communist philosopher who dared to criticize the head of a very important Communist Party must have been backed by the highest political authorities – ultimately by the Kremlin itself.

After the Long March – October 1935 – and the establishment of a small territorial base in Shensi (first capital: Pao-an) negotiations between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists about an anti-Japanese united front were in progress, and communications between the Red Shensi headquarters and the outer world became easier. In the summer of 1936 Edgar Snow reached Pao-an without serious difficulty. And at least since 1937 airplanes had been flying between Moscow and the Red capital[12], which in December 1936 was moved to Yenan. The Soviet

consulate in Shanghai was usually among the first recipients of important Party publications, and the transmission of such material from Shanghai to Moscow and of critical comments from Moscow to Yenan was then technically quite simple.

These facts indicate the external conditions under which Mao wrote the original versions of 'On Practice' and 'On Contradictions' (probably in the spring and early summer of 1937) and the first chapter of 'On Dialectical Materialism' (probably in the winter of 1939/1940). But they are fully meaningful only after we identify (1) the state of Mao's dialectical thinking prior to 1936 and (2) the major writings on Marxist-Leninist philosophy that became available to the interested Chinese reader from 1936 to 1939.

A detailed discussion of these two factors necessitates comprehensive knowledge of the pertinent sources and their comparative study by means of an interdisciplinary approach. In the hope that such a study will be undertaken soon, I shall be content for the present purpose to offer a few, but in my opinion highly relevant, data. With regard to Mao's philosophical ideas prior to 1936 I shall concentrate on the development of his attitude toward the core of Marxist-Leninist dialectics – his use of the concept of contradictions for analysis and political orientation.

V

The early political statements of the Chinese Communists suggest that until the end of the first united front with the Nationalists the leaders of the CCP were not yet in the habit of defining internal and international conflicts in terms of contradictions (*mao-tun*). In the *Political Programs of the Past Five Years*, a collection of major Party documents, published in 1926, this term appears only once – in the Manifesto of the Second Party Congress which was held in the summer of 1922.[13] In the months preceding this Congress, Moscow worked hard to convert the Chinese Communists from the non-Leninist sectarian radicals of the First Congress[14] into Leninist Communists.[15] In November 1922 Radek bluntly stated that thus far no Eastern Communist Party had done "any independent intellectual work".[16] Under the circumstances it seems legitimate to assume that the introduction of the term, contradictions, as an analytic device was due to the influence of the Comintern envoys who, by that

time, had begun systematically to supervise the work of the CCP.

To be sure, occasional references to contradictions did not transform the Chinese Communists into seasoned dialectical materialists. Even Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the first head of the CCP, who was relatively well versed in the political tenets of the Communist doctrine, was not, in philosophical matters, more advanced than his comrades. In an article published in the official weekly of the Party in March 1926, he used the term 'contradictions' in a quotation taken from a Left Kuomintang pamphlet.[17] This was the time when Soviet penetration of the left wing of the Nationalist Party had gone very far.

In Mao's writings of the first united-front period the term 'contradictions' seems to have appeared initially in his 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society', published in February 1926. It is used twice to describe the 'ambivalent' (*mao-tun*) attitude of the Chinese national bourgeoisie toward the revolution[18], that is, it points not to an objective economic or social contradiction, but to a political and psychological one (the 1922 Manifesto had used the term in the same way). In the earliest available version of Part III of the 'Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan' – the 'Report' was first published in 1927 – Mao does not present the conflicts in the villages in terms of contradictions.[19] A reference to "the contradiction between town and country" appears only in the revised version of the 'Report' in volume I of Mao's *Selected Works* (1951).[20]

The original indifference of the Chinese Communist leaders to the dialectical approach becomes all the more striking if we know that translations of Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism*, which discussed the major international conflicts in terms of contradictions[21], began to appear in China from 1924.[22] It cannot be laid to the hectic activities of the Communist leaders during the first united-front period. More probably it was due to the fact that, in contrast to certain other countries in which there also were young Communist parties, China had virtually no Marxist tradition.

VI

The Session of the Enlarged Plenum of the Provisional Politburo of the CCP, held on November 14, 1927, marked the definite turn from alliance

with the Nationalists to a policy of all-out civil war against them. Like the emergency conference of August 7, 1927, which demoted the first head of the Party, Ch'en Tü-hsiu, and installed Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai in his stead, the November 14th Session was directed by B. Lominadze, who had arrived shortly before the first conference to implement Stalin's changing China policy. Although, at the time, Lominadze committed certain theoretical 'mistakes' (he viewed traditional Chinese society as 'Asiatic' and the struggle in China as involving a 'permanent revolution'), the CCP statements made under his guidance interpreted the major political tensions in terms of contradictions very much in line with Stalin's use of the concept in his *Foundations of Leninism*. The 'Resolution on China's Present Conditions and the Tasks of the Communist Party', adopted by the Enlarged Plenum on November 14, 1927, contains the following passage: "The counter-revolution in Shanghai, Kwangtung, and Wuhan not only failed to solve the contradictions in China's societal relations, it sharpened and increased these contradictions, and furthermore it precipitated the breach of these contradictions... The national bourgeoisie wants to utilize the conflicts and contradictions between the imperialists." Despite the setback, the Chinese revolution continues to develop "because the conflicts and contradictions between the ruling class themselves are very acute".[23]

Thus the new revolutionary line that emerged from the ashes of the united-front policy was doctrinally associated with an increasing emphasis on the Leninist-Stalinist version of the concept of contradictions. We will do well to keep this in mind when contemplating Mao's career during the period of guerrilla warfare and the establishment of regional Communist power bases ('soviets').

In 1928 Mao participated prominently in these activities in Central China. According to a report written by him in the Chingkang Mountains and dated November 25, 1928, the Hunan Front Committee, of which he then was the secretary, had received a copy of the November 14th Resolution in April 1928.[24] In October of that year a resolution of the Second Conference of the County Representatives in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area, drafted by Mao, considered the survival of regional Communist power centers dependent upon the continuance of serious contradictions in the internal and international situations. "The contradictions and struggles among the various cliques and warlords in China reflect the

contradictions and struggles among the various imperialist powers."[25] Manifestly here Mao was using the dialectical arguments provided by the November Plenum; and going beyond the Plenum, he made a positive correlation between China's internal contradictions and the external contradictions within the imperialist camp.

The interlinking of these two sets of contradictions is indicative of Mao's interest in the use of general concepts. However, it took more than a year of political and doctrinal developments before he again resorted to the contradiction-based argument. In the summer of 1928 the Comintern had held its Sixth World Congress in Moscow; at the same time and also in Moscow the CCP had held its Sixth Congress. The Comintern Congress systematically discussed the international situation, predicting that the growing contradictions of an expanding capitalism would result in a new revolutionary upsurge. Speakers at the Comintern Congress followed Bukharin in calling the 'capitalistic stabilization' and the new revolutionary upsurge that allegedly was forming in its womb the 'third period'.[26] And Stalin, who soon after the Congress engineered Bukharin's demotion because Bukharin opposed his plan to collectivize Soviet agriculture, took it upon himself to modify the concept of the 'third period' by placing much more stress on the alleged revolutionary upsurge in various parts of the world, China included.[27] Obviously such a picture of the international situation would hearten his supporters and dishearten the victims of the collectivization policy which he initiated at the close of 1928.

Following the line of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, the Sixth Congress of the CCP in its Political Resolution also described China's internal and international situation in terms of contradictions.[28] By the spring of 1929 the leaders of the Central Chinese Soviets, Mao among them, had learned about the Resolutions which the CCP had adopted the previous summer.[29] It seems safe to assume that by that time they had also learned about the decisions of the Sixth Comintern Congress, which under the influence of the Stalin-dominated Soviet delegation[30], went somewhat beyond Bukharin's relatively cautious view of the "third period". But Stalin's ideas on the intensification of the global contradictions which he had been openly propounding since December 1928[31] were still unknown in the Chinese Soviet areas when in a letter to the Central Committee, obviously written by Mao and dated April 5, 1929, a reference was made to the CCP's Resolutions of the summer of 1928.

This letter, which Mao cited at length in his subsequent letter to Lin Piao, already predicted the coming of a revolutionary upsurge and the weakening of the various hostile forces in the three provinces of South China ("the Kuomintang will collapse completely"). It foresaw the possibility of closing in on Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, proposed "contending with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi"[32], and criticized the Central Committee (then headed by Li Li-san) for being too pessimistic. But the *Selected Works* go beyond this. They represent the April 1929 letter as speaking of "the intensification of contradictions within the ruling camp".[33] An earlier version of this letter contains no such sentence.[34]

Because of the efforts of the anti-Communist forces to keep the Red guerrilla areas isolated, Mao and his comrades usually learned about new political developments in Moscow some six to nine months after they had occurred. Hence Stalin's statement of December 1928 on the intensification of the global contradictions may have reached Mao in the summer or fall of 1929; by the end of the year he may also have heard of Stalin's still stronger statement of April 1929. In January 1930 Mao wrote the just mentioned letter to Lin Piao, which, considerably revised, appeared in the *Selected Works* under the title: 'A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire'. In this letter Mao depicts China's internal and international situation as a mass of contradictions which he expected would quickly culminate in an open revolutionary conflagration. It will be remembered that the Chinese Communist attack on the cities, which Mao's Front Committee had been recommending since April 1929 and which in the summer of 1930 Li actually unleashed, ended disastrously and that after its failure it was condemned as the 'Li Li-san line', first by the Comintern (whose third-period policy had stimulated it) and later by Mao who had pleaded for it since 1929. Mao's very 'scientific' and very involved argument of January 1930 ran as follows:

"If it is asked whether the revolutionary upsurge will arise soon in China, we can give a definite answer only after studying carefully whether the contradictions leading to the revolutionary upsurge are developing. If we really understand that contradictions are developing internationally between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between imperialism and the proletariat, [and that] consequently the imperialists feel all the more urgently the need to

contend for China; that as the imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily expanding and intensifying strife thus follows between the ruling classes in China and the contradictions between them develop daily; that from these contradictions between the rulers – the strife between the warlords – follows a ruthless increase in taxation; thus the development of the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the rulers is accelerated with every passing day; that from the contradiction between imperialism and China's capitalism follows the failure of the Chinese bourgeoisie to obtain concessions from imperialism; this intensifies the contradiction between China's bourgeoisie and China's working class, with the Chinese bourgeoisie trying to increase its exploitation of the working class; that from the dumping of commodities by imperialism, the inroads of merchant capital, and the increase of the tax burden, follows the sharpening of the contradiction between the landlords and the peasants; the exploitation through rent and usury becomes heavier; that because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the broad masses of the workers and peasants, and the increase in taxation by the government, dealers in domestic products and independent small producers are forced daily further on the road to bankruptcy; that because troops are endlessly spread out without sufficient provisions and funds to support them, wars multiply every day and the masses of soldiers constantly find themselves in straitened circumstances; that because of the increase in taxation by the government, the mounting burden of rent and interest demanded by the landlords, and the daily extension of the horrors of war, famine and banditry have spread all over the whole country and the broad masses of the peasantry and the city poor are brought to such a pass that they can hardly survive; that because funds are lacking for keeping schools open, students are worried about the interruption of their education; and because China is backward in her production, many graduates are deprived of the hope of obtaining employment; if once we understand all these contradictions in the above, we shall see how desperately precarious is the situation, and how chaotic the state in which China finds herself. We shall see also how inevitably the revolutionary upsurge against the imperialists, the warlords and the land-

lords will arise, and very speedily at that. China is littered all over with dry firewood which will soon be kindled into a conflagration. The proverb 'A single spark can start a prairie fire' appropriately describes how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the nation-wide development of the workers' strikes, peasants' uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, merchants' strikes, and students' strikes in various places, to see that it is no longer a 'spark', and the time for it to become a 'prairie fire' is not far away."[35]

Mao accompanied this argument with a criticism of certain comrades "who observe only the appearance, but not the essence" of the political situation and who "often unwittingly generalize and magnify what after all are only momentary, particular, and local conditions, as if the whole situation in China and throughout the world was dark and gloomy, and the prospect for a victorious revolution dim and remote". They are pessimistic "because they have not made a scientific analysis of the essence of the general situation".[36] On the basis of his supposedly scientific approach Mao demanded a concentration of the Red forces which "will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy the cities".[37] He quoted the passage from the Front Committee's letter of April 1929 which predicted the complete collapse of the Kuomintang regime,[38] and the expressed the expectation that the Red armies would seize Kiangsi Province – if not within the year, as the April letter had announced, nevertheless 'soon'.[39]

Obviously Mao had become very adept in describing conflicting trends in terms of contradictions. Obviously also the skilful use of dialectical formulas was no substitute for a realistic analysis of the relative strengths of these trends. The subsequent developments showed that Mao had profoundly misjudged the revolutionary potential of the 1930 situation. Far from collapsing, the Kuomintang government consolidated itself in the next years; and the Communists, far from occupying the cities and whole provinces, remained confined in Central China to their rural power bases, and in 1934 they were compelled to abandon these bases altogether. Two decades later Mao obliquely admitted the faultiness of his 'scientific' analysis of January 1930. In the version of the Lin Piao letter published in 1951 he presented a watered-down version of his original predictions and he completely eliminated his assertion concerning the imminent collapse of the Kuomintang regime.[40]

VII

Until the end of the Soviet period Mao occasionally discussed the current situation in terms of contradictions[41], but his basic approach remained unchanged. He was certainly aware of the doctrine of dialectical materialism, and in dealing with practical problems he applied such quasi-philosophical concepts as subjectivism. But he did not, to our knowledge, in any lecture or article discuss as such the various aspects of the underlying theory.

In this respect the two philosophical essays of 1937 and 'On Dialectical Materialism' represent a new phase. Ch'en Po-ta, who became a close collaborator of Mao on theoretical matters, stated in 1950 that Mao had settled down to a comprehensive study of the then orthodox form of Communist theory, Stalinism, only "during the anti-Japanese war".[42] No doubt the peculiar way in which the Communists were fighting the war gave Mao considerable time for theoretical study. But manifestly he had begun to occupy himself with philosophical matters already in 1936 when, due to the changed political situation, Chinese translations of Soviet books arrived in the Northwest in increasing numbers.

In the context of our inquiry one of these books was of particular importance: the Chinese version of a long and systematic exposition of 'dialectical materialism' that in 1935 appeared in the new edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* prepared by several Soviet scholars, headed by Mitin, who after the defeat of Deborin and his associates (in 1931) became "the leading philosopher of the thirties".[43] The Chinese translation of this Encyclopedia article was done by Ai Ssu-chi and Cheng I-li (Ai was a Communist author who, prior to 1936, had written among other things a book on the relation between theory and practice and who later in Yenan became the editor of the leading Communist daily). The translation appeared in Peiping as a 200 page book, *Hsin Che-hsüeh Ta-kang* (Outline of New Philosophy). The first printing is dated June 1936. Others followed in quick succession.

Edgar Snow had come to the Chinese Communist capital in June and begun his 'formal interviews' with Mao on July 16. He reports that one of his nightly conversations on Communist history was interrupted by a visitor who brought "several new books on philosophy". Obviously this was a momentous event. "Mao asked me to postpone our engagements.

He consumed these books in three or four nights of intensive reading, during which he seemed oblivious to everything else."[44]

Was the *Outline of New Philosophy* one of the new arrivals? Whatever the answer to this question may be, Mao's advisers in matters of Communist theory certainly knew that at this time the most authoritative interpretation of dialectical materialism had been made by Mitin. And since from 1936 on this interpretation was available in China through the *Outline*, it seems safe to assume that Mao had obtained a copy of this book when he began seriously to study Communist philosophy. In April 1937, that is three months before Mao gave his first philosophical lecture, the *Outline* had its fourth printing. If the revised texts of the two lecture-essays in any way resemble the original versions, then Mao in 1937 leaned heavily – though not exclusively – on the *Outline*. Technically speaking, it is entirely possible that Mao in 1937 discussed the deviations of the Deborin school[45], because this issue was critically discussed in the *Outline*[46], and that he also quoted Lenin's remark on the occurrence of non-antagonistic contradictions under socialism[47] because this remark is also included in the *Outline*.[48]

But no matter what details of argument and citation appeared in the 1937 essays (or were added in the 1951–1952 versions), in 1937, and in contrast to his previous procedure, Mao made the explanation of fundamental dialectical problems the center of his presentation. In both cases he drew practical conclusions – conclusions which tended to strengthen the wholehearted supporters of the new united-front line and which tended to stigmatize those who were reluctant to accept it (such as Chang Kuo-t'ao). Mao had discussed the crucial political points before; but his 1937 lectures gave his political arguments a new depth in that they elaborated the dialectical materialistic principles which allegedly sanctioned the new line. Thus 'On Practice' and 'On Contradictions' would be apt to consolidate Mao's position as supreme political and theoretical leader of the Party.

VIII

According to a Lenin statement which Mao repeated, the 'law' of contradictions was 'the essence of dialectic'. Hence, although 'On Practice' dealt with an important epistemological aspect of dialectical materialism, 'On Contradictions' dealt with its most significant single issue. Together they

prepared the ground for a full presentation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which Mao initiated by publishing 'On Dialectical Materialism', Chapter I, 'Idealism and Materialism', in March 1940. How did Mao go about writing it?

As noted above, when Mao was preparing his two philosophical essays in 1937 there was available in China a translation of the comprehensive *Soviet Encyclopedia* article, 'Dialectical Materialism' by Mitin *et al.*; and, if the versions published in 1951–1952 approximated the originals, Mao had leaned heavily on it from the outset. In the case of his 1940 fragment there is no 'if'. Here we have the undoctored text – and this text shows that Mao used not only the 1935 Encyclopedia article, but also and most liberally another work, *Dialektičeskij Materializm*, which, under the editorship of the Soviet philosopher Mitin, was published in Moscow in 1933. Chapters II and III of this Soviet work had appeared as Chapters I and II of a Chinese book of nearly 550 pages, *Che-hsüeh Hsüan-chi* (*Selected Philosophical Writings*), again edited by Ai Ssu-chi and published in Shanghai in March 1939. Textual examination reveals that for Chapter I of his 'On Dialectical Materialism' Mao except for a few omissions and syntactical and editorial rearrangements, took over literally sizable passages from Chapter I of the *Che-hsüeh Hsüan-chi* (i.e., from Chapter II of Mitin's book of 1933) and also some sizable passages from the *Outline of New Philosophy*. (i.e. from the Encyclopedia article of 1935). In the following translation of Mao's chapter the passages he lifted – with or without editorial changes – are placed within brackets. The attached footnotes refer to the Chinese books from which the passages were taken; they also give the corresponding pagination of the original Soviet sources.

Further inquiry may identify further correlations. Our analysis establishes that some 40 per cent of Mao's chapter consists of passages that are either literally or with some editing taken from Chinese translations of Soviet presentations of dialectical materialism. The arguments in the rest of the text paraphrase ideas that can largely be found in the *Outline of New Philosophy* and the *Selected Philosophical Writings*.

IX

The just given data provide a fuller background to the remarks which,

according to General Sheng, Fang Lin and Chou En-lai made about Mao's discussion of dialectics in the fall of 1940. Did Mao's new philosophical venture create a problem only because it contained theoretical omissions and errors?

A point by point examination of the not plagiarized parts of the 1940 fragment will, if measured by the standards of contemporary Soviet philosophy, disclose the 'errors' Mao committed. Two examples of, problematic omissions may be found in Section One of his chapter. In the third paragraph the Chinese passage which he copied has "idealism... *often* performs a reactionary function".[49] Mao discarded the word 'often'. The Chinese passage reproduced in his next sentence speaks of "the struggle between *the inclination* toward idealism and *the inclination toward* materialism".[50] Mao wrote "the struggle between idealism and materialism". In both cases he claimed that the correlation between sociopolitical position and philosophy was a rigid one, whereas the two sources took pains to present it only as a dominant tendency.

The criticism Chou En-lai voiced may have been based in part on deficiencies of this kind. But our comparative study of the text of the published chapter points to another aspect of the matter that was fraught with very embarrassing political implications. In November 1939 the *Outline of New Philosophy* had its ninth printing, and in December 1939 the *Selected Philosophical Writings* its second – that is, by the spring of 1940 many Chinese interested in Marxist-Leninist theory could have read both books. The publication of further chapters of Mao's 'On Dialectical Materialism' would have exposed Mao's performance to increasing scrutiny – and before long his friends (and enemies) would realize that he had copied substantial parts of his presentation from the work of others. At a time when the Chinese Communists were making a great effort to enhance not only their political power, but also their intellectual prestige, such a discovery would have been most harmful.

X

Mao's large-scale plagiarism probably goes far to explain why the publication of his 'On Dialectical Materialism' was discontinued soon after it got under way. However, it does not explain why Mao failed to publish in his *Selected Works* a revised version of 'Idealism and Ma-

terialism' as he had done with 'On Practice' and 'On Contradictions'. The two essays may also have contained plagiarized passages, particularly in their abstract (essentially conceptual) arguments. But both were focused on limited problems. This provided ample opportunities for elaborating on political and historical issues – which Mao relished. Hence, if the 1937 versions contained plagiarized passages, there may have been fewer of them; and they could be more easily paraphrased – deplagiarized.

The discussion of the principles of dialectical materialism was less conducive to concrete digression; and the need to concentrate on abstract concepts was much more urgent. In his Chapter I Mao sought to satisfy this need, especially when he gave his basic definitions in Sections One and Two. It is just in these sections that he resorted most extensively to copying earlier formulations.

The facts in themselves are incontestable. But can't they be explained otherwise? Wasn't Mao, in 1939–1940, deeply involved in political and military matters? Chou En-lai stressed this point in his conversation with General Sheng, and it certainly was so. However, two years later he found time to discuss problems of subjectivism[51], art and literature[52] in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory. Moreover, although the revision of 'On Contradictions' presented considerable difficulties, he found time to work the essay over and have it published in 1952. All this suggests that the extensive plagiarism to which Mao resorted in his 1940 chapter was not the decisive deterrent to the completion of this work, but only an indication of a much more serious obstacle: his inability to expound comprehensively the concepts inherent in Hegelian-Marxist dialectics.

After 1940 Mao or the Mao-directed Central Committee of the CCP repeatedly discussed critical situations in terms of contradictions. Cases in point are the 'Resolution on some Questions in the History of the Party' (1945)[53], the editorial 'On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' (April 5, 1956), the 'Resolution on the Political Report of the Central Committee of the CCP', adopted on September 27, 1956, the editorial 'More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' (December 29, 1956), Mao's speech 'On the Proper Handling of Contradictions among the People' (published with radical changes on June 18, 1951) and the letter of the CCP leaders to the leaders of the CPSU, dated June 14, 1963. It is imperative to recognize the quasi-dialectical pattern that characterizes the analytic key passages of these

documents. But it is equally imperative to recognize that neither as editor of his *Selected Works* nor otherwise has Mao made another attempt to give a systematic account of the dialectical core of Communist philosophy.

Obviously then, the fragment 'On Dialectical Materialism' is more than an example of crude plagiarism, although among other things it is certainly this. It is more than a device for identifying Mao's theoretical development during the early years of the Yenan period, although it is certainly this also. Ultimately, and most importantly, it is a manifestation of the peculiar conceptual limitations of a man who, in political and military matters (and predominantly on a tactical level), has, during the early and middle phases of his career, often made shrewd analyses and highly effective decisions.

REFERENCES

1. Mr. C. S. Chao contributed substantially to the research on which the introduction is based; and the author of the introduction checked the terminology and annotation of the translation.
2. Unofficial selections of a number of Mao's writings had been published previously. They are useful for the student interested in Mao's career because they often preserve earlier versions of texts that were considerably revised for the official edition of the *Selected Works*.
3. In the first Chinese edition this note appears on the back of the title page; in the first Russian edition it precedes the text of the essay. The first British and American editions of volume II have no such note because they appeared two years later when the shifting of the essay had already been accomplished in the Chinese and Russian editions. In the two English-language editions this essay appears as the first item of volume II.
4. See Mao Tse-tung: *Hsüan-chi*. Vol. II (first edition), Peking, 1952, p. 766. In the British edition, of which volumes I and II were first published in 1954, the above-cited passage appears on page 13; it is rendered "additions, deletions and revisions" (This edition is hereafter cited as Mao, *SW*).
5. In the British edition the announcement is called "Publisher's Note". This is not quite accurate since the responsible agency was a very high Party body whose declared function was essentially editorial. The American edition, which reproduces the text as given in the British edition, does not contain this announcement at all. Only a brief unsigned note appears on the back of the title page. The pagination, which follows the British edition, indicates that pages 9 and 10, which in the London edition carry the "Publisher's Note", are omitted in the New York edition.
6. According to my informant, Dr. Ito Nobubumi, the General had commented essentially on the political aspect of the matter: "They are talking about contradictions. Obviously they are having troubles."

7. See General Sheng Shih-ts'ai: 'Red Failure in Sinkiang'. Part Two of *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* by Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai (East Lansing, Michigan, 1958), p. 206.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
9. Fang was stationed at Tihua as representative of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army (*Ibid.*, p. 229; cf. pp. 189 f.).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 230 f.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 188 f.
13. *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang wu nien lai chi cheng-chih chu-chang* (The Political Program of the Chinese Communist Party during the last Five Years), Canton. 1926. p. 15.
14. See Ch'en Kung-po: *The Communist Movement in China.* New York, Columbia University East Asian Institute No. 7, September 1960, pp. 106 ff.
15. See Radek's speech at the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (Petrograd-Moskau vom 5. November bis 5. Dezember 1922. Hamburg. 1923), pp. 632 f.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
17. See *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, no. 190, March 6, 1926, 2045 f.
18. *Chung-kuo nung-min* no. 2 (1926) 4. In the English-language editions the term *mao-tun* is once translated as 'contradictory' and once as 'dilemma' (*SW* I, p.14).
19. See Mao Tse-tung: *Hsüan-chi,* Chin-ch'a-chi edition, no place, 1947, Supplement, vol. I, pp. 40 f. (Hereafter cited as Mao, *Hsüan-chi,* 1947).
20. Mao, *SW* I, p. 54.
21. J. Stalin. *Works.* Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952–1955. 13 vols. Vol. VI, pp. 74 ff., 152, 161. (Hereafter cited as Stalin, *Works*)
22. See *Chung-kuo ch'u-pan shih-liao*, Pu-pien. Peking, 1957, p. 466.
23. *Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'e* (Bolshevik), no. 6, 140 (published either at the close of 1927 or early in 1928.)
24. Mao: *Hsüan-chi*, 1947, vol. I, p. 56. This sentence is lacking in the doctored version of 'The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains', published in 1951 (*SW* I, pp. 72 f.).
25. Mao, *SW* I, p. 63.
26. *International Press Correspondence.* English ed. Vienna/London, 1920–1938. 1928, pp. 724 ff., 734 ff., 864 f., 1567, and *passim.*
27. See Stalin, *Works* XI, pp. 309 f. (December 19, 1928, starting point of the collectivization policy); XII, pp. 22 f. (April 1929), 254 ff. and 261 (June 27, 1930).
28. *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang ti liu tze tai-piao ta-hui chüeh-i-an* (Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party). Moscow. 1928. Political Resolution, pp. 13 f.
29. Mao, *SW* I, p. 122.
30. See Stalin, *Works* XII, pp. 22 ff.
31. *Ibid.* XI, pp. 308 f.
32. Mao, *Hsüan-chi.* 1947, Vol. IV, p. 97.
33. Mao, *SW* I, p. 126.
34. Mao, *Hsüan-chi.* 1947, Vol. IV, p. 97.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 92 f. For the 1951 version of this sentence see Mao, *SW* I, pp. 120 f.
36. Mao, *Hsüan-chi*, 1927, Vol. IV, p. 92.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 98 f.
40. Mao, *SW* I, pp. 126 f.
41. Cf. his political report before the Second Congress of the Central Chinese Soviet Government in January 1935 (*Chih yu Su-wei-ai neng-kou chiu Chung-kuo* [Only Soviets can save China]). Moscow. 1934. pp. 14 ff.
42. Ch'en Po-ta: 'Stalin and the Chinese Revolution'. In *700 Millions for Peace and Democracy*, Peking, 1950. p. 65.
43. Gustav A. Wetter: *Dialectical Materialism*, trans. by Peter Heath. New York, 1958. p. 176. Despite some ups and downs "Mitin has remained to this day one of the leading philosophers and theoreticians in the Soviet Union" (*op.cit.*, p. 178).. Professor Bochenski considers him the most important contemporary Soviet philosopher (I. M. Bochenski: *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus* (*Diamat*). 3d ed. Bern and Munich. 1960. p. 55).
44. Edgar Snow: *Red Star Over China*. New York. 1938. p. 71.
45. See Mao *SW* II, pp. 13 and 20 f.
46. See *Hsin Che-hsüeh Ta-kang* (Outline of New Philosophy), Peiping, 1936, pp. 147, 165 f., 312. (Hereafter cited as *ONP*)
47. Mao, *SW* II, p. 52.
48. See *ONP*, p. 241.
49. 'Wei-wu lun ho wei-hsin lun' (Materialism and Idealism). Chapter I of *Che-hsüeh hsüan-chi* (Selected Philosophical Writings). Shanghai. 1939. pp. 40 f. Italics added.
50. *ONP*, p. 189. Italics added.
51. Mao, *SW* III, pp. 16 f., 46 ff.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 70 ff.
53. *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 176 f., 198 ff.

MAO TSE-TUNG

ON DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM*

A FRAGMENT

CHAPTER I: IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

In this chapter the following questions will be discussed: (1) the war between the two camps of philosophy; (2) the difference between idealism and materialism; (3) the cause of the emergence and development of idealism; (4) the cause of the emergence and development of materialism.

1. The War between the Two Camps of Philosophy

[The whole history of philosophy is the history of the struggle and development of two mutually antagonistic camps of philosophy – idealism and materialism. All currents of philosophical thought and schools are variations of these two basic schools.][1]

[All theories of philosophy are built by persons of definite social classes and the consciousness of these persons is also historically determined by the life of a definite society. All theories of philosophy express the needs of definite social classes, reflect the level of development of the social productive powers[2] and the historical stage of man's knowledge of nature. The fate of philosophy depends on the extent to which it satisfies the needs of the social classes.][3]

[The social roots of idealism and materialism lie in the social structure of class contradictions. Original idealism was a product of the superstition and ignorance of primitive and barbaric man. Later, with the development of the productive powers which advanced man's scientific knowledge, idealism should have declined and materialism should have arisen and replaced it. However, from ancient times until now idealism not only did not decline; on the contrary, it has flourished, competing with materialism for supremacy, and neither can prevail over the other. This is due to the differentiation of classes in society: on the one hand, the oppressing classes that must develop and consolidate idealism for the sake of their interest,][4] and on the other hand, the oppressed classes that must develop

* Translated and annotated by C. S. Chao.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

and consolidate materialism for the sake of their interest. Idealism and materialism exist as instruments of class struggle. The antagonism between them will not cease until the classes are eliminated. [Idealism in the process of its historic development represents the ideology of the oppressing classes and performs a reactionary function, while materialism represents the outlook of the revolutionary classes and has grown and developed during its continuing struggle within class society against the reactionary philosophy,][5] idealism. Hence [from the beginning to the end the struggle between idealism and materialism in philosophy reflects the struggle between the interests of the reactionary classes and the revolutionary classes. Whether a philosopher realizes it or not, his philosophical inclination is invariably influenced by the class politics he learns, and any predisposition in philosophy always tends to support, directly or indirectly, the political interest of the class to which the philosopher belongs. In this sense, the crystallization of a definite philosophical predisposition also expresses the particular form that the policy of his class assumes.][6]

[The peculiarity of Marxist philosophy, *i.e.*, the peculiarity of dialectical materialism, makes for the clear and correct understanding that social consciousness (including philosophy) has a class character; it openly manifests its proletarian character, waging a resolute struggle against the bourgeois idealist philosophy and subordinating its special task to the general task of overthrowing capitalist institutions, establishing a proletarian dictatorship, and building a socialist society.][7] At the present stage in China the task of philosophy should be subordinate to the general task of overthrowing imperialism and the semi-feudal system, thoroughly realizing bourgeois democracy, and preparing for the transition to a socialist and communist society. [Philosophical theory and political practice must be closely interlinked.][8]

2. The Difference between Idealism and Materialism

[What is the basic difference between idealism and materialism? Their basic difference lies in the mutually opposed answers they give to the basic question of philosophy concerning the relation between spirit and matter (the question of the relation between consciousness and being). Idealism holds that spirit (consciousness, ideas, the subject) is the cause of everything in the world, and that matter (nature, society, the object) is

merely accessory. Materialism holds that matter exists independently and apart from spirit, and that spirit is merely accessory. From these mutually opposed answers to this fundamental question all different views about all questions arise.][9]

[From the idealistic point of view the world is either a complex created by our senses or a spiritual process created by man's thought or the world mind[10]; the external material world may be regarded either as an illusion or as the material shell of a spiritual essence and man's knowledge is the self-movement of the subject, it is the product of the spirit itself.][11]

3. The Cause of the Emergence and Development of Idealism

Idealism holds that matter is the product of the spirit; and this puts the world of reality upside down. Then, what is the cause of the emergence and development of this kind of philosophy?

As mentioned above, original idealism was a product of superstition and the ignorance of primitive and barbaric man. And later, with the development of productivity the separation of physical labor from mental labor was the primary condition for idealism becoming the line of philosophical thought. As a result of the development of productive powers, division of labor emerged in society, and with the development of the division of labor some persons were separated from others and engaged exclusively in mental labor. When the productive powers were still weak, their separation was not yet complete. However, with the emergence of classes and private property and when exploitation became the foundation of the life of the ruling classes, a great change took place: mental labor now became the privilege of the ruling classes and physical labor the fate of the oppressed classes. The ruling classes now began to examine their relation to the oppressed classes upside down, regarding it not as a relation in which the toilers provide them with material for subsistence, but one in which they provide the toilers with materials for livelihood. Therefore they despised physical labor, and as a result idealism emerged. One condition for eliminating idealistic philosophy is the elimination of the distinction between physical labor and mental labor.

The social root that enables the idealistic philosophy to develop lies chiefly in the fact that this kind of philosophical ideology consciously represents the interest of the exploiting classes. The dominance of idealistic philosophy in all spheres must be explained in this way. Without the

exploiting classes idealism would lose its social foundation. The final elimination of idealistic philosophy will be achieved only when classes have disappeared and a communist society is established.

[End of the first instalment published in *Min Chu*, no. 1, March 1940. What follows is the second instalment published in *Min Chu*, no. 2, March 20, 1940.]

We have to inspect the process of man's acquiring knowledge to discover why idealism has developed and deepened and is able to combat materialism. [The likelihood of man's slipping into idealism is there after he begins to employ concepts in his thinking. In thinking man has to employ concepts, hence our knowledge is easily split into two aspects, one concerned with things of an individual or particular nature, and one concerned with concepts of a general nature (for example, the judgment that "Yenan is a city"). But the particular and the general are actually interconnected and cannot be separated, and we would be divorced from objective truth if we separated them. Objective truth is the harmony of the general and the particular. Without the particular the general cannot exist, and without the general there can be no particular. Separating the general from the particular, that is, regarding the general as objective substance and the particular merely as the form of the general, is the method employed by all idealists. All idealists use consciousness, spirit, or ideas as a substitute for objective substance, which exists independently of man's consciousness.][12] Starting from this viewpoint, idealists strongly emphasize that man's consciousness can move in social practice. They fail to point out the materialist truth that consciousness is limited by matter; instead, they hold that only consciousness can move, and that matter is only a collective body which does not move. Furthermore, driven by their class nature, the idealists take various measures to exaggerate the capacity of consciousness to move, developing this aspect one-sidedly, expanding this mental aspect without any restraint and making it a dominant entity, thus obscuring and subjugating the other aspect; and this artificial and great entity is firmly established as the general world outlook and even transformed into an idol. In economics idealism excessively exaggerates the non-essential aspect of exchange, and elevates the law of supply and demand to the level of the fundamental law of capitalism. Many people see that science operates as a moving force in

social life, but they do not realize that its operation is conditioned and limited by definite social relations of production, and they therefore conclude that science is the force which sets society in motion. Idealistic historians regard heroes as makers of history. Idealistic politicians regard politics as omnipotent. Idealistic military strategists practice desperationism in fighting. And idealistic revolutionaries advocate Blanquism. The die-hards say the only way to revitalize the nation is to restore the traditional virtues. All these are the results of the excessive exaggeration that the subjects can move. Our thought cannot in one stroke reflect an object as a whole; it only constitutes the dialectical process through which the varied, multicolored, and live knowledge which is close to reality, is being formed. Basing itself on these characteristics of thought, idealism exaggerates the individual aspects, fails to present the process correctly, and hence distorts it. [Lenin said: "Man's knowledge is not a straight line, but a curve. Any section of this curve can be changed into an individual and complete straight line, and this straight line may bewilder you. The straightness of the line, the one-sidedness, the inflexible obstinacy that makes one see the trees, but miss the forest, subjectivism and subjective blindness, these are the causes of the idealistic theory of knowledge." "In philosophy, the theory of idealism one-sidedly exaggerates a section or one aspect of knowledge so that it becomes an idolized absolute entity, divorced from matter and nature. Idealism is the doctrine of religion. And this is very true."][13]

Pre-Marxist materialism, namely, mechanistic materialism, did not emphasize the activity of thought in knowledge, it only assigned a passive role to thought and regarded it as a mirror reflecting nature. Mechanistic materialism assumed an arbitrary and crude attitude toward idealism, paid no attention to the origin of its theory of knowledge, and therefore failed to conquer idealism. Only dialectical materialism correctly points out that thought on the one hand is active, but on the other hand is restricted by matter, that thought on the one hand emerged from social practice, but on the other hand can actively guide practice. Only this kind of dialectical theory of "the harmony of thought and action" can thoroughly conquer idealism.

4. The Cause of the Emergence and Development of Materialism

The recognition of the independent existence of matter is the foundation

of materialism. This foundation is acquired by man through practice. The practice of production by labor, the practice of class struggle, and the practice of scientific experimentation enable man gradually to divorce himself from superstition and illusion (idealism), to know the essence of the world and reach materialism.

The rise of religion and idealism is rooted in the fact that primitive peoples, subjugated by the power of nature and using only simple tools, could not explain the events they experienced and had to ask the gods for help.

However, for a long period of time man in the process of production has been in contact with the nature that surrounds him, producing food, shelter, and things for use, exercising his influence on nature, changing it, and making it serve his interest. All this deeply convinced man that matter exists objectively.

In social life the interrelation between man and man creates mutuality and influence, and in a class society they also carry on class struggle. The oppressed classes ponder the situation, estimate their strength, and set up a plan; when they succeed in a struggle, they are firmly convinced that their ideas are not the products of illusion, but reflections of the objectively existing material world. The oppressed classes will fail if they adopt the wrong plan, and they will succeed if they rectify it. This makes them understand that they can reach their goal only if their subjective plan is based on their correct understanding of matter and the laws of the objective world.

Scientific history has proven to man that the world is materialistic in nature and has its laws. This makes man realize that religion and idealistic illusions are useless; hence they can reach the conclusion of materialism.

In short, in the long history of Man's practice – history of the struggle against nature, history of the class struggle, and history of science – man, after having pondered over the reality of matter and its laws, and because of the needs of living and struggle, has verified the correctness of the materialistic philosophy and found the materialistic philosophy his own ideological weapon for struggle. The higher the level of the production of society, the more advanced the class struggle, the further exposed the "secrets" of nature by scientific knowledge, the more will the materialistic philosophy be developed and consolidated. Then man will be able to liberate himself gradually from the double oppression of nature and society.

There was a time when the proletariat did not yet constitute a threat to the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie, because of the need to struggle against the feudal class, found and employed materialism as a weapon and firmly believed that the things surrounding them were products of matter, not products of spirit. It was only when the bourgeoisie became the ruling class and the struggle of the proletariat threatened it that it abandoned this "useless" instrument and picked up another instrument, the philosophical theory of idealism. The living proof of this is the change in the thought of the spokesmen of the Chinese bourgeoisie, Tai Chi-t'ao and Wu Ch'ih-hui, who in 1927 changed their thought from materialism to idealism.

The gravedigger of capitalism, the proletariat, is in essence materialistic. However, the proletariat is the most progressive class in history; hence its materialism differs from that of the bourgeoisie, and is more thorough and deeper, being entirely dialectical in character and lacking completely the character of mechanistic materialism. The proletariat after having absorbed all the fruits of practice in the whole history of mankind, and as a result of its own practice, has created through their spokesmen and leaders, Marx and Engels, dialectical materialism, which not only advocates that matter exists independently of man's consciousness, but also that matter changes. Thus dialectical materialism has become a completely systematic, brand new world outlook and methodology. And this is the Marxist philosophy.

REFERENCES

1. For this passage see 'Wei-wu lun ho wei-hsin lun' (Materialism and Idealism), Chapter I of *Che-hsüeh hsüan-chi* (Selected Philosophical Writings), Shanghai, 1939, p. 39 (hereafter cited as *WWL*). Chapters I and II of *Che-hsüeh Hsüan-chi* are translated from *Dialektičeskij Materializm*, ed. M. B. Mitin, Moscow, 1933 (hereafter cited as Mitin 1933). For the above passage see this work, p. 36.
2. The German word *Produktivkräfte* is rendered as "productive powers", not "productive forces" as many translators have done. "Productive powers" is the term that Marx found in the writings of the classical economists and that he used himself when writing in English. For documentation on this point see the forthcoming book of Karl A. Wittfogel: *Marx*.
3. See *WWL*, p. 40; cf. Mitin 1933, p. 36.
4. See *WWL*, p. 40; cf. Mitin 1933, pp. 36 f.
5. See *WWL*, pp. 40 f.; cf. Mitin 1933, p. 37.
6. See *Hsin Che-hsüeh Ta-kang* (Outline of New Philosophy), Peiping, 1936, p. 189

(hereafter cited as *ONP*). Cf. *Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, vol. XXII, 1935 pp. 127 f. (hereafter cited as *BSE* XXII).

7. *ONP*, p. 183; cf. *BSE* XXII, p. 125.
8. In *ONP*, p. 183 the ideas expressed in this sentence follow immediately after the preceding passage. Mao inserted the notion about China's historical position.
9. See *WWL*, p. 42; cf. Mitin 1933, pp. 37 f.
10. Obviously Hegel's *Weltgeist*.
11. See *WWL*, p. 43; cf. Mitin 1933, p. 38.
12. See *WWL*, p. 47; cf. Mitin 1933, pp. 40 f.
13. See *WWL*, p. 49; cf. Mitin 1933, p. 41. This is, of course, a free reproduction of two passages from Lenin's *On Dialectics* (V. I. Lenin: *Collected Works*. New York. 1927. vol. XIII, p. 327). Mao somewhat shortened the translation given in *WWL*, p. 49, but he followed its wording and also the altered sequence of the two passages which the translation shares with Mitin's presentation.

HELMUT FLEISCHER

DER KERN DER MATERIALISTISCHEN DIALEKTIK

Die materialistische Dialektik ist bei den marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophen zunächst thematisch als ein bestimmtes Lehrstück definiert, nämlich als eine allgemeine Theorie der Entwicklung, spezieller als Lehre von den allgemeinsten Gesetzen jeglicher Entwicklung oder manchmal auch weniger speziell als Lehre von den Zusammenhängen in der Welt. Doch dieser thematische Begriff der Dialektik ist von einem ursprünglicheren 'charakterologischen' Begriff des Dialektischen als einer bestimmten strukturellen Verfassung des Realen und der ihm adäquaten Begriffsbildung abgeleitet. Daß die Konstitution des Seienden eine dialektische ist, das heißt für die marxistische Philosophie vor allem: ihr ist ein unendlicher Nuancen- und Beziehungsreichtum, eine alles erfassende Prozessualität oder 'Flüssigkeit' und eine gewisse Gegensätzlichkeit und Spannungsgeladenheit eigen. In dieser Trinität aus unendlicher konkreter Totalität, Dynamizität und 'Widersprüchlichkeit' kommt dem zuletzt genannten Konstitutionsprinzip eine besonders hervorragende Rolle zu. Was sich in den Kategorien des 'Widerspruchs', des 'Gegensatzes', der 'Identität', 'Einheit' oder 'Durchdringung der Gegensätze' und schließlich des 'Kampfes der Gegensätze' ausspricht, gilt als der Kern der Dialektik, als das Innerste ihrer revolutionären Seele.

Von einem 'Kernpunkt' (oder einfach 'Kern', russ.: *jadro*) der Dialektik ist sowohl bei Engels als auch bei Lenin die Rede. Es ist ideengeschichtlich interessant, daß sie die Akzente dabei recht unterschiedlich gesetzt haben. So meinte Engels[1], den 'Kernpunkt der dialektischen Auffassung der Natur' bilde die Einsicht, daß allerlei Gegensätze und Unterschiede – die im 'metaphysischen' Denken als "unversöhnlich und unlösbar vorgestellten polaren Gegensätze, die gewaltsam fixierten Grenzlinien und Klassenunterschiede" – "zwar vorkommen, aber nur mit relativer Gültigkeit, daß dagegen jene ihre vorgestellte Starrheit und absolute Gültigkeit erst durch unsre Reflexion in die Natur hineingetragen ist".[2] Jenes eine seiner drei dialektischen Hauptgesetze, das von den 'Gegensätzen' handelt, nennt Engels das 'Gesetz von der Durchdringung der Gegensätze.'[3]

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

Als Beispiele solcher Gegensätze, die im dialektischen Denken eine Relativierung erfahren, nennt Engels einige Artunterschiede zwischen physischen 'Bewegungsformen der Materie', ferner die Unterschiede zwischen Klassen von Organismen, dann aber auch einige kategoriale Disjunktionen wie Ursache und Wirkung, Identität und Unterschied, Wesen und Erscheinung.[4]

In der sowjetischen Philosophie ist an die Stelle des Engels'schen Ausdrucks 'Durchdringung der Gegensätze' die Doppelformel von der 'Einheit' und dem 'Kampf der Gegensätze' getreten. Maßgebend hierfür waren einige Notizen in Lenins philosophischen Heften: "Die Dialektik kann kurz als die Lehre von der Einheit der Gegensätze bestimmt werden. Damit wird der Kern der Dialektik erfaßt sein...". In der Reihe der von Lenin hervorgehobenen sechzehn Elemente der Dialektik finden sich folgende Charakteristiken: "das Ding... als... *Einheit der Gegensätze*... der *Kampf* resp. die Entfaltung dieser Gegensätze, das Widersprechende der Bestrebungen etc."[5] An anderer Stelle heißt es: "Entwicklung ist 'Kampf' der Gegensätze. ... Entwicklung als Einheit der Gegensätze (Spaltung des Einheitlichen in einander ausschließende Gegensätze und das Wechselverhältnis zwischen diesen. ... Die Einheit (Zusammenfallen, Identität, Wirkungsgleichheit) der Gegensätze ist bedingt, zeitweilig, vergehend, relativ. Der Kampf der sich gegenseitig ausschließenden Gegensätze ist absolut, wie die Entwicklung, die Bewegung absolut ist."[6]

Es ist nicht unsere Absicht, die Engels'sche Gegensatz-Dialektik mit ihrer Warnung vor den '*hard and fast lines*'[7] gegen die Lenin'sche Kampf-Dialektik auszuspielen; denn keines der beiden Prinzipien läßt sich in eine ontologisch-methodologische Monopolstellung erheben und überhaupt kann es in der allgemeinen Ontologie weder darum gehen, dem Pathos des Kämpfers noch dem des Versöhnlers eine letzte metaphysisch-universelle Rechtfertigung zu verschaffen. Dieser kurze ideengeschichtliche Rückblick soll lediglich zeigen, was für eine beträchtliche Variationsbreite der Aussagen in jenem Kerngebiet der Dialektik, in der Lehre von den Gegensätzen, möglich ist. In den folgenden Ausführungen wollen wir einige Überlegungen darüber anstellen, welche Thesen über den 'Widerspruch', über 'Einheit' und 'Kampf der Gegensätze' in der allgemeinen Ontologie (also in Absehung von jederlei Regional- oder Lokaldialektik) einen legitimen Platz beanspruchen dürfen.

DAS GESETZ DER EINHEIT UND DES KAMPFES DER GEGENSÄTZE

In der einen Formel des dialektischen Grundgesetzes der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze sind mehrere Feststellungen über die Konstitution eines jeden Objekts und über den Gang der in ihm ablaufenden Prozesse vereinigt; es bildet eine Einheit von Gegensätzen, diese Gegensätze entfalten sich und agieren in einer ganz bestimmten Weise und das Gebilde hat darum einen typischen Werdegang. In den *Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie* hat man das Gesetz so formuliert: "Kraft des Gesetzes der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze sind allen Dingen, Erscheinungen und Prozessen innerlich widersprüchliche Seiten und Tendenzen eigen, die sich in einem Zustand des Kampfes befinden; der Kampf der Gegensätze gibt den inneren Impuls zur Entwicklung, führt zum Anwachsen der Widersprüche, die sich in einer bestimmten Etappe durch das Verschwinden des Alten und die Entstehung des Neuen lösen."[8]

Zur Interpretation dieser Formel kann man in der sowjetischen Literatur eine Reihe ergänzender Bestimmungen finden, die wir hier in die Form einer Folge von Thesen bringen wollen.

1. Die 'Einheit der Gegensätze' ist ein Beziehungstypus, der zum 'Wesen', d.h. zur Grundstruktur eines jeden Gebildes gehört. Sie ist eine Konfiguration, in der bestimmte Relata, die 'Gegensätze', durch eine bestimmte Relation, den dialektischen oder realen 'Widerspruch', wesensnotwendig miteinander koordiniert sind.

Der Ausdruck 'Gegensatz' kommt auch noch in einigen Nebenbedeutungen vor: außer den Relata der 'Widerspruchs'-Relation bezeichnet man damit auch (a) die Relation selbst, (b) eine auf die Phase der Latenz folgende deutliche Ausprägung und einen erhöhten Schärfegrad der Widerspruchsrelation, (c) die Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen dem Alten und dem Neuen und, davon abgeleitet, (d) auch die im Prozeß einander ablösenden gegensätzlich gearteten Bildungen selbst.

2. Als Ort und Subjekt, als 'Träger' der Gegensatz-Einheit können Instanzen von recht verschiedenartigem Status fungieren: (a) Ontisch selbständige Concreta, 'Dinge', Systeme oder Aggregate, in denen gleichfalls relativ selbständige Concreta als Gegensatz-Glieder auftreten; (b) ontisch unselbständige Teil-Charakteristika wie 'Eigenschaften' und einzelne Strukturmomente, im besonderen Prozesse, die sich aus einzelnen

Prozeßkomponenten ('Kräften', 'Tendenzen') konstituieren. Gegensatz-Einheiten bilden auch viele Momente der strukturellen Grundbeschaffenheit des Seienden, die in den korrelativen Kategorienbegriffen dargestellt sind.

3. Der 'Widerspruch' als Beziehungstypus in Gegensatz-Einheiten ist nicht eine logische (logisch illegitime) Aussagenverbindung, sondern ein Realverhältnis der Ausschließung zwischen ontisch positiven Instanzen, zwischen materiellen Gebilden beziehungsweise einzelnen ihrer Bestimmungen. Ob Aussagen über reale Widersprüche auch formallogische Widersprüche involvieren, ist in der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie ein strittiges Problem.

4. Der Ausdruck 'Einheit' hat mehrere Bedeutungsvarianten: vor allem bezeichnet er (a) die wesentliche Korrelativität der Gegensatz-Glieder, dies, daß sie einander voraussetzen; (b) die Möglichkeit, daß die Gegensatz-Glieder ineinander übergehen (identisch werden); (c) eine Übereinstimmung im Sinne von 'Harmonie' (zwischen sozialen Gruppen: Freundschaft, Einmütigkeit); (d) wie man im Anschluß an eine Andeutung Lenins bemerkt, möglicherweise auch 'Wirkungsgleichheit' (*ravnodejstvie*), Gleichgewicht.[9] Im dialektischen Grundgesetz geht es hauptsächlich darum, daß die Gegensatz-Glieder in der Einheit eines Gebildes (Systems) koexistieren. Statt 'Einheit' sagt man manchmal auch 'Identität' der Gegensätze.

5. Der Widerspruch, der zwischen den Gliedern der Gegensatz-Einheit besteht, involviert einen 'Kampf' zwischen ihnen. Dem Ausdruck 'Kampf' kommt allerdings hinsichtlich der außermenschlichen Bereiche nur allegorische Bedeutung zu; was er generell bezeichnet, ist eine Wechselwirkung von der Art eines 'Zusammenstoßens' (*stolknovenie*) der gegensätzlichen, einander ausschließenden Tendenzen.[10] Solche 'Tendenzen' können den Bestand der Gegensatz-Einheit (und damit des Gebildes) berühren und unterscheiden sich dann formal als das 'Positive' und das 'Negative', das 'Konservative' und das 'Revolutionäre', das 'Ablebende' und das 'Entstehende' oder kurz als das 'Alte' und das 'Neue'. Doch wie man gelegentlich feststellt, repräsentiert nicht in jeder Gegensatz-Einheit die eine Seite ein 'Altes' und die andere ein 'Neues' im Sinne des Entwicklungsfortschritts. Es muß auch nicht unbedingt so sein, daß der 'Kampf der Gegensätze' zur Aufhebung der Einheit und des Bestandes des betreffenden Gebildes führt.

6. Der Widerspruch ist nichts Stationäres; er durchläuft einen Prozeß der Entstehung, Entfaltung und Lösung. Seine Anfangsform ist der Unterschied, die höher entwickelte ist der Gegensatz.[11] Ein Widerspruch muß unbedingt letzten Endes seine Lösung finden und diese erfolgt nicht durch Versöhnung der Gegensatz-Glieder, sondern durch ihren Kampf. Die Überwindung der wesentlichen, fundamentalen Widersprüche im Kampf der Gegensätze bedeutet die Beseitigung der alten Einheit und die Entstehung einer neuen. Jede Gegensatz-Einheit ist relativ und vergänglich, der Kampf der Gegensätze aber ist absolut.[12] Sowjetische Autoren haben jedoch schon darauf hingewiesen, daß die 'Einheit' der Gegensätze im gleichen Sinne absolut wie ihr 'Kampf' und dieser im gleichen Sinne relativ wie ihre Einheit ist[13]; man bezieht diese These auch auf das Verhältnis zwischen Gleichgewicht (Ruhe) und Bewegung: jedes etablierte Gleichgewicht ist vergänglich und wird durch innere und äußere Bewegungen wieder zunichte.[14]

7. Der Widerspruch beziehungsweise der Kampf der Gegensätze bildet die 'Quelle', die 'bewegende Kraft', den 'inneren Impuls' der Entwicklung; ohne Widerspruch und Kampf der Gegensätze wären die Gegenstände unveränderlich und in der Welt herrschte Stillstand.[15] Nicht wenige Autoren weiten diese These noch mehr aus und meinen, der Widerspruch sei der Grund für die Selbstbewegung der Materie[16], was andere bestreiten.[17] Strittig ist, ob als Triebkraft von Entwicklungen stets nur widersprüchliche Gegensatz-Einheiten in Betracht kommen oder auch rein positiv konstituierte, harmonische Konfigurationen.[18] Die Hauptrolle in der Entwicklung spielen die inneren Widersprüche der Gebilde, die äußeren sind deswegen aber nicht unwichtig.

Eine schematische Darstellung des generellen Ablaufsmodells, das im Gesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze fixiert ist, könnte etwa so aussehen:

1. *Ort der Handlung*: die Gebilde- und Struktureinheit eines hinreichend abgegrenzten und ganzheitlich organisierten Gebildes oder Objektfeldes;

2. *Die Akteure*: 'Gegensätze', d.h. in der Einheit miteinander verbundene, doch einander in bestimmter Hinsicht ausschließende Teile beziehungsweise deren Eigenschaften, Kräfte (Tendenzen, Bewegungsimpulse) oder Prozesse;

3. *Der dominante Beziehungstypus*: ein sich fortschreitend vom Unter-

schied bis zum (möglicherweise schroffen) Gegensatz explizierender 'Widerspruch', die Richtungsgegensätzlichkeit der Tendenzen;

4. *Die Aktion*: 'Kampf', Zusammenstoß der gegensätzlich gerichteten Impulse;

5. *Funktion der Akteure*: der eine wirkt hinsichtlich des Ordnungstypus der Gebilde-Einheit erhaltend, der andere verändernd; hinsichtlich des Entwicklungsprozesses wirkt der eine retardierend, der andere beschleunigend;

6. *Ausgang der Handlung*: obligatorische Lösung des Widerspruchs, indem der eine Gegensatz den anderen überwindet und den ihm angemessenen neuen Ordnungstype etabliert.

UNIVERSALITÄT UND SPEZIFIK DER GEGENSATZ-EINHEITEN

Im Gesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze ist ein formales Modell des 'sich entwickelnden Gebildes' statuiert, das streng universelle Geltung besitzen soll. Die Diamat-Literatur bietet denn auch eine Überfülle von Beispielen für die Gültigkeit (das 'Wirken') dieses Gesetzes in allen Regionen des Seienden. Und man betont zugleich, daß sich das universelle, identische Wesen dieses Zentralgesetzes der Dialektik in einer reichen Vielfalt spezifischer Formen manifestiert. Plus und Minus, Differential und Integral in der Mathematik, Wirkung und Gegenwirkung in der Mechanik, positive und negative Elektrizität in der Physik, Verbindung und Dissoziation der Atome in der Chemie und Klassenkampf in der Gesellschaft – so hatte Lenin die Variationsbreite der Gegensatz-Einheiten verdeutlicht[19] und die sowjetische Schulphilosophie hat den Katalog der dialektischen Widersprüche in vielen Richtungen erweitert. Es sei hier eine repräsentative Auswahl aus diesem Katalog angeführt (in einer gewissen typologischen Klassifikation, die man in manchen sowjetischen Darstellungen wie in den *Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie* vermißt).

1. *In der strukturellen Grundordnung der materiellen Welt*: Materie–Bewußtsein; Anorganisches – Organisches; Raum – Zeit; Unendlichkeit–Endlichkeit; Absolutheit – Relativität; Kontinuität – Diskretion; Identität – Unterschied; Bewegung – Ruhe; Qualität – Quantität; Inhalt – Form; Wesen – Erscheinung; Möglichkeit – Wirklichkeit; Notwendigkeit – Zufälligkeit.

2. *Im anorganischen Fundament der materiellen Welt*: Atom – Atomkern; Stoff – Feld (Korpuskel – Welle); Nordpol – Südpol; Attraktion – Repulsion; Assoziation – Dissoziation.

3. *Im Bereich des Organischen*: Organismus – Umwelt; Leben – Tod; Assimilation – Dissimilation; Vererbung – Anpassung (Konstanz – Variabilität); Erregung – Hemmung; Nutzen – Schaden.

4. *In der menschlichen Gesellschaft*: Produktivkräfte – Produktionsverhältnisse; Gesellschaft – Natur; Produktion – Konsum; Gebrauchswert – Tauschwert; gesellschaftliche Produktion – private Aneignung; Bourgeoisie – Proletariat; imperialistische Staaten – Kolonien; imperialistische Staaten untereinander; Kapitalismus – Sozialismus; Gut – Böse.

5. *In der menschlichen Erkenntnistätigkeit*: Subjekt – Objekt; unendliche Erkenntnisfähigkeit – endliche Erkenntnisleistung; absolute – relative Wahrheit; Sinneswahrnehmung – logisches Denken; Abstraktes – Konkretes; Analyse – Synthese.

Es wird wohl kaum jemand behaupten können, in allen diesen heterogenen Gegensatz-Einheiten spiele sich das ab, was im dialektischen Grundgesetz der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze kodifiziert ist, also die fortschreitende Explikation des Widerspruchs, ein Kampf der Gegensätze und die Überwindung des Widerspruchs durch Aufhebung der alten Gegensatz-Einheit und Bildung einer neuen. Man kann hier nur – wie es die sowjetischen Autoren im allgemeinen auch tun – selektiv verfahren und am einen Fall die unauflösliche Korrelativität gegensätzlicher Bestimmungen exemplifizieren, an einem anderen den Kampf entgegengerichteter Bestrebungen, an einem dritten die Intensivierung einer Konfliktsituation, an einem vierten die Lösung des Widerspruchs, an einem fünften das Übergehen ins Gegenteil u.a. Man hat es eben im Grunde nicht mit einem einzigen Strukturmodell zu tun, sondern mit mehreren, die man nur bei ungenügender kategorialanalytischer Präzision auf eine gemeinsame Formel bringen kann. Aus der sowjetischen Literatur der jüngsten Zeit kann man den Eindruck gewinnen, daß man jetzt intensiver darum bemüht ist, die 'pluralistische' Phänomenologie des Spezifischen auszuarbeiten, als den Versuch einer Kodifikation des Universell-Identischen fortzusetzen. Es bleibt nur zu wünschen, daß man die vorgefaßten Generalisierungen genügend ausdrücklich suspendiert und bei der Arbeit an der Differenzierung nicht gänzlich das Problem einer neuen, richtigeren Synthese aus dem Auge verliert.

ANSÄTZE ZU EINER LEGITIMEN THEORIE DES GEGENSATZES

Man kann auf zwei Wegen versuchen, die mannigfachen Phänomene der Gegensätzlichkeit, der Polarität, der Disharmonie, des Widerstreits, des Konflikts und der gegenseitigen Vernichtung für die ontologische Theorie auszuwerten: man kann die in der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie vorliegende Fassung dieses Lehrstücks, die sich als der umfassendste Entwurf dieser Art anbietet, als Diskussionsgrundlage akzeptieren und versuchen, durch ihrere weitere Bearbeitung zu einer tragfähigen Theorie zu gelangen; es ist jedoch auch denkbar, daß man diese Vorlage ganz beiseite läßt und seinen Ausgang von der *tabula rasa* oder von einer weniger traditionsbelasteten und vor-fixierten Konzeption nimmt. Wer sich einmal an die Aufgabe gemacht hat, die in der Diamat-Literatur ausgebreitete allgemeine und spezielle Phänomenologie der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze in ihrem ganzen thematischen Umfang einer typologischen Strukturanalyse zu unterziehen, der hat eine Vorstellung davon, wie mühsam ein solches Unternehmen ist; er wird es vielleicht für sinnvoller halten, auf derartige Vorarbeiten zu verzichten und *ab ovo* zu beginnen. Doch angesichts des ausgeprägten Traditionalismus, der in der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie herrscht, wird man damit rechnen müssen, daß sich dort die rationellen Kerne in äußerst langwieriger Arbeit aus der mystifizierenden Hülle herausschälen. Wenn man all das betrachtet, was in den letzten Jahren an Diskussionsbeiträgen zur Theorie des dialektischen Widerspruchs publik geworden ist, so kann man sagen, daß es bei entsprechender Konzentration bereits einen beträchtlichen kritischen Gesamteffekt haben könnte – leider ist schon vieles wie im Sande verlaufen. Auch die Umrisse einer gänzlich neuen Konzeption des gesamten Lehrstücks sind schon erkennbar.

Verschiedene der vorgebrachten Argumente sind dazu angetan, die übermäßigen Erwartungen zu reduzieren, die man in den theoretischen Erklärungswert (und auch in den politisch-pädagogischen Nutzeffekt) des Gesetzes der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze gesetzt hat. Eine universell-ontologische Legitimation des proletarischen Klassenkampfes und der sozialistischen Revolution ist daraus nicht mehr abzuleiten, sobald man eingesehen hat, daß 'Kampf' lediglich ein metaphorischer, also eigentlich ontologisch deplazierter Ausdruck ist und daß eine Dynamik des Widerstreits nur manchmal und nicht immer den Bestand eines

Systemtypus aufhebt. Auch die 'Selbstbewegung der Materie' läßt sich aus dem Beziehungstypus der Gegensatz-Einheit nicht ableiten und erklären. Wie der dialektische Widerspruch als 'Quelle der Entwicklung' fungieren soll, ist bislang so wenig geklärt, daß auch manche sowjetische Philosophen mit diesem Theorem nicht allzuviel anzufangen wissen.[20] Man kann allenfalls konstatieren, daß für Objektfelder, in denen Entwicklungen vonstatten gehen (aber nicht nur für sie), auch ein produktives Spannungsverhältnis charakteristisch ist. Auf keinen Fall aber kann man, wie es in der sowjetischen Literatur so oft geschieht, den Widerspruch als *Triebkraft* der Entwicklung charakterisieren, wenn nicht der Begriff der 'Kraft' jegliche Prägnanz verlieren soll. Die 'Kräfte' (d.h. die Bewegungsimpulse realer Gebilde), die dem Weltprozeß in bestimmten Regionen und in bestimmten Konfigurationen den Charakter der 'Entwicklung' verleihen, gehen – was ihre Richtungsbestimmtheit betrifft – dem 'Widerspruch' voraus; sie können sich in gegensätzlichen Richtungen kombinieren und in dieser Kombination den spezifischen Entwicklungseffekt zustande bringen, doch der 'Widerspruch' ist nicht der eigentliche Entstehungsort dieser Impulse.

Ferner verdient Beachtung, daß sowjetische Philosophen damit begonnen haben, die störende Verquickung des realontologischen Gegensatzes und Widerstreits mit dem logischen Problem des Widerspruchs aufzulösen. Die Verfasser der *Grundlagen der marxistischen Philosophie* glauben der ontologischen Fassung des Aristotelischen Widerspruchsverbots widersprechen zu müssen[21] und viele andere halten es für selbstverständlich, daß Aussagen über reale Widersprüche auch logisch widersprechend sein müssen, doch dagegen hat sich bereits eine nennenswerte Opposition erhoben: "logische Widersprüche, die reale Widersprüche widerspiegelten, gibt es überhaupt nicht"[22], "man kann und muß die objektiven Widersprüche logisch widerspruchsfrei denken".[23] Das einzige Demonstrationsbeispiel eines dialektischen Realwiderspruchs, der sich in logisch kontradiktorischen Aussagen präsentiert – der von Engels im Anschluß an Hegel herausgestellte Widerspruch in der Ortsveränderung – unterliegt in der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie seit längerem der Kritik.[24]

Am bedeutsamsten aber dürfte der Ansatz zu einer Konzeption sein, die den Komplex des Gesetzes der Einheit und des Kampfes der Gegensätze in zwei verschieden konstituierte und nur partiell miteinander kongruierende Strukturen aufgliedert und damit erst Ordnung in dieses ge-

dankliche Rohmaterial bringt. "Unter allen Gegensätzen, die es in der Natur gibt", so führt S. T. Meljuchin aus, "lassen sich zwei Hauptgruppen unterscheiden. Zur einen Gruppe gehören jene Gegensätze, die sich in ständiger Wechselwirkung miteinander befinden. Der Kampf dieser Gegensätze ist die Quelle und der innere Gehalt des Entwicklungsprozesses. Doch es gibt noch eine andere Gruppe von Gegensätzen, zwischen denen es keinerlei Kampf gibt und die objektiv keine Quelle der Entwicklung sind. ... Es wäre unrichtig, die zweite Gruppe von Gegensätzen mit der ersten zu identifizieren, wie es oft geschieht, da dies zu einer vereinfachten, vulgären Interpretation eines der Grundgesetze der materialistischen Dialektik führt."[25] Es gibt in der Welt tausenderlei Gegensätze – d.h. Formen des Unterschiedes zwischen Erscheinungen, die einander hinsichtlich irgendwelcher Merkmale oder Entwicklungstendenzen ausschließen oder negieren –, die sich gegeneinander jedoch völlig indifferent verhalten, weil sie überhaupt nicht im Rahmen einer ganzheitlichen Erscheinung in Wechselwirkung miteinander treten. Sie können in einem ganzheitlichen System zu verschiedenen Zeiten auftreten, sie können zugleich in verschiedenen und kaum miteinander verbundenen Systemen auftreten; nur wenn sie zugleich im selben System auftreten, kommt es zu jener Wechselwirkung zwischen ihnen, die das Wesen des realen Widerspruchs ausmacht.[26]

Es bedarf hier ohne Zweifel noch weiterer Präzisierung, doch im Prinzip ist diese Distinktion zwischen Gegensatz und 'Widerspruch', d.h. Gegeneinander-Wirken, der richtige Ausweg aus der heillosen Konfusion, die bei so vielen dialektisch-materialistischen Widerspruchstheoretikern herrscht. Wir wollen im Folgenden zeigen, wie die Beziehungstypen des 'Gegensatzes' und des 'Widerstreits', voneinander in ähnlicher Weise unterschieden, auch in der ontologischen Kategorienlehre Nicolai Hartmanns einen wichtigen Platz einnehmen.*

"Es gibt kategoriale Gegensätze im Seienden", erklärt er, "die sich in keiner Weise wegdisputieren lassen" (158). Der Beziehungstypus des Gegensatzes (eben um eine Relation handelt es sich und jede Substantialisierung ist zu vermeiden) ist aufs engste mit dem verknüpft, was Hartmann die 'Dimensionen' des Seienden nennt; es sind dies, vereinfacht gesagt, die Gattungen, denen die 'Eigenschaften' und strukturellen Bestim-

* Die Zitate sind seinem Werk *Der Aufbau der realen Welt* (1940) entnommen, auf das sich die in Klammern gesetzten Seitenzahlen beziehen.

mungen der Gebilde angehören.[27] Am geläufigsten ist uns der dimensionale Charakter von Raum und Zeit, doch auch die energetische Verfassung der Welt hat ihre Dimensionen (Masse, Impuls, Gewicht). Schon im System dieser wenigen elementaren Dimensionen kann ein diskretes Gebilde eine beträchtliche Vielfalt von Bestimmungen haben. Auf den höheren Stufen des Realen nimmt die Dimensionenmannigfaltigkeit, die jedes Gebilde charakterisiert, beträchtlich zu: man denke an die vielfältige Dimensionierung unseres Wahrnehmungsfeldes nach Farben, Tönen, Gerüchen u.a.m. Auf der Stufe des Lebendigen rückt alles auch noch in Wertdimensionen ein.

Dimensionen haben eine weitgehend gleichartige Struktur: sie sind Continua, gleichsam Skalen, auf denen es eine Unzahl möglicher Abstufung (Diskretion) und folglich auch möglicher Verhältnisse, Strukturen und Bewegungen gibt (207, 303). Die Möglichkeit der Abstufung, der unterschiedlichen Lokalisation und Extension, setzt ihrerseits aber Richtungen voraus und diese Richtungen sind evidentermaßen gegensätzlich: jede Richtung hat ihre Gegenrichtung, wie es auch Mao Tse-Tung exemplifiziert hat: ohne Oben kein Unten, ohne Leichtes nichts Schweres, ohne Glück kein Unglück usw. Die Dimensionen haben, wie Hartmann sagt, eine 'bipolare Struktur' (300); unter dem Blickpunkt des Richtungsgegensatzes, den die Dimension besitzt, sind die in ihr verschieden lokalisierten, extendierten und bewegten Gebilde hinsichtlich der betreffenden Eigenschaft oder Verhaltensweise gegensätzlich geartet: groß und klein, sich vergrößernd und verkleinernd, nahe und fern, sich annähernd und entfernend, getrennt und vereinigt, sich trennend und vereinigend, einander anziehend und abstoßend usw.

Gegensätzliche Bestimmtheiten und Verhaltensweisen dieser Art sind in der Einheit ihrer Dimension korrelativ verbunden. Doch in der Sphäre der realen, diskreten Gebilde kommen die essentiell gegensätzlichen Beschaffenheiten und Vorgänge milliardenfach vor, ohne daß aus der gegensätzlichen Beschaffenheit als solcher schon irgendetwas Entscheidendes für ihre wechselseitigen Beziehungen folgen müßte. Es kommt indessen auch vor, daß in der realen Einheit von Gebilden und ihren Komplexionen eine wesentliche, konstitutive Polarität besteht. In einem Fluß gehen ständig zahllose chemische Reaktionen – Assoziationen und Dissoziationen – beziehungs- und regellos nebeneinander und nacheinander vonstatten; etwas anderes ist es, wenn in der Ganzheit eines Organismus die

Vorgänge der Assimilation und Dissimilation in streng koordinierter Weise ablaufen. Man muß die essentielle Einheit der Gegensatz-Dimension also von der realen Einheit gegensätzlicher Bestimmungen in der Organisation und Funktionsweise eines Gebildes unterscheiden. Von einem 'Kampf' der 'Gegensätze' braucht in keinem dieser Fälle die Rede zu sein, selbst der abgeschwächte Ausdruck 'Wechselwirkung der Gegensätze', den S. T. Meljuchin vorschlägt, ist anfechtbar. (Man darf nicht vergessen, daß man es, wenn vom 'Gegensätzlichen' die Rede ist, mit ontisch unselbständigen, stets partiellen Bestimmungsmomenten konkreter Gebilde-Einheiten zu tun hat; zwischen abstrakten Momenten dieser Art ist überhaupt keine 'Wechselwirkung' im eigentlichen Sinne möglich, es gibt sie nur zwischen ontisch selbständigen, konkreten Gebilden.) Das läßt sich leicht klar machen: die gegensätzlich gerichtete Bewegung zweier Eisenbahnzüge führt nur dann zur Kollision, wenn sie sich auf ein und demselben Geleise abspielt. "Das Entgegengesetzte", sagt Hartmann, "widerstreitet sich nicht, es besteht unangefochten nebeneinander; denn es berührt sich nicht, es klafft auseinander. Berg und Tal widerstreiten einander nicht, eher schon kann man sagen, sie bedingen einander. Der Widerstreit dagegen ist die Aufhebung dieses Auseinanderseins, das Zusammenkommen des Entgegengesetzten, das Aufeinanderstoßen. Da entsteht der Kampf, oder zum mindesten der Konflikt. So ist es, wenn zwei Kräfte einander entgegengerichtet sind, so, wenn organische Individuen im Kampf ums Dasein einander bedrängen, so, wenn im Gewissen Pflicht und Pflicht im Konflikt liegen" (235).

Die Wechselwirkung mit *entgegengerichteten* (also nicht bloß *gegensätzlich* gerichteten) Impulsen ist somit nur ein sehr spezieller Fall von Gegensätzlichkeit. Hartmann bezeichnet diesen Beziehungstypus (wie übrigens auch Engels gelegentlich) mit dem Ausdruck 'Widerstreit'. Er grenzt dieses dynamische Realverhältnis damit gegen den 'Widerspruch' als eine Beziehung zwischen unvereinbaren Aussagen terminologisch ab: "Der Widerspruch ist freilich eine Art des Widerstreits, aber doch eine sehr besondere. Nur wo es Urteile (Aussage, 'Spruch') gibt, kann es 'Widerspruch' geben. Urteile gibt es nur in der logischen Sphäre, in der Realsphäre kommen keine Urteile vor. In ihr kann man nicht von 'Widerspruch' sprechen" (320). Das haben die Kritiker auch schon oft gegen den Sprachgebrauch der dialektischen Materialisten vorgebracht und diese haben auf solche Kritik oft sehr heftig reagiert und dahinter politische

Motive (den Widerwillen gegen den Klassenkampf des Proletariats u.ä.) vermutet. Soviel Leidenschaft ist dieser Streit nicht wert und es sollte nicht allzu schwierig sein, die kategoriale Terminologie in diesem Punkte zu berichtigen; auch sowjetische Autoren finden es übrigens unbefriedigend, daß das eine Wort 'Widerspruch' in der formalen Logik und in der Realdialektik mit unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen in Gebrauch ist.[28]

Die spezielle Phänomenologie des Widerstreits in den verschiedenen Regionen des Seienden, die Hartmann kurz skizziert, deckt sich in manchem mit den Beispieldemonstrationen marxistisch-leninistischer Autoren. "Man kann den Widerstreit schon in den einfachen Widerstandsphänomenen des Materiellen finden, in der Undurchdringlichkeit, in Druck und Gegendruck, Stoß und Gegenstoß. Er ist hier sehr unscheinbar, und wir empfinden ihn nicht als Konflikt, denn das Aufeinanderstoßen löst sich hier überall sofort in ein klar geordnetes Verhältnis, resp. in das eindeutige Weiterlaufen des Prozesses auf" (321). Eine wesentliche Rolle spielt der Widerstreit in der energetischen Konstitution jener Gebilde, die man als dynamische Systeme bezeichnet. "Die dynamischen Gleichgewichte aller Arten sind bereits Ausgleichsformen realen Widerstreites. Es sind also Formen der Einstimmigkeit widerstreitender Momente. Die große Konstanz solcher Ausgleichsformen täuscht uns leicht über das Vorhandensein des Widerstreites hinweg; aber es gibt auch Grenzen des dynamischen Gleichgewichts, und sieht man genauer zu, so findet man, daß alle Gleichgewichte einen Einschlag der Labilität haben, d.h. daß sie von einem bestimmten Grade der Verschiebung im Kräfteverhältnis ab sich auflösen. Die Auflösung ist dann das Zutagetreten des Widerstreites" (322). In der obersten Schicht des Realen, im menschlichen Dasein, nimmt der Widerstreit in den Beziehungen zwischen Individuen und größeren sozialen Verbänden äußerst mannigfache Formen an. Hierher gehört auch die Sphäre der Erkenntnis, in welcher der Widerstreit die Form des Widerspruchs annehmen kann. "Der Satz des Widerspruchs spielt nur deswegen eine so große Rolle im Denken, ist Maßstab und Kriterium seiner Richtigkeit, weil das Denken voller Widersprüche ist." Das Denken ist ein "Feld des Konflikts", ein "Kampfplatz von mindestens zwei verschiedenen Gesetzlichkeiten", nämlich der logischen Gesetze und der Gesetze des psychischen Vorstellungsablaufs. "Wäre es das nicht, machte es keine 'logischen Fehler' und träten in ihm nicht immerfort Widersprüche auf, die es erst zu bewältigen trachten muß, so

würde der logische Satz des Widerspruchs in ihm keinerlei irgendwie aktuelle Rolle spielen" (320).

Den Typen des Widerstreits sind – im Sinne der kategorialen Polarität und Komplementarität – die Typen der Einstimmigkeit (oder Harmonie) essentiell zugeordnet. Es läßt sich zwar nicht sagen, daß sich der Widerstreit stets und überall in Harmonie auflösen müßte; "der Widerstreit kann sich auch erhalten und steigern; er kann auch zur Vernichtung führen" (321). Namentlich im "Reich des Menschen, des Ethos, des Gedankens und der Geschichte", so meint Hartmann, "nimmt der Überschuß des unbewältigten Widerstreits zu" (325). Doch im Ganzen gilt, daß der Widerstreit nicht allein herrschen kann, daß es auch übergreifende Harmonie geben muß, "Formen der Einstimmigkeit..., in die der Konflikt übergeht, oder in die er sich aufhebt" (321).

Hartmann geht in seinen Überlegungen noch einen Schritt weiter und konstatiert den Widerstreit nicht nur als ein Phänomen in den Beziehungen und Wechselwirkungen zwischen realen, konkreten Gebilden oder in der Konstitution dynamischer Gefüge; er rechnet zum mindesten auch mit der Möglichkeit eines noch viel prinzipielleren Widerstreits in den 'kategorialen Grundlagen des Seienden'. Im menschlichen Denken kündigt er sich durch das Auftreten unlösbarer Antimonien an. Unlösbare Antinomien können wohl, wie Kant gemeint hatte, ihren Entstehungsgrund in der Gesetzlichkeit des Erkennens haben, "er kann aber auch im Sein liegen" und es sprechen nach Hartmann sehr gewichtige Überlegungen dafür, daß es wirklich einen "Realwiderstreit in den kategorialen Grundlagen des Seienden gibt" (329). Das führt auf dasselbe Problem hinaus, das sich auch angesichts der Hegel-Engels'schen Dialektik der Ortsveränderung erhebt: ob ontologisch legitime Aussagen die Form logisch kontradiktorischer Sätze haben können, ob es etwa bloß "Größenwahn der Vernunft" ist, "alles Widerstreitende einstimmig zu machen, es unter den Satz des Widerspruchs zu zwingen, es koste was es wolle" (167–168). Darüber dürfte das letzte Wort noch nicht gesprochen sein.

Der wirklich fruchtbare Anwendungsbereich für das Kategorienpaar 'Harmonie–Widerstreit' dürfte in der Theorie der dynamischen Systeme liegen. Hier gilt es in einer durch keine vorgefaßten Deutungsmodelle beeinflußten Deskription die Phänomene des Widerstreits, der Tension und der Kollision in den vielfältigen System- und Aggregat-Einheiten zu

protokollieren und auf ihre Struktur hin zu analysieren. Erst dann wird die andere Aufgabe spruchreif, in der pluralistischen speziellen Typologie des Widerstreits die Elemente einer universellen Typik dieses Realverhältnisses aufzusuchen.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Sonst bedeutet 'dialektisches Denken' für Marx und Engels oft auch lediglich das Erfassen der Phänomene in ihrer Prozessualität und Entwicklung.
2. *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft.* Vorrede zur Ausgabe von 1885, Berlin. 1948. S. 14–15.
3. *Dialektik der Natur.* Berlin. 1955. S. 53.
4. *Ibidem*, S. 216, 225.
5. *Aus dem philosophischen Nachlaß.* Berlin. 1954. S. 144–145.
6. *Ibidem*, S. 286.
7. *Dialektik der Natur.* S. 226: "Die Dialektik, die ebenso keine *hard and fast lines.* kein unbedingtes allgültiges Entweder-Oder! kennt, die die fixen metaphysischen Unterschiede ineinander überführt und neben dem Entweder-Oder! ebenfalls das Sowohl dies – wie jenes! an richtiger Stelle kennt und die Gegensätze vermittelt, ist die einzige ... in höchster Instanz angemeßne Denkmethode."
8. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* 2. Auflage 1962. S. 214.
9. L. N. Vorob'ev, V. M. Kaganov, A. E. Furman: *Osnovnye kategorii i zakony materialističeskoj dialektiki.* 1962. S. 303, 324.
10. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* S. 222.
11. *Ibidem*, S. 212–213.
12. *Ibidem*, S. 213.
13. M. F. Vorob'ev in *Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma.* (Red. V. P. Tugarinov) 1962. S. 9–10.
14. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* S. 219. Es fällt auf, daß sowjetische Autoren in letzter Zeit den affirmativen Sinn der Gleichgewichtszustände sorgfältiger als bisher (im Zeichen des Kampfes gegen die 'Gleichgewichtstheorie') herausarbeiten.
15. *Ibidem*, S. 211.
16. *Ibidem*, S. 216–217. Ferner *Dialektičeskij materializm.* (Red. A. D. Makarov u.a.). 2. Aufl. 1962. S. 166.
17. P. V. Kopnin u.a. in einer Rezension des eben genannten *Dialektičeskij materializm, VF* 1962, 1, 166. Ähnlich S. T. Meljuchin: *O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj prirody.* 1960. S. 110.
18. Diese Ansicht verfechten besonders nachdrücklich V. P. Rožin und V. P. Tugarinov, u.a. in einem gemeinsam veröffentlichten Diskussionsbeitrag *VF* 1957, 3, den Rožin später gegen verschiedene Kritiker verteidigte. (in: *Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma.* 1962).
19. *Aus dem philosophischen Nachlaß.* S. 285.
20. In diesem Sinne hat sich ein Philosophielehrer in der Konferenz der Gesellschaftswissenschaften (Jan./Febr. 1962) geäußert. (*XXII s"ezd KPSS i zadači kafedr obščestvennych nauk.* 1962. S. 480)
21. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii.* S. 205.
22. A. A. Zinov'ev, referiert in *VF* 1958, 7, 170–171.

23. S. T. Meljuchin: *O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj pridrody.* S. 84–85.
24. Nach A. Schaff haben sich auch E. Kol'man, A. A. Zinov'ev, I. V. Sviderskij und S. T. Meljuchin um eine Umdeutung des Theorems der Widersprüchlichkeit der Bewegung bemüht.
25. *Problema konečnogo i beskonečnogo.* 1958. S. 100–101.
26. *O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj prirody.* S. 83.
27. Insbesondere haben auch die ontologischen Fundamentalkategorien, in denen sich uns die Grundordnung des Realen darstellt, den Charakter von Gegensatz-Korrelationen. Hartmann nominiert die folgenden: Prinzip – Concretum, Struktur – Modus, Form – Materie, Inneres – Äußeres, Determination – Dependenz, Qualität – Quantität, Einheit – Mannigfaltigkeit, Einstimmigkeit – Widerstreit, Gegensatz – Dimension, Diskretion – Kontinuität, Substrat – Relation, Element – Gefüge. (Aufzählung in *op. cit.* S. 230–231).
28. S. T. Meljuchin: *O dialektike razvitija neorganičeskoj prirody.* S. 84–85.

J. M. BOCHEŃSKI

RESEARCH IN SOVIET PHILOSOPHY AT THE FRIBOURG INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES 1958–1963

I. HISTORICAL

The Institute was founded by a decree of the Director of Public Instruction of the Canton of Fribourg in 1957 and was attached to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Fribourg. Research activity began immediately. This was very greatly facilitated by a grant of the Rockefeller Foundation, first given for the three years, 1958–1960, and then renewed for another period of three years, 1961–1963. During the first years no teaching courses were offered and most of the collaborators were allowed to work at the places most convenient for them; at that time the Institute was still constituting its specialized library and could not offer all the facilities required. Since 1960 this policy has been reversed and all workers who received grants were asked to live in Fribourg. They were joined by other scholars who, by the end of the period, constituted the majority of the collaborators of the Institute. Since 1961 regular teaching was also undertaken by the Institute with a rapidly growing number of students. They were 14 during the first term (1961–1962) and 60 during the last term considered here (1963). Among them was a number of post-graduate students who collaborated with the team in research.

During the period under consideration – especially since 1960 – close collaboration developed between the members of the Institute. There was a continuous exchange of information and ideas, and discussion of current problems was intense. The members met twice a month in the *Nasov* (*naučnoe soveščanie* = scientific meeting) and the *Orgsov* (*organizacionnoe soveščanie* = organisational and planning meeting) – but independently of these, discussions were continuously conducted in smaller and larger groups. Some of the papers and books produced by members of the Institute were so extensively discussed that they represent – in a manner of speaking – collective achievements.*

* The Director of the Institute is under the pleasant obligation to express his thanks to several institutions and persons who considerably helped in establishing and conducting

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

II. BASIC POLICY

The Institute, being a part of a Swiss State University, has no political aims nor any political activity. It would hardly be necessary to state this in another context: as, however, there are many organisations with similar names which are not academic, it might be mentioned that one basic assumption in the work of the Institute was formulated in the slogan: "The University has only one adversary, ignorance."

There was, however, still another assumption by which the work of the Institute was marked off not only from the above mentioned more or less political organizations, but also from most other genuinely academic centers of research. Many of these are exclusively interested in the study of facts and doctrines in as far as they are directly relevant to political problems. The Fribourg Institute, is on the contrary, a philosophical center of research, in which Communist thought as such is the only object of study. It is believed to be the only academic institution in non-Communist countries entirely devoted to this task.

This presupposed, in turn, yet another assumption: namely, that there is in Communist countries – above all in the Soviet Union – a philosophy worthy of being studied for its own sake. It was – it is true – also assumed that, whatever intrinsic value Soviet philosophy might have, it merits to be studied in as far as it is an important factor in the life of the countries in which it is being developed. But, the belief that Soviet philosophy is of interest in its own right was the primary reason why the study was undertaken.

---

the work of the Institute. These go, above all, to the Rockefeller Foundation which granted him substantial financial help for scholarships; some other foundations – for example, the Ford Foundation – granted scholarships to individual scholars for study in Fribourg; scholarships were given to German students by the German Federal Government; the Swiss Federal Government helped by similar grants to some Asian and African students.

Several Professors of the University of Fribourg, more particularly Dean N. Luyten, Dean A. Houriet, Professor R. Ruffieux, and Professor E. Billeter, put their knowledge and experience at the disposal of the members of the Institute, greatly contributing to the success of the projects. One of the great advantages of the Fribourg Institute consists in the fact that its work has been constantly supported by several other departments and institutes; this is particularly true of the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Physics which collaborated closely with the work of the Institute.

Thanks are due also to the members of the Institute, among whom the Director wishes to name, in particular, Dr. T. J. Blakeley and Dr. S. Müller-Markus.

A further principle of policy was the concentration on pure research. Some teaching was also provided – as mentioned above – but this only in as far as was necessary for the preparation for research. The Institute was, essentially, a team of research-workers studying and discussing together problems of contemporary Soviet philosophy.

Finally, the rule of specialization was laid down from the beginning. It was believed that synthetic works on Soviet philosophy may now be compiled only on the basis of detailed research and that this, in turn, cannot be conveniently performed without a rather high degree of specialization. There was no 'general Sovietologist' nor 'general historian of Soviet philosophy' in the Institute: each of its members was working in one single discipline or in a group of inter-related philosophical disciplines.

III. PERSONNEL

The Institute was under the direction of Professor J. M. Bocheński, head of the board made up of himself, Professor C. Regamey and Professor F. Brenn. The last named was replaced in 1962 by Professor R. Ruffieux. T. J. Blakeley, Ph. D., was, during the whole period, first assistant to the Director; since 1962, S. Müller-Markus, Ph. D., has headed the Department of Philosophy of Physics. Several members of the Institute acted as assistants or junior assistants to the Director. They were 7 in 1963. L. Vrtačič was librarian during the whole period.

Altogether about 40 persons collaborated with the Institute in different capacities during various periods. Their number varied from year to year but there were, at any one time, 15 to 20 members actively engaged in the work of the Institute. These may be divided into several groups.

(1) Nine persons received, during different periods, grants from the Rockefeller Foundation under the Marxism-Leninism project. Some continued later on as members of other groups. Included are K. G. Ballestrem (1963), Dr. T. J. Blakeley (1958–1963), Dr. H. Fleischer (1961–1963), Dr. Z. Jordan (1958–1960), Dr. N. Lobkowicz (1958–1960), Dr. S. Müller-Markus (1959–1960), Dr. J. Planty-Bonjour (1958–1960), Dr. B. Rüegg (1962–1963), and L. Vrtačič, M. A. (1958–1963).

(2) A second group was composed of persons who did not receive the above mentioned grant and who worked in Fribourg with the research team either under various other grants or on their own resources. This

group includes I. Angelelli (1959–1963), D. D. Comey M. A. (1961–1963), Prof. R. DeGeorge (1962–1963), Dr. J. Delabays (1958–1963), Dr. M. Faraon (1963), Dr. L. Hackstaff (1961–1962), Dr. G. Küng (1959–1961), E. Laszlo, M. A. (1962–1963), E. Marcin, M. A. (1963), T. Payne (1962–1963).

(3) The third group is composed of lecturers in the University of Fribourg and/or in the Institute. It includes Professor J. M. Bocheński (1958–1963), Professor A. Bronarski (1958–1963), Professor R. Erni (1962–1963), Professor O. Halecki (1963), Dr. S. Müller-Markus (1962–1963), Professor C. Regamey (1958–1963), Dr. L. Révész (1962–1963), Professor R. Ruffieux (1962–1963), J. Watts (1962–1963).

(4) Finally another group of scholars, while not being strictly members of the Institute, collaborated with it in research: Dr. A. Buchholz, Dr. H. Dahm, Professor G. L. Kline and Professor K. A. Wittfogel. Several members of the first and second groups had this status after ceasing to be active members of the Institute.

In addition, there was a number of post-graduate students (with an M. A. or Ph. D.) who were also engaged in research work under tutorship. Their number varied but is at the moment (1963) about a dozen.

R. DeGeorge resumed his teaching as associate professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas. H. Fleischer has been appointed scientific collaborator at the Institute of East-European Studies of the University of Berlin (West). L. Hackstaff was appointed professor at Wabash College. Z. Jordan obtained a grant and continued his research at Columbia University. G. Küng became an instructor of philosophy in the University of Notre Dame. N. Lobkowicz was appointed associate professor of philosophy at the same university. B. Rüegg was appointed as expert at the Department of Justice of the Swiss Federal Government.

IV. PUBLICATIONS

In the period under consideration the Institute was publishing two series of books, under the common title, *Sovietica*: "Sovietica Publications", containing more technical writings conceived as tools of research, and "Sovietica Monographs", made up of monographic studies on particular problems. It was also publishing a quarterly review, *Studies in Soviet Thought*.

In the first series, "Publications", eight volumes were published, five of which make up the "Bibliography" [6–10].* The second series comprises four volumes. The *Studies* appeared first as a single volume (in 1960) and, since 1961, is published as a quarterly review.

All the publications were under the general editorship of J. M. Bocheński. The *Studies* have T. J. Blakeley as managing editor and an editorial board made up of D. D. Comey, H. Fleischer and S. Müller-Markus, while A. Buchholz, H. Dahm, Z. Jordan, G. L. Kline, N. Lobkowicz, G. A. Wetter and K. A. Wittfogel were consulting editors. The magazine, which is up to now unique in its field, found a positive response in the public, both in the West and in Communist countries and it is hoped that this will continue.

Altogether 20 separate publications were published up to the end of 1963, making a total of some 3000 pages.

As of the end of 1963 five further volumes are ready for print while nine others are in the course of preparation.

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND OTHER TOOLS OF RESEARCH

Before systematic research work was started in Fribourg there were only a few individual efforts to study the field of Soviet philosophy, among which those of J. M. Bocheński, G. L. Kline and G. A. Wetter should be mentioned. This study was handicapped by the size of the subject – there were many thousands of writings published in Soviet philosophy since 1947 – and by a nearly complete lack of a bibliography of the subject. It was, therefore, decided to start with the constitution of a bibliography of Soviet philosophy – a rather rare case when this had to be compiled by scholars foreign to the country which the bibliography concerns. A considerable number of bibliographies was prepared: a general bibliography of Soviet philosophy; special bibliographies on the same; bibliographies of other East-European countries.

(1) The work on general Soviet bibliography was started under the direction of J. M. Bocheński in 1958 and a first issue was published in 1959 [6], containing a list of the articles published in the *Voprosy filosofii* 1947–1956. A second issue, prepared with the collaboration of T. J.

* Numbers in square brackets refer to the numbers of the Bibliography hereafter on page 314.

Blakeley, was published during the same year [7] and includes a list of books 1947–1956, and a list of articles from the *Voprosy filosofii* and the *Filosofskie nauki* 1957–1958. The third issue, prepared in 1959 and published in 1960 [8] by T. J. Blakeley, continued the bibliography of articles and books for 1959 and 1960. Finally, the fourth issue (1963) brought complements from other Soviet journals and also – a most difficult task – a list of articles published in Soviet collective works, both for 1947–1960 [9]. The fifth issue (1963) contains ample English and German indices for the whole series [10], thus completing it for the period 1947–1960, i.e. for 14 years. These last issues, like the second, were compiled under the direction of T. J. Blakeley, with H. Fleischer, S. Müller-Markus, D. D. Comey, P. J. Brady, P. Beemans, F. Rapp and W. F. Boeselager collaborating. The work contains the titles of 7846 books and articles. It is estimated that over 85% of the Soviet publications during this period are covered; this, at least, is the conclusion of soundings made in Moscow – especially by R. DeGeorge. This bibliography has been described in an article by T. J. Blakeley [13].

(2) Among the special Soviet bibliographies the following may be mentioned: by K. G. Ballestrem on recent Western works on Soviet philosophy [1]; by S. Müller-Markus of philosophical articles in *Uspexi fizičeskix nauk* [146]; by R. DeGeorge on ethics [89]; by K. G. Ballestrem of editions of philosophical classics in Russian translation [3]; by W. F. Boeselager on Soviet criticism of positivism [67].

A number of such bibliographies are incorporated in the monographic studies which will be described later on. Among those already published that on Einstein (Müller-Markus) and on method (T. J. Blakeley) can be mentioned.

(3) Finally, a number of bibliographies of some countries other than the Soviet Union were compiled. One of them, that of Jugoslav Marxism-Leninism by L. Vrtačič, has been published [164]. Two others, on Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia (N. Lobkowicz) and in Poland (Z. Jordan) were partially published in their respective works [117, 132]. A bibliography of Hungarian Marxism-Leninism is being prepared by E. Laszlo [127].

In addition to the bibliographies, a number of other research tools, necessary for the study of Soviet philosophy, were prepared and published. They are mainly a chronology and a series of texts.

(a) A chronology of major events relevant for Soviet philosophy was

first published by J. M. Bocheński [47] and continued (since 1960) by T. J. Blakeley in each issue of the *Studies in Soviet Thought.*

(b) The following texts were published: by N. Lobkowicz, the main papers of the 1958 discussion on contradictions [131], (some of them were never printed in the Soviet Union and were difficult to obtain); a résumé of the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* [48] (J. M. Bocheński) and of the *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* [108] (H. Fleischer), both with ample indices – an indispensable aid to quick reference; two translations of logical texts (quoted below under "Logic") by D. D. Comey and G. Küng, and by I. Angelelli; the text and commentary on 'Dialectical Materialism' (Mao Tse-tung) by K. A. Wittfogel [168].

VI. GENERAL SURVEYS

In spite of the fact that there is an ample literature purporting to supply a general presentation of Soviet philosophy, there are only very few works which are strictly limited to this subject and written with use of original sources. Most of the literature is either on the so-called 'Marxism' (i.e. does not make the necessary distinction between Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and contemporary Soviet thought), is mostly devoted to political questions, or is written without knowledge of original sources. One reason why such presentations are rare is that, given the number of Soviet publications and of the problems treated, it is increasingly difficult for one man to write such a book.

The standard works on the subject are those of G. A. Wetter and J. M. Bocheński (on their mutual relation see *SST* II, 4, 330–331). Another work of Wetter belonging to this category – namely a short presentation of the essentials of Soviet philosophy and political economy [167] – has been extensively reviewed by Bocheński [58]. The latter published in 1959 an *Introduction to Contemporary Soviet Philosophy* [47], parts of which have been integrated into the third edition of the 'Diamat' [40]. He also prepared a survey of Soviet ideology [64] and had previously published the chapter on philosophy in the *Handbook on Communism* [41].*

* This work was originally published in 1956 in German and, consequently, written in 1955, before the great changes were operated at the Twentieth Party Congress. The English edition, which is a simple translation of the German text, was published in 1962 without any mention – in spite of protests by the editors – that it is a translation of an older book.

The above mentioned résumés of the two *Osnovy* by Bocheński [48] and Fleischer [108] also belong here. Short surveys of the recent evolution of Soviet philosophy were published by Bocheński [46, 50, 61, 62].

While all of these writings are reports on what is happening in Soviet philosophy, another work supplies a survey of a different sort. This is the second part (pp. 261–532) of Z. Jordan's book [117]. It contains a detailed analysis and criticism of recent developments in Marxist-Leninist philosophy as presented in Poland, with the stress on criticism. It covers three main topics: logic and dialectics; theory of knowledge, of universals and of truth; and historicism. This work is among the rare systematic general studies on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and is – in spite of its limitation to Polish Marxism-Leninism – relevant to the general problematic.

VII. PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH: IDEOLOGY

The whole field studied in Fribourg is so new that there was, in the beginning, not even a constituted tradition concerning its delimitation and general character. This has been the object of a series of studies by J. M. Bocheński. In a paper, published in 1961 [49], he proposed a distinction between three different, inter-connected disciplines: Marxology, Leninology, and Sovietology, insisting on the vagueness of the widely used term 'Marxism' and on the necessity of specialization in each of these different fields. He then sketched the ideal curriculum of a Sovietologist specialized in philosophy. No one can be a Sovietologist if he is not at the same time a specialist trained in *another* discipline. He must then learn what Bocheński termed 'Basic Sovietology' and only after acquiring a sufficient knowledge in its branches (Russian language, history of Russia, history and organization of the Communist Party, Ideology, etc.), can he specialize in one of the 'regional' Sovietologies, regional either geographically or thematically.

In another study, published in 1962 [51], Bocheński proposed a working hypothesis, according to which there are three sorts of components in Soviet philosophy as taught today: basic faith, speculative superstructure, and declassified doctrines. While basic faith remains substantially unchanged and no personal interpretation of it is allowed, declassified doctrines are largely free and the intermediate region – that of speculative superstructure – is one where the 'classical' doctrines must be verbally

held but may be interpreted – and that interpretation goes sometimes very far, indeed.

Finally, in a third paper of 1963 [57], he analysed the relevance of contemporary Soviet philosophy showing that, in spite of its many weaknesses, it presents at least a twofold major interest: as an important factor in the life of Communist-dominated countries, and as containing some valuable elements in itself.

D. D. Comey offered another hypothesis concerning the structure of Soviet thought [82]. He distinguishes: (1) ideology, itself divided into (a) doctrine and (b) action-program, and (2) philosophy. Philosophy does not belong to ideology, according to him, in spite of the fact that it often serves to 'authenticate' it. There is, he thinks, no logical relation between ideology and politics; however, there are several non-logical links between them: ideology serves to mask, to direct and to authenticate politics.

H. Fleischer published an analysis of the concept of ideology as found in the works of Soviet authors [101]. He showed that considerable developments have taken place in recent years, especially in as far as the 'cognitive' element is being opposed to the 'ideological' (Kelle-Koval'zon, Tugarinov), and he surveyed the discussion between the 'traditionalists' and the more progressive thinkers on this subject.

D. D. Comey also reviewed the work of Brzezinski especially in reference to the problem of ideology [83].

In the same context, J. M. Bocheński showed, in a technical note using mathematico-logical analysis [59], that there is no inconsistency between following Communist ideology and applying the principles of power-politics. R. Löwenthal contributed an analysis of the significance of ideology for the maintenance of Communist Party rule [135].

A. Buchholz devoted to similar problems two papers and a book. In the first, published in 1961 [72], he first proposed his doctrine of the 'empty domains', sectors of philosophical problematic which are not covered by the dogmatic assumptions of Soviet philosophy and yet which contain very relevant – even central – questions. He then analysed the conditions under which discussion between Soviet and Western philosophers is possible. He later expanded on this theme in a book [71]. In the second paper [73], Buchholz formulated the points which he considers essential for the Communism of the future; they are the decisive binding factors in Soviet ideology.

The most ample systematic contribution to the subject is the book, *Soviet Scholasticism*, by T. J. Blakeley [12]. It contains an analysis of method in Soviet philosophy. Among many new results, Blakeley formulated the following: (1) Soviet philosophy claims to be 'scientific', meaning hypothetico-deductive in its methodological structure. (2) The first part of the work, however, by which the most general propositions are established, is thought to have been accomplished – once and for all – by the 'classics'. (3) Consequently, what remains for a contemporary Soviet philosopher is (a) to deduce new conclusions from these principles, (b) to verify them by using the results of sciences. (4) In this process, the 'negative cases' (those which contradict the principles) are, however, dismissed. (5) While the system is object-linguistically built on some 'dogmata' – namely, on the principles established by the 'classics' – there are also two 'meta-dogmata', the 'proletarian redemption' and the 'Communist destiny'. Blakeley concluded that there is, in spite of some basic differences, a striking similarity between this method and early Western Scholasticism. This is the first systematic study made by a logician on the structure of the (basic) form of Soviet thought. It has been (viciously) reviewed in the *Kommunist* (1963, 2).

The total result of these studies may be summed up as follows: some of the basic working hypotheses, necessary for guiding research and study, have been formulated – many of them for the first time. The problem of the peculiar structure of Soviet philosophy has been thoroughly examined from different points of view, especially as to the concept of ideology and its relation to scientific philosophy.

VIII. LOGIC

Little was known about Soviet logic before the inauguration of the Institute, in spite of the chapters in the books of Bocheński and Wetter. There were only two known papers on the subject: by Dahm and Philipov plus a few reviews in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*. Extensive studies on *formal* logic were undertaken by Bocheński [65] and Comey [86], both of which are in elaboration. The work of Comey will also contain an ample bibliography and a glossary of technical terms.

A bibliography of Soviet mathematical logic by Küng [120] was mentioned above. Bocheński published a survey of the field [50], and

Comey a report on two logical conferences in which he reported on the general situation in the field. L. Hackstaff and Bocheński published a critical review [115] of A. A. Zinov'ev's *Philosophical Problems of Many-valued Logic*. The same book has been translated by Comey and Küng [169].

The general result of this research was the confirmation of a statement earlier made by G. L. Kline to the effect that logic is among the parts of philosophy which seem to develop in a most satisfactory way in the Soviet Union. One new conclusion is that not only in pure logic but also in philosophy of logic, some Soviet philosophers have made relevant contributions.

Contrary to formal logic, *dialectical logic* was a subject on which there was in the Soviet Union practically nothing of any philosophical interest up to recent years. However, the situation seems to be changing, as shown by the texts on the 'dialectical law' of 'contradictions' published in translation by Lobkowicz [131] and by the text of Zinov'ev mentioned above [169]. This results also – if in a different way – from an extensive study made on the subject by Blakeley. In a series of reviews of older and newer books he was able to show that since 1958 there has been a massive effort in the Soviet Union to formulate 'dialectics' in a way such that it would be what the 'classics' said it is and still, at the same time, a logic [22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35]. Blakeley came to the conclusion that what Soviet philosophers mean by 'dialectical logic' is rather what other philosophers refer to by 'epistemology'. Yet, he found some formulations of that 'logic' far better done than the older ones.

These studies – which are again the first to be done in the field – showed an interesting variety of interpretations of 'dialectical logic.' They are pioneering works and far more research in the field is needed.

A chapter (pp. 261–313) of the book by Jordan on Poland [117] is devoted to the analysis and criticism of the Marxist-Leninist views on formal and dialectical logic as expressed by Polish Communists. Jordan finds that they systematically changed their ideas and, in fact, reversed Marxist-Leninist thought.

IX. ONTOLOGY

On the development of Soviet ontology, very little was published previous to 1958 (apart from the relevant chapters in Wetter). It became the sub-

ject of investigations by J. Planty-Bonjour who wrote a monograph on it [159]. Dahm examined the concepts of 'basic laws', 'order' and 'principles' [87]. Bocheński made the suggestion that there is a more Aristotelian and a more Hegelian trend in Soviet ontology. The main work in the field has been, however, carried out by H. Fleischer. He published studies on the concept of matter [100], on the idea of necessity [103], on the categories [99] and wrote an extensive monograph, *The Structure of Dialectical-Materialist Ontology* [114]. He also reviewed a number of recent ontological books by Soviet writers [106, 107, 113].

Fleischer's main results – corroborated on some points by the work of other members – can be summarized as follows:

(1) Since 1956 there has been much work done on ontology in the Soviet Union. No less than 150 authors published on its problems in the period 1956–1963.

(2) Dialectical materialism – though presented as a coherent, 'monolithic' system – is, in fact, an aggregate of many parts which, while being perhaps consistent, are by no means strictly interdependent.

(3) A systematic reconstruction of this doctrine is the primary task in the field; it has been only very inadequately performed by the Soviet philosophers themselves.

(4) The concept of matter, which is central in this system, has not been sufficiently elaborated in the Soviet Union. It should be described by means of ontological attributes. What has been offered up to now is hardly more than a nominal definition.

(5) Another weak point of Soviet ontology is the lack of elaboration of those concepts and ideas which are connected with the (basic) evolutionary attitude of these philosophers.

(6) In spite of all these weaknesses, Fleischer, notes that – especially in monographic publications (as opposed to the current general presentations) – much progress has been made.

Fleicher contributed to the proposed reconstruction of dialectical-materialist ontology himself and one of his papers has even been published in the (Soviet) journal, *Filosofskie nauki.*

X. EPISTEMOLOGY

Soviet epistemology was the subject of studies by T. J. Blakeley. He pub-

lished a paper on it [18] and has prepared a full monograph on the subject [39]. Previously there was a book on Soviet epistemology by DeVries. This, however, was written without the direct use of Russian texts, so that Blakeley's work is the first scholarly attempt to survey this vast field. The main results to which he arrived may be formulated as follows:

(1) Theory of knowledge is the most underdeveloped classical philosophical discipline in contemporary Soviet philosophy. Little has been done since 1947. There are few signs of any amelioration to come. With the exception of the criticism of contemporary Western epistemologists and of the recent developments in 'dialectical' logic, Soviet writings on theory of knowledge are interminable repetitions of 'classical' positions and Marxist-Leninist platitudes.

(2) Few of the problems considered as important by Soviet philosophers are even mentioned by non-Marxist-Leninist philosophers, e.g. practice as criterion of knowledge, the identity of logic and theory of knowledge, reflection as a universal property of all matter. On the other hand, many problems considered essential in the West are completely ignored or misconstrued by the Soviet philosopher – e. g. the problem of induction.

(3) Contemporary Soviet theory of knowledge – like contemporary Soviet philosophy in general – suffers from the tensions and contradictions between the mixture of Hegelian dialectics and crass materialism which is the heritage of the 'classics'. Basically, in epistemology, this conflict comes out in the incompatibility of a fundamentally realist point of view with the affirmation on the 'identity' of the laws of thought and reality.

(4) Progress has been made in the Soviet treatment of non-Marxist-Leninist theoreticians of knowledge. The Soviets are now more polite, more honest (in quoting) and more balanced in their judgements of philosophers who do not share their epistemological point of view, than they were in the period 1947–1956.

Another work on the same subject is the large chapter of Z. Jordan's book on Poland [117]. This constitutes a full monograph on Marxist-Leninist epistemology, as formulated by Polish writers (Part V. pp. 316–429) and is probably the most complete analysis yet published of the basic tenets concerned. Jordan analyses not only the present situation but also its historical background; in the process, he compares the epistemologies of Engels and Lenin. Here again, he finds a variety of interpretations, but the changes operated seem to be far less relevant than in logic.

XI. PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS

Soviet philosophy of physics was much studied in the Institute thanks, above all, to the efforts of S. Müller-Markus. The older discussions in this field were examined outside the Institute by D. Joravsky (see the review by Comey [76]); they were also touched on by Comey. Müller-Markus attached himself to the study of the 1950–1955 discussion on Einstein. He has published the first volume of an ample work on this subject [138], while the second – on general relativity – is ready for print [154]. He also started a research project in Soviet philosophy of microphysics [157] and surveyed, in a series of papers, the latest developments in the Soviet Union [143, 145, 159, 160, 161].

The main results of Müller-Markus' research may be formulated in the following way:

(1) In distinction to epistemology but similar to logic, philosophy of physics in the Soviet Union seems to be rapidly developing. A considerable number of workers–often capable and well trained–is engaged in research in this field.

(2) As in many other sectors, there are two main tendencies, the 'traditionalist' and the 'progressive'. While the representatives of the first are keeping in a static way to the old confused concepts and go as far as to reject established conclusions of physics, there are many Soviet physicist-philosophers or philosophers interested in physics who try to interpret dialectical materialism in a way which would not contradict these conclusions.

(3) The supremacy of the 'progressive' trend is obvious and was manifested on several occasions – above all in the recognition of Einsteinianism in 1955.

(4) The discussion of 1950–1955 often had a predominantly epistemological character.

(5) In the frame of the discussion being carried on by the more progressive thinkers, a number of quite fundamental metaphysical and ontological problems are being discussed and there is a diversity of views.

It may be mentioned that, while Müller-Markus was for a time nearly alone in the field, he is now the center of a group of research-workers. Since autumn 1962, eight young German physicists, fully trained in physics (they are all either M.A.s or Ph.D.s. in physics) are working under

the direction of Müller-Markus in this field. Several of them are already engaged in the preparation of monographic studies. The concept of truth in the language of microphysics, the concept of causality, the philosophical problems of cybernetics are examples of subjects now being elaborated by them.

During 1963 several chemists have joined the Institute in order to do similar work in Soviet philosophy of chemistry.

XII. OTHER BRANCHES OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY

The vast field of Soviet philosophical *psychology* is practically unexplored. There are only a few translated texts and these do not supply an adequate picture of what is going on in this sector. E. Laszlo wrote a short survey of the problematic [125]. Psychology has been made the subject of research by T. Payne who is preparing a monographic study on S. L. Rubinštejn. D. D. Comey reviewed O'Connor's *Recent Soviet Psychology* [79].

Little has been done in the investigation of Soviet *ethics*. During the period under consideration, E. Kamenka wrote a book on 'Marxist' ethics which has been reviewed by R. DeGeorge [90]. H. Fleischer wrote a review of Tugarinov's book on values [101]. During 1962–1963 DeGeorge undertook an examination of the general situation in Soviet ethics and is preparing a monograph on the subject [46]. He published a report on his research [91] and a paper on some of its basic problems [94]. The main results he arrived at are:

(1) While ethics was little cultivated up to about 1960, there is now a quite obvious trend to expand this study; thus, in 1961 alone not less than 16 books and 24 papers on ethics appeared in the Soviet Union. Ethics is now a mandatory subject in Soviet institutions of higher education.

(2) While the quality of the writers on ethics varies, they remain in general dogmatic as to the foundations of Marxist-Leninist ethics.

(3) Some new topics are now being examined (like ethical categories, the notion of good, the status of value), and some of the writings are philosophically relevant.

(4) However, the above mentioned dogmatic attitude prevents the discussion of some basic ethical questions.

Esthetics, which has recently become the subject of relatively many publications in the Soviet Union, was studied by E. Laszlo [126, 128] and D. D. Comey [80].

The so-called '*scientific atheism*' which forms one of the major items in Soviet philosophical literature (as concerns number and size of publications) still awaits its historian and analyst. It seems that both in the Soviet Union and abroad philosophers are discouraged by the very low level of these writings. T. J. Blakeley extensively reviewed a number of books on this subject [19, 20, 38].

XIII. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY

While considerable work is being done in the Soviet Union on history of philosophy, there were – with the exception of G. L. Kline's book on Spinoza – no studies at all in this field. These have been undertaken in the Institute. K. G. Ballestrem wrote a general survey of the field [2] and is preparing a book on Aristotle in Soviet philosophy. W. F. Boeselager is working on a book on the Soviet presentation and criticism of positivism [68].

Ballestrem's main results are the following:

(1) Historiography of philosophy flourished in the Soviet Union especially after the 1931 decree against Deborin. It has recently come to life again.

(2) Both as far as the editions of (translated) texts and the studies are concerned, considerable progress has been made.

(3) Soviet historiography of philosophy assumes a number of premisses foreign to other historians of philosophy (histomatic periodization, division of all philosophies into 'materialism', 'idealism' and 'in-between', party-mindedness, etc.).

(4) One particular feature of this historiography is that it considers all countries equally, rejecting overemphasis on European thinking.

(5) The development of Soviet historiography of philosophy has grown and has contributed to the amelioration of systematic philosophy in the Soviet Union.

The so-called 'criticism of bourgeois philosophy' is strictly linked in the Soviet Union with Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy. An extensive survey of the discussion with A. J. Ayer was published in this

field by D. D. Comey [78], while Lobkowicz, Jordan and others described these activities in different other Communist countries.

XIV. PHILOSOPHY IN OTHER EAST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Up to the foundation of the Institute very little had been written on Marxist-Leninist philosophy in countries other than the Soviet Union. Since that time a number of studies on philosophy in Eastern Germany were made under the direction of Professor J. Lieber at the Institute of East-European Studies of the Free University of Berlin. In the Institute of Fribourg, studies on Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Jugoslavia were undertaken.

N. Lobkowicz devoted himself to the study of the developments (since 1948) in *Czech and Slovak* philosophy. He published a complete survey of it in book form [132] and then completed it in a paper on more recent happenings [133]. His results are in several respects quite new and even unexpected. He was namely able to show that

(1) There has been and still is in Czechoslovakia a lively and well-developed Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

(2) This philosophy is by no means a simple 'reflection' of Soviet philosophy, but shows a certain originality.

(3) In some fields the developments of Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia preceeded analogous phenomena in the Soviet Union.

(4) Some influence of Czechoslovak philosophy on Soviet philosophy is noticeable.

(5) The more recent developments in Czechoslovakia do not follow exactly the line found in the Soviet Union.

Thereby, attention has been drawn for the first time to the philosophical thought of the so-called satellite countries which, as it appears from Lobkowicz' studies, are not quite *sputniks* of the Soviet Union in every philosophical respect and merit, therefore, more attention than has been usually devoted to them.

The developments in *Poland* have attracted much attention since 1956, but very little has been written previously on philosophy in that country. Z. Jordan has been researching the subject for some time. The results of his research have been published in an ample monograph [117], a résumé of which was published by the author [116]. The book contains, as a mat-

ter of fact, three different topics; a general history of Polish philosophy during the Twentieth Century; a detailed description of the rise and development of Marxism-Leninism in Poland; and, finally, a number of critical essays on the main themes controverted by different Marxist-Leninists as well as between them and other Polish philosophers.

As far as recent general history of Polish philosophy is concerned, this lies outside the scope of the present report; it will be enough to mention that Jordan's book offers the most complete survey of that history in existence. The second part offers the first complete survey of the development of Marxism-Leninism in Poland. It is not dissimilar to that of Lobkowicz about Czechoslovakia with, however, very different results. In one way, Jordan's report confirms the discovery made by Lobkowicz, namely that there is a large variety of Marxism-Leninisms according to the country in which they flourish. And this it does by showing that the Polish Marxist-Leninists

(1) Were faced with a well-constituted local philosophical tradition of the 'analytical' type,

(2) Fought, in the main, a defensive battle against the criticism of non-Marxist-Leninist thinkers.

(3) By and large finally capitulated on many of the tenets they once considered essential.

The systematic aspects of this work have been mentioned above.

Jugoslavia is another Communist country, the developments of which were the object of much curiosity. But, as in the case of Poland, there had been no serious studies on its philosophy. These have been undertaken in the Institute by L. Vrtačič. He first prepared and published an introduction, containing a survey of institutional organisation, of philosophic developments, and a complete bibliography up to 1958 [164]. He then examined some particular problems of recent Jugoslav thinking [163] and is now working on a monograph on relations between ideology and philosophy (the 'de-ideologisation') in the same country [165]. His main results may be summed up as follows:

(1) Recent history of Marxism-Leninism in Jugoslavia may be divided into three main periods; up to 1948, from 1948 to 1952, and after 1952. While the first is a period of slavish repetition of Russian doctrines, we find during the second a negative criticism of the same. Since 1952 an original Jugoslav philosophy is being developed in which there are several trends.

(2) The Western influence on philosophy in Jugoslavia seems to be greater than in any other East-European country.

(3) Philosophy is now flourishing and some views, sometimes very personal, are being proposed and hotly discussed.

(4) In some parts of philosophy – especially in Historical Materialism – the differences between the Soviet and Jugoslav views are considerable indeed.

While Marxist-Leninist thought is notoriously alive in *Hungary*, there is as yet no monograph on this subject. All we have are several studies on Lukács. A selection of his writings has recently been published in German and was reviewed by J. Rühle [161]. However, E. Laszlo has undertaken to write a monograph on the development of Hungarian philosophy since 1946 and has contributed a number of notes and bibliographies in the field [122, 124].

XV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The results obtained by the research described above are modest in comparison with what is being done in some other departments of Sovietology; they are also, at least quantitatively, very modest as compared with the size of the Soviet and other Communist publications. It must also be admitted that many aspects of Soviet and other Communist philosophy have not even been touched by it.

However, it is no exaggeration to say that in comparison to what was previously known the results are appreciable and that some pioneering work has been achieved. Many Soviet doctrines and the philosophy of some other countries have been here studied for the first time. The main effort has been concentrated on reporting; however, some critical analysis was also provided.

As far as the reporting is concerned, the details of the results have been referred to in this survey. From then the following general insights emerge and may be considered as the ultimate results of the work of the Fribourg team:

(1) There is in the Soviet Union and in other Communist countries much genuinely philosophical activity. If many writers there cannot be considered as philosophers – they are just propagandists and 'quotatologists' – there exists a group of men, seriously working out philosophical problems.

(2) There is practically in each sector a nearly constant evolution, especially since 1947, which tends towards improvement of the general level of thought.

(3) There exists inside the Communist world – despite the common dogmatic basis – a number of differences of view which are being more or less freely discussed.

(4) Among the problems discussed in Soviet philosophy there are some which are also the object of studies by other philosophers and, consequently, the efforts of the former are sometimes not irrelevant to the latter.

These results were anticipated in the form of a working hypothesis at the foundation of the Institute. They have been amply confirmed by the research accomplished in the Institute and elsewhere. This being the case, further research seems to be desirable.

The Institute has provided the basic tools for such work. The main working hypotheses have been formulated. A basic bibliography has been compiled. A number of texts has been supplied. An organ for technical publications has been created.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography contains the titles of books, articles, reviews and notes,

(1) published 1958–1963 by members of the Institute;

(2) published in the *Studies in Soviet Thought* or in the series, *Sovietica*, of the Institute by other scholars;

(3) written by members of the Institute 1958–1963, but as yet unpublished, if quoted in the text;

(4) in elaboration by members of the Institute as of December 1963;

(5) some other scholarly publications relevant to the subject of the present survey.

Writings by members of the Institute written during the time they were actively engaged at the Institute are designated by an asterisk.

BALLESTREM, K. G.:

[1]* 'Bibliography of Recent Western Works on Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* II (1962) 168–173.

[2]* 'Soviet Historiography of Philosophy'. *SST* III (1963) 107–120.

[3]* 'Bibliography of Soviet Historiography of Philosophy: Editions in Russian Translation'. *SST* III (1963) 170–175.

[4]* *Russian Philosophical Terminology*. (in preparation).

BEEMANS, P. J.:

[5]* 'Biographical Data on Soviet Philosophers: Part 1'. *SST* III (1963) 220–229.

[6]* *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie I.* Die 'Voprosy Filosofii' 1947–1956. Hrsg. v. J. M. Bocheński. Dordrecht. 1959. VIII + 72 S.

[7]* *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie II.* Bücher 1947–1956; Bücher u. Aufsätze 1957–1958; Namenverzeichnis 1947–1958. Hrsg. v. J. M. Bocheński u. T. J. Blakeley. Dordrecht. 1959. IV + 109 S.

[8]* *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie III.* Bücher u. Aufsätze 1959–1960. Hrsg. v. T. J. Blakeley. Dordrecht. 1962. X + 73 S.

[9]* *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie IV.* Ergänzungsheft für den Zeitraum 1947–1960. Hrsg. v. T. J. Blakeley. Dordrecht. XIV + 1963. 153 S.

[10]* *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie V.* Gesamtregister 1947–1960/Complete Indices 1947–1960. Hrsg. v. T. J. Blakeley. (in print).

BIRJUKOV, B. V.:

[11] *Two Soviet Studies on Frege.* Translated, edited and with a critical introduction by Ignacio Angelelli. (in print).

BLAKELEY, T. J.:

[12]* *Soviet Scholasticism.* Dordrecht. 1961. 176 pp.

[13]* 'A Bibliography of Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 12–16.

[14]* 'Method in Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 17–28.

[15]* 'Le Communisme dans l'Union Soviétique et en Europe Orientale'. *Justice dans le monde* Tome II (1960–1961) 2.
[16]* 'Bibliography of English-Language Publications on Communism'. *Columbia Review* 1962.
[17]* 'Basic Books on Communism'. *Pax Romana Journal* 1962, 4.
[18]* 'Is Epistemology Possible in Diamat?' *SST* II (1962) 95–103.
[19]* Review of *Osnovnye voprosy naučnogo ateizma* (Basic Questions of Scientific Atheism). *SST* II (1962) 243–247.
[20]* Review of *Osnovy naučnogo ateizma* (Principles of Scientific Atheism). *SST* II (1962) 247–248.
[21]* Review of G. A. Wetter: Le matérialisme dialectique. Marx, Engels, Lénine, Staline. *Pax Romana Journal* 1963, 1.
[22]* Review of P. V. Kopnin: *Dialektika kak logika* (Dialectic as Logic). *SST* III (1963) 73.
[23]* Review of V. I. Čerkesov: *Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija* (The Materialist Dialectic as Logic and Theory of Knowledge). *SST* III (1963) 74–76.
[24]* Review of M. N. Alekseev: *Dialektičeskaja logika* (Dialectical Logic). *SST* III (1963) 76–78.
[25]* Review of M. N. Rutkevič: *Praktika – osnova poznanija i kriterij istiny* (Practice as Basis of Knowledge and Criterion of Truth) and A. N. Iliadi: *Praktičeskaja priroda čelovečeskogo poznanija* (The Practical Nature of Human Knowledge). *SST* III (1963) 78–80.
[26]* 'New Books'. *SST* III (1963) 56–57.
[27]* 'Marxism-Leninism in High School'. *SST* III (1963) 139–147.
[28]* Review of *Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija* (Dialectic and Logic. The Laws of Thought). *SST* III (1963) 162–165.
[29]* Review of *Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija* (Dialectic and Logic. The Forms of Thought). *SST* III (1963) 165–166.
[30]* Review of M. M. Rozental': *Principy dialektičeskogo logiki* (Principles of Dialectical Logic). *SST* III (1963) 167–168.
[31]* Review of D. P. Gorskij: *Voprosy abstrakcii i obrazovanie ponjatij* (Questions on Abstraction and the Formation of Concepts), G. A. Gevorkjan: *O roli abstrakcii v poznanii* (On the Role of Abstraction in Knowledge) and V. T. Pavlov: *Otnošenie meždu ponjatijami* (Relations Between Concepts). *SST* III (1963) 168–169.
[32]* 'The Classics Revisited'. *SST* III (1963) 158–159.
[33]* 'New Books'. *SST* III (1963) 160–161.
[34]* 'Un problème central de l'épistémologie soviétique' (A Central Problem in Soviet Epistemology). *SST* III (1963) 182–189.
[35]* Review of A. X. Kasymžanov: *Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija* (The Problem of the Coincidence of Dialectic, Logic and Theory of Knowledge). *SST* III (1963) 216–217.
[36]* Review of Ju. P. Mixalenko: *Filosofija D. Juma – teoretičeskaja osnova*

anglijskogo pozitivizma XX veka (D. Hume's Philosophy as Theoretical Base of English Positivism of the Twentieth Century) and A. I. Korneeva: *Kritika neopozitivistskix vzgljadov na prirodu poznanija* (Critique of Neopositivist Views on the Nature of Knowledge). *SST* III (1963) 217–218.

[37]* Review of A. F. Begiašvili: *Metod analiza v sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii* (The Method of Analysis in Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy). *SST* III (1963) 218–219.

[38]* Review of *Kritika religioznoj ideologii* (Critique of Religious Ideology), *Istorija i teorija ateizma* (The History and Theory of Atheism) and *Filosofskie problemy ateizma* (Philosophical Problems of Atheism). *SST* III (1963) 219–221.

[39]* *Epistemology in the Soviet Union.* (in preparation).

BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.:

[40] *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus.* Bern. 1950. (3. Ausg. 1960).

[41] 'Philosophische und soziologische Grundlagen'. In *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus.* Freiburg i/B. 1956, 21-51.

[42] 'Die formale Struktur des Kommunismus'. In *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus.*

[43] 'Die Religion'. In *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus,* 1-16

[44] 'Zur Kritik des Kommunismus'. In *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus.*

[45] Die kommunistische Ideologie und die Würde, Freiheit und Gleichheit der Menschen im Sinne des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23.5.1949. Bonn. 1956.

[46]* 'On Communist Ethics'. *The Columbia Review* 1958.

[47]* 'Einführung in die sowjetische Philosophie der Gegenwart'. In *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1959, 45.

[48]* *Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der sowjetischen Philosophie.* Dordrecht. 1959. (English 1963). XII + 84 S.

[49]* 'On Soviet Studies'. *SST* I (1961) 1–11.

[50]* 'Soviet Logic'. *SST* I (1961) 29–38.

[51]* 'The Three Components of Communist Ideology'. *SST* II (1962) 7–11.

[52]* 'Logic, Dialectical and Other'. *SST* II (1962) 321–322.

[53]* 'On Ideology'. *SST* II (1962) 325–326.

[54]* 'Bulgaria'. *SST* II (1962) 327.

[55]* Preface to G. Küng: 'Bibliography of Soviet Work in the Field of Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, from 1917–1957'. *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 1962, 3.

[56]* Review of A. Buchholz: *Kampf um die bessere Welt. SST* II (1962) 139–142 and *Ost-Europa* 1963, 194 ff.

[57]* 'Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy?' *SST* III (1963) 1–10.

[58]* Review of G. A. Wetter: *Sowjetideologie heute, I. SST* III (1963) 61–66.

[59]* 'Ideology, Power-Politics and Dialectics'. *SST* III (1963) 53–55.

[60]* 'Fondements philosophiques du marxisme-léninisme'. *Revue économique et sociale* 1963, 21.
[61]* 'Soviet Philosophy. Past, Present and Prospects for the Future'. *Natural Law Forum* 1963, 8.
[62]* 'La philosophie soviétique'. *La table ronde* No. 185 (1963).
[63]* 'Der freie Mensch in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen West und Ost'. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1963, 23.
[64]* *Kommunistische Ideologie.* (in print).
[65]* *Soviet Logic.* (in preparation).

BOESELAGER, W. F.:

[66]* 'Knowledge'. *SST* III (1963) 157–158.
[67]* 'Recent Soviet Works on Neopositivism'. *SST* III (1963) 230–242.
[68]* *Die zeitgenössische sowjetische Auseinandersetzung mit dem logischen Empirismus.* (in preparation).

BUCHHOLZ, A.:

[69] *Ideologie und Forschung in der sowjetischen Naturwissenschaft.* Stuttgart. 1953.
[70] 'Über das Entwicklungstempo der Sowjetwissenschaft'. *Osteuropa-Naturwissenschaft* 1959, 2.
[71] *Der Kampf um die bessere Welt. Ansätze zum Durchdenken der geistigen Ost-West-Probleme.* Stuttgart. 1961.
[72] 'Problems of the Ideological East-West Conflict'. *SST* I (1961) 120–132.
[73] 'Thesen zur geistigen Problematik des Zukunftskommunismus'. *SST* III (1963) 134–138.

COMEY, D. D.:

[74]* 'Two Recent Soviet Conferences on Logic'. *SST* II (1962) 21–36.
[75]* Review of G. L. Kline: 'The Withering away of the State: Philosophy and Practice'. *SST* II (1962) 75–76.
[76]* Review of David Joravsky: *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917–1932. SST* II (1962) 142–148.
[77]* Review of Aleksandr Sergeevič Esenin-Vol'pin: *Vesennij List'* (A Leaf of Spring). *SST* II (1962) 148–157.
[78]* 'A Positivist Among the Dialecticians'. *SST* II (1962) 204–219.
[79]* Review of *Recent Soviet Psychology. SST* II (1962) 251–253.
[80]* 'Philosophy of Science'. *SST* II (1962) 226–228.
[81]* 'Esthetics'. *SST* II (1962) 233.
[82]* 'Hungarian Philosophy'. *SST* II (1962) 235–236.
[83]* 'Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Soviet Policy'. *SST* II (1962) 301–320.
[84]* Review of Z. K. Brzezinski: *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. SST* II (1962) 337–338.
[85]* 'Quotationism'. *SST* II (1962) 323–324.
[86]* *Logic and Cybernetics in the Soviet Union.* (in preparation).

DAHM, H.:
[87] 'Soviet Philosophy's Conception of "Basic Laws", "Order" and "Principles".' *SST* I (1961) 52–63.
DEGEORGE, R.:
[88] Review of T. J. Blakeley: *Soviet Scholasticism*, and *Studies in Soviet Thought I. Philosophical Studies* 1962.
[89]* 'A Bibliography of Soviet Ethics'. *SST* III (1963) 83–103.
[90]* Review of E. Kamenka: *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism*. *SST* III (1963) 81–82.
[91]* 'The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics'. *SST* III (1963) 121–133.
[92] Review of N. Lobkowicz: *Marxismus-Leninismus in der ČSR. Die tschechoslovakische Philosophie seit 1945. Philosophical Studies* 1963.
[93] Review of *Studies in Soviet Thought II (1962) 1. Philosophical Studies* 1963.
[94]* 'Value Theory in Soviet Philosophy: A Western Confrontation'. *Proceedings of the XIII International Congress of Philosophy*. 1963.
[95]* *Readings in Soviet Ethical Theory*. (in preparation).
[96]* *Soviet Ethics*. (in preparation).
[97]* 'Morality and the Builders of Communism'. (in preparation).
[98]* 'The Soviet Concept of Man'. (in preparation).
FLEISCHER, H.:
[99]* 'On Categories in Soviet Philosophy – A Survey'. *SST* I (1961) 64–77.
[100]* 'The Materiality of Matter'. *SST* II (1962) 12–20.
[101]* Review of V. P. Tugarinov: *O cennostjax žizni i kul'tury* (On the Values of Life and Culture). *SST* II (1962) 72–75.
[102]* 'The Limits of "Party-mindedness".' *SST* II (1962) 119–131.
[103]* 'Die Idee der historischen Notwendigkeit im historischen Materialismus'. *SST* II (1962) 181–203.
[104]* 'Ethics'. *SST* II (1962) 229–233.
[105]* 'Auf dem Bauplatz der materialistischen Dialektik'. *SST* II (1962) 269–288.
[106]* Review of L. V. Vorob'ev, V. M. Kaganov, A. E. Furman: *Osnovnye kategorii i zakony materialističeskoj dialektiki* (The Basic Categories and Laws of the Materialist Dialectic). *SST* II (1962) 334.
[107]* Review of I. I. Novinskij: *Ponjatie svjazi v marksistskoj filosofii* (The Concept of Bond in Marxist Philosophy). *SST* II (1962) 335–336.
[108]* *Kleines Textbuch der kommunistischen Ideologie*. Dordrecht. 1963. XIV + 116 S.
[109]* Review of A. S. Bogomolov: *Ideja razvitija v buržuaznoj filosofii XIX i XX vekov* (The Idea of Development in Bourgeois Philosophy of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries). *SST* III (1963) 67–71.
[110]* Review of *Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma* (Some Questions of Dialectical Materialism). *SST* III (1963) 71–72.
[111]* 'Criticism and Self-Criticism'. *SST* III (1963) 148–150.
[112]* 'Philosophy and "Scientific Communism".' *SST* III (1963) 150–152.

[113]* Review of V. I. Sviderskij: *O dialektike élementov i struktury* (On the Dialectic of Elements and Structure). *SST* III (1963) 210–213.

[114]* *Der Aufbau der dialektisch-materialistischen Ontologie.* (in preparation).

HACKSTAFF, L. and BOCHEŃSKI, J.:

[115]* 'A Study in Many-Valued Logic'. *SST* II (1962) 37–48.

JORDAN, Z. A.:

[116]* 'The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland since the War'. *SST* I (1961) 88–99.

[117]* *Philosophy and Ideology.* The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland since the Second World War. Dordrecht. 1963. XII + 600 pp.

KLINE, G. L.:

[118] 'A Discrepancy'. *SST* II (1962) 327–330.

KÜNG, G.:

[119]* 'Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union (1917–1947 and 1947–1957)'. *SST* I (1961) 39–43.

[120]* 'Bibliography of Soviet Work in the Field of Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, from 1917–1957'. In *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 1962, 3.

LASZLO, E.:

[121]* 'Scientific Atheism'. *SST* II (1962) 234–235.

[122]* 'Hungarian Philosophy'. *SST* II (1962) 236–238.

[123]* 'A Reply to Sartre's Critique of the Marxist Philosophy of the Person'. *SST* III (1963) 55–56.

[124]* 'A Bibliography of Hungarian Philosophy'. *SST* III (1963) 57–59.

[125]* 'Soviet Psychology'. *SST* III (1963) 152–156.

[126]* 'Contrasts of Socialist Realism and Contemporary Esthetics'. Part I of 'Art as Esthetic Experience' (read at the International Cultural Congress in Jyväskylä, Finland, July 4, 1963. Published in Suomalainen Suomi (Finland) as 'Taide Esteettisenä Kokemuksana').

[127]* *Bibliography of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy in Hungary 1945–1963.* (in preparation).

[128]* *Soviet Socialist Realism.* A Study of Some Recent Contributions to Marxist Esthetics. (in preparation).

LOBKOWICZ, N.:

[129]* 'Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia'. *SST* I (1961) 100–110.

[130]* 'The Principle of Contradiction in Recent Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 44–51.

[131]* *Das Widerspruchsprinzip in der neueren sowjetischen Philosophie.* Dordrecht. 1960. 89 S.

[232]* *Marxismus-Leninismus in der ČSR.* Dordrecht. 1962. XVI + 276 S.

[133]* 'Philosophy in Czechoslovakia since 1960'. *SST* III (1963) 11–32.

[134]* 'A. Kolman'. *SST* III (1963) 159–160.

LÖWENTHAL, R.:
[135] 'The Role of Ideology for the Preservation of a Totalitarian Regime'. *SST* III (1963) 179–183.
MÜLLER-MARKUS, S.:
[136]* 'Die physikalischen Thesen des Diamat'. *Ostprobleme* Dez. 1958.
[137]* 'Physikalischer Materiebegriff und dialektischer Materialismus'. *Osteuropa Naturwissenschaft* 1958, 2.
[138]* 'Der Prozeß Einstein'. *Wort und Wahrheit.* 1959, 12.
Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie. Krisis einer Lehre. I. Dordrecht. 1960. XVI + 481 S.
[139]* 'Das naturwissenschaftliche Weltbild der Sowjetunion'. In *Rußland–gestern und heute.* Bonn. 1960.
[140]* 'Das Reich der Physik'. In *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia.* vol. VI. Firenze. 1961.
[141]* 'Erkenntnisprobleme der Relativitätstheorie'. *Philosophia Naturalis* 1961 (Bd. VII) 2.
[142]* 'Diamat and Einstein'. *Survey* July-September, 1961.
[143]* 'Zur Diskussion der Relativitätstheorie in der Sowjetwissenschaft'. *Philosophia Naturalis* 1961, 3.
[144]* 'Einstein and Soviet Philosophy'. *SST* I (1961) 78–87.
[145]* 'Die Organisation der sowjetischen Philosophie der Physik'. *SST* II (1962) 49–63.
[146]* 'Bibliography of Philosophical Articles in *Uspexi fizičeskix nauk* (1918–1962)'. *SST* II (1962) 255–260.
[147]* 'Zum Anschaulichkeitsproblem in der Quanten-mechanik'. *SST* II (1962) 289–300.
[148]* 'Physik gegen Diamat'. *Wort und Wahrheit* Februar 1962.
[149]* 'Sowjetphilosophie in der Krise'. *Schweizer Monatshefte* Juli 1962.
[150]* 'Zur sowjetischen Philosophie der Physik im Jahre 1962'. *SST* III (1963) 33–52.
[151]* 'Branskij, V. P.: Die Philosophische Bedeutung des Anschaulichkeits-problems in der modernen Physik'. *SST* III (1963) 191–201.
[152]* 'La física in oposición al materialismo dialéctico'. *Orb. Cath.* 1963, 7.
[153]* 'Versuchung oder Versuch einer Gegenideologie'. *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* August 1963.
[154]* *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie. Bd. II. Allgemeine Relativitäts-theorie.* (in print).
[155]* 'Die sowjetische Diskussion um die Grundlagen der allgemeinen Rela-tivitätstheorie'. *Osteuropa Naturwissenschaft* 1963 (in print).
[156]* 'Die Grundlagen der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie'. *Synthese* (in print).
[157]* *Quantenmechanik und Sowjetphilosophie.* (in preparation).
PAYNE, T.:
[158]* 'Sergej Leonidovič Rubinštejn'. *SST* III (1963) 208–209.

PLANTY-BONJOUR, J.:

[159] *Études d'ontologie soviétique.* (in print).

RÜEGG, B.:

[160] *Die Sozialpolitik des sowjetrussischen totalitären Klassenstaats.* Winterthur. 1963. 111 S.

RÜHLE, J.:

[161] Review of Georg Lukács: *Schriften zur Literatursoziologie. SST* II (1962) 249–250.

VRTAČIČ, L.:

[162]* 'Marxist-Leninist Literature in Jugoslavia (1945–1959)'. *SST* I (1961) 111–119.

[163]* 'Der jugoslawische philosophische Revisionismus im Lichte der sowjetischen Kritik'. *SST* II (1962) 104–118.

[164]* *Einführung in den jugoslawischen Marxismus-Leninismus. Organisation. Bibliographie.* Dordrecht. 1963. X + 208 S.

[165]* *Einige Versuche der Entideologisierung des Marxismus-Leninismus in Jugoslawien.* (in preparation).

WETTER, G. A.:

[166] *Der dialektische Materialismus.* 4. Ausg. Wien. 1958. (English, London. 1958).

[167] *Sowjetideologie heute. I. Dialektischer und historischer Materialismus.* Frankfurt a/M. 1962. 333 S.

WITTFOGEL, K. A.:

[168] 'Some Remarks on Mao's Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics'. *SST* III (1963) 251–269.

ZINOV'EV, A. A.:

[169] *Phliosophical Problems of Many-Valued Logic.* Translated by G. Küng and D. D. Comey. Dordrecht. 1963. XIV + 155 pp.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SOVIET PHILOSOPHERS AT THE THIRTEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

Some 46 Soviet philosophers were listed as members of the 13th International Congress of Philosophy, held in Mexico City, Sept. 7–14, 1963. However, only 18 are said to have actually taken part in the meeting. They were led by F. V. Konstantinov, presently director of the *IF*, M. B. Mitin, editor-in-chief of *VF*, P. N. Fedoseev, former director of the *IF* and, as far as is known, the only philosopher left on the Central Committee after the 22nd Party Congress, M. E. Omel'janovskij, and others who have regularly attended previous international congresses. Mitin was entrusted with one of the plenary lectures during the Congress, and the Soviet philosophers spoke both in the discussions and in the symposia. Some among them also read free papers, but these were rather difficult to attend, given the poor organization: the free papers were read in the Ciudad Universitaria, some 10 miles from the Centro Médico where the main sessions took place, and nobody knew the times when philosophers were to speak. There was also a symposium of Soviet and U.S. philosophers, attended by many members of the Congress, and a party given by the Embassy of the USSR to which someof the Western philosophers were invited. The Congress offered, as usual, opportunities for private meetings and discussions with philosophers from the Soviet Union.

R. DeGeorge, G. L. Kline, and G. A. Wetter were noticeable among the Western philosophers interested in Soviet philosophy; both R. DeGeorge and G. Wetter read papers which met with considerable success. However, the structure and organization of the Congress was such that no real public discussion could develop: the philosophers mostly exchanged monologues. There was an opportunity for discussion on the symposium mentioned above, but this was largely wasted by the incompetence of most of the Western philosophers who spoke there. This lack of information about Soviet philosophy was one of the most striking aspects of the Congress. Thus, for example, many members were greatly astonished by the quite 'classical' statement of Mitin, that Soviet philosophy does not pretend that consciousness is material; they took that to be a quite revolutionary change.

One of the Soviet papers, M. B. Mitin's 'Čelovek kak ob'ekt filosofskix issledovanij', was published before the Congress in Volume I of the Proceedings of the Congress (*Comunicationes Introductorias*, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1963, pp. 143–164). Its interest is rather limited. Mr. Mitin says that "Marxist philosophy was the first in history to solve in a scientific way the problems of Man and of the human 'I'" (p. 160) – but there is no trace of an effort to clarify what is meant by 'man' and how 'Marxist' philosophy has solved his problems. Some other papers were printed by the Soviet delegation in a pamphlet which met with such considerable success that it was out of print within 24 hours. It is hoped that new copies will be printed later on.

Personal contacts with the representatives of Soviet and other Communist philosophers were, in general, cordial, but nonetheless, on the whole rather deceiving. Some of them thought it right to defend the brutal, quite Stalinian attack on Kamenka and others in No. 7 of *VF* 1963. Moreover, the discussions, which were generally frank and conducted in a sympathetic mood, showed how deeply these philosophers are politically committed. In spite of sincere efforts, several among them seemed unable to understand that another attitude is not only possible but actually exists among their Western colleagues. One conclusion which this reporter had to draw from several conversations was this: many of the delegates really believe that every effort by Sovietologist philosophers is consciously directed towards falsification of Marxism-Leninism, and that it is exclusively done under orders of certain political powers. They simply disbelieve the existence of a sincerely scientific attitude and are not prepared to admit that some persons may be interested in Soviet philosophy for its own sake, independently of its political relevance.

One criticism voiced at the Congress appears to be not without interest for all those who seek to understand Soviet philosophy. The philosopher in question started by acknowledging the 'immense erudition' which he finds in the publications of the Fribourg Institute, but thinks that they often contain erroneous interpretations – a phenomenon difficult to avoid under the circumstances, as he stated. He thinks the main weakness of the work consists in the placing on the same level of really relevant thoughts and of 'silly utterances'. He seriously warned Western Sovietologists of it.

Another criticism, often made from the Soviet side, was that Western philosophers are making undue distinctions between the older and young-

er philosophers. There is, it was stated, no *Generationsproblem* in the Soviet Union. All philosophers, both young and old, have exactly the same attitude and it is preposterous to look for differences between generations. This was sometimes stated with such violence that it served only to strengthen the suspicions that a *Generationsproblem* is present in the Soviet Union as elsewhere, and perhaps more than elsewhere.

A general readiness for continuing contacts and exchanges of ideas was noticeable at the Congress. Unfortunately, very few Soviet philosophers present could speak any Congress language. An invaluable service was rendered in that regard by Semionov and some others, who acted as interpreters. But the meeting confirms the opinion always held in Fribourg that knowledge of the Russian language is quite essential for contacts with representatives of Soviet philosophy. The general conclusions of the experience at Mexico City is that the broadening of personal contacts is very important for the sake of the study of Soviet philosophy.

To sum up, not much progress has been made in mutual understanding and discussion between the Communist and the non-Communist philosophers at the Congress. This is due, it seems, to two circumstances: on the Soviet side, the sending of delegates lacking, for the most part, linguistic and general preparation; on the Western side the already mentioned lack of knowledge of even the ABC's of Soviet philosophy. If similar meetings are to be fruitful for purposes other than political propaganda, both handicaps would have to be removed. As far as the Soviet side is concerned, this could be quite easily fulfilled, for there seem to exist in the Soviet Union many philosophers capable of conducting fruitful discussions with their Western colleagues; the presence of such thinkers at the Congress would have considerably enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union. What was said about Western philosophers is far more difficult to fulfill, at least as far as older thinkers are concerned. But is perhaps not a forlorn hope that some among the younger philosophers will – *mieux vaut tard que jamais* – learn at least something about Soviet philosophy, in order that such disastrous things as the aforementioned American–Soviet symposium in Mexico City might be avoided. *J. B.*

A NEW ANGLE ON DIALECTICAL LOGIC

It looks like a play of some *ars combinatoria* when the voluminous books

of P. V. Kopnin on the 'Dialectic as Logic' (*Dialektika kak logika.* Kiev 1961. 446 str.) and of V. I. Čerkesov on the 'Materialist Dialectic as Logic and Epistemology' (*Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija.* Moskva. 1962. 478 str.) are followed by an equally bulky text on 'Marxist Logic as Dialectic and Epistemology' by the Armenian author G. G. Gabriel'jan (*Marksistskaja logika kak dialektika i teorija poznanija.* Erevan. 1963, 436 str.) We are dealing here with an original attempt to carry out the Hegel-inspired Leninist idea that logic is not merely the explanation of the 'external forms of thought', but is the theory of the 'evolution of all material and spiritual things'. Hence, the demand that logic treat also such subjects as matter, the constitution and structure of things, the 'fundamental forms of being' – space, time and movement, with the latter taken in all the variety of its (inorganic, organic and social) forms. Similarly to Hegel's *Logic*, Gabriel'jan divides his work into three books: 1. The Knowledge of Matter; 2. The Knowledge of the Fundamental Existential Forms of Matter; 3. The Forms and Laws of Knowledge of Matter. In fact, this is nothing else than a new mode of systematizing the entire basic doctrine of Diamat – and as such, to call it a 'Logic' is, of course, contestable. Gabriel'jan's book deserves some notice as a contribution to the current discussion on the structure of Diamat – in accordance with Lenin's principle of the identity (or unity) of dialectic (= ontology), epistemology and logic – since it is an attempt at a practically literary implementation of this principle, not just a purely methodological treatise as in A. X. Kasymžanov's book, and since it does not suffer (as do those of Kopnin and Čerkesov) from the notorious underdevelopment of the materialistic-ontological problematic. It is remarkable, also, that one does not find the same hypertrophy of politico-sociological interpretations as in the majority of Diamat compendia.

H. F.

ON MAN

A study *On the Marxist Understanding of the Essence of Man* has been published in *FN* 1963, 5, 19–27. The introductory remarks give rise to the hope that the author is going to broach the problem of wherein consists the universally human (in the factological as well as in the normative sense) amidst the historically changing 'social conditions' in which Marxism has always sought the human essence. She refers to the Marxian

statements about the alienation of the proletarian from his true human essence, but very soon the investigation loses itself in the domain of secondary questions – that the individual is not fatally bound to the position of the social class into which he is born, that it is incorrect to attribute to Marxism an 'economistically' narrow view on social relations, that Sartre is wrong in his thesis that for Marxism the individual is *eo ipso* something accidental, non-essential, etc. The problem, therefore, remains open, whether or not in Marxism-Leninism, besides the rejection of naturalistic, unhistorical and anti-social 'Anthropologism', there may exist an Anthropology whose subject-matter is the basic constitution of Man, the social being.

The '*Problem of Man in the Light of Marxism*' is also treated in an article by L. N. Mitroxin in *VF* 1963, 8 designed as a contribution to the 13th International Congress of Philosophy. Its sociological schematism is rather penetrating and the general philosophic problematic of man is covered by a thick layer of 'historically-concrete' statements: polemical and apologetical declarations addressed to the Western critics of Communism are dominant and do not leave much room for a positive presentation of a systematic view. The argument is centered around two topics – man and work, man and freedom. Of a certain importance is the confession that "Marxism-Leninism never considered society as a fetish, a self-purpose, and man as a means"(23). The author is definitely mistaken when he presupposes that the concept of freedom, as it is understood by the Western philosophers, has just a bourgeois class meaning (19) and that in socialist society the whole problematic of personal, individual freedom *vis-à-vis* 'society' (i.e., its leading representatives) loses its actuality. To convince himself of this Mitroxin ought to ask those of his colleagues who came into conflict with the party when it still called itself the 'party of Stalin'. That there exists a problematic of individual freedom within and – to a certain extent – even against socialist society has been clearly seen and stated by V. P. Tugarinov (see his article on '*Communism and Person*' in *VF* 1962, 6). *H. F.*

KANT'S COLLECTED WORKS IN RUSSIAN

Although Soviet philosophers' interest in Kant has been shown by five

recent studies on Kant and Kantianism (cf. *SST* 1963, 2, 120), the edition of his works in Russian has been rather neglected. Two editions of the *Prolegomena* (1934 and 1937) and one volume of *Works* (1940) were the only Soviet editions of Kant's works.

Now the *Novye knigi* (1963, 33, 9/10) have announced the publication of I. Kant's *Collected Works* in six volumes. All volumes are to appear by 1965, the first already at the end of 1963. The volumes planned are: (1) Precritical works; (2) *ibid.*; (3) The Critique of Pure Reason; (4) Prolegomena. The Critique of Practical Reason, etc.; (5) Works on esthetics. The Critique of Judgement; (6) Works on the philosophy of history and on the philosophy of nature. *K. G. B.*

HUNGARIAN CRITIQUE OF SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

Tibor Huszár, known mainly for his writings on ethics ('Ideals of the Modern Youth and the Real Modernity' *Valóság*, 1960, 5; 'Christian Humanism' *Világosság*, 1961, 9, 10) spoke in Radio Kossuth (Budapest) of the new Soviet philosophic literature. According to Huszár, earlier Soviet philosophic works were simply offensive owing to their flat style. One could not even distinguish between different writers on the basis of style alone. All works were characterized by a grey monotony all their own. Newer writings are, on the other hand, distinguished by a consideration of a wider range of interest, their authors evidently read several languages, and know the latest bourgeois trends. While until recently Soviet philosophers have not treated such fundamental philosophic problems as, for example, social philosophy, ethics, esthetic and moral values, the first Soviet books dealing with these questions are just now being published. Huszár's critique was the first of its kind to be heard in Hungary in recent years. *E. L.*

A USEFUL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Volume X of the Hoover Institution's Bibliographical Series is volume I of *Guide to Russian Reference Books*, compiled by Karol Maichel and edited by J. S. G. Simmons, which will be followed by five more volumes. This first volume (92 pp.), *General Bibliographies and Reference Books*, contains a numbered listing and description of the major bibliographical

sources, Soviet and Western, on Russia and the Soviet Union. If the subsequent volumes (II: Historical Sciences. III: Social Sciences, Religion, and Philosophy. IV: Humanities. V: Science, Technology, and Medicine. VI: Supplement and Cumulative Index) are as well done as the first, the whole will be a major contribution to research on Russia and the Soviet Union. *T. B.*

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ETHICS IN HUNGARY

After three years of preparation, the first national conference on ethics has now taken place in the University of Pécs. The conference is a further indication of the increasing interest in ethics manifested in Hungary today, prompted by articles in the Communist press, deploring the degeneration of moral standards in the country.

'Marxist Ethics' has been already introduced as a compulsory subject in the faculties of Law, Medicine, and Pedagogy, and it is now extended to most institutions of higher learning. The number of articles on ethics appearing in the philosophic and cultural journals has been steadily growing in the past few years. *E. L.*

CONTROVERSY ON CULTURE

A controversy concerning what has been variously styled 'the rift between the exact and the humane sciences', 'the epistemic split of culture', 'the conditions of unity for humanistic and realistic culture' has been taking increasing dimensions in Hungary. The esthetician László Bence has presented his conclusions, which represent at the same time a critique of the previous contributions to the solution of the controversy, in an article in *Valóság* (Reality), the official journal of the TIT (Society for the Diffusion of Scientific Information), 1963, 4. According to Bence, grasping the problem as a purely intellectual one is fallacious, for it divorces it from the perspectives offered by Communism. Concerning future society, the question is posed: will it be an 'intelligentsia society', or Communist society? The formulation of this question itself shows that the entire problem of the gap between the natural and the social (so-called 'spiritual' (from *Geistes*) sciences) is wrongly grasped. Some leading Hungarian thinkers, among them the famed writer László Németh, have denied the

very possibility of such a gap, holding that the two general fields of culture form one inextricable tangle in history, from the 17th century onwards. Bence considers the resolution of the problem to lie with the careful application of Marx' distinction between alienation and reification. The physical process of work must be separated from its social character. The reification (*Verdinglichung*) of the forces of production takes place independently of social relations. Reification is not necessarily alienation, however. In the Communist society alienation does not take place, but the effective and always human character of all sciences becomes evident, owing to the fact that industry (and the economy based on industry) is the real historical relation of nature to man, and in Communist society natural science as part of this relation, loses its idealistic direction, and becomes really that what it basically always was: part of the foundation of human life. Hence under Communism the rift between the world of the natural sciences and that of the human, or social ones cannot occur, since all disciplines serve the unfolding of real human personality through the correct adjustment of human relations. It is particularly interesting that Bence concludes with the assertion that Communism is not to be regarded as the final form of human society, as the ultimate goal of humanism and of progress. Quoting Marx, and attributing the above view to a return to Hegelianism, Bence affirms that Communism is a new quality in the evolution of humanity, which no longer contains the momentum of alienation, and thus can assure an even faster development toward a future which presents unlimited and as yet unpredictable (*beláthatatlan*) perspectives. *E. L.*

REVIEWS

V. P. Čertkov: *Jadro dialektiki* (The Nucleus of the Dialectic). Moskva. 1963. Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR. 152 str.

Of a monographical study on the central dialectical law of the 'unity and the struggle of the opposites' one might expect it to tackle the numerous discussion problems which have been raised by Soviet authors during the past few years. But this Čertkov accomplishes only to a very small extent. In the first chapter of his booklet ("The most Important Law of Being and Knowledge", pp. 5–46) he gives a through and through conventional and conventionally confused presentation of the law as is to be found in any textbook, in some of them even in a more instructive manner (M. N. Rutkevič). In the other three chapters Čertkov wants to show that the 'action' of the law of unity and struggle of the opposites is not only confined to the real processes of development in nature, society and thought, but also extends itself to the mode of 'action' of the other dialectical laws: "Unity and Struggle of the Opposites Within the Universal Interdependence and Conditionedness" (pp. 47–56), "The Rôle of Unity and Struggle of the Opposites in the Action of the Fundamental Laws of the Dialectic" (pp. 57–102), "The Rôle of Unity and Struggle of the Opposites in the Action of the Non-fundamental Laws of the Dialectic" (pp. 103–134). Thus, e.g., every law is by itself 'contradictory' in as far as it shows a contradiction between the 'general tendency' (which it expresses) and the 'deviations' which may happen, thereby being an application of the law of unity and struggle of the opposites (p. 59). Unity and struggle of the opposites manifest themselves also in that every object is a unity of essence and appearance, of content and form, etc. (106, 117).

Although Čertkov is proceeding quite subtly and conscientiously, his investigation must turn out to be a complete failure because the basic categorial prerequisites remain unclear. It is an old insight that for the formation of categorial concepts some correlative polarity of opposite categorial moments is very characteristic, i.e. some 'unity of opposites'. But to interpret this by the formulae of the law of the unity and the *struggle* of the opposites is simply devious. In addition, Čertkov multiplies the confusion by his idea that laws are able to 'act' one upon the other (p. 46), that the central law of the unity and the struggle of the opposites may, as he puts it, "condition the source of development", that it functions as the "central force" of the dialectic and of the world process (p. 55–56).

In passing I wish to remark that Čertkov is right in pointing out the nonsensical character of the usual distinction between the 'basic laws' and the 'categories' of the dialectic. But he merely replaces, to speak with a phrase of Engels, the greater nonsense by a lesser one when he converts the wrong disjunction 'laws' vs. 'categories' into the equally contestable disjunction 'fundamental laws' vs. 'non-fundamental laws'. Is the correlation between cause and effect,

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

the necessary and the accidental, the content and the form, etc., less fundamental than that between quantity and quality?

In the meantime already another monograph on the law of unity and struggle of the opposites has been announced, written by S. P. Dudel' and G. M. Štraks and twice as long as that of Čertkov. Let's hope that the quantity will at least prepare the leap into a new quality.

H. Fleischer

A. I. Uëmov: *Veščі, svojstva i otnošenija* (Things, Properties and Relations). Moskva. 1963. Izd. Akademii nauk SSSR. 182 str.

In Soviet philosophical literature of the past few years one may find a series of reflections on the old problem which concerns the categorial status of 'things' (or objects), 'properties' and 'relations'. In 1956 V. P. Tugarinov drew attention to this topic when he published an article, 'On the Categories of Object, Property and Relation' (*Vestnik LGU* 1956, 17) and a booklet, 'The Interrelation of the Categories of Dialectical Materialism', in which he took this trinity as the basis of his systematic classification and 'subordination' of the Diamat categories (*Sootnošenie kategorij dialektičeskogo materializma.* 1956). His view on the primacy of the category 'thing' in relation to the others has provoked various objections, e.g. on the part of I. B. Novik (*VF* 1957, 4) and V. G. Afanas'ev (*FN* 1958, 1). The problems 'thing–property' and 'thing–relation' have been touched also by L. A. Man'kovskij (*VF* 1956, 5) and N. F. Ovčinnikov (*VF* 1960, 6).

Now A. I. Uëmov presents a major study on the ontological as well as the logical aspects* of this basic categorial division. In the course of his rather non-dogmatic reasonings Uëmov arrives at the conclusion and demand that one replace the traditional 'spatial' understanding of the thing by a 'qualitative' one which expresses itself in the following definition: "The thing is a system of qualities. Different (*različnyj*) things are different systems of qualities. One and the same thing is one and the same system of qualities" (p. 21). This leads him to an unconventional interpretation of real identity – demonstrated on the Hobbesian example of the ship of Theseus: after all parts of it have been consecutively changed, the result is not a different ship, but another copy of the same (p. 29). It seems to me better to maintain the 'spatial' concept of the thing and the corresponding view on 'real identity' (*toždestvo*), and to distinguish from it the differently constituted problem of 'qualitative identity' (*odinakovost'*) in the meaning of the Husserlian 'ideal unity of the species'. The qualitative concept of the thing allows Uëmov not only to extend the category of the thing to the sphere of the ideal and to speak of 'ideal things' (p. 31); it also leads him to a complete relativization of the status difference between thing, property and

* I have to confine myself to some remarks on the ontological part of the book

relation. Thus it becomes possible to take a relation as a property (pp. 57–59) and a property as a relation (pp. 63–65), and both of them as things (pp. 59–62); similarly a thing may be interpreted as a property and as a relation (pp. 62–63, 65–66). Moreover, all of these three – things, properties and relations – are also relative in the sense that they are co-constituted by external relations (pp. 67–69). Behind these statements lurks a problematic of great importance for the ontological theory of categories. It embraces, among others, the following questions: is the classification of the theoretical objects into 'things', 'properties' and 'relations' (a) sufficiently precise; (b) a complete conjunction; (c) irreducibly elementary? I would like to argue, e.g., that the category of 'property' is, because of its origin in the pre-scientific sphere of thought, very ambiguous and hardly capable of greater precision. As for the category of 'thing' (likewise pre-scientific), it seems to me advisable to analytically reduce it – for theoretical purposes – to the more elementary category of the 'substratum'. Among the manifold predicates which we used to subsume under the notion of 'property', at least the 'movements' (processes, events, modes of behavior) have the right to an independent categorial status.

In the course of his analyses, Uëmov touches a number of particular topics: the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities; the distinction (frequent in Soviet literature) between 'quality' and 'property'; the problem of the 'one quality' or the 'many qualities' (*mnogokačestvennost'*) of things; the general concept of reality. The latter is especially interesting since here lies one of the great unsolved problems of Diamat ontology. It seems to be evident to many Soviet authors that the concept of 'reality' has a categorial function of its own, different from that of other qualifications, as 'being', 'existence', 'objectivity', 'materiality'. Uëmov connects the categorial status of reality with the idea of the (greater or lesser) independence of existing – the greatest independence belongs to matter, the 'maximally absolute reality' ('even Spinoza already' knew something about different degrees of reality...) (pp. 71–74). Here – as in other cases – one must emphasize what the author himself admits in his concluding remarks: that it does not exhaust the problematic (p. 176).

Although (and even *because*) many of Uëmov's statements are contestable, his study is an encouraging phenomenon on the Soviet philosophical scene, since it is able to give valuable impulses to the much neglected investigation of the ultimate categorial fundaments of philosophical theory. It is here that the tools are formed by which, as I believe, the sometimes grotesque conceptual disorder which reigns in many quarters of the Diamat building may be set aright.

H. Fleischer

Bošnjak, Branko: *Povijest filozofije kao nauka. Problem metodologije i predmeta.* (Geschichte der Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Das Problem der Methodologie und des Gegenstandes.) Zagreb, Naprijed. 1958. 211 str.

In seiner Doktordissertation hat B. Bošnjak den Versuch unternommen, einen Beitrag zur Methodologie der Geschichte der Philosophie zu geben. Da ihn die marxistisch-leninistische Geschichtsschreibung augenscheinlich nicht befriedigen kann (S. 164), beginnt er selber bei den Griechen und verfolgt die Entwicklung der Philosophiegeschichte bis in die Gegenwart, um in dieser Entwicklung aufzuspüren, wie man zu einer wissenschaftlichen Methode in der Philosophiegeschichte gelangen könnte. Dieses Unternehmen ist charakteristisch für die Mehrheit der jugoslawischen Philosophen der damaligen Zeit (die Dissertation ist im Jahre 1956 an der Universität Zagreb angenommen worden), da sie der sowjetischen Philosophie sehr mißtrauisch gegenüber standen.

Wie sehr dieser Versuch zu würdigen ist, so wenig dürfen die schwerwiegenden Mängel unerwähnt bleiben:

1. Eine solche Arbeit setzt grosse Kenntnisse der Geschichte voraus. Diese besitzt aber der Autor nicht. Er widmet zwar mehr als 30 Philosophen und Philosophiehistorikern eigene Kapitel (von Heraklit bis G. F. Aleksandrov), aber seine Analysen bleiben oberflächlich. Kein Wunder, daß der Autor selber sozusagen keine neuen Einsichten gewinnen kann. Er gibt am Ende doch in wesentlichen Punkten nur den historischen Materialismus wieder. In der Arbeit, die als Beitrag zur Methodologie der Philosophiegeschichte zu gelten hätte, kann der Autor selber den einzelnen philosophischen Lehren kein besseres Verständnis entgegenbringen, als dies die in der Sowjetunion geläufige Methode auch schon zu erreichen vermochte. Er rechtfertigt die Zwei-Lager-Theorie (Idealismus-Materialismus), obwohl er nicht immer den Materialismus als progressiv und den Idealismus als reaktionär bezeichnet.

2. Weil der Autor offensichtlich zu wenig Geschichte kennt (vor allem vom "finsteren" Mittelalter), glaubt er folgendermaßen schließen zu dürfen: "Wenn man die Philosophie aus der Theologie herleitet, so ist die Geschichte der Philosophie auf die Rechtfertigung der Kirche und ihrer Tätigkeit hin orientiert" (S. 94). Hinter dieser Aussage steckt mehr von der atheistischen Einstellung des Autors als von seiner geschichtlichen Einsicht. So einfach war es weder damals noch heute.

3. Den Begriff der "Objektivität" läßt der Autor ganz unbestimmt, obwohl dieser Begriff in seiner Arbeit eine Schlüsselstellung einnehmen müßte. Er hat Platon (S. 17), Aristoteles (S. 19 f.) und Augustin (S. 35) die Objektivität ihrer philosophiegeschichtlichen Interpretation abgesprochen, weil sie die Philosophie ihrer Vorgänger vom eigenen System aus beurteilten. Diese Stellungnahme ist aber kein Hindernis, um bei Lenin ganz umgekehrt vorzugehen: Bošnjak stimmt Lenin zu, daß man andere Philosophien vom dialektischen Materialismus aus zu beurteilen habe, führt ausdrücklich die Auffassung Lenins an, daß jede Philosophie parteilich sei, und behauptet trotzdem, daß Lenins philoso-

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Holland*

phiegeschichtliche Interpretationen objektiv seien (S. 178). Es ist hier ganz offenkundig, daß der Autor sich um eine Objektivität bemüht, aber nicht versteht, Lenin selber neu zu interpretieren – auf seine Parteilichkeit hin.

4. Auch im letzten Teil seiner Arbeit, wo Bošnjak noch einmal das Problem der Objektivität und der Parteilichkeit (partijnost) aufwirft, kommt er zu keiner besseren Lösung. Er bleibt beim partikulären Ideologiebegriff im Sinne von Karl Mannheim stecken, nachdem nur der Gegner der Ideologiehaftigkeit beschuldigt wird, und versucht überhaupt nicht, sich zu einem allgemeinen Ideologiebegriff emporzuarbeiten, wonach auch seine eigenen Ansichten (d.h. des Marxismus-Leninismus) als ideologiehaftig zu untersuchen wären. Weil er das nicht geleistet hat, bleiben die Begriffe "Objektivität" und "Parteilichkeit" verworren. Bošnjak hat damit tatsächlich den Beweis erbracht, daß eine marxistisch-leninistische Geschichte der Philosophie nach wissenschaftlicher Methode noch nicht geschrieben worden ist (S. 164). Sein Beweis ist aber ein negativer – der positive bleibt noch aus.

Trotzdem gewann aber Bošnjak schon vor 1956 wichtige Erkenntnisse: Er betont an mehreren Stellen die Interdependenz zwischen der Basis und dem Überbau (SS. 157, 161, 164) und ist der Ansicht, daß man ein besseres Verständnis einer Philosophie nur dann gewinnen kann, wenn man sie auch in der philosophiegeschichtlichen Entwicklung (d.h. nicht nur vom jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen Sein her) betrachtet. Er nimmt als Beispiel aus der zeitgenössischen Philosophie K. Jaspers und teilt mit Bocheński die Ansicht, daß die Philosophie von Jaspers nur dann verständlich ist, wenn man den Neuplatonismus gut kennt (S. 163). Aus diesen und anderen Beispielen (Boethius u.a.) sieht man, schreibt Bošnjak, "daß wir *methodisch* das zeitgenössische Philosophieren nicht studieren können, wenn wir nicht die Geschichte der Philosophie kennen, aber ebenso können wir die Geschichte der Philosophie im Ganzen ihrer Äußerungen und Einflüsse nicht begreifen, wenn wir nicht den heutigen Stand des philosophischen Gedankens kennen".

Diese Gedanken sind sehr bemerkenswert. Bošnjak hat mit Recht auf die Unmöglichkeit einer "Autarkie" des Marxismus-Leninismus hingewiesen. Die Folgen einer solchen Haltung konnte er an der sowjetischen Philosophie dieser Zeit ablesen. Ganz unnütz war aber auch sein Aufenthalt bei Prof. A. Wenzl in München im Jahre 1954 nicht.

Es wird einmal später zu zeigen sein, ob und wieweit die jugoslawischen Philosophen diese Gedanken in die Praxis umsetzen konnten.

Ludvik Vrtačič

Nikolaus Lobkowicz: 'Materialism and Matter in Marxism-Leninism'. In: *The Concept of Matter*. Notre Dame University Press. 1963. pp. 430–464.

The present work, which was delivered as a report to a symposium at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana, U.S.A.) in Summer 1961, is to our knowledge the first thorough treatment of this theme by a Western Sovietologist. The author was trained in Sovietology at the Institute of East-European Studies of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) and is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. His paper is a clear and critical presentation of what Marxism-Leninism means by 'materialism' and 'matter'.

The author begins his exposé by showing the central position which these two terms occupy in Dialectical Materialism. This in no way means that they are clearly defined. On the contrary they are used in such multifarious contexts that they finally become confused and ambiguous. The author poses two questions in order that by answering them one may gain some clarity as to the meaning of 'materialism' and 'matter': how is matter defined in Dialectical Materialism and to what in reality is it supposed to correspond? and, is there in Dialectical Materialism at least the possibility of non-material beings?

In response to the first question the author begins by introducing the well-known epistemological definitions of Lenin. Here matter is identified as the objective reality which is given to us through the senses and, further, as the objective reality which exists outside of our consciousness. In the meantime other – ontological – definitions of matter have been discovered: matter is that reality which is in motion; it moves itself in space and time; it is infinite. There is still no clarity as to what this word would indicate in reality: all individuals as they are? a type of *substantia unica*? or, perhaps a primitive material which is common to all things? The author shows that we can find in Dialectical Materialism no answers to these questions. It is, however, probable that matter is to be understood as a type of universal *genus* under which all individuals are subsumed.

But there still remains the possibility that, even though there are no immaterial things, there are properties of these things which cannot be called material. The author asks this question in reference to human consciousness. Lenin stated – and this is repeated still today – that consciousness is not material. In order, however, not to have to admit that there is something outside of matter it is maintained that this is only an epistemological opposition which entails no strict ontological duality. The author concludes that it is precisely in the discussion of the ontological place of consciousness that one of the basic contradictions of Marxism-Leninism comes to light: either one denies the possibility of every non-material sphere of being and one is a 'vulgar materialist', or one admits that there is something outside of the material, thereby abandoning materialism.

Studies in Soviet Thought III, 4 (December 1963); © *D. Reidel, Dordrecht-Holland*

The present work is a significant contribution to the investigation of Soviet philosophy. It is to be hoped that these considerations which treat almost exclusively of the ontological aspects of the problem will be complemented by research into the epistemological and psychological aspects of Soviet materialism.

K. G. Ballestrem

CHRONOLOGY

1963

Jan. Meeting in IF on social psychology (*VP* 1963, 3, 180–183)
Conference in Leningrad on the "Development of the Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution in the Materials of the Twenty-Second Congres of the CPSU" (*FN* 1963, 3, 121–123)
Theoretical conference on "the new man on the farm" at the Kurskij Farm with participation of members of the IF (*VF* 1963, 5, 156–163)
Joint meeting of the philosophy and jurisprudence sections of the AN on work done in 1962 (*VF* 1963, 5, 151–156)

18 Jan. Soviet participation in the meeting of the International Sociological Association at Louvain, on peaceful coexistence (*VF* 1963, 5, 163–164)

7 Feb. Meeting in IF on "The Concrete Conditions of Life and the Person" (*VP* 1963, 3, 188–189)

Feb. Inter-collegiate conference in Sverdlovsk on social science research (*FN* 1963, 3, 126–130)

Spring Meeting in Kiev on the philosophy of elementary particles (*VF* 1963, 7, 145–149)
Meeting on the study of the history of Marxism in the light of the decisions of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, organized by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU (*VF* 1963, 7, 150–151)

March Symposium at MGU on the problem of meaning (s. *VF* 1963, 6, 22).
Meeting of *VF* staffers with members of Krasnopresnenskij district CP committee (*VF* 1963, 7, 154–156)

April MGU philosophy faculty session in honor of Lomonosov (*V MGU* 1963, 4, 92–93)

May Philosophical study session at Moscow's Lixačev car factory with participation of *VF* staffers (*VF* 1963, 7, 151–154)

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE

The courses offered by the Institute for the academic year 1963–1964 are as follows:

Course F

Russische Sprache (two hours)
Langue russe (two hours)
Geschichte und Organisation der Kommunistischen Partei (one hour)
Idéologie communiste (one hour)
Proseminar on General Sovietology (one hour)
General Introduction to Communism (one hour)

Courses H and K

Russische Sprache für Fortgeschrittene (four hours)
Sowjetische Philosophie der Physik (two hours)
L'"athéisme scientifique" soviétique (one hour)
Lénine (one hour)
Seminar: Lenin, "Materializm i empiriokriticizm" (russischer Text) (two hours)

Course P 1

Course F, plus:
Sowjetische Philosophie der Physik (two hours)
Probleme der Naturphilosophie (two hours)
Probleme der theoretischen Physik (two hours)

Course P 2

Courses of *H* and *K*, plus:
Seminar für sowjetische Philosophie der Physik (one hour)
Chapitres choisis de logique mathématique supérieure et appliquée (one hour)
Einführung in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (one hour)

INDEX OF NAMES

Abelard, P. 170
Abramov, V. 231
Adeišvili, Š. G. 38
Afanas'ev, V. G. 146, 331
Ai Ssu-chi 262
Aitov, N. A. 84
Akatov, L. S. 84
Akčurin, I. 231
Aksenova, T. A. 94
Akos, K. 57
Aleksandrov, A. C. 203
Aleksandrov, A. D. 34, 220, 221
Aleksandrov, G. F. 116, 119, 120, 221
Aleksanjan, T. A. 221
Alekseev, I. S. 44, 210
Alekseev, M. N. 23, 72, 74, 77, 149, 190, 214, 221
Alekseev, V. V. 101
Almasi, M. 57
Altmyšbaev, A. A. 221
Alexander, S. 68
Amanaeva, G. 84
Ambarcumjan, V. A. 221
Anan'ev, B. G. 221
Anaxagoras 111
Anaximander 111
Anderson, J. 81
Andreev, G. G. 101
Andreev, G. L. 85, 218
Andreev, I. D. 104
Angelelli, I. 297
Anisimov, A. N. 218
Aptikaev, F. Š. 150
Aquinas, T. 60
Arbatov, Ju. 85
Aristotle 4, 27, 57, 77, 112, 114 f., 170, 212
Artykov, A. 148
Arxangel'skij, L. M. 85, 123, 132
Aržanov, M. A. 222
Aseev, Ju. A. 231
Asmus, V. F. 74, 115, 116, 117, 120, 222, 231
Augustine 112
Austin, J. 215
Avicenna 173
Avraamov, D. S. 85
Axlibinskij, B. V. 231
Axmanov, A. S. 10, 222
Axmedli, D. T. 85
Ayer, A. J. 64, 216, 231, 309
Azerov, N. I. 85

Bacon, F. 86, 111, 114, 170, 212
Bacon, R. 112
Bajkara, M. K. 85
Bakradze, K. S. 70, 74, 77 f., 116, 120, 184, 222, 231
Bakšutov, V. K. 85
Ballestrem, K. G. 6, 10, 107, 175, 296, 299 f., 314, 336
Baranov, P. 85
Bartoš, J. 23
Baskakov, V. G. 222
Baskin, M. P. 2, 85, 222
Batalov, E. Ja. 218
Batiščev, G. 231
Bauer, B. 170
Bauer, R. A. 10
Bazarov, A. 39, 49, 86
Beemans, P. J. 229, 230, 299, 314
Begiašvili, A. F. 216, 232, 233
Bĕk, G. 86
Belik, A. P. 105
Beljaev, K. I. 86
Belorusova, V. V. 86
Belov, L. P. 217
Bence, L. 328 f.
Berdnik, P. M. 86
Beerstnev, V. F. 222
Bergson, H. 68
Berka, K. 32
Berkeley, G. 65, 171, 215
Bernadiner, S. M. 86, 223
Berz, A. S. 86
Bertalanffy, L. v. 212
Bexterev, V. M. 153, 208
Billeter, E. 295
Birjukov, B. V. 314
B'jarnason, S. 86
Blakeley, T. J. 8, 64, 73, 76, 80, 134, 165, 166, 168, 169, 184, 219, 230, 245, 295, 296 f., 300 f., 314–316

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Blatin, A. Ja. 86
Blauberg, I. V. 86
Bloxincev, D. 39, 79, 223
Bober, J. 25
Bocheński, J. M. 2 f., 8, 9, 26, 66, 74, 78, 107, 119, 120, 207, 245, 294, 296 f., 300 f., 316–317, 319
Bodnar, J. 232
Boeselager, W. 60, 158, 242, 299 f., 314
Bogoljubov, N. N. 38
Bogomolov, A. S. 67 f., 232
Bogoutdinov, A. M. 223
Bogračev, Ja. L. 86
Boguslavskij, V. M. 232
Bojkov, V. V. 139, 146 f.
Bokarev, P. L. 86
Boldyrev, N. I. 86, 87
Borisova, I. S. 232
Born, M. 192
Bošnjak, B. 333
Boxkareva, M. A. 87
Brady, P. 299
Branskij, V. P. 191 f.
Brecht, B. 57
Breck, A. 59
Bridgeman, P. T. 40, 216
Bronarskij, A. 297
Bruno, G. 111, 114, 171
Brutjan, G. A. 232
Buchholz, A. 134 f., 297 f., 317
Bujin, V. S. 87
Bukharin, N. 179, 258
Bunge, M. 87, 232
Burkov, B. 87
Burrows, M. 58
Burxard, A. I. 232, 234
Buslov, K. P. 87, 223
Butlerov, A. M. 41
Byxovskij, B. 119, 223, 232

Cabet, E. 173
Caikovskij, V. V. 87
Camerjan, I. P. 218
Campanella, T. 112, 114, 173
Carnap, R. 74, 79
Carus, Lucretius 111, 114
Celikova, O. P. 87, 102
Chardin, T. de 71
Chen Kung-Po 268
Ch'en Po-ta 269
Chou En-lai 253, 254, 265, 266
Cikol', Ja. N. 87
Clausewitz, C. 58
Clofač, J. 31
Comenius, J. A. 58, 173
Comey, D. D. 8–10, 230, 245, 296 f., 317
Condillac, E. 112, 114, 173
Condorcet, J. 173
Cornforth, M. 235
Coufal, J. 23, 31
Couturat, L. 26
Cusanus, N. 173
Cvejling, K. 232, 234
Cvekl, J. 20

Čagin, B. A. 87
Čerkašin, P. P. 232
Čerkesov, V. I. 8, 74, 158, 169, 190, 232, 325
Černik, V. 18
Černyj, M. 88
Čertkov, A. B. 161, 218
Čertkov, V. P. 330
Česnokov, D. 150, 160
Čudnorskaja, E. Ju. 88, 132
Čugaev, A. Ja. 57
Čžou Juan-Bin 88

Danieljan, M. S. 88
Dahm, H. 9, 297 f., 317 f.
D'Acosta, V. 114, 171
Davydov, A. S. 39
Deborin, A. M. 2, 115, 119, 223, 262
DeGeorge, R. T. 10, 82, 103, 121, 245, 297 f., 318, 322
Delabays, G. 297
Demidova, A. I. 88
Democritus, 117, 212
Denisova, L. 65
Descartes, R. 58, 65, 112, 117, 171
Dezami, T. 114, 171
Dezsery, L. 59
Dieška, J. 59
Diaz de Gamarra 110
Diderot, D. 114, 171
D'jacento, F. F. 88
Dolgaeva, A. T. 88
Dolgov, M. M. 73

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Dobronrarov, I. 237
Drobnickij, O. G. 84, 88
Drujanov, L. A. 146
Dukinin, G. M. 88
Dudel', S. P. 224, 331
Dubsky, I. 21, 27, 32
Dunaeva, E. A. 224
Duns Scotus, J. 112
Dürr, K. 26
Dynnik, M. A. 116, 243
Dyson, F. I. 201
Dzerzinskij, F. 88
Džunosov, M. S. 150, 224

Eddington, A. 211, 216
Efimov, V. T. 85, 88, 132
Egorov, A. G. 58, 224
Eichorn, W. 21
Eilstein, H. 9
Einstein, A. 299
Elek, T. 59
Elez, J. 165
Elkblast, 152
Emdin, M. V. 71, 74
Empedocles, 111
Enevič, F. F. 224
Engels, F. 130, 135, 140 f., 184, 279, 289
Engliš, K. 20, 29, 32
Engst, Ja. 89
Epicurus 111
Erasmus, D. 112, 114, 171
Ermolenko, D. V. 233
Ešbi, R. (Ashby) 297
Ezding, F. A. 94

Fajkus, B. 23, 31
Fajnberg 44, 48
Fang Lin 253, 254, 265
Faraon, M. 245, 297
Fataliev, X. M. 233
Fedorenko, E. G. 89
Fedoseev, P. N. 322
Feuerbach, L. 59, 112, 114, 171
Fichte, J. 114, 172
Filimonov, V. V. 38
Filkorn, V. 18, 21
Filonovič, N. 89
Firsov, B. A. 133
Fleischer, H. 9, 71, 72, 213, 245 f., 278, 296 f., 318, 332
Fok, V. A. 34
Fourier 42
Fourrier, C. 114, 172
Foustka, R. N. 30
Francev, Ju. P. 89
Frank, P. 79, 153, 216
Frege, G. 65
Freyer, H. 207
Fricgand, M. 89
Frolov, I. T. 19, 72
Furman, A. E. 292

Gabinskij, G. A. 218
Gabriel'jan, G. A. 325
Gagarin, A. P. 224
Gajdukov, Ju. G. 160
Gak, G. M. 89, 224
Galic 152
Galileo, G. 111
Granatštejn, E. M. 90
Gapočka, P. N. 89, 224 f.
Garaudy, R. 90
Gassendi, P. 111
Gedö, A. 58
Georgiev, F. I. 225
Gerasimov, I. G. 165
German, L. I. 90
Gevorkjan, G. A. 168, 169
Geymanat, L. 58
Glebov, A. V. 49
Gleiman, L. 60
Glezerman, G. E. 79
Gluščenko, M. G. 90
Gokieli, L. P. 166, 225
Golosov, V. F. 225
Gorbenko, Ju. 190
Gorina, I. 190
Gornštejn, T. N. 234
Goroxov, F. A. 225
Gorskij, D. P. 105, 165, 168 f., 234
Grankin, N. I. 90
Grečanov, A. D. 234
Grieger, P. E. 59
Grigor'jan, T. G. 90
Gubanov, N. I. 218, 225
Gulian, K. I. 90

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Gulyga, A. V. 105, 234
Gumnickij, G. K. 90
Gusev, A. D. 91
Gusejnov, G. N. 226
Gyarmati, I. 206

Hackstaff, L. H. 297 f., 319
Haeckel, E. 172
Haldane, J. S. 39
Halecki, O. 245, 297
Hartmann, N. 189 f., 213
Havemann, R. 19, 20
Hegedius, A. 58
Hegel, G. 4, 21, 58, 68, 112, 114 f., 117, 165, 172, 212, 214, 286
Heidegger, M. 21
Heintete, E. 21
Heisenberg, W. 38, 48
Helvetius, C. 114, 172
Hilbert, W. 26
Heraclitus 27, 111
Herder, J. G. 114, 172
Heyting, A. 74
Hobbes, T. 111, 114, 172
Holbach, P. d' 114, 172
Houriet, A. 295
Houška, J. 19
Hrušovsky, I. 15
Hrzal, L. 26, 32
Huarte, J. 111
Husserl, E. 65
Huszar, T. 55, 56, 327

Ibn Tufail Abu Bekr 58
Igitxamjan, M. X. 91
Ionidi, P. P. 226
Ikonnikova, S. N. 91
Il'enkov, E. V. 72, 166, 234
Iliadi, A. N. 78 f.
Il'icev, L. 71, 90, 226
Iovčuk, M. T. 116, 226
Ivanov, A. A. 104
Izimbetov, T. 218

Janagida, K. 91
Janoušek, J. 20
Janovskaja, S. A. 8 f., 234
Jaroševskij, M. G. 234
Jaspers, K. 64, 334
Jauris, M. 32
Joravsky, D. 8
Jordan, Z. A. 246, 296 f., 319
Julina, N. S. 91
Jurovickij, O. G. 91
Juškevič, P. S. 215

Kalab, M. 21
Kalandarišvili, G. M. 226
Kalinin, M. I. 91
Kalivada, K. 20 f., 27, 32
Kaljuznyj, V. I. 146 f.
Kal'sin, F. F. 227
Kaltaxčan, S. T. 36
Kammari, M. D. 91, 227
Kamenka, E. 81 f., 323
Kamysan, M. A. 91
Kánský, J. 26 f., 32, 91
Kant, I. 4, 10, 26, 112, 114 f., 165, 173, 196, 214, 326 f.
Kapica, P. 33
Karabanov, N. V. 163
Karapetjan, A. A. 227
Karapetjan, R. A. 91
Karasek, J. 26, 32
Kareva, M. P. 91
Karpovič, E. 227
Karpušin, V. A. 160
Kasavina, G. 92
Kasumov, M. M. 227
Kasymžanov, A. X. 214, 325
Kaširin, P. 92
Kavelin 153
Kazakevič, T. A. 72
Kazjutinskij, V. V. 10
Kedrov, B. M. 19, 67, 116, 157 f., 160, 162 f., 165 f., 227, 234, 243
Kelle, V. 92
Kemenov, V. S. 227
Khrushchev, N. S. 74
Kikoin, I. K., 38
Kisilenčev, A. C. 79
Kissel, M. A. 234
Kitajgorodskaja, R. 92
Klaus, G. 24
Kline, G. L. 9 f., 107, 119 f., 297 f., 319, 322
Kločkov, V. M. 92
Klofač, J. 23

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Knigin, A. N. 234
Kogan, L. N. 150
Kolbanovskij, V. N. 92
Kollontaj, A. 92
Kol'man, E. 14 f., 19 f., 24, 31, 60, 159, 228, 293
Kolodjažnyj, V. I. 228
Kolonickij, P. F. 92
Kompaneec, A. I. 38, 48
Kon, I. S. 93, 232, 235
Kondakov, V. I. 74
Konoplev, V. K. 93
Konstantinov, F. V. 322
Kopecky, M. 24, 31
Kopnin, P.V. 73 f., 162, 167, 190, 214, 325
Korneeva, A. I. 215, 235
Kornilov, K. 153
Korolëv, F. A. 38
Koselskij 152
Kosičev, A. D. 57
Kosik, K. 13
Kosolapov, S. M. 89
Kovalčuk, A. S. 93
Kovalev, A. G. 93
Kovalev, A. M. 104
Kovalev, S. I. 59
Kovalev, S. M. 93
Kovalgin, V. M. 235
Kozlova, M. S. 235
Kozyrev, L. A. 94
Kozyrev, N. A. 38
Kral, M. 22, 31
Krasnov, Ju. M. 93
Krëber, K. 236
Krjažev, P. E. 93
Krupskaja, N. K. 93
Krupskaja, P. E. 93
Kryvelev, I. E. 59
Kukarkin, B. V. 38
Küng, G. 9, 297 f., 319
Kurylev, A. K. 93
Kursanov, G. A. 160, 235 f.
Kurzanov, M. I. 93
Kuz'min, I. G. 93
Kuz'min, N. 236
Kuznecov, I. I. 236
Kuznecov, I. V. 33, 39 f.
Kuznecov, O. P. 236
Kvitko, D. J. 228
Lamettrie, J. 114, 173
Lapina, T. S. 218
Larmin, O. 57
La Rochefoucauld 173
László, E. 59, 156, 297, 299 f., 319
Leibniz G., 26, 112, 114, 173
Lejman, I. I. 93 f., 132
Lektorskij, V. A. 163 f., 210
Lem, G. F. 152, 160
Lenin, V. I. 58, 74, 77, 94, 130, 134, 140 f., 179, 184, 215, 279, 333, 335
Leonardo da Vinci 112, 114, 173
Leont'ev, A. N. 154, 156
Leucippus 111
Levada, Ju. A. 218
Lifanov, M. I. 94, 121, 132
Livencov, V. A. 99
Lobkowicz, N. 9, 11, 60, 296 f., 319, 335
Locke, J. 114, 173 f., 189, 191
Lomonosov, M. V. 152
Losev, A. F. 115, 119
Loskutov, I. M. 39
Losskij, N. O. 59, 153
Löther, R. 19
Löwenthal, R. 179, 319
Lucanus 174
Lucianus 114
Lucretius 174
Lukács, G. 207
Łukasiewicz, J. 25
Lušnikov 147
Luyten, N. 295
Lysenko, T. D. 79

Mably, G. 114
Mach, E. 215
Macha, K. 26, 32
Machiavelli, N. 114, 174
Machovcova, J. 18
Machovec, M. 20, 27, 31 f.
Makarenko, A. S. 94
Makarov, A. D. 292
Makarov, M. G. 72
Makarov, V. T. 236
Maksimov, A. A. 33
Mal'cev, V. 57
Mal'kov, V. A. 94
Man'kovskij, B. S. 94
Man'kovskij, L. A. 331

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Manofeev, I. A. 94
Mannheim, K. 334
Mao Tse-tung 251–270
March, A. 211
Marcin, E. 297
Margenan, H. 20
Markov, M. A. 9, 191
Marx, Gy. 58
Marx, K. 12, 21, 55, 58, 74, 80, 115, 130, 134 f., 140 f., 184, 246
Masič, I. 94
Maskulija, A. V. 93
Materna, P. 25, 32
Matrai, L. 58
Matveenkov, I. I. 11, 94
Mčedlov, M. P. 217
Meleščenko, Ju. S. 234
Meljuxin, S. T. 9, 44, 67, 149, 210, 287
Mel'nikov, V. M. 236
Menzel, L. 26, 32
Meslier, J. 111, 174
Mindlin, I. B. 94
Mišin, M. I. 94
Mitin, M. B. 21, 33, 39 f., 74, 116, 159, 168, 236, 243, 264, 322 f.
Mitroxin, L. N. 236, 326
Mixailov, F. T. 94
Mixalenko, Ju. P. 215, 236 f.
Mikeev, V. I. 95
Mleziva, M. 25, 31
Mlynar, Z. 27, 32
Molotov, V. M. 79
Montaigne, Ph. 114, 174
Montesquieu, Ch. de 112, 114, 174
Moore, B. 65, 216
More, T. 112, 114, 174
Morelli 114, 174
Morgan, K. 64, 68
Mšvenieradze, V. V. 236, 237
Müller-Markus, S. 9, 33 f., 191, 245, 295–299, 320
Muratov, N. M. 95
Murauskas, V. I. 95
Murin, Ch. 60
Muxartov, N. M. 95
Mxitarjan, G. E. 95
Myslivčenko, A. 237

Nahalka, E. 59
Narskij, I. S. 215, 237, 238
Nazarenko, I. D. 104
Nejedly, Z. 29
Nemcov, V. 85, 95
Németh, L. 328
Nesterov, V. G. 95
Newton, I. 111, 174
Nicholas of Cusa 112
Niemeyer, G. 246
Nikitin, E. P. 239
Nikodimov, P. M. 146–147
Nikolaev, L. V. 95
Nobubumi, I. 267
Novik, I. B. 38, 160, 331
Novoselov, N. S. 95

Ockham, W. 112
Odojevskij 152
Ojzerman, T. I. 95, 116, 162, 239
Okulov, A. F. 34, 114, 116–120
Olgin, C. 9
Omel'janovskij, M. E. 38, 45, 239, 243, 322
Oparin, Z. I. 61, 79
Orlovcev, F. Ja. 96
Osipov, A. A. 161
Ovčinnikov, N. F. 210, 331
Ovčinnikov, V. S. 96
Ovčinnikova, M. P. 146 f.
Owen, R. 114, 174

Paine, T. 114, 174
Palacky, Fr. 27
Pancxava, I. D. 57, 218 f.
Panov, D. 154, 156
Papazjan, S. M. 96
Parkin, V. F. 96
Pauling, L. 39 f.
Pavlov, I. P. 10
Pavlov, T. 24, 79
Pavlov, V. T. 153, 168, 208
Payne, R. T. 209, 297, 320
Pekarek, V. 27
Perederij, V. I. 239
Persic, M. M. 96
Pestov, N. A. 96
Petras, Ju. G. 218
Petrosjan, M. I. 96
Piaget, J. 164
Pilipenko, N. V. 36

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Piantovskij, A. A. 96
Planty-Bonjour, J. 296, 321
Plato 27, 112, 114, 174, 212
Plekhanov, G. 58
Plotinus 112
Plutarch 58
Podkorytov, G. A. 72, 73
Podmarkov, G. V. 96
Polikarov, A. 19, 120, 239
Poljakov, K. P. 96
Pomogaeva, E. F. 239
Pomponazzi, P. 111
Popov, A. I. 25
Popova, I. Ja. 96
Popovič, M. V. 239
Pozner, A. P. 48
Priduvalov, F. M. 217
Priestley, J. 114, 175
Prokof'ev, V. I. 97
Pustovojtova, V. K. 97

Račkov, P. A. 56, 93
Radiščev, A. N. 152
Rajchl, J. 24, 31
Rakitov, A. I. 97
Rapp, F. 299
Razumnyj, V. A. 97
Rebrin, V. I. 97
Regamey, C. 296, 297
Resetnikov, N. A. 160
Révész, L. 297
Reznikov, L. O. 240
Riedel, G. 14
Rjakin, A. N. 79
Robinet 69, 114, 175
Rochausen, R. 19
Rousseau, J. J. 112, 114, 175
Rozental', M. M. 9, 72, 74, 160, 167 f., 190, 214
Rožin, V. P. 10, 71, 74, 78, 148, 292
Rubinštejn, S. L. 208
Ruegg, B. 296, 297, 321
Ruffieux, R. 295–297
Rühle, J. 321
Ruml, V. 16 f., 20 f.
Russell, B. 64, 74, 79, 211, 215 f.
Rutkevič, M. N. 78, 79 f., 149 f., 330
Rybekova, N. V. 72, 97
Ryle, G. 125

Sačkov, I. V. 59
Sadovskij, N. A. 97
Sadovskij, V. N. 210, 240
Sadykov, F. B. 60, 123, 132
Saint-Simon, H. de 114, 175
Sandor, J. 206
Sandor, P. 59
Sarsenbaev, N. 97
Sartre, J.-P. 55, 326
Satybatov, A. A. 71
Savčenko, I. Ja. 97
Saxarov, A. B. 97
Sečenov, I. M. 152, 153
Segal, J. 19
Selektor, M. Z. 98
Selivanov, F. N. 98
Sel'kina, O. S. 210
Sellars, R. W. 68, 69
Selsam, C. 98
Semenčenko, V. K. 38
Semenov, S. I. 150
Semionov 324
Semkov, B. F. 38
Sern-Borisova, I. S. 218
Serastjanova, S. T. 98
Serdjukov 48
Serjan, V. K. 98
Sheng Shih-ts'ai 253, 268
Siger of Brabant 112
Simmons, J. S. G. 327
Simonov, C. S. 217
Sinicyn, V. G. 98
Sirokov, I. S. 49
Sjusjukalov, B. I. 98
Skajsgiris, R. P. 240
Skirdo, M. P. 98
Skurlatov, V. I. 45
Slejske, Dr. 19
Smirnova, E. D. 240
Smol'kov, V. G. 150
Smuts, J. C. 68, 211
Snow, E. 254, 262, 269
Sobotke, M. 21
Sobocinskij, B. 25
Sokolov, A. A. 39, 48
Sokolov, V. V. 57, 98, 240
Sondhi, M. L. 246
Spasov, D. 8
Spencer, H. 68, 69

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Spinoza, B. 111, 114 f., 175
Spirkin, A. 240
Stalin, J. 2, 17, 49, 62, 134, 180 f., 185, 258 f., 268 f.
Stegmüller, W. 207
Stepanjan, C. A. 151
Stepanov, V. I. 148
Stepanskij, M. A. 150
Stoletov, V. N. 37
Strašnikov, V. M. 79
Straxov 153
Strinka, J. 21
Stul', Ju. E. 98
Suchij, M. 24
Suvorov, L. N. 150, 152, 240
Suxov, A. D. 218
Svečnikov, G. A. 37, 240
Sviderskij, V. I. 60, 201, 210 f., 293
Svitèk, I. 13
Svoboda, K. 29
Svoboda, L. 13, 27
Szanto, L. 15, 30
Szigeti, J. 207
Safarev, V. S. 240

Šandra, V. A. 98
Šatura, V. 59, 152 f.
Šarija, P. A. 98
Šaxnazarov, G. X. 98, 203
Ščerbak, F. N. 98
Šeputo, L. L. 240
Šeršenko, L. A. 241
Šeršunov, A. D. 150
Šestakov, V. P. 98
Šexterman, E. I. 99
Širjaev, Ju. I. 99
Šiškin, A. F. 60, 84, 99, 121 f., 132, 202
Šiškina, V. I. 93
Školskij, E. D. 79
Šljaxtenko, S. G. 71
Šmidt, O. Ju. 79
Španar, J. 27
Šteijn, V. S. 99
Štoff, V. A. 72
Štraks, G. M. 9, 148, 331
Šušurin, S. F. 45
Šutnikov, F. A. 99
Švarcman, K. A. 84, 100, 241
Švečkov, G. Ja. 100
Švyrev, V. S. 241

Tamás, G. 58
Tambovcev, I. V. 100
Tardy, Vl. 20
Tarakanov, N. 57
Tarski, A. 23
Tarxova, M. A. 146
Tavanec, P. V. 162, 241
Tažibaev, T. 100
Tereščenko, S. I. 100
Terleckij, Ja. P. 24, 31, 38, 44 f., 48
Ternov, I. M. 39
Thales 111
Titarenko, A. 57
Titarenko, S. 100
Tjapkin 49
Tlusty, V. 23, 31
Toland, J. 111, 114, 175
Tondl, L. 13
Topol'sky, M. 15
Traxtenberg, O. V. 116
Trifonenkov, P. I. 100
Trofimov, P. 100
Trušagina, E. F. 101
Truščenko, V. 101
Tugarinov, V. P. 9 f., 13, 44, 49, 71, 79, 84, 101, 292, 326, 331
Turgot, A. R. 114, 175

Uëmov, A. I. 331, 332
Ukraincev, B. S. 79
Utkin, S. 203

Valeskaln, P. 228
Vartik, Fr. 27
Vaseckij, G. S. 228
Vasil'ev, O. 101
Vavilov, S. I. 228
Vedenov, M. F. 36
Velikovič, L. N. 218
Vellanskij 152
Vetrov, A. A. 241
Vimmscare, K. A. 217
Vipper, R. Ju. 101
Vladimirov, V. 101, 102
Vojtko, V. I. 149
Volčenko, L. B. 102

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Vol'kov, G. A. 9, 24
Voltaire, A. 112, 114, 175
Vorob'ev, L. N. 292
Vorob'ev, M. F. 71, 212
Voronkov, V. S. 101
Vrtačič, L. 246, 296, 299 f., 321, 334

Wang Fu 111
Wang Tschung 111
Weinberger, O. 25, 26, 32
Wetter, G. A. 61 f., 107, 119 f., 269, 298, 321 f.
Whitehead, A. N. 2, 68
Winstanley, G. 175
Wittfogel, K. A. 297 f., 321
Wittgenstein, L. 74, 216
Wolff, C. 26

Xajkin, A. L. 102
Xanidov, P. X. 102
Xanjutin, Ju. 102
Xarčev, A. G. 102
Xaxaleva, P. M. 102
Xil'mi, G. F. 38
Xolostava, T. V. 102

Zakladnaja, V. 102
Zamkov, V. A. 38
Zamoškin, Ju. A. 102, 103
Zaporožec, A. V. 228, 229
Zaporožec, I. F. 103
Zaradskaja, N. V. 103
Zaxidov, V. Ju. 229
Zazerskij, G. D. 103
Zegalkin, I. I. 229
Zeleny, J. 20
Zeman, J. 20
Zempliner, A. 27, 32
Zeno 49
Zerkin, D. M. 152
Zinov'ev, A. A. 9, 166, 292, 321
Zis', A. I. 103
Zoltec, D. K. 8
Zvegincev, V. A. 242
Zybkovec, V. F. 103, 161

Ždanov, A. A. 2, 108, 109, 114, 116
Ždanov, G. B. 47
Žigulev, G. I. 161
Žuravkov, M. G. 103
Žuravlev, L. A. 242

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Absolute and relative 196
abstract and concrete 168
abstraction 41, 105, 157, 168, 169
academic degrees 148
activity, neural 176
agnosticism 235
alienation 81, 90
analysis 7, 216, 232, 240
anarchism 57
ancestor-worship 218
animatism 219
animism 219
anthropology 135, 326
anti-Communism 57
army 90
arrogance 88
art 58, 79, 101, 104, 124
artistic method 57
Asia 111
atheism 16, 20, 59, 161, 243
atheism, scientific 205, 206, 217, 309
atom 47
atomism, logical 215
axiology 4
axioms 206

Baptistry 205, 217
behavior 86
behaviorism 153
being 290; social 26, 57, 85, 89, 101
Bern 106
Bible 59, 205
bibliography 298 f., 314–321, 327, 328
biology 18, 19, 208
Budapest 55
Buddhism 5, 219
building of Communism 37, 56, 86, 176, 244
building of socialism 19
bureaucrat 103

Capital 58
capitalism 98, 102, 105, 109, 276
car factory 337
catechism 161
categories 3, 71, 72, 168, 169, 199, 210, 283, 330, 331
Catholicism 97, 205, 217
causality 19 f., 64, 232
chance 47
chemistry 41
China 251–277
Christianity 5
Church 160, 333
coexistence, peaceful 75, 179, 337
cognition 57
collectivisation 258
collectivism 89, 94, 160
colonialism 218
commandments 88
Communism 2, 4, 129 f.; anti- 57; building of 37, 56, 86, 176, 244; of the future 134 f.; scientific 22, 150–152, 160
complementarity 48, 236
concept 76, 105, 160, 167–169, 234, 235, 251–267
concrete, abstract and 168
concreteness 191–201
conference 245
congress 18 f., 322; philosophical 1; Twenty-First 122, 238; Twenty-Second 104, 148, 150, 207, 322, 337
conscience 102, 125
consciousness 155, 335
contacts, personal 322–324
content 167
contradiction 3, 18, 23, 60, 71, 160, 232, 251 f., 278 f.
core 278–293
correspondence 197
cosmogony 3
cosmology 3
courses 106, 139–147, 246, 247, 338
criminality 90
criticism 63; and self-criticism 148
Cuba 22
culture 101, 328, 329
cybernetics 3, 22, 24 f., 105, 160
cynicism 59
Czechoslovakia 11 f., 96, 159, 160, 299, 310; reviews in 14 f.

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Dead Sea 58
degrees, academic 148
de-ideologisation 4
democracy, socialist 18
determinism 127, 156
development 67 f., 87, 129, 278
dialectic 158, 160, 214, 278–293, 330; objective 77, 214; subjective 77, 214
dialectical logic 57, 73 f., 162–169, 184–190, 304, 325
dialectical method 167
dialectics 53, 251–267; and metaphysics 107
diamat 22, 56, 61, 139 f., 232, 270–277
discussion 35 f.; freedom of 16
dissertation 104–105, 205
doctrine, Soviet 64
dogma 63
dogmatism 6
domains, empty 136, 202, 302
drama 57
dualism 48, 186
duty 88, 101, 125

Eastern Europe 180, 310 f.
eclecticism 13
education 84 f., 105, 121 f., 204, 232, 241
elementary particles 38, 43 f., 337
embourgeoisement 5
emotion 95
empiriocriticism 58
empiricism 232
empty domains 136, 202, 302
endless 195
England 232, 239
epistemology 59, 71, 73 f., 158, 160, 184–190, 192 f., 201, 214, 230–242, 305 f., 325
error 234
esquimeaux 218
essence 71, 157, 193 f.
esthetics 87, 97, 104, 207, 244, 309
Estonia 217
ethics 26, 59, 60, 81–82, 83 f., 121 f., 202–205, 241, 246, 308, 328
Europe, Eastern 180, 310 f.
evolution 68 f., 185
existence 238
existentialism 100
explanation 239
extension 169

Factory 88; car 337
faith 2, 3
family 102
farm 337
fascism 160
fetishism 219
feudalism 109
fideism 237
field 191
Filosofskaja énciklopedija 150, 220
finiteness and infinity 24
First International 28
force 180
foreign policy 181
France 90
freedom 20, 58, 81, 85, 88, 136 f., 203, 326; of discussion 16
Fribourg 294 f.
future, Communism of the 134 f.

Geneva 243
geocentricity 197
Germany 239
good 128
Greek philosophy 111

Habits 85
happiness 27, 86, 125
harmony 291
heroism 99
high school 139
Hindu thought 3
histomat 26, 61, 102, 139 f., 151, 160, 232
historical, logical and 72
historicism 216, 235
historiography of philosophy 107 f., 309
history 333
history of philosophy 4, 27, 216
honor 125
hope 95
humanism 96, 243
Hungary 55–59, 206, 207, 299, 312, 327–329

Ideal, mental and 65
idealism 238; materialism and 107 f.,

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

270–277; objective 215, 234, 239; subjective 215, 237, 239
ideals 81
identity 164, 331
ideology 53, 62, 134 f., 179 f., 246, 301, 334; and philosophy 5 f.; and science 18
ignorance 295
immateriality 187
imperialism 57
implication 25
impulses 289
incentives 86
indeterminism 240
India 111
individualism 100, 234
inductive logic 241
infinity and finiteness 24
Institute of Philosophy 37, 104, 221 f., 337
Institute of Physics 104
interests 87, 89-103, 129
interactivity 188
International, First 28
intersubjectivity 238
intuitionism 88
irritability 188
Islam 95, 102, 205, 218

Joy 95
Judaism 205
Jugoslavia 299, 311
jurisprudence 337

Knowledge 78 f., 157, 160, 215, 284; political 139
Kratkij filosofskij slovar' 235
Kratkij kurs 2
kul 't ličnosti 2, 114, 214
Kuomintang 261

Labor 27; physical and mental 22
language 2
law 27, 95, 96, 185, 236, 243, 330
laws 71; of logic 163
Leningrad 2, 337; University of 104, 220 f.
life 37, 176, 337
linguistics 242
logic 22, 25, 59, 73 f., 80, 105, 149, 150, 158, 160, 169, 214, 232 f., 241, 242; dialectical 57, 73 f., 162–169, 184–190, 304, 325; inductive 241; laws of 163; mathematical 25 f., 53, 232; multi-valued 3; Soviet 3, 303
logical and historical 72
logical atomism 215
Louvain 337
love 124
Lutheranism 205, 217

Machism 240
magic 161, 219
man 134 f., 323–326; new 176, 337; Soviet 86, 154, 203
Marburg 209
marriage 102
Marxism 55, 81, 179
Marxology 1
masses 84 f.
Materialism 85, 335; and idealism 107 f., 270–277
mathematical logic 25 f., 53, 232
mathematics 159
matter 22, 45, 67, 71, 185, 283 f., 335
meaning 238, 239, 337
measure 49, 196 f., 239
mechanics, quantum 3, 59
medecine 176, 240
mechanism 238
mental and ideal 65
mental and physical labor 22
metaphysics 7, 162, 235; dialectics and 107
method 63–65, 78, 216, 303, 333; artistic 57; dialectical 167
methodology 38 f., 243
Mexico 322–324
microphysics 3, 246
Middle Ages 20, 333
model 192 f., 206, 283 f.
modesty 88
morality 203–205, 217
morals 84 f., 121
Moscow 2; University of 104, 221 f., 243, 337
motion 23, 195
motives 81
multi-valued logic 3

'Nasov' 294

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

necessity 47, 85, 89
negation of negation 24
neopositivism 56, 215, 230–242
neo-Thomism 16
neural activity 176
New Delhi 246
new man 176, 337
nihilism 234
nominalism 112
non-homogeneity 195 f.
nonsense 1
norms 126
nucleus 47

Objective dialectic 77, 214
objective idealism 215, 234, 239
objectivity 333
objects 210
ontology 3, 201, 304, 305, 325, 331
opinion, public 101
opposites 278 f., 330
order 283 f.
organic 284
'orgsov' 294
Orthodoxy 205, 217

Papacy 205
paradox 194
particles, elementary 38, 43 f., 337
party 179
party-mindedness 7, 8, 64, 109, 334
peaceful coexistence 75, 179, 337
pedagogy 93
person 55, 85, 102, 160, 203, 326, 337
personal contacts 322–324
phenomenology 7
philosophical congress 1
philosophy 108; Greek 111; historiography of 107 f., 309; history of 4, 27, 216; ideology and 5 f.; of physics 33 f., 307 f.; of science 3, 21; social 3; Soviet 301 f.
philosophers, Soviet 322–324
physical labor and mental 22
physics 3, 19, 23, 58, 191–201; philosophy of 33 f., 307 f.
physiology 176
plurality 200
Poland 299, 310 f.
policy, foreign 181
political knowledge 139
politics 137
positivism 215, 216
power-politics 4, 5, 53
practice 78 f., 85, 215, 240, 251 f.
pragmatism 57, 78, 234
process 210
production, relations of 244
progress 56, 207
proletariat 82
property 89, 331
protein 41
psycho-physical problem 3, 155
psychologism 214
psychology 3, 20, 59, 93, 152–156, 208, 209, 244, 308
public opinion 101
purpose 72

Quanta 191 f.
quantum mechanics 3, 59
quantum theory 41 f.
quotatology 2

Rational 240
reaction 99
reactions 154
realism 3, 71
reality 246
reason 327
reflection 80, 186
reformism 90
relation 331
relations of production 244
relative, absolute and 196
relativism 232
relativity 3
religion 57, 58, 85 f., 103, 124, 217, 239, 242, 275
Renaissance 111
research 294 f.
resonance-theory 39 f.
responsibility 94
reviews in Czekoslovakia 14 f.
revisionism 12, 58, 180, 235
revolution 151, 259 f.
Rjazan 244
Rome 59

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Royaumont 243
Russia 57

Scepticism 215
science 17, 56, 99, 105, 110, 159, 176, 230–242, 243; and ideology 18; philosophy of 3, 21; social 337
sciences 329
scientific atheism 205, 206, 217, 309
scientific Communism 22, 150–152, 160
scouts 98
self-criticism and criticism 148
semantics 22, 237
seminars 60
sensation 79, 188
sense 22, 239
senses 157
sensible 240
sensibility 188
signal system 189
Slovakia 14, 310
social being 26, 57, 85, 89, 101
social philosophy 3
social science 337
socialism 109; building of 19
socialist democracy 18
society 67, 156, 157, 284, 326, 328
sociology 3, 58, 232, 244, 337
soldier, Soviet 85
Soviet doctrine 64
Soviet logic 3, 303
Soviet man 86, 154, 203
Soviet philosophy 301 f.
Soviet philosophers 322–324
Soviet soldier 85
Soviet studies 1
Soviet youth 87
Sovietica 297 f.
Sovietology 1, 294 f.
sovpadenie 214–215
space and time 194
spiritualism 153
Stalinism 17
structure 192 f., 210
studies, Soviet 1
subjective dialectic 17, 214
subjective idealism 215, 237, 239
substance 46, 194, 335
superstructure 108
Sverdlovsk 337
Switzerland 294 f.
system, signal 189

Tambov 176
teachers 148
technology 16
terror 180
theater 57
theory 158; quantum 41 f.; resonance- 39 f.
thing 331
thought, Hindu 3
Tiflis 2
time, space and 194
totalitarianism 179 f.
totemism 219
translations 6, 114, 170–175
triangle 198
truth 16, 74, 125, 232, 237, 240
Twenty-First Congress 122, 238
Twenty-Second Congress 104, 148, 150, 207, 322, 337
typology 153

USA 40, 88, 232, 233
Učenye zapiski 149
unity 212, 280 f.
universities 1
University of Leningrad 104, 220 f.
University of Moscow 104, 221 f., 243, 337
Urals 244

Values 90, 124
verification 22, 362
Voprosy filosofii 116

War 58, 90, 100, 179, 217
Washington D.C. 105
Weltanschauung 89, 104
work 88, 95, 105
world 23
World War II 98, 217
worship, ancestor- 218

Youth 203; Soviet 87

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME III (1963)

ARTICLES

BALLESTREM, K. G.: Soviet Historiography of Philosophy 107–120
BLAKELEY, T. J.: Marxism-Leninism in High School 139–147
– : Un problème central de l'épistémologie soviétique 184–190
BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.: Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy? 1–10
– : Research in Soviet Philosophy at the Fribourg Institute of East-European Studies 1958–1963 294–321
BUCHHOLZ, A.: Thesen zur geistigen Problematik des Zukunftskommunismus 134–138
DE GEORGE, R. T.: The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics 121–133
FLEISCHER, H.: Der Kern der materialistischen Dialektik 278–293
LOBKOWICZ, N.: Philosophy in Czechoslovakia Since 1960 11–32
LÖWENTHAL, R.: The Role of Ideology for the Self-Preservation of a Totalitarian Regime 179–183
MAO TSE-TUNG: On Dialectical Materialism. A Fragment 270–277
MÜLLER-MARKUS, S.: Zur sowjetischen Philosophie der Physik im Jahre 1962 33–52
– : V. P. Branskij: Die philosophische Bedeutung des Anschaulichkeitsproblems in der modernen Physik 191–201
WITTFOGEL, K. A.: Some Remarks on Mao's Handling of Concepts and Problems of Dialectics 251–269
NOTES AND COMMENTS 53–60; 148–161; 202–209; 322–329

REVIEWS

BALLESTREM, K. G.: Nikolaus Lobkowicz: 'Materialism and Matter in Marxism-Leninism' 335–336
BLAKELEY, T. J.: P. V. Kopnin: Dialektika kak logika 73
– : V. I. Čerkesov: Materialističeskaja dialektika kak logika i teorija poznanija 74–76
– : M. N. Alekseev: Dialektičeskaja logika 76–78
– : M. N. Rutkevič: Praktika – osnova poznanija i kriterij istiny

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

and A. N. Iliadi: Praktičeskaja priroda čelovečeskogo poznanija 78–80
BLAKELEY, T. J.: Dialektika i logika. Zakony myšlenija 162–165
– : Dialektika i logika. Formy myšlenija 165–166
– : M. M. Rozental': Principy dialektičeskoj logiki 167–168
– : D. P. Gorskij: Voprosy abstrakcii i obrazovanie ponjatij and G. A. Gevorkjan: O roli abstrakcii v poznanii and V. T. Pavlov: Otnošenie meždu ponjatijami 168–169
– : A. X. Kasymžanov: Problema sovpadenija dialektiki, logiki i teorii poznanija 214–215
– : Ju. P. Mixalenko: Filosofija D. Juma – teoretičeskaja osnova anglijskogo pozitivizma XX veka and A. I. Korneeva: Kritika neopozitivistskix vzgljadov na prirodu poznanija 215–216
– : A. F. Begiašvili: Metod analiza v sovremennoj buržuaznoj filosofii 216–217
– : Kritika religioznoj ideologii and Istorija i teorija ateizma and Filosofskie problemy ateizma 217–219
BOCHEŃSKI, J. M.: Gustav A. Wetter: Sowjetideologie heute. I. 61–66
DEGEORGE, R. T.: Eugene Kamenka: The Ethical Foundations of Marxism 81–82
FLEISCHER, H.: A. S. Bogomolov: Ideja razvitija v buržuaznoj filosofii XIX v XX vekov 67–71
– : Nekotorye voprosy dialektičeskogo materializma 71–72
– : V. I. Sviderskij: O dialektike élementov i struktury v ob"ektivnom mire i v poznanii 210–213
– : V. P. Čertkov: Jadro dialektiki 330–331
– : A. I. Uëmov: Vešči, svojstva i otnošenija 331–332
VRTAČIČ, L.: Branko Bošnjak: Povijest filozofije kao nauka. Problem metodologije i predmeta 333–334

BIOGRAPHY

BEEMANS, P. J.: Biographical Data on Soviet Philosophers. I. 220–229

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BALLESTREM, K. G.: Bibliography of Soviet Historiography of Philosophy: Editions in Russian Translation 170–175

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BOESELAGER, W. F.: Recent Soviet Works on Neopositivism 230–242
DEGEORGE, R. T.: A Bibliography of Soviet Ethics 83–103

CHRONOLOGY

1961, 1962 104–105
1962 176
1962, 1963 243–244
1963 337

REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE 106; 245-247; 338

This content downloaded from 146.201.32.11 on Tue, 20 Sep 2016 01:02:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms